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ABSTRACT
COMPUTER SIMULATION OF A NEUROLOGICAL MODEL OF LEARNING
by
Samuel Donald Houtman
A number of problems in psychology and neurology are discussed to 
orient the reader to a theory of neural integration. The impor­
tance is stressed of the comprehensive temporal and spatial inte­
gration of sensory, motor and motivational aspects of brain function. 
It is argued that an extended neural template theory could provide 
such an integration.
Contemporary solutions to the problem of neural integration are 
discussed. The available knowledge concerning the structure of 
neural tissue leads to the description of a theory of neural inte­
gration which might provide such neural templates. Integrating 
Neurons are suggested to be organised in columns or pools. Sub­
sets of Neurons are formed as a result of excitation and can pre­
ferentially exchange excitation. These sub-sets or Linked 
Constellations would act as spatial templates to be matched with 
subsequent states of excitation. Inhibition acts to restrict spike 
emission to the most highly activated sub-sets.
An initial computer simulation represented a simple learning or 
classical conditioning situation. In a variety of test computer 
runs the performance confirmed the main predictions of the theor­
etical model.
The model was then extended to include representation of instru­
mental, consummatory, motivational and other aspects of behaviour.
The intention of these further simulations was not to demonstrate 
the predictions of prior formulations but rather to use the com­
puter to develop simulations progressively able to represent 
behaviour.
Difficulties were encountered which were remedied by incorporating 
rhythmic mechanisms. A number of different versions of the model 
were explored. It was shown that the models could be trained to 
produced a different response to discriminative cues, when those cues 
had previously signalled different contingencies of obtaining the 
opportunity to perform consummatory behaviour.
A published experiment on the Spiral Illusion is reported, which con­
firmed predictions suggested by the model.
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CHAPTER 1
BRAIN MODELS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING BRAIN
FUNCTION
I Introduction
The idea that there is some special principle or discovery which would 
enable the working of the brain to be understood goes back to antiquity 
and continues to the present day in such models as those of Pribram 
(1971), Marr (19 70), Hendrickson (1972), Mark (1974), Kilmer and Olinski 
(1974), Stanley and Kilmer (1975), Mcllwain (1979) and many others.
Over the years, however, the contribution which such a model can make 
towards the understanding of the brain has come to be seen in a truer 
perspective. Especially during the past twenty years, there has been an 
explosion of knowledge and technique in the disciplines surrounding the 
problem. These include advances as diverse as the development of the 
electron microscope, the placement of intra-cellular electrodes, com­
puter analysis of the EEG, and, perhaps most remarkable of all, the 
elucidation of biochemical and hormonal processes. The result has been 
an enormous increase in the understanding of the physiology, anatomy, 
histology and biochemistry of the brain. Associated with these advances 
there has been an expansion of experiments correlating lesions, pharmaco­
logical procedures and electrical stimulation with behavioural changes. 
Psychological experiments designed to tease out the factors affecting 
behaviour have also grown in sophistication and refinement of technique.
In a more abstract context, the disciplines of communication and control 
theory, and of the logical aspects of computer programming known as 
Artificial Intelligence, have supplied models of the kind of processing 
a nervous system might perform in order to account for the ability of 
the animal to discriminate gestalt patterns and to seek out natural 
goals. In this latter respect, the concept of the feed-back from the 
environment as an essential part of a closed control loop (Wiener, 1949) 
has greatly modified earlier notions of stimulus-response relationships 
(Oatley, 19 78) .
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These advances have led to a richer and deeper understanding of brain 
function than could have been foreseen half a century ago. The brain 
model has played a part in that progress. It is perhaps mostly through 
brain models that many principles have been elucidated which enable us 
to understand how intelligent functions might be mediated by systems of 
neurons. One may perhaps mention, as example, the work of Uttley (1956, 
1959) in demonstrating how simple neural arrangements might represent 
conditional probability and temporal sequence, as for example in the 
notes of a melody.
Hebb resolved one of the apparent paradoxes : the apparent diffuse neural 
processes accompanying mental activity, of which increasing evidence was 
coming from Adrian (1941, 1947), and the precise patterning of neural 
events required at the periphery to execute behaviour.
Konorski (1967) has shown how intricate and apparently paradoxical 
features of behaviour can be brought under a unified concept by consid­
ering a system in terms of opposing motivational forces, rather than 
the presence or absence of a single force, as for example, his postula­
tion of opposing Food and Hunger reflexes. His work followed Anokhin 
,(1961) who broadened the concept of the conditioned reflex by introducing 
the notion of an acceptor of action which would cause discordance in 
the case of the return afferentation not matching its requirements.
In proposing another such model based upon a special principle, the 
author hopes that it may make a contribution of this kind to the general 
understanding of the working of the brain. The principle is that of a 
distributed diffuse system. It is, of course, not suggested that the 
brain can only be understood by reference to this principle, but rather 
that it is an explanatory principle of some power. The position at 
the present stage of neuroscience may perhaps be similar to that in 
physics when both a particle theory and a wave theory seemed to be re­
quired to explain light. The hierarchical network systems have received 
considerable representation in computer simulations, and it seems reason­
able to see what can be done with a different kind of theory.
There is a second motive in undertaking a project of the present kind. 
With the rapid development of the digital computer, there is the possi­
bility of constructing more complex and realistic working models than 
has previously been possible. Man has always been fascinated with making
19
models which exhibit life-like characteristics. This applies not only 
to the mechanical models of former centuries and to present day robots, 
but also to models like Grey Walter's Speculatrix (Walter, 195 3) which 
exhibit some fundamental resemblances of principle with living things 
ratlier than a mere superficial imitation.
In pursuing this second aim of the project, the intention is to try to 
demonstrate that the model is capable of producing behaviour. As Oatley 
(1978) stresses, this is one of the cardinal requirements of theories 
of brain function. The more that the behaviour one is able to produce 
resembles that of animals, not superficially but in the principles 
which our new-found insights have given us, the more confidence we may 
have that the model is telling us something about the function of the 
brain. On the neurological side, the more resemblance we find between 
what is known of neural function, and the processes we find in the model, 
the greater our hope that, even if it does not in itself approximate a 
solution, at least by exposing the deficiencies of the model, it will 
lead us to see what is wrong with our ideas.
Accordingly, I would like to stress that I am not proposing that the 
solutions incorporated in the model, whether of a general kind or 
detailed mechanisms, represent what actually happens in the brain.
Having a conviction that the general organising principle proposed 
possesses explanatory value, I have attempted to take the model stage 
by stage to generate behaviour of a more convincing kind. Each stage 
has presented a number of theoretical difficulties, many of them unfore­
seen. The solution chosen in each case has seemed to me the one most 
likely to take the model a stage further. Wherever possible, I have 
tried to select the solution most in accordance with the behavioural 
and neurological evidence. That was not always possible, for practical 
reasons of computing, and also because it would have meant diverting 
resources to simulate well known and irrelevant aspects of physiology. 
Nevertheless, it is hoped that the resulting model will be found not to 
be unlike the brain in its general structure and in the physiology 
represented.
From what has been said, it will be appreciated that I am aware that my 
model is wrong in many respects of general principle. It is certainly 
wrong in detail. However, the difficulties I have experienced in 
taking a model to the stage of producing behaviour in terms of neurons 
are possibly universal. The areas of difficulty present a list of
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criteria which we might at least apply to other brain models. Have 
they at least solved these problems in a working simulation.
In many cases, the difficulties concern the control of physiological 
variables in the model; these problems suggest questions which neuro­
physiologists might wish to comment upon.
It was hoped that the present project would lead to a more realistic 
model of the brain in both neuro-anatomical and behavioural terms than 
has actually been achieved. The author found that this aim has been 
very much more demanding than envisaged, both in computing resources 
and in time. Furthermore, the finding of solutions to unforeseen prob­
lems in moving towards a more realistic model, e.g. brain (EEG) rhythms, 
has been far more difficult than was expected. The model as at present 
simulated does, however, represent a small step in that direction. 
Further simulations are planned, and it is hoped that the present 
effort does show the possibility of development in the direction of a 
more realistic model of a nervous system, given greater concentration 
of resources.
II The problem of neural integration
Richard Mark (1974) after summarising "all that is known in principle 
about the physiology of the brain", concludes that "somewhere in such 
a system is lying undetected a mechanism of modification of some aspect 
of brain function that can permanently alter the way it works. The 
result of one fleeting experience is instantly recorded and remains a 
potent influence for a lifetime of up to a hundred years".
However, it seems doubtful whether the discovery of a particular mech­
anism of neuronal alteration would in itself tell us much that we wish 
to know about the way the brain accomplishes its purposes. We need also 
to know the principle by which the brain is organised. The two questions 
may be closely related. For example, in Mark's own proposal, the modifi­
cation is suggested to be a selective suppression of initially profuse 
connections. This is by way of being a principle rather than a mechanism, 
There are also different levels of principle; neither of the two examples 
given explain in themselves how the brain mediates behaviour. Moreover, 
principle is not always separable from mechanism as in Mcllwain's
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proposal that neuronal patterns of discharge may reproduce previously 
imposed patterns converging from several inputs (Mcllwain, 1979). 
Neuronal mechanisms and their relationship with organising principles 
will be discussed further in Chapter 4.
Whatever this hidden mechanism or principle is taken to be, the problem 
which faces the model is to be able to demonstrate to some degree at 
least that it is able to explain the working of the brain. So in effect 
the problem to be solved by a brain model is to encompass the entire 
sum of neurological and psychological knowledge available at the time. 
For this reason the presentation of brain models has tended to fall 
under one of two approaches. It has often taken the form of a synthesis 
of existing knowledge, e.g. Pribram (1971); Konorski (1957). An oppo­
site approach, especially in the field of computer simulations, has been 
to design the model as an expression of principle, and to leave its 
application to problems of behaviour to the reader, e.g. Kilmer and 
Olinski (19 74); Rosenblatt (1958).
The present project differs from either of these approaches. The theory 
of neural integration, as initially conceived, is presented in the form 
of a computer simulation which is intended to demonstrate its basic 
characteristics. Progressive attempts are then made to extend the 
model so as to enable it to produce behaviour approximating closer to 
that of animals. In doing so, advantage is taken of the data available 
from contemporary psychology, neurology and other relevant disciplines. 
Unlike many other simulations of neurological models, the later versions 
of the model presented here do not comprise a computer simulation of a 
system which is theoretically designed beforehand. The computer simu­
lations are themselves a tool which enables the basic theory of neural 
integration to be developed further towards a model which bears a closer 
resemblance to nervous systems. Working in this way, one cannot say 
that the model actually reflects the working of the brain either in gen­
eral principle or in detail. One can, however, note the resemblances 
between the model and its subject in structure and function, and one 
can assume that where the model is able to reproduce some aspect of 
animal-like behaviour, it at least sheds light on that behaviour.
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III Thesis outline
In the next two chapters some attempt will be made to orient the 
reader to the psychological approach of the present model. Chapter 4 
deals with solutions provided by some other neurological models, and 
tries to classify them in terms of main principles of operation. This 
will give some background to the present attempt.
Chapter 5 outlines in broad neurological terms the main concepts of 
my model. Subsequent chapters describe the simulation of a simple 
version of the model and its performance, exhibiting the basic charac­
teristics of the theory of neural integration. Mark (19 74) in a brief 
but wide-ranging survey of contemporary knowledge of the brain, lists 
a number of features which a neurological model might be expected to 
clarify. These are Pavlovian Conditioning, Operant Conditioning and 
latent learning. On the neurological side he draws attention to space 
codes, time codes and overall organisation. In a simple presentation 
of a neurological model, these would appear to be the priorities, and 
the simulations presented are oriented towards the demonstration of 
behaviour in simple conditioning situations. This is not intended to 
convey a stimulus-response view of brain function, but rather the 
demonstration that a more holistic view of brain function can demon­
strate the kind of behaviour seen in simple stimulus-response 
situations.
Chapter 10 serves the dual purpose of introducing a set of more advanced 
simulations of the model and of considering further some other models 
in the literature which were only briefly touched upon in the opening 
chapters. In subsequent chapters, the extended simulations are des­
cribed and their performance reported. Chapter 15 relates some signi­
ficant problems encountered in the development of the model. These 
problems were solved by the introduction of rhythmic mechanisms. The 
functions which such rhythms might serve in the theoretical model are 
discussed.
Chapter 15 reports a separate simulation intended to demonstrate that 
the basic proposal of the theory, the formation of neural templates 
termed Linked Constellations, could be mediated by orthodox synaptic 
connections obeying simple rules of connectivity. In Chapter 17 a 
short report of the computer programming is given. This is followed 
by an account of some further simulations which were in the course of
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investigation at the cessation of the work. These programs were 
intended to extend the mechanisms used in earlier simulations to 
show how temporal sequences requiring a number of successive instru­
mental actions might be organised- Although definite demonstrations 
were not obtained from these programs, they may be of interest in 
pointing to the manner in which the model might eventually be able 
to represent more advanced behaviour.
An experiment was carried out to confirm predictions suggested by 
the theoretical model in relation to the Spiral Illusion. This is 
discussed in Chapter 18.
The concluding chapter briefly reviews the work carried out.
Simulations are described which are in the course of investigation. 
These programs extend the mechanisms used in earlier simulations to 
show how temporal sequences requiring a number of successive instru­
mental actions might be organised to exhibit purposive behaviour. 
Although at the time of writing definite demonstrations of these capa^r 
cities have not been achieved, an account of these programs points to 
the manner in which the application of an appropriate theory of neural 
integration might be extended so that the more life-like attributes of 
brain function may emerge.
IV Terminology
In general the terms used in this thesis are not intended to carry any 
theoretical import. Where they are intended to do so, their theoret­
ical significance will be specifically stated: otherwise they are 
merely used as convenient terms of reference to well known aspects of 
behaviour or neuro-physiology. For example, the terms Action and 
Response are used interchangeably to refer to the actual physical move­
ments made by animals or notionally by the model. It is not intended 
to imply that they are released by some direct Stimulus-Response con­
nection. Similarly, the term stimulus is often employed to refer to a 
particular permutation of the states of the receptor organs of the 
animal, or to the notional representation of a state by an Input Pattern 
of the model. Some of the aspects of the model have been given rather 
inappropriate terms. This has been principally to distinguish them 
from other parts of the model which might otherwise have been confused.
24
The aim of these labels has been mainly to avoid the necessity to in­
clude long specification phrases within a sentence. The author would 
apologise if they impose a burden on the reader to remember to which 
aspects of the model a term refers.
25
CHAPTER 2
SOME PROBLEMS OF NEURAL INTEGRATION: PATTERN RECOGNITION AND
PERCEPTION
Introduction
This chapter discusses a number of aspects of pattern recognition 
and perception. The aim is to make some points which will assist 
in orienting the reader towards the model to be presented. These 
points may be briefly summarised as:
(i) Pattern recognition as an aspect of animal perception is insep- 
erable from the organisation of action. Accordingly a general 
model of neural integration should establish the main principle 
of motor organisation before tackling pattern recognition.
(ii) Temporal organisation of schemata is an important challenge to 
theories.
(iii) An enrichment model based upon a sophisticated template match­
ing system has greater potentiality than has generally been 
credited to it.
II The problem of pattern recognition
It should perhaps be stated immediately that the simulations presented 
in this thesis do not provide a gestalt pattern recognition apparatus.
It is not that the theory of neural integration upon which tlie simula­
tions are based would not probably support such an apparatus. It is 
rather a question of priorities, as to what it is necessary to demonstrate 
in a model of neural integration before one tackles what seems to me a 
more challenging task, that of taking pattern recognition and perception 
a stage further than is offered by models already available. Possible 
ways of mediating the recognition of static gestalt patterns are no 
longer a mystery. Many artefactual devices are capable of doing so with 
a high degree of efficiency. What does not appear to have been clarified
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to the same degree is the manner in which the animal integrates his 
pattern recognition capabilities to perceive a world of objects.
Many authors have assumed that the primary problem to be solved by a 
brain model is a demonstration of gestalt pattern recognition. This 
was probably justified before certain fundamental aspects of pattern 
recognition had been elucidated, as, for example, by Rosenblatt's 
Perceptron (1958) described in Chapter 4. Pattern recognition as an 
aspect of animal perception is, however, a function of basic capacities 
of neural integration, namely, feature analysis, sequential ordering, 
sensori-motor co-ordination and the ability to make appropriate selec­
tion from total input. By concentrating upon the static image, pattern 
recognition devices may miss clues to the general integrative properites 
of nervous systems. It is upon these general properties that the 
futher understanding of perception depends. Accordingly the strategy 
taken here is that the solution of basic sensori-motor functions should 
precede an attempt to further the understanding of pattern recognition.
An indiscriminate use of the term "pattern" has been criticised recently 
(Uttal, 19 73). Generally in this thesis, the use will be that which 
implies least theoretical commitment. Pattern will be used simply to 
refer to a particular permutation of the states of a set of elements or 
fibres. A different use of "pattern" is implied in references to 
pattern recognition models, and will generally apply in the present 
chapter. Pattern in the latter usage implies a perceptual equivalence 
between certain different states of a set of elements, e.g. an 
equivalence enabling various forms of the letter 'A' to be recognised.
The term gestalt pattern will be used as a convenient shorthand when­
ever there is likely to be ambiguity.
The strength of a demonstration of pattern recognition lies in the 
accomplishment of a task which seems to contain the essentials of human 
intelligence. Sutherland (1968) gives a list of twelve aspects of 
pattern recognition which illustrate this: (i) size variance; (ii) posi­
tion variance; (iii) brightness variance; (ivj equivalence of outline 
and filled shapes ; (v) lack of invariance' under most rotations;
(vi) confusions of pattern; (vii) disregard of jitter; (viii) segmenta­
tion; (ix) Man's recognition of complex scenes without recognition of 
detail; (x) perceptual learning; (xi) utilisation of redundancy;
(xii) consistency with physiological evidence. The list is impressive.
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One might perhaps add the capacity to recognise pattern under conditions 
of fragmentary and degenerate information. However, as models of the 
integrative activity of the brain, pattern recognition models have a 
number of weaknesses. A few words only will be given on some main points.
(1) Without any substantial exceptions, simulations of pattern recogni­
tion have theoretical gaps in the story of neural integration. In 
particular, certain models which have had a considerable influence on 
theories of neural integration specify a "reinforcement line" or 
"teaching input" (e.g. Selfridge's Pandemonium; Rosenblatt's Perceptron; 
see Chapter 4). Such inputs represent the feed-back from the environment.
However, the source of the information in such a teaching input is
external to the pattern recognition apparatus and its explanation in 
neural terms is missing. The assumption implicit in such models is that 
the theoretical gap is either irrelevant or trivial to the task of pattern 
recognition. The animal presumably takes action following its discrimina­
tion of pattern, and the reinforcement line represents the action of the 
environment on the animal, favourable or unfavourable. Such an assump­
tion may be justified for the model as a pattern recognition device, but 
not as suggesting a general model of neural integration.
The question of how a model can assess the results of its behaviour as
appropriate is by no means as simple as it seems. Even if it is seen 
simply as a matter of, say, obtaining food or not, the means of neural 
integration by which this assessment reaches the pattern recognition 
apparatus as the state of a reinforcement line is far from clear. More 
significantly, it seems fairly certain that neither animals nor Man 
learn to discriminate patterns by receiving direct physiological rein­
forcement such as food after each successful discrimination. Rather 
their recognition of pattern seems to be an essential part of their inter­
action with their environment, including activities which are remote from 
the receiving of physiological rewards and punishments.
In respect of reinforcement, a pattern recognition model faces a harder 
task than general models of neural integration. A model of say, 
classical conditioning, might incorporate a mechanism of physiological 
reinforcement, and that would be logically acceptable. Pattern recog­
nition seems implausible in terms of such reinforcement. Even secondary 
reinforcement does not answer the difficulty. Many patterns in a 
sequence of behaviour deriving its organisation in secondary reinforcement
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terms from a single physiological event, say, eating, would not be 
equivalent in a gestalt sense. On the contrary, due to eye-movements, 
many of the retinal images which result even from the inspection of 
a single object, are clearly not equivalent, in a gestalt sense.
This difficulty clearly does not apply to pattern recognition models 
which are inherently capable of discriminating pattern. An early model 
of this kind is useful as illustrating the type of neural arrangement 
which might fit in with many theories of neural integration. Pitts and 
McCulloch (1947) suggested that the structure of the cortex, as a series 
of columns crossed by oblique fibres, would enable transformations of an 
image to be scanned (Figure 2.1). Undoubtedly the authors did not 
intend to propose a general explanation of neural integration, as it 
was presented as only part of their general argument about "How we know 
Universais". The model was simulated as a physical device which could 
read print of varying size and type-face (Figure 2.2). The principle 
of the model is a simple but powerful one, especially as its mode of 
neural implementation is so clear. The model fits in especialjq^ well 
with my model, because my model is based upon the columnar structure of 
the cortex also. However, such direct neural arrangements are not the 
only way in which geometrical transformations might be mediated, as 
will be discussed in the following section.
(2) "Computer models almost invariably neglect whole classes of 
evidence - usually behavioural - which should be taken into account ..." 
(Dodwell, 1970) . Three examples are contextual information, sensory 
analysers and temporal sequential sensori-motor integration. Rosenblatt's 
Perceptron does not employ sensory analysers, whilst Selfridge's 
Pandemonium employs feature detection, analogical to sensory analysers, 
but does not employ sensori-motor integration. Neither uses contextual 
information. The omission of known features of animal performance and 
processing does not, of course, detract from these models as illustra­
tions of a particular principle which may or may not operate in the 
nervous system. What it does suggest is that the models do not repre­
sent neural integration as it operates to mediate pattern recognition 
in the living animal, because animals appear to rely extensively upon 
other mechanisms. Eye-movements, for example, are an intimate part of 
the perceptual activity of mammals (see Section III (ivj).
Aside from its involvement in perception, sensori-motor integration is 
an important aspect of neural integration. The absence of a detailed
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formulation of motor organisation in pattern recognition models 
accordingly leaves a considerable gap in such models. This absence 
has been noted by a number of workers. In particular, Kilmer and his 
associates produced several simulated models (Kilmer, McCulloch, Blum, 
Craighill and Peterson, 1968; Kilmer and Olinski, 1974) which applied 
principles of neural organisation similar to those proposed by 
Rosenblatt and Selfridge to control notional motor actions. Such 
motor responses are however mere names for the output. The structure 
and organisation of motor action in relation to the environment, e.g. 
appetitive and consummatory behaviour, is not differentiated. Nor is 
any neural structure or organisation represented which would discrimi­
nate the significance of the feed-back from such motor action.
Consequently the relationship between motor behaviour and perception 
remains at the most abstract level. These models will be further 
described in Chapter 4.
Pitts and McCulloch (1947) supplemented the pattern recognition model 
mentioned earlier with a neurological model of the Superior Colliculi 
which would control eye muscles to converge upon a luminance centre of 
gravity. This was a step towards the neural representation of those 
motor actions which assist perception in bringing the retinal image to 
a standard position on the retina, what Neisser (1967) calls normalising 
processes. However, the perceptual implications of sensori-motor 
integration would appear to go considerably beyond normalising procedures 
(see Gibson, 1968) .
(3) Many models which put forward an interesting principle do not 
qualify as general models of neural integration because they rely upon 
a single principle to the exclusion of others. Although the principle 
may enable pattern recognition to be effectively demonstrated, this only 
goes to show that pattern recognition is not a satisfactory test of a 
model of neural integration. For example, Rosenblatt's Perceptron 
gained tremendous support just because it was able to demonstrate a cap­
acity to discriminate gestalt patterns by a single principle of 
organisation, the feed-back modification of its connections. The principle 
was of major importance in an abstract theoretical sense. However, the 
fact that it could acheive its object without sensory analysers, temporal 
sequential processing, or any distinction between the effects of its 
actions on the environment except that they were successful or
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unsuccessful, suggests that the contribution of the basic principle to 
the actual pattern recognition of animals may well have been exagger­
ated.
Animal nervous systems enjoy a wealth of sensory analysis for contour, 
movement and colour. The feed-back from motor action can hardly be 
classified as simply successful or unsuccessful. Aside from the point 
made earlier, that such a classification would provide behavioural 
equivalence rather than gestalt equivalence, it does not take into 
account the qualitative learning which the animal gains from manipulat­
ing its environment. When we inspect an unfamiliar object, move our 
eyes or head, or reach out and examine it with our hands, what is it 
about the sensory feed-back which may be classed as success or failure?
(4) Feature analysers, sampling techniques and special codings play a 
large part in models of pattern recognition. Such arrangements are, 
however, equally possible under many different theoretical principles 
of neural integration. These particular aspects of neural organisation 
explain the chief items in Sutherland's list (above). Sutherland 
(1968) reports the ability of goldfish to respond to novel shapes pro­
jected upon different parts of the retina. He himself refers this 
capacity to special codings and feature analysers. It certainly seems 
possible that goldfish have an advanced visual analysing system. There 
are good reasons for believing that frogs have one (Lettvin, Maturana, 
McCulloch and Pitts, 1966). Octopus can recognise and discriminate 
horizontal and vertical shapes and co-ordinate its motor action accord­
ingly (Young, 1964). In an earlier model related to Octopus, Sutherland 
(1957) described a neural arrangement which coded the vertical and 
horizontal extent of figures. Corcoran (1971) comments; There is a 
very good relationship between the similarity of the coded patterns and 
the tendency of the animal to confuse shapes . . . but the crucial 
question of how the similarity between the various codes is computed is 
not answered". The point made here is that although these models con­
tribute to our understanding of the capacity of animals to recognise 
patterns, they do not provide models of neural integration.
(5) An important aspect of perception which is missing from pattern 
recognition models is the relationship of motor action to the geomet­
rical transformation of the retinal image (Gibson, 1968). The retinal
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projections of objects occupy successive positions on the retina as 
the object moves, and, perhaps more significantly, as the animal moves 
its head, eyes and body. The retinal images also change shape in a 
regular manner - circular objects present a series of ellipses, rectang­
ular objects, rhombuses. Many of these regular transformations relate 
to key shapes which are common to many objects. Given the registration 
of such transformations in conjunction with the motor actions which 
accompany them and in conjunction with their temporal relationships, 
the equivalence of retinal images under such transformations follows 
as a fundamental aspect of neural integration. The concept of an object 
would appear to be intimately concerned with the temporal sequential 
aspects of such geometrical transformations (cf. Piaget, 1954). From 
the recognition of the equivalence of different views of an object to 
the recognition of the equivalence of different transforms of the 
retinal image is a step. It may be a step which animals such as rats 
cannot take. Their pattern recognition appears to be more closely bound 
to the discrimination of objects: they are able to discriminate two 
patterns when these are objects, i.e. cues for jumping. To discriminate 
thirty six alpha-numeric characters may be difficult for them because 
they lack the capacity to know the different uses to which these thirty 
six objects can be put (see below).
(5) The ability to identify alpha-numeric characters was undoubtedly a 
considerable step forward in explaining intelligence in terms of the 
concepts of the physiological sciences. Man can, of course, do far 
more, but it is significant that in many respects animals can do far 
less. One would have thought that if the identification of alpha­
numeric characters could be accomplished by a simple arrangement of the 
nervous system containing simple feature analysers and feed-back 
adjustment of neuronal connections, then animals as highly developed 
as the rat, octopus or cat, could learn to do so quite easily. The 
inability of animals to do so must reduce the plausibility of a demon­
stration of pattern recognition as elucidating the basic principles of 
operation of the nervous system.
It is not suggested here that animals cannot recognise patterns of far 
greater complexity than alpha-numeric characters. Probably one of 
the difficulties is to get the animals to pay sufficient attention to 
the aspects of the pattern which are important for alpha-numeric 
identification. Reading books is not a frequently observed aspect of
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cat behaviour. This points to attentional aspects of pattern recogni­
tion. Anyway, there are no experiments reporting the ability of 
animals to be able to identify all 36 alpha-numeric characters. This 
is an easy task for many pattern recognition models. The patterns used 
by Lashley (Hinde,1970, p.89) for testing pattern discrimination in 
rats, although complex were either very different from each other, or 
relied upon the discrimination of two simple shapes within the presen­
tation, e.g. a cross or a triangle. Even so the animals were only 
required to discriminate between two of such patterns, not thirty six.
A related point is made by Neisser (19 76). According to the kind of 
explanation given for pattern recognition "the image that he supposedly 
looks at is upside down, foreshortened, and the wrong size . . . such a 
homunculus would have a few problems of his own . . . Many sophisticated 
theories have been advanced to explain how he might solve these problems, 
but real perceivers do not have them. We do not see retinal images, we 
see the real environment of objects and events . . .". Moreover, if 
the object is upside down, we may still recognise it but we also see 
that it is upside down. We do far more than equivalence retinal pat­
terns. We distinguish them at the same time.
In summary, the aim of this section has been to suggest that pattern 
recognition devices and principles enter into a description of the ner­
vous system only as part of a general sensori-motor-temporal integration. 
It is the latter which comprises the main subject matter for a theory of 
neural integration.
In the context of attempts to simulate brain models, the successful 
representation of pattern recognition undoubtedly contributed enormously 
to our understanding of psycho-neurological function. Criticisms of the 
shortcomings of such models has not been intended to detract from that 
contribution. It is intended rather to indicate that the stage has been 
reached when it is desirable to see pattern recognition in the setting 
of a more general neural integration incorporating temporal and motor 
aspects.
In Chapter 4 the contribution made by some of the models mentioned 
briefly in this chapter will be examined in further detail.
One of the aims of this section is to defend in advance the relatively
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simple performance of the simulations to be reported here against a 
possible expectancy that a simulation of a brain model must exhibit 
performance on a par with that of pattern recognition models.
Ill Templates and pattern recognition
Before leaving pattern recognition it may be helpful to the reader in 
following the later exposition of the present model, if we consider 
certain aspects of explanatory concepts used in pattern recognition 
theory, in particular the notion of a "simple template". The model to 
be presented here will probably be considered as a simple template 
theory. Most writers (e.g. Corcoran, 19 71) are rather scathing about 
template models. Neisser (1967) says "one must choose between elabor­
ating the template model considerably and abandoning it altogether . . , 
Hebb himself chose the second alternative". Although in other respects 
the present model may be seen as resembling Hebb's theory, this is one 
way in which it differs.
Pattern recognition theory may be somewhat loosely described in certain 
main ideas which appear in most models. Most of the models reject the 
template and substitute some kind of feature analysis as the first 
stage of the recognition process. Such feature analysers may perhaps 
themselves be characterised as (i) specific, (ii) random samples and 
(iii) sophisticated recognisers. Specific feature analysers are analo­
gous to the receptive fields discovered by Hubei and Wiese1. Random 
sampling appears in many models where the effect is to distinguish 
features (see Chapter 4). The statistical implications of random samp­
ling were developed by Rosenblatt into his theory of Separability 
(1958b). Selfridge's Pandemonium combines the notion of discrimina- 
bility and feature analysis, by suggesting feature analysers which com­
pete with each other and which are changed to achieve optimum discrimi­
nation. Sophisticated feature analysers are those which distinguish 
features which are closer to perceptual aspects of gestalt patterns, 
e.g. legs and arms of numbers and letters.
This point will not be pursued here. It is merely intended to show 
that a template process may be elaborated in quite simple ways to em­
brace the chief assumptions of pattern recognition.
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Figure 2.3 (Reproduced from Neisser, 19G7) The customary criticism 
brought against template theories.
36
The simple template model is illustrated by Neisser (1967), reproduced 
here as Figure 2.3. It may be elaborated as follows;
(i) Coded templates
Templates need not represent complete isomorphic projections of the 
retinal patterns. The simplest feature analysers may be seen as 
simple templates reproducing fragments of gestalt patterns. These 
templates may be duplicated across the retinal field. For example, 
the line oriented receptive fields of Hubei and Wiesel (1959) . A 
template with greater abstractive powers would be one taking a 
smaller number of inputs, say, one where the input to a particular 
location on the array represented the appearance of a line of a par­
ticular orientation anywhere on the retina, i.e. where a neuron fires 
whenever one or more of the line oriented receptive fields for one 
particular direction is fired anywhere in the system. A template 
with generalising capacity would be useful, e.g. where a neuron 
fires when any receptive field oriented within say, 15 degrees of the 
optic horizon is activated. These are illustrated in Figure 2.4.
The foregoing is of course merely a manner of expressing the well 
known principles of feature analyser function. By expressing these 
principles in simple template terms, it is hoped to remove the presump­
tion that the presence of feature analysers implies some kind of hier­
archical organisation of the nervous system. The present model can 
elaborate such templates without convergent-divergent neural circuits. 
There is a hierarchy of templates in the systems analysis sense but 
not in the neurological sense.
A simple template model is not an alternative to a feature analysis 
model. It is one way of mediating feature analysers.
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(ii) Variety of codings: attention
Most models of pattern recognition explore the potentialities of one 
particular scheme of coding e.g. angles, lines, or some general samp­
ling and weighting principle. Selfridge's Pandemonium suggests that 
there are arrays of feature analysers, and these can be altered. In 
template terms, there may be a multiplication of templates against 
which the retinal image or parts of it are matched. With any partic­
ular input pattern there will be matching in some of these templates 
and not others. We are not here referring to the matching of templates 
to the input pattern within a particular category of templates, but 
the fact that a matching may be found in one template category, say 
orientation of lines, and not in another, say colour patches. For 
example, two images of A in two different retinal positions will show 
a matching in the line orientation template system but not in the 
simple isomorphic template system. What gave Selfridge's system its 
power was that it could choose between different codings, according to 
which set of "demons" shouted the loudest. What is perhaps not so 
easily seen is that the template system offers a very simple way of 
doing the same thing; its simple neurological implementation may 
point to a fundamental mechanism of attention. If we imagine an array 
of templates with separate cortical locations for each category of 
encoding, it is a relatively simple matter to visualise how each match­
ing may demand "attention" according to the degree of matching it finds 
within its own library of templates. These matchings within each cat­
egory may conflict or confirm matchings in other categories. Such 
conflicts and confirmations may decide the particular matching which is 
selected in each category. A matching in the colour library of an 
input which may coincide with that of many grey, white or blue objects 
previously encountered, may be accompanied by a matching in the line 
orientation library of a circular image. To see how this combination 
of template matching may be used to discriminate against oranges, grey 
flags or circular dinner plates, or billiard balls, one must assume 
that the results of the two or more template matchings can be combined 
in some way. This combination is also often assumed to be necessarily 
hierarchically organised. To show that it can be seen in template form 
is the next step.
(iii) An extended template
Template systems are usually conceived as operating within self-contained
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categories and self-contained sensory modalities. Generally in pattern 
recognition, the template analogy is only used of isomorphic images, 
anyway, but the idea may be extended, as suggested, to include templates 
which match particular sensory analyses. Each feature analysis category 
say, line orientation, colour, movement, would have its own separate 
match-mismatch process, but would be part of an attempt of find the best 
match for the whole of the extended template. In my proposed model, the 
principle will be extended to a single template containing the projec­
tions of all the sensory and motor modalities, including the projections 
of all innately organised feature analysers. We need not consider here 
how such a template is neurally organised: this is the function of the 
neurological theory to be presented. What is important is that the 
extended template should be able to find the best matching over its 
entire span.
With such a template system it may be seen how a tennis ball may be 
distinguished from an orange. If there is a template of a tennis ball 
with grey or white in the "colour" section, and "circular" in say a 
line orientation section, it will be selected in favour of templates of 
either oranges or grey-white rats, as the templates of such discrimi­
nated objects will not be matched in both sections.
It is perhaps not so easy to see how a template system would explain 
the interpretation of a particular wavelength of light as "grey" on 
some occasions and "white" on others. Such an explanation depends upon 
a schematic, contextual and temporal organisation of templates which it 
would be premature to call upon at this stage. It may be sufficient to 
stress the argument of the previous section. Perceptual problems 
require to be discussed in a system of neural integration in which the 
main problems or organisation have been solved, and in which accordingly, 
temporal sequential and contextual information may be utilised.
That the neural implementation of the visual system may conform to a 
template system is reported by some contemporary research. According 
to Bazier, Robinson and Dow (1977), colour, orientation, spot cells, 
light inhibited cells and border cells occupy separate populations in 
area 18 of monkey striate cortex. "The findings that different pop­
ulations of cells in areas 17 and 18 are maximally sensitive to different 
stimulus parameters implies that, at least at this stage in visual 
processing, the neural representation of visual stimuli is accomplished 
through the simultaneous activity of cells in different groups rather
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than through the activities of single cells with compound specifities". 
The utilisation of simultaneous activity in spatially dispersed cells 
implies a template concept. Singer and Tretter (19 76) interpret the 
results of their own experiments in a similar manner: "It rather 
appears as if the predetermined circuitry of striate cortex allows for 
interactive processes between fairly distant pattern elements". In 
the template concept, a particular "colour" receptive neuron may not 
fire simply because it is excited by an afferent fibre which is active 
when a particular wavelength falls on the retina. Its firing may be 
partly dependent upon the matching of other aspects of the retinal 
image occurring in other parts of the template. A template implies 
both a functional separation of elements and an interaction between 
them.
The variation of weightings which gives Selfridge's model its power 
may have its counterpart in neural terms with a simple variation of 
the effective excitation sent to different locations; or even to sel­
ected fibre systems within a location (see item (v) ) . One may envisage 
a display of template categories extended across the cortex. If 
these separate categorial locations were illuminated by separate lamps 
which might be extinguished individually or in combinations, it will 
be clear that even an on-off system offers a considerable degree of 
"attentional" flexibility. The whole display may be illuminated as a 
giant template, or certain parts only, effectively reducing the size 
of the template matching. (Figure 2.5).
(iv) Sensori-motor representation
The template may include the representation of motor actions. It will 
in fact be proposed that this is the manner in which sensory and motor 
aspects of events are integrated. Assume that a figure is first fixated 
in its centre. A left-hand saccade brings a new input to be matdied 
to previous inputs following a left hand saccade. A right hand saccade 
then produces another input to be matched. Let us suppose that the 
system of establishing neural templates includes a representation of 
the actions taken just before and just after the sensory input. Then 
when we fixate the centre of say, a triangle, a left hand eye-movement 
will result in a selection of all those templates containing both a 
certain kind of angle and a left-hand saccade. Similarly saccades 
will serve to bind bundles of templates into schemata. The similarity 
will have been noted with Hebb's account of the perception of a tringle
42
and with his postulation of phase sequences (Hebb, 1949).
(v) Superimposition of templates
Templates within a single modality need not require separate cortical 
locations, although it seems probable from the researches of Bazier, 
Robinson and Dow, and of Singer and Tretter, cited above, that they 
are organised separately. Topological mapping of sense organs onto 
cortex would be uneconomical^/ used if each sub-cortical encoding had 
to be separately mapped onto a different projection location. Fibres 
from a particular sensory location but carrying different information 
might map into neighbouring points on the cortex. Different analyses 
of the stimulus, for example, for line orientation and movement, may 
be seen as separate templates sharing approximate spatial co-ordinates 
but separately registering coincidences of either line orientation or 
movement. An analogy would be the three-colour screen of a television 
tube, in which each small point is actually made up of three light- 
sensitive phosphors. Although functionally separate, the juxtaposi­
tion of different "feature detectors" would enable several template 
systems to be packed into the same single topographical mapping.
Nor need local hierarchical network arrangements be entirely excluded 
from the scheme. Templates matching conjunctions of simpler feature 
detectors, e.g. line orientation and movement might be mediated by 
convergences from two of these superimposed templates. One may then 
envisage a stack of templates, one above the other in the thickness of 
the cortex, so that at the upper layers the particular co-ordinate of 
the template would derive from the conjunction of the templates sit­
uated lower down in the stack. Such an arrangement would accord well 
with Hubei and Wiesel's findings of a change of function as one moves 
through the cortical column (Hubei and Wiesel, 1963).
(vi) Innate and learned templates
The evidence from ethology is that some templates are innate. The 
question of the learned or innate nature of templates may be applied 
separately to the proposed divisions of the template system and to the 
actual stock of templates present within the library held in any part­
icular division. It would seem improbable that the receptive field 
organisation disclosed by Hubei and Weisel and others (see Chapter 5) 
would be other than innate. On the other hand, there does not appear 
to be a similar clearly defined organisation of neurons registering 
the reception of complex environmental patterns, such as cubes, or
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perhaps legs and noses. It is not necessary for our purpose to decide 
the extent to which the template system is innate or acquired, provided 
some neural mechanism to implement either source is allowed for. What 
does seem to be of interest is the manner in which initially provided 
(genetically and developmentally determined) templates would influence 
the later acquisition of acquired templates.
(vii) Temporal integration
For the template matching principle to be applied not only to pattern 
recognition but to neural integration generally, it is necessary that 
there should be some way in which the matching of templates is influ­
enced by the conditional probability of events (Uttley, 1959). The 
inspection of a triangle provides an example. The matching of a left- 
pointing angle followed by a right-handed saccade, increases the 
conditional probability that the next input will be a right-pointing 
angle. One method of introducing the conditional probability has been 
mentioned, the inclusion of the saccade in the template representation. 
The temporal sequential bringing forward of appropriate templates 
within a particular division of the template system would be assisted 
by the fact that over the whole system input does not generally change 
simultaneously. These common contents of templates which differ only 
in one division would tend to bind them into bundles. Another possi­
bility is that there is some division of the template section which is 
specially representative of temporal sequence. These aspects of the 
model go beyond our present concerns. They are mentioned becuase it 
seems important that temporal sequential and conditional probability 
considerations are borne in mind when the neural mediation of a tem­
plate system is examined.
(viii) Summary
Aspects of matching of patterns have been discussed in terms of an exten­
ded template system. It is argued that a sophisticated template system 
is acceptible. Of course, the description of the system as a template 
system is somewhat arbitrary. Use of the template concept has been 
applied to showing how information might be spatially organised and sel­
ected by reference to the total configuration of the sensory and motor 
systems,
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IV The problem of perception
As one turns from pattern recognition to its theoretical explana­
tion, one finds that one has moved into the field of perception.
There have been a number of computer models of perception in terms 
of information processing, list processing and computer programming 
logic (see e.g. Minsky, 1958, 1968) , In the field of Artificial 
Intelligence there have been models which can interpret two dimen­
sional photographs as a three dimensional world (e.g, Roberts, 1965) 
and a model which can manipulate and even describe such a world in 
English (Winograd, 1972), In terms of neurons, however, there have 
been no simulations which might be described as models of perception 
rather than pattern recognition. As may have been gathered from the 
discussion of pattern recognition in the preceding section, an 
attempt to do so would be premature. Before a convincing model of 
animal perception can be simulated, the basic problems of neural 
integration must be overcome in respect of many aspects of sensori­
motor integration and temporal sequential processing.
Nevertheless, at a verbal level, neurological models have attempted 
to explain perception. Some have had particular influence (e,g,
Kohler, 1942; Hebb, 1949) , Hebb's model was simulated but not at a 
level which would demonstrate its perceptual implication (Rochester, 
Holland, Haibt and Duda, 1956). Models of perception have also been 
implicit in many theoretical discussions, A few points will be dis­
cussed here only to orient the reader,
A. Enrichment versus differentiation
Gibson and Gibson (1955) distinguished between "enrichment models" 
and "differentiation models". My model is undoubtedly an enrichment 
model, but may be a differentiation theory also.
Gibson and Gibson also distinguished "differentiation" theory from 
those "discriminative" theories, following Pavlov, which explain per­
ception merely in terms of attaching stimuli to motor responses. The 
essence of "differentiation theory" is that "instead of assuming 
that stimuli can give rise to only meager sensations, let us now con­
sider the opposite assumption : that the environment is rich in varied 
and complex stimulus information capable of giving rise to diverse, 
meaningful, complex perceptions . . .  In the normal environment there
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is always more information than the organism is capable of register­
ing . . . As perception develops the organism comes to detect 
properties of stimulation not previously detected even though they 
may have been present. With growth and continued exposure to the 
world of stimulation, perception becomes better differentiated and 
more precise , . (E.J, Gibson, 1959, pp75-76).
The strength of this approach lies in the complexity and difficulty 
of the experimental data concerning perception (reviewed comprehen­
sively in Gibson (1959), where the main theories of perception are 
also reviewed), The data has been difficult to fit into an overall 
explanatory system. Differentiation theory avoided a growing sterility 
of former approaches by concentration upon the relationship of the 
stimulation to the perception. As Postman (1955) stresses, the theory 
is essentailly one of psycho-physical correspondence, the perception 
reflects the stimulation. But as he commented: "The fact that the 
organism has learned to discriminate more qualities is the very fact 
that we need to explain", Some purely discriminative models do in 
fact learn to do this. They do so however only by attaching sets of 
equivalent stimuli to responses. One might say that discrimination 
theories explain discrimination learning but not perception, unless 
one is prepared to equate the two. Apparently the Gibsons are not, 
and it is this which makes their position difficult.
Consider for example the perception of a cup. The differentiation 
theorist would say, quite reasonably, that having had experience of 
cups which are hollow, and other cylindrical objects which are not, 
the observer learns to detect the information which differentiates 
the two. This is apparently intended to be different from saying that 
the observer discriminates the two, for the latter idea only refers 
to what the observer can do with a cup, whereas I take it that the 
differentiation theorist considers that the observer learns to dif­
ferentiate the objects in other ways, for example, to differentiate 
a hollow cup from a solid cylinder. However, the perception of a 
hollow vessel is something different from the information indicating 
its presence. It is the conceptual (perceptual) knowledge that one 
can, say, put an object or liquid into it. This is an implicit know­
ledge of the nature of objects which, whether innate or acquired, has 
in some way to be attached to the discriminated information. If all 
the information for perception were in the stimulus presentation, we 
could differentiate a cup from a solid cylinder, but we would not
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perceive the cup as something we could fill with tea unless we could 
actually see into its receptacle. Whether one considers that per­
ceptual knowledge of the world is innate, developmental or individually 
acquired, it is still necessary to explain how that knowledge becomes 
attached to the discriminative attributes of the stimulus. This is 
absent from differentiation theory. Moreover, the distinction against 
discrimination theory may be overstated. Implicitly, for example, 
our perception of hollowness may be that of attaching responses to a
representation of a cup; certainly, what we can do with a hollow
vessel is close to our perception of the nature of such a vessel,
Gibson's theory was attacked by Postman (1955), Postman's defence of 
enrichment theory is not one which would be taken here. He defended
a certain kind of associationism - "physiological associationism",
Gibson (1955) reports him in the following words: "he (Postman) objected 
to the distinction" because the "kind of enrichment hypothesis exempli­
fied by the addition of images to sense data is no longer of interest 
to contemporary associationists . . . "  However, "sense data" is a 
philosophical not a psychological or neurological term. Few enrich­
ment theorists would wish to maintain that the brain stores "images".
The brain encodes information in such a manner that when that encoding 
substrate is reactivated something similar to perception - imagery - 
occurs. As Postman pointed out, associationists have long since left 
behind the introspective pursuit of bare sensations and accruing 
imaginai contexts. Such a model was not really an enrichment model 
but one in which "ideas" were attached to a "sensation". In the kind 
of model we have in mind not only are there no sense data, but sensa­
tion is only a terra for convenient reference. In the model to be 
presented there are only perceptions, that is, activities in the appa­
ratus which result from the interpretation of sensory input by the 
current state of the apparatus. Perceptions change in the presence of 
identical stimuli. The differentiation theorists say that it becomes 
"better differentiated and more precise". In the enrichment model 
this is partly because greater selection is made from the environmental 
information, and in this respect the enrichment model does not differ 
greatly from the differentiation model. However, the enrichment model 
says that the selection is on the basis of what is already held in 
storage: it also says that something may be added to the information at 
present coming from the stimulus. The differentationist would one
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assumes, disagree on just this pioint, and say that what one perceives 
still reflects only the input information.
Possibly, there is a different usage of the term "perception". 
Perception is not an all or none event. It is hard to see that in 
cases of fragmentary or degenerate information, the observer does not 
construct what he perceives, Oatley (19 78) has a photograph of a 
student seated at a table in which only the smallest fragment of the 
chair frame is visible. Yet we have no difficulty in discerning a 
chair. Presumably the differentiation theorists would wish to main­
tain that we do not "construct the image" of a chair from the fragment, 
but that we differentiate the small fragment as part of a chair. Prob­
ably the differentiation theorist would not wish to maintain that we 
cannot describe the remainder of the chair, e.g, that it is formed of 
bent tubing and probably has a canvas seat. He would be forced to 
say that this knowledge is cognition, not perception. In doing so 
he would be drawing a hard line between the two, If we enter a room 
and perceive a telephone on the table, and then discover that it is 
not the telephone at all but a cardboard box placed there by a mis­
chievous experimenter, we would then have to say that the original 
perception of the telephone was a false cognition!
One may agree with the differentiation theorists that given full 
inspection in adequate circumstances, perception reflects the stim­
ulation. It is in circumstances where evidence is fragmentary or 
degenerate that enrichment becomes an important part of the process.
It is just this ability to deal with fragmentary evidence which would 
seem to point to the intellectual and creative aspects of human 
psychology. Enrichment occurs "by association" because stored infor­
mation gives us access to further information about the stimulus. 
Enrichment theory does not wish to deny, as Gibson suggests it does, 
that the "environment is rich in stimulation" or that stimuli "can 
give rise to only meager sensations",
Hierarchical implications of differentiation theory are summarised 
in Gibson's (1969) conclusions: "First, that some sort of memorial 
representation of the distinguishing and invariant features of a 
stimulus object or event is involved in differentiation of it from 
other objects or events in its absence. Second, that this represen­
tation is based on prior discovery of distinctive features of the
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object, or abstraction of invariant features of a pattern. Discrimina­
tion is thus prior to recognition. And third, that both discrimination 
and representation are prior to production. In Other words, perceptual 
learning . . .  is a requisite for all three processes, discrimination, 
recognition, and production, and the processes form a kind of cognitive 
hierarchy".
As thus stated, the enrichment theorist would have little to quarrel 
with differentiation theory, except perhaps for the possible implica­
tion that the hierarchy defined is a neural hierarchy. In the kind 
of extended template model described earlier, all three of Gibson's 
postulated processes occur as a single process. Moreover, the template 
model, at least as embodied in my neurological hypothesis, is an 
enrichment model. The priority to which the differentiationists have 
addressed themselves is a logical not a neurological priority.
Considerable time has passed since the controversy between differentia­
tion, discrimination and enrichment theories was a central issue. The 
matter has been discussed at some length because it may assist the 
reader in what to expect of the neurological hypothesis to be developed 
here.
B. Sensori-motor schemata
The work of the Gibsons served the purpose of drawing attention to many 
aspects of the sensory input which the brain is able to analyse. An 
example is the change of grain size with depth, as when we observe a 
beach of pebbles extending into the distance. Partly as a result of 
the work of the Gibsons, there are a number of excellent contemporary 
discussions of the mechanisms of perception, not necessarily sharing 
their viewpoint (e.g. Neisser, 1967, 1975; Zusne, 1970; Gibson, J.J.,
1968) . Accordingly it is unnecessary to consider such matters here.
It is perhaps worth stressing that sensori-motor integration and tem­
poral integration have been seen as a key to perception by writers of 
many different viewpoints.
Corcoran attributes the first appreciation of these aspects to Hebb. 
"Pre-Hebbian theory" was dominated, on the one hand, by the Gestalt 
psychologists, whose implicit model of the nervous system was of a 
sensitive, but unstructured mass, and on the other hand, by the "learn­
ing theorists" who thought in terms of deterministic sensory-motor
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connections in the brainJ Hebb's neurological theory will be mentioned 
again in Chapter 4. The psychological importance of the theory may be 
seen as at least partly due to its emphasis upon integration over both 
time and space. As is well known, his explanation of perception depends 
upon successive recognition of discriminated features. These were inte­
grated into a perceptual unity because ttie neural process itself was 
conceived as a diffuse process in which "cell assemblies" were bound 
into "phase sequences".
Hebb's hypothesis is supported by the data concerning eye-movements, at 
least in normal perception. Scanning eye-movements recorded during 
inspection of visual displays are closely related to specific stimulus 
characteristics, e.g. eyes and nose in a face. "When looking at pictures 
the observer's eyes fixate more frequently on those features which are 
actual or potential carriers of information". (Zusne, 1970, referring 
to work of Buswell (1935) and Yarbus (1967)). He continues: "Informa­
tion here is not information measured in bits or physically the most 
complex portions of the picture. It is rather the meaning and signifi­
cance of a particular portion of the picture to the observer which 
attracts attention. Thus, in a painting of a hunter in a forest, it is 
not the (physically) very complex branches, bushes and grass that 
attract attention. Rather it is the very small, detail-less incon­
spicuous figure of the hunter that most fixations center upon". Such 
facts present a challenge to neurological theories of perception.
Gibson J.J. (1968) stresses the longer term possibilities of temporal 
integration: "The visual world as I once described it has the property 
of being stable and unbounded. By stability is meant the fact that it 
does not move when one turns his eyes or turns himself around. The 
phenomenal world seems to stay put, to remain upright and to surround 
one completely" (p253). "The man in the dark who gropes with his 
fingers, like the insect who gropes with his antennae, seems to get a 
succession of contact stimuli, not a simultaneous pattern of them (p251) .
Piaget, in his various studies of the development of a concept of space 
and time in the infant, developed the concept of a sensori-motor schema. 
Neisser (1976) feels the necessity for such a concept. A neurological 
substrate for such a schema is one of the primary aspects of the present 
model. Piaget developed his concept into his "centration theory" of 
perception (Piaget, 1969). The relationship of this theory to the
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present model is too distant to pursue here. Relevant to our present 
concerns are his earlier observations of children from which he 
developed a concept of the nature of the phenomenal object. To the 
infant the face which appears from no where in the game of peek-a-boo 
has not been in existence since it disappeared behind the screening 
article: it appears and disappears. The infant has to be older before 
a sweet hidden under a cushion is the same sweet as is found there 
later. Objects present successive transformations of shape, retinal 
size and position. These successive transformations are embedded in 
sensory motor relationships. The integration of appearances into 
objects is acheived by conservation. Piaget does not indicate how con­
servation is mediated neurologically. Such an answer would be extremely 
useful, as it would bridge the neurological gap between perception and 
intelligence.
Neisser in his later work (1975) on cognition elaborates Piaget's 
concept of sensori-motor schemata. He makes two proposals of especial 
relevance to the model to be presented here: (i) "Because schemata
are anticipations, they are the medium by which the past affects the 
future . . (ii) In addition, however, some schemata are temporal
in their very nature. When an object moves, for example, continuous 
and complex changes take place in the optic array . . .  We need not 
suppose that this expansion is picked up as a series of discrete and 
individually anticipated frames . . ." (op.cit. p22). In my model, it 
is in a way, picked up by such discrete frames: these are the neural 
templates. The frames are however capable of being bonded into temp­
orally integrated sequences. Moreover, change itself can be embodied 
in a single discrete frame, as when the activity of a movement detector 
is registered. To record the continuous and complex changes which take 
place it is not necessary to propose that the succession of frames 
registers everything that occurs. Even within a single frame, the 
template may be only fragmentary. A template of an 'A* can be discrim­
inated from that of a 'B' if only small fragments are present. In a 
temporal sequential record, one or two frames selected from a sequence 
may discriminate a particular sequence from another. (Compare Bledsoe 
and Browning's pattern recognition model, 1959).
C. Information process analysis distinguished from neuroscience 
Neisser (1976) expressed growing conviction in an information processing 
view (bf perception. The success of Artificial Intelligence models of
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perception supports that view. Nevertheless it is necessary to be 
aware of the inherent limitations of that approach. Except in so far 
as such models borrow from psychology and neurology, they are neither 
psychological models nor neurological models. Information processing 
and systems analysis are conceptual abstractions common to many dif­
ferent kinds of apparatus, biological and artefactual. As such, like 
mathematics and logic, they are one way of furthering our knowledge 
of brain function in terms of an analysis of the way the components 
of the brain and its assembly into a system, handles the information 
passing through it. Such analyses are powerful tools in elucidating 
the psychological and neurological functions of brains. They may be 
alternative languages in which psychological and neurological hypotheses 
may be expressed, but they are not in themselves such hypotheses.
There may be a level at which one can speak of an information proces­
sing or systems theory of a psychological or neurological process.
That level is not the psychological or neurological level, but a more 
abstract one which the theory will share with quite other entities 
than the animals with which the psychological or physiological, theories 
are concerned.
One or two examples may indicate what is intended. A television set 
may be described as the coding of a spatial set of variables into a 
temporal sequence with an inverse process at the receiver. Such a 
description gives no indication of cathode ray tubes, of the timing 
of circuits, aerials, and electro-magnetic radiation. Compare a modern 
television receiver with Baird's original set, connected by wires in­
stead of radio. From an information processing viewpoint the two 
receivers are in principle identical, except perhaps in the quality of 
performance and the kind of repair man one would call in. The analogy 
may give a rather fair picture of both the strengths and weaknesses of 
the information processing approach 1
There are two further weaknesses of the information-processing approach 
to psycho-neurological problems. Two pieces of apparatus may acheive 
the same informational results by completely different means, according 
to the particular strengths which the different hardware possesses. It 
is not that the hardware is the same but the software different. It is 
that one program is quite different from the other. Compare a pendulum 
analogue clock with a quartz digital. Both have as fundamental a
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natural process with a fixed cycle time. From then on their informa­
tion handling is entirely different. One counts discrete changes.
The other controls an analogue motion. Of course, once can still see 
analogy at abstract level: if not they would not both be clocks. But 
knowledge of the pendulum clock does not help much in understanding the 
quartz digital clock. This is the trouble with comparing the behaviour 
of the brain with that of the computer. Even if the information handling 
is similar, each may acheive its end in very different manners.
The other weakness is that because information theory is at an abstract 
level, it is easy to mistake the knowledge, which we as human beings 
possess of the world, with the knowledge which the apparatus we are pro­
posing would possess or be able to obtain on its own account. This is 
the controversial field known as heuristics. An example, is the computer 
model which can interpret a two-dimensional line drawing as a three- 
dimensional world (Guzman, 1959). The model interprets conjuntions of 
lines as evidence of three-dimensional aspects of the world. For example 
a conjunction of three reasonably equally spaced lines is a "corner".
A T-junction implies that a nearer surface is partially obstructing the 
view of a more distant object, and so forth. The knowledge of such 
coincidences between the conjunctions of lines and objects of the three- 
dimensional world is not discovered by the program itself: it is 
supplied by the programmer who has applied his own intelligence in dis­
covering such relationships. This can be defended upon the basis that 
evolution has undoubtedly furnished the animal or Man with a similar 
knowledge. Such an answer does not provide any hypothesis of how the 
knowledge of the relationship is mediated in the brain. Even in rela­
tion to the psychology of the process, it is doubtful whether the ability 
to recognise the three-dimensional meaning of conjunctions lies at the 
base of our ability to interpret line-drawings. It seems quite possibly 
the other way round. We immediately perceive two-dimensional line 
drawings as three-dimensional objects, and because of that we are able 
to infer the relationships between conjunctions of lines and three- 
dimensional objects.
The intention of this discussion is not to call into question the value
of Guzman's model in interpreting perceptual processes. In fact Oatley
(1978) is able to show some close analogies between a similar model
(Roberts, 1955) and neurological processes. The point is to suggest that
information processing models are an adjunct to but not a direct approach 
to understanding brain function and psychological attributes.
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y Conclusion
A nuiriber of topics have been discussed with a view to orienting the 
reader to the psychological and neurological ideas which underly the 
neurological model to be presented.
Pattern recognition as it appears in neurological models has been con­
trasted with the perception of gestalt pattern as an inherent aspect 
of ongoing sensori-motor integration. It was argued that for pattern 
recognition models to become models of perception, it would first be 
necessary for models of effective action to be simulated. Accordingly 
in the present project, the simulations would be directed towards 
modelling motor action rather than pattern recognition.
The template analogy was discussed and it was argued that an extension 
of the template concept can be used to explain many aspects of percep­
tion and motor interaction. There are, however, limitations in the 
application of any simple analogy to the problems of brain function. 
Especially in relation to temporal sequential organisation and to the 
formation of schemata, the template matching system is necessarily 
superseded by considerations of neural mechanisms. Nevertheless, the 
template concept will, it is hoped, assist the reader in following the 
main neurological ideas of the model. Essentially the model proposes 
how extended neural templates may be constructed and manipulated in 
terms of simple neural connections.
Differentiation theory has been discussed, partly because that theory 
was especially antagonistic towards enrichment theories, and partly to 
give an opportunity to suggest certain implications of the model which 
will be proposed; namely, its mediation of the constructive aspects of 
the animals interaction with its environment. Sensori-motor schemata 
and information processing models ;served as further opportunities for 
orienting the reader to the approach taken here.
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CHAPTER 3
SOME FURTHER PROBLEMS OF NEURAL INTEGRATION: MOTOR ASPECTS AND THE
GENERAL CO-ORDINATION OF FUNCTION
I The problem of motor activity
In the previous chapter emphasis was placed upon the role of motor
activity in establishing sensori-motor relationships which contribute 
to pattern recognition. This is of course only a limited aspect of 
motor activity. Motor activity is the means by which the animal sat­
isfies its biological needs, physiological and psychological. The 
considerations discussed in relation to pattern recognition must be 
extended to these functions. Accordingly, the primary problem which 
a neurological model must deal with is that of sensori-motor integra­
tion, in the sense of showing how the action of the system on the 
environment produces sensory feed-back which in turn controls the 
action of the system on the environment. Closely associated with this 
problem is the problem of motor learning, and in turn this is concerned 
with concepts like reinforcement and motivation.
The literature of motor activity is perhaps more extensive than that of
any other branch of psychology. In contrast, the simulation of neural 
motor mechanisms does not appear to have been attempted so far in any­
thing more than a formal labelling of output as "motor". (Some 
simulations with stronger motor representation will be described in the 
next chapter). In attempting to take the simulation of motor organisa­
tion one step further, the present project should not be taken as putting 
forward a unified theory of motor learning, such as have been proposed 
by Hull, Skinner, Sheffield, Konorski, Deutsch and others. The simula­
tion is used here as a tool for developing a theory, rather than the 
presentation of a theory which has been worked out beforehand. The 
simulation starts with the representation of the simplest learning situa­
tion in which the full cycle - sensori-motor-environment-sensory - can 
be seen, the classical conditioning situation. It then attempts to 
build upon this base. In doing so, the modeller naturally has in mind 
the more thorny problems, but the main aim remains the demonstration
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that the theory of neural integration can cope with the control of 
motor action. Naturally, one should bear in mind the level of 
representation in tJie simulation.
The following discussion of one or two topics may assist in orient­
ing the reader.
(i) TOTE
Miller and Pribram suggested that behaviour is organised in an hier­
archy of units of a negative feed-back kind. These units compare 
the input to some criterion within the organism. A mismatch gives 
rise to a response, and the sequence continues until a matching 
occurs, i.e. Test-Operate-Test-Exit. This is a powerful concept in 
explaining goal directed behaviour without necessarily involving 
the notion of primary goals, such as food, dominating all behaviour. 
Hinde (19 70, p.630) considers the hierarchical organisation of TOTE 
units proposed by Miller and Pribram as important "for this permits 
the possibility tliat behaviour can be goal directed (in some sense) 
at one level and not another". Whilst agreeing with Hinde, one 
might draw attention to the point earlier made with respect to hier­
archical organisation in connection with perception. A system may 
be hierarchical in action without being reflected in an hierarchical 
neural organisation.
A difficulty with the TOTE hypothesis is to find a plausible neural 
implementation. Whilst Pribram (1971) gives some notional examples 
of neural structures which might be organised on a Tote basis, these 
only apply to simple feed-back adjustment loops, where a clear physio­
logical variable, say a tension in a muscle spindle, is to be 
balanced. What is required to explain motor behaviour is a TOTE 
mechanism with psychological criteria of success. An attempt is made 
in the present model to show how an image of anticipation could act 
as an internal criterion which the system tries to match. Unfortu­
nately, it must be confessed at this point that the simulation of the 
present model has had to stop short of actually demonstrating this 
capacity. There is, however, some demonstration of the capacities 
required to implement such mismatch-match tests. A simulation.
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programmed but not yet run, will be described to show that the idea, 
although rather ambitious in terms of present resources, is not 
nebulous.
(ii) Classical Conditioning concepts, instrumental conditioning concepts, 
and more generalised concepts of motor action
Research on motor action has grown very much from Thorndike's early 
experiments and from Pavlov's demonstrations of Classical Conditioning.
A considerable advance was the isolation of the concept of operant or 
instrumental conditioning by Skinner, Konorski and Miller, and Hull. 
Accordingly, many neurological models have aimed at demonstrating the 
neural implementation in simple form of those concepts. A number of 
models of the control of motor action are in effect pattern recogni­
tion models the outputs of which are categorised as responses (e.g. 
those of Kilmer and his associates, see Chapter 4 and Chapter 1).
A useful exposition of the problem of motor learning in neural terms 
is that of Burke (1966). He sets out the main forms of learning in 
terms of conditioning theory, i.e. classical, operant conditioning, 
drive and reinforcement implementation. His neurological "models" 
involve very few neurons. The idea would seem to be that these models 
could be duplicated and combined. They have the merit of making the 
requisite conceptual components of learning very clear. The models 
typify a certain approach to behavioural function : they assume that 
the mechanisms within the brain reproduce the same overall structural 
relationships which can be seen in overt function. Each neural net­
work is really a model of the conditioning process itself. However, 
the components are without the complexities which surround the concepts 
they represent, e.g. reinforcement and motivation (see below). More­
over, the problems of neural integration in combining such models to 
deal with behaviour is not shown. Their value remains, therefore, as 
conceptualisations of the factors which enter into conditioning rather 
than a neurological model of nervous function.
Two process theory
One of the controversies which has occupied the theoretical literature 
is whether there are two kinds of motor learning or one kind. Put in 
its simplest terms, the controversy is whether instrumental learning 
(operant conditioning) represents a different kind of process from 
classical conditioning (Miller and Konorski, 1928; Skinner, 1938;
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Mowrer, 1947). This issue is discussed in more recent perspective by 
Rescorla and Solomon (1967) and Mackintosh (1974). The distinction 
has been made in a number of ways, some of which imply no more than a 
reflection of the situations in which they are observed. Essentially 
the two-factor theorists maintain that in classical conditioning 
learning occurs between stimuli, and in operant conditioning between 
stimulus and resonse. Another way of putting the distinction is that 
the classical conditioning principle of stimulus substitution states 
that the occurrence of a reinforcing stimulus causes the responses 
elicited by the reinforcer to antedate its delivery, and those 
responses become attached to an accompanying or antedating stimulus.
The principle of operant conditioning, following Thorndike's law of 
effect, is that the occurence of a reinforcing stimulus will strengthen 
any response which happens to precede its delivery (Mackintosh, 19 74, 
pp. 125 ff).
The resolution of the controversy may depend upon further research 
clarifying learning and conditioning mechanisms generally. Where a 
neurological model may be useful is in demonstrating that such issues 
may not be quite as clear cut as they seem. Neither Classical Condi­
tioning nor Instrumental Conditioning might represent fundamental modes 
of learning as such. They might merely be situations in which certain 
aspects of the system appear more prominently. One may bear in mind 
that over and above the basic capacity of nervous tissue to mediate 
learning, there may be superimposed mechanisms which have developed to 
deal with the more specific requirements of a more sophisticated ner­
vous system. Thorpe (1963) suggests that mechanisms of learning may 
differ in different species. Tolman (1932, 1959) related performance 
in standard learning situations to six capacity laws, including for 
example, the ability to form an expectancy of a stimulus and to act in 
accordance with it. Certain conditions, e.g. the classical conditioning 
paradigm, may give prominence to one aspect of the process. The present 
model suggests that classical conditioning does not represent a 
behavioural mechanism at all, but rather allows a feature of nervous 
processing to become observable. The possibility is that the Classical 
CR is not intended by nature as an act upon the environment but is a 
side effect of the build up of excitation in a system directed towards 
learning to anticipate events.
Because of the importance of classical and operant conditioning in the
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literature, and because well documented experimental situations provide 
a test of the performance of the model, these paradigms are the subject 
of the simulations reported here. It is not, however, intended that 
the simulations show "classical conditioning" or "operant conditioning". 
They are intended as demonstrations of how the model would act in those 
situations.
(iii) Broader approaches to motor organisation
Many workers have considered that the conditioning approach fails to 
illumine a wide area of brain function. Amongst views still related 
strongly to the laboratory, one may mention those of Tolman (1959).
He showed that reinforcement may not influence learning so much as 
the performance of learning. He suggested that cognitive maps guide 
behaviour. The cognitive psychologists have developed concepts of 
behaviour which workers in Artificial Intelligence have expressed in 
more definite algorithmic terms, although such implementations are 
rarely in forms which provided models of neural integration.
The ethologists following Lorenz and Tinbergen (Schiller, 1957;
Hinde, 1970) have developed concepts which offer some promise of being 
expressed in neural form, e.g. imprinting, innate releasing mechanism, 
search image, hierarchy of behavioural organisation. The present 
project does not reach a stage where the broader aspects of behaviour 
as described by the ethologists could be discussed except in general 
verbal terms. The simulations do, however, contain features by which 
an ethological description of behaviour might be implemented in some 
model of the future. For example, the basic formulation of the model 
contains something analogical to the Innate Releasing Mechanism, and 
which could provide the substrate for a search image.
Although the limitations of the simulations necessarily tie them to 
the representation of emission of single notional abstract "responses", 
it is possible to see the organisation proposed as the basis for a 
more complex explanation in terms of ethological descriptions. Beha­
viour may be described either in relation to its effects on the environ­
ment or in terms of its implementation by muscles or other effectors.
A neurological model is naturally concerned with the latter aspect, but 
it must bear in mind the eventual application of its explanatory concepts 
to broader descriptions. Hinde (19 70) distinguishes three sources for 
the control of movements (i) environmental stimuli (ii) proprioceptive
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stimuli and (iii) co-ordinating mechanisms within the central nervous 
system- At the basis of the co-ordinating systems are fixed action 
patterns whidi are able to be oriented towards the environment: super­
imposed upon this system is that of skilled movements. Underlying 
these mechanisms may be seen a propensity for learning. In devising a 
neurological model of behaviour it seems necessary to provide for a 
combination of influences upon the emission of muscular and other 
effector movements. These influences must express the environment, the 
proprioceptive information which guides the development of the muscular 
actions, and the factors within the organism which cause behaviour to 
be generated towards the environment. Behaviours like walking are 
oriented fixed action patterns. They are influenced by learning in 
that they occur and are shaped accordingly when, for example, at a 
given time the animal moves towards a food bowl where it knows it will 
be fed at a particular time. Yet the act of walking must be guided by 
feed-back information from the paws (Gray and Lai, 1965, Shik and 
Orlovsky, 19 76). Such problems of organisation cannot be dealt with in 
a simulation at the level attempted here. However, the mechanisms for 
response emission and control must be capable of being developed to 
cope with such behaviour.
At another level, the cognitive aspects of behaviour seem to be depen­
dent upon anticipatory capacities of the brain. Expectancy is an 
aspect of the theory of neural integration presented here which arises 
from the possible build up in an analogue fashion of excitation within 
a distributed network.
II The problem of reinforcement
The incorporation of "reinforcement lines" into many pattern recogni­
tion models suggests that the concept of reinforcement is not restricted 
to motor learning. Moreover, reinforcement is involved in questions of 
motivation (see next section). The absence of a representation of 
actual neural mechanisms of reinforcement in simulations of neurologi­
cal models makes it a matter of some importance in the present project. 
The aim is to incorporate in a model at the level of neurons, some 
means of showing how learning can be dependent upon what happens to the 
animal following its actions upon the environment. This capacity should
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appear in the model without some external intelligence deciding for 
the model whether the response was correct or incorrect.
The concept of reinforcement is theoretically controversial. For the 
purpose of a neurological model one can, without committing oneself 
theoretically, make a start at representing the reinforcing effects of 
"reward" and "punishment". Certainly the satisfaction of physiological 
needs and the avoidance of physiological injury assists learning. The 
strategy of representing these mechanisms does not exclude the possi­
bility that there are other ways of supporting learning. Certain 
aspects of the mode of neural integration in the model to be presented 
here, suggest that even at the stage of simulation so far acheived, 
the model has some relevance to these more general aspects of motor 
learning. In particular, the model shows a certain ability to antici­
pate events (see below).
A. Emission of responses: innate and learned control
There is considerable doubt whether physiological reinforcers, such as 
food and shock, act quite in the way assumed by theories of behaviour 
like those of Skinner and Hull. Premack (1971) has demonstrated that 
the role of a customary "reinforcer", candy, can be exchanged with a 
customary "instrumental response" - manipulation. "Running" is often 
used as a reinforcement for rats. The reinforcing aspect of a response 
may depend upon the likelihood that the response would occur at this 
time spontaneously, in relation to the likelihood of the response it 
"reinforces". To deal with such problems it would be desirable to 
have some clear neurological picture of how responses are emitted.
This is an aspect of neurological modelling which appears to have been 
neglected.
Skinner distinguished operants from respondents. Respondents appeared 
when specific stimuli occurred: operants appeared in a more spontaneous 
manner to a much wider range of stimuli. This distinction is in the 
same direction as Premack's analysis of reinforcement in suggesting 
that all responses are not solely dependent upon environmental stimula­
tion. Many actions appear to be innately programmed and under the 
control of stimulus feed-back. Walking is such an action. Yet the occa­
sion and emission of such an action appear to be subject to learning, as 
when a dog walks to where it expects its master to appear. In many so 
called learned actions it does not seem to be the form of the actions
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themselves which is modified, but the occasion of release, the orienta­
tion, the co-ordination and application to the environment.
Neurologically, the emission of responses has not been clarified. 
Theoretical behavioural approaches refer to probability or occasion of 
emission. One might represent such theories in a model by a random num­
ber generator. Reinforcement would alter the distribution from which 
the random number was drawn. Motivational states would also alter the 
distribution. One might label input patterns with an operator which 
indicated their probability of eliciting a response. Such a model would 
not, of course, be a neurological model at all.
An unexpected difficulty encountered in devising a neural mechanism of 
response emission was the conflict between the learned control and the 
spontaneous emission. This problem may be specific to the model to be 
presented here. That seems unlikely, as response emission seems to be 
necessarily under dual control. Even if it is assumed that all responses 
are initially emitted in response to specific stimuli, e.g. bar-pressing, 
those responses are brought under learned control. The question which 
must be answered neurologically is how the innately controlled emission 
of response is able to give way to learning. This question, which is 
not raised in most neurological models of action (e.g. Pringle, 1951) , 
is far from simple. If learning takes precedence over innate emission, 
then one will learn not to employ a response in a given situation, and 
perhaps employ some other response. Suppose the contingencies are 
changed. The animal will then be unable to experiment by emitting the 
response required for success, because it has learned not to do so.
This takes precedence over its innate power to emit the response in trial 
and error.
Something similar was found in the simulation of the model. In the 
model, if learned responses were given precedence, then the model would 
continue to emit that response even if changed contingencies made it 
unsuccessful. The continuing failure eventually extinguished that 
response. However, since other responses had already been extinguished 
by the earlier learning, the model was reduced to a standstill. The 
model could be allowed to escape from this learning trap by giving 
innate emission occasional precedence. However, then the opposite kind 
of error occurred. Even when the model had learned to produce a correct 
response, it would occasionally produce some other response. This was 
because the latter spontaneous response had been given greater precedence
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at that particular time. Naturally, the difficulty would not have 
arisen if the model could have had unlimited time to learn its task.
The original learning would have dissipated and released spontaneous 
responses. However, the latter remedy merely serves to underline the 
problem of control.
It is appreciated that there are other ways than those mentioned by 
which a nervous system could escape from its own learning. One way 
would be the operation of a reactive neural inhibition which suppressed 
a response when it had been repeatedly emitted. However, the time 
scales for behavioural inhibition would seem to make it unlikely that 
it could be mediated simply by the release of inhibitory transmitters 
in reaction to excitatory spikes.
Some progress was made towards a representation of motor emission which 
could deal with problems of this kind, and which could be related to 
Premack's analysis.
B. Key trigger patterns: preset patterns
Whatever may be the eventual resolution of the problem of reinforce­
ment, one way the animal's nervous system can monitor the appropriate­
ness of its actions is by reference to innate "wiring" which tells it 
so, e.g. food acting upon the chemical and metabolic system to signal 
that its actions have been favourable; electric shock informing it 
that the situation is unfavourable. Evidence, principally of specific 
re leasers from ethologically oriented psychology, suggests that innate 
recognition of stimuli can be far more complex than can be explained 
by a simple stimulus-response connection, analogical to the spinal 
reflex. Neural integration must handle these innate or developmental 
recognitions. More than this, if such recognition processes enter into 
reinforcement in the sense that "food" and "sex" are reinforcers, it 
must be shown how they act in the required manner to support learning.
Konorski (1967) deals extensively with these problems in terms of con­
ditioning theory. Eventually his neural solution must depend upon 
the hierarchical neural network system which constitutes his neurologi­
cal model. His solutions, although of considerable psychological 
interest are not developed in terms of neurons, only the general 
principles of the neural model being given. A solution closer to that 
of the model proposed here is that of Pringle (1951). In a system of 
neural oscillators capable of forming pattern configurations, he
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proposed that "key trigger patterns" are present. When a sensory 
pattern matches such innate patterns, motor action is triggered. A
similar mechanism operates in my model. It is not restricted to the
mediation of physiological events. It is capable of being interpreted 
as the Innate Releasing Mechanism proposed by Lorenz (195 7). It is 
capable of providing the innate "sensory analysers" porposed by Deutsch 
(1960) which lead to primary links with motivational excitation. (See 
below).
C. Cognitive confirmation
A question related to reinforcement is whether an animal can judge 
whether it has succeeded in producing the effect which it has "intended" 
independent of predetermined satisfactions or unpleasantness. To human 
beings, this seems a natural capacity. When we try to draw a circle, 
we know to what extent we have succeeded. This may be a learned capac­
ity obtained by comparing the result of our handiwork with a remembered 
circle. Moreover, we can say what we expect to happen in all sorts of 
circumstances. Our ability to do so does not seem to be related to
whether we wish what we expect or not.
At the neural level, key experiments show changes of processing of 
"novel" in contrast with "habituated" stimuli, reflecting a control of 
orienting response (Sokolov, I960; Anokhin, 1961). The implied capacity 
of the nervous system to lay down and label a "neuronal model" (Sokolov, 
1960) might contribute to the organisation of behaviour itself. In 
Pribram's illustration of the TOTE mechanism, of hammering nails, an 
inner criterion is required by which we recognise that the nail is 
flush with the surface. Deutsch (1960) would say that the input from 
the flush nail affects an "analyser" which switches off the "link" 
providing excitation to the hammering action. The "link" (flush nail) 
was earlier connected to excitation deriving from a primary link (innate 
analyser) because it was excited just before an analyser one step 
nearer to the primary link. This theory suggests that we cease hammer­
ing to proceed to the next step in a sequence approaching some innately 
satisfying reward. According to Deutsch's account, the afferent pattern 
switches off drive excitation and connects that excitation to the next 
link and so on to the primary link. We may note in passing that this 
does not explain why the flush nail ever became the link for ceasing 
hammer action.
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However, the main question for a model of neural integration is simply 
tlie neural implementation for the setting up of the inner criterion 
and its action upon motor movement. Does such a criterion have to be 
tied to a primary source of motivation? Deutsch's model says that it 
does. Yet a device for hammering pegs into a board is a well known 
toy, which presumably provides its own reinforcement.
One way in which an animal might judge the consequences of its actions 
is in comparison with some kind of expectation. Such an expectation is 
implied not only by Sokolov's experiments, but later work by Grey Walter 
on the CNV (Walter, 1969). Konorski (1967, p.290) says: " . . .  of 
particular importance is the old concept put forward by James, stating 
that the chief, if not the only, source of voluntary movements is pro­
vided by their images (ideo-motor action)". Konorski does not give the 
neural implementation of such particulars beyond the general statement 
of his hierarchical network theory (see Chapter 4), but he clearly has 
in mind the concept of conditioning as an anticipation of events.
Neisser (1976) considers that sensori-motor schemata act as anticipa­
tions .
As will be reported, the present model is able to anticipate events 
when a familiar sequence is repeated. This anticipation takes the 
form of a rise in excitation in the neural records of the event which 
is about to occur. The anticipation can act both as a prescription for 
the next response, as proposed in James' notions of ideo-motor action, 
and also as an inner criterion. According to this explanation, hammer 
knocking would stop because the anticipated result of further hammer­
ing is "no change" in the position of the nail.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to simulate the model to a stage when 
these concepts could be definitely demonstrated. This was mainly due 
to the delays in getting an efficiently operative model, attributed to 
difficulties solved by rhythmic mechanisms. It was possible to demon­
strate that the anticipatory excitation could control instrumental 
actions. Further simulations were programmed which were intended to 
show how these anticipations could confirm the environmental success or 
failure of an action, independently of primary reinforcement. Unfortu­
nately, these were unable to be run before programming ceased. 
Accordingly, the discussion of such mechanisms rely upon the ability to 
express the ideas in a computer program, supplemented by the consider­
ations which make such a view plausible or otherwise.
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III The problem of motivation
Like the problem of reinforcement, with which it is closely associated, 
motivation has appeared in simulations only in a minimal form. In con­
trast the subject has occupied a large part of the theoretical 
literature and has given rise to deep-seated controversy. The more 
difficult aspects of motivation are beyond present prospects of simula­
tion. However, within a system of neural integration one would wish to 
see the general direction in which motivational problems would be handled.
A number of neurological models in the literature, although not simulated, 
give a fairly specific account of the neural implementation of motiva­
tional factors. These give some idea of the problems involved.
(a) Spinelli's neural implementation
Spine Hi's (19 70) neural hologram model is described in Chapter 10. He 
suggests that the neural networks mediating particular input patterns 
might be completed by adding networks representing reinforcement. In 
this way an input pattern leading to reinforcement can be discriminated 
from one which does not. Further, the networks might be biassed by 
adding inputs representing motivational states. Because of the special 
character of the hologram model as a diffuse distributed memory net­
work, this is not quite the same as merely adding formal drive and 
reinforcement inputs to the sensory pattern. The drive inputs would make 
some of the memory networks more easily stimulted than others, a bias 
effect. My model is also a diffuse distributed network model, and drive 
inputs would have a similar effect. Although the neural hologram model 
was simulated, the reinforcement and motivational proposals were not.
In any case, the simulation was not in behavioural terms. Accordingly, 
it is not possible to say what the actual effects of the motivational 
inputs would be. In the simulation of my model, the introduction of 
motivational sources of excitation had a most disturbing effect. In par­
ticular it raised two problems never quite resolved. However, some 
progress was made towards their solution (see below).
(b) Olds' neural implementation
Olds (1969) proposed a neurological model of motivation related to the 
neuro-anatomical structure and input output relations of the Hippocampus. 
Research had revealed hypothalamic centres, the stimulation of which can 
support eating and drinking. Olds discovered neurons in the Hippocampus 
which were active while the animal "expected food, and inactive while
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the animal "expected" water. He found other neurons with opposite 
characteristics. Moreover, he found neurons in the reticular system 
which were correlated with the neurons in the Hippocampus. This 
relationship was not permanent, and Olds attributed it to a memory 
function.
The basic concept of Olds' neural model (Figure 3.1) is modelled on 
the wiring of a digital computer hardware memory, such that the mag­
netic cores at the crosswires are analogical with synapses. The 
"digit" lines represent emotional, motor and sensory information. 
Successive lines of the grid represent the patterns which occur in 
temporal sequence, i.e. "successive memories". To deal with the prob­
lem that computer cores retrieve information by an addressing system, 
whereas the brain recognises patterns. Olds suggests a scanning mech­
anism which identifies similar patterns. "The memory element itself 
has to be a single line, with all its sensory elements crossing its 
afferent side, or its dendrites, and all the motor elements crossing 
its efferent side or its axons. The structure required is that of the 
Hippocampus". (Figure 3.2).
Although superficially very different from my model, the two share many 
assumptions. However, Olds' model is not sufficiently developed neuro­
logically to see exactly how it would work. For example, the scanning 
mechanism is not defined. Neuronal integration is restricted to an 
analogy with the crosswire magnetic cores. Each unit would therefore 
be isolated, holding one bit of information defined by the selective 
action of axons and dendrites. It is not clear how this would operate 
as a general neural integrative system. Olds' interpretation of the 
histological structure is tight and convincing. However, Kilmer and 
Olihski's model (19 74), described in a later chapter, also utilises the 
detailed layout of the Hippocampus to support a very different 
hypothesis.
Olds proposes: "if there was a reward among the events that followed 
last time, the biological memory would yield an output which would 
instigate remembered behaviours . . .". A psychologically similar strat­
egy was adopted in my model. However, the difficulties encountered 
were with just those aspects which Olds does not define : (i) how scanning
looks forward through the learned records; (ii) how the system takes a
record of sensory and motor patterns, and (iii) how the motor output is 
switched on and off.
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Olds' model is perhaps best regarded as summarising the main advances 
in understanding of the neurology of motivation. It suggests that 
there is a centre where sensory, proprio-ceptive and motivational fac­
tors meet and are made the basis of motor decision, and that this 
centre is the Hippocampus (Adey, 1970; Vanderwolf, Bland and Whishaw, 
1973; Kilmer and Olinski, 19 74). The model co-ordinates much contem­
porary research on the pharmacology of the rewards system of the brain, 
including his own work on brain stimulation (see for example. Olds,
1976; Deutsch and Koopmans, 19 76; Mogenson and Philips, 1976; Margules 
and Margules, 1973; Sigg, 1971; Isaacson, 1974).
A particular difficulty with Olds' model as one of neural integration is 
that it relies on the special histological arrangements of the Hippo­
campus, i.e. crossing fibres, for its function. It seems unlikely that 
the properties of integration are peculiar to a single location with 
somewhat unusual anatomical structure, the Hippocampus. More likely the 
neural organisation of brain tissue provides a general integrative 
process, and the Hippocampus is a special exploitation of that process.
Olds' model is essentially a computational decision model, which issues 
motor instructions on the basis of past experience. Many workers con­
sider that motivational states drive behaviour dynamically, and modify 
perceptual as well as motor processes to a degree dependent upon the 
current state of the motivational system. There is little scope in Olds' 
model for such pervasive effects. In this respect, it may perhaps be 
constrasted with Spinelli's neural hologram model, in which motivational 
input biasses the operation of the system. Nevertheless, Olds' model 
firmly indicates the neural relationships which have to be provided bet­
ween reinforcing, motivational and sensory influences. In particular it 
makes the point that a reinforcing event may not occur immediately after 
an action but may have to be searched for in the "successive memories".
(c) Response suppression as a learned response
Much motor learning seems to be learning not to do, rather than learning 
to do. Such learning is implicit in most behavioural experiments of 
instrumental learning or operant conditioning : the animal leams in the 
specific situation not to make incorrect movements. Margules and 
Margules (1973) summarise the behavioural data in relation to motivation : 
"The brief presentation of a motivationally significant stimulus to an 
organism results in the activation of a broad spectrum of exploratory
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movements. These movements have consequences that exert a powerful 
effect upon the future movements of an organism. Some of these move­
ments may be unsuccessful in producing the re-occurrence of the 
motivationally significant stimulus, whereas others may produce harm­
ful consequences. When a successful movement occurs, an active 
organism will refine this movement by the suppression of unsuccessful 
variations . . ."
This aspect of motor learning has been neglected in most neurological
models, and is not, as far as I know, represented in any simulation of
a neurological model. Konorski (1967) is one of the few theorists who
examines this aspect of behaviour in great detail. Using Pavlovian 
terms, adapted to his own concept of a Type II Conditioned reflex (i.e. 
operant conditioning), Konorski refers to the suppression of responses 
due to failure of reinforcement or' an "aversive Unconditioned Stimulus" 
as Inhibition. He argues, on analogy with his researches into the sim­
ilar suppression of classically conditioned responses, that there are 
two centres of conditioning, one promoting the response and one 
antagonistic to it. These centres are both excitatory in the neuro­
logical sense. "It is worth remembering that in all our experiments 
dealing with motor act inhibition, the antagonistic movement was always 
conspicuous . . . when the dog had been trained not to flex his leg
in the presence of the metronome, because its flexion prevented receiving 
food, the metronome began to elicit a strong extension movement of that 
leg". (Konorski, 1967, p.453). Basically, what Konorski suggests is 
that the receptor signals which indicate absence of a UCS (e.g. no food 
in tlie mouth) form their own Inhibitory Conditioned reflex. This con­
ditioned reflex is driven by an Anti-food Drive.
As already mentioned, there is a considerable theoretical gap between 
Konorski's outline of his hierarchical network model and his motiva­
tional and similar explanations of behaviour. Nevertheless, his basic 
mechanisms have the strength of being based upon an exceedingly thorough 
and sophisticated analysis of results of behavioural experiments.
In my model, concepts similar to those of Konorski are developed.
There are some differences. These differences are probably due to the 
particular way the simulations developed, rather than to an intention to 
challenge Konorski's conclusions in the respects in which they differ. 
What both models have in common is a conviction that the suppression of
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behaviour is important: that it is mediated by excitatory connections 
in special suppression centres; and that these centres are driven by 
motivational sources.
(d) Disturbing effects of motivational inputs
It was mentioned earlier that two problems arose in the model in con­
nection with the incorporation of the motivational system. The first 
of these was predicted by Hebb (1955), who argued that motivation would 
be disorganising at high levels. Accordingly the appearance of such 
disorganisation in my model does not perhaps represent so much a defici­
ency of the model as a challenge which nervous systems have overcome 
more successfully. In my model, the effect was exaggerated because of 
control troubles to be recounted later.
Briefly, in my model there was demonstrated a conflict between motiva­
tional bias and stimulus recognition. If the motivational inputs were 
given a sufficiently low value, trouble was avoided. In that case the 
motivational excitation merely added slightly to the pattern discrimina­
tion of one learned record from another. The model remained one in 
which motor actions are elicited by stimuli, albeit with the motivational 
state as a discriminative factor: i.e. a Stimulus-Response model. There 
is then no explanation of how behaviour might be initiated by motiva­
tional factors. If, on the other hand, the motivational inputs were made 
powerful enough to initiate behaviour, then the excitation from such 
inputs overbalanced the discriminatory effects of the sensory inputs.
In the model this had the effect that the model could be easily taught 
to repeat an action which had previously been reinforced: it found it 
very difficult to learn to make one response under one notional stimulus 
cue, and another response under another such cue.
The second problem concerned attempts to make the model learn a number 
of successive actions to reach a goal. Once it had succeeded in reach­
ing the goal and being "reinforced", on subsequent trials the successful 
response was driven by the motivational input. Although the motivational 
excitation spread "backwards!" temporally speaking to responses emitted 
earlier in the sequence, it acted most strongly on the response nearest 
to the goal. The model therefore produced this response at earlier 
inappropriate steps of the sequence.
Although these problems were not adequately solved in the simulations to 
be reported, some progress was made. A solution was developed towards
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the end of the project, and was programmed, although not run suffici­
ently to demonstrate its effectiveness definitely. It is mentioned 
here because, although developed independently in the present model, 
it shows considerable similarity to solutions proposed by Konorski 
(1967) and Deutsch (1960). Essentially, the idea is that every repre­
sentation of an emitted response is balanced by a representation of 
the suppression of tliat response. Motivational excitation is fed in 
through links with these representations. When any input pattern is 
in the input other than the particular input pattern which preceded 
a previous emission of the response concerned, then both representa­
tions are equally biassed by the motivational inputs. The particular 
input pattern which preceded the previous emission triggers the release 
on the current occasion because it energises one of the two representa­
tions more than the other, thus disturbing the equilibrium in the 
direction of release. A similar strategy of balanced motivational 
inputs was used to label responses as "successful" or "unsuccessful" 
in relation to a goal which occurred later in the sequence.
Further details of the proposed mechanism will be given in due course. 
As far as can be seen, the representations of suppression would act 
rather like the switches suggested by Deutsch, permitting the currently 
required response to be released, and afterwards switching off the 
excitation to it. One slight difference is that in my proposal 
motivational inputs are counterbalanced rather than actually switched 
off. This enables the whole of a sensori-motor pathway to a particular 
goal to be biassed above general levels, whilst the release of res­
ponses is held in check. The mechanism also resembles Konorski's form­
ulation by providing an opposing force which brings a response to 
cessation.
(e) Motivation and arousal
In the early simulations of my model, an arousal system was introduced. 
The level of arousal was made dependent upon the notional biological 
significance of the input, i.e. its temporal relationship to innately 
recognised patterns representing satisfaction of physiological needs. 
One of a number of problems encountered was the appearance of error 
accompanying high levels of arousal, as forecast by Hebb. Another was 
its neurological implausibility. The behaviour of the simulated system 
bore little resemblance to the known behaviour of the nervous system in 
arousal (see e.g. Sokolov, 1960; Magoun, 1954). The main difficulty
now seems to have involved theoretical difficulties in distinguishing 
the operation of arousal and motivation, Hebb saw this difficulty 
also: "If we tentatively identify a general state of drive with degree 
of arousal, where does this leave hunger, pain and sex drives?" (Hebb, 
1955). Since Hebb's statement, an enormous amount of research has 
been devoted to this aspect of neuroscience (see e.g. Deutsch and 
Koopmans, 1976; Olds, 1976).
Some progress was made towards incorporating the insights of such 
research into the later development of the model. In particular, cer­
tain problems of control encountered in the model were solved by a 
notional periodic gating of afferent inputs. These brought the behaviour 
of the simulated system more into conformity with the observed activity 
in the nervous system in arousal. It also introduced a change of per­
spective into the representation of both arousal and motivational 
inputs to the system. Arousal became an attentional rather than a 
directly motivational control. The concept of arousal came closer to 
that described in connection with an extended neural template system. 
Arousal can be directed to any part of the template, or to all or none 
of them. Arousal in specific pathways enables weight to be given to 
one or another aspect of the total configuration of sensory and other 
inputs to the integrating system. Motivational inputs, by comparison, 
form part of the neural template system. States of arousal can thus 
drive either motivational or sensory discriminative aspects of the system, 
with differing behavioural effects.
A diffuse distributed model in which motivational inputs may have 
biassing effects would appear to differ from a computational one in that, 
as in the simulations of my model, motivational inputs at too high a 
level led to the model "perceiving" incorrectly as well as behaving 
incorrectly.
(f) The nature of the reinforcing event
A question which a model of neural integration representing motivated 
action must answer is the nature of the reinforcing event. To find a 
solution concordant with the data is far from simple.
Perhaps the most widely accepted proposal was that of Hull (19 37, 1943). 
He said that reduction of drive was the essential condition for rein­
forcement of learning. Hull distinguished drive (D) from Habit Strength 
(sHr). Reinforcing states are those involving a diminution of the
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receptor discharge characteristic of a need, or, alternatively, the 
reduction in drive receptor response (Hull, 1943). Essentially this 
ties learning firmly to specific physiological needs. Later research 
has thrown considerable doubt upon the reduction of drive concept.
Clearly many aspects of eating behaviour have little to do with the 
metabolic need states resulting from lack of food (Mogenson and 
Phillips, 1976). On the other hand, the discovery of the diencephalic 
reward systems maikes the physiological aspects of the hypothesis more 
plausible. Considerations of this kind led to Konorski's (1967) 
formulation, in which there is a separate "food reflex" and "hunger 
reflex", each having its own reinforcing event.
In Hull's theory, D and sHr are multiplicative, so that an absence 
of drive means that no learning takes place. In contrast, Guthrie and 
his followers supported a pure contiguity theory of learning in which 
motivational conditions play the part of stimuli only. In this con­
text, Tolman's classic work (1932) makes Hull's hypothesis extremely 
doubtful.
Drive reduction offers no particular difficulty of representation in 
my model. It was not actually adopted as the definition of reinforce­
ment because of my predelictions rn other directions. Contiguity, as 
a principle of learning, is the basis of the neurological model proposed 
here. The question, however, is whether such a principle is a sufficient 
explanation of learning. An exhaustive attempt to demonstrate effective 
learned instrumental responses using only the contiguity aspects of the 
model failed. This may of course have been due to inadequate solutions 
of quite different problems of neural integration at the time the 
attempt was made. The reader will have gathered from foregoing discus­
sion that the present author considers that contiguity is a principle 
which underlies all learning; learning as it appears in animals is, 
however, assisted by special mechanisms. Amongst the most important of 
those mechanisms may be mechanisms of arousal.
Instead of Drive reduction, Sheffield (1966) proposed what in effect is 
a drive induction theory, if it is a drive theory at all. Sheffield 
and Campbell (1954) had suggested that the effect of hunger is to lower 
thresholds at which responses are elicited by external stimuli. It is 
not clear how the threshold reduction is to be accomplished. Selective 
addition of drive inputs lowers threshold. This necessarily applies to
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all the motivational models discussed. Whether such a reduction of 
thresholds is to be regarded as driving behaviour or facilitating 
response to stimuli is a question of the weight given to the inputs, 
as already discussed. This question is closely associated with the so- 
called incentive view of motivation. These views of motivation are 
perhaps not so far apart as may at first seem. If motivational inputs 
can be applied selectively to records of sensory events which have 
preceded reinforcements, then such inputs would reduce the thresholds 
of the records concerned. Thus stimuli would acquire incentive 
properties.
A feature of Sheffield's model is that it is the consummatory response 
rather than drive reduction which is the reinforcing event. This is 
quite close to Deutsch's model (1960). In Deutsch's view the reinforc­
ing event is the arrival of excitation to a stimulus analyser connected 
to a primary link (innately connected to motivational excitation). For 
him the reinforcing event is the arrival of a sensory pattern. The 
resemblance of this assumption to the "key trigger patterns" proposed 
by Pringle (1951) may be noted. Key trigger patterns also release 
responses. A key trigger pattern could mediate Deutsch's Sensory 
Analyser connected to a Primary Link. A similar assumption is made in 
my model. In so far as behaviour is guided by innate needs, it is 
reinforced by the occurrence of an environmental situation which matches 
an inbuilt configuration.
However, such an assumption does not in itself explain reinforcement.
The mechanisms still have to be defined whereby responses which lead to 
a key trigger pattern gain precedence over responses which do not. Some 
indication has already been given of the general approach I have taken 
to this question. The shaping of behaviour is not suggested to be 
exclusively tied to direct physiological satisfactions, like food, or 
even psychological satisfactions, like sex. Nevertheless, in develop­
ing the simulations a number of mechanisms have been used. As already 
mentioned, the aim has been primarily to take the model a stage further 
towards the mediation of behaviour which can be compared to that of 
living things. The kind of picture reached towards the end of the project 
resembles most closely that of Deutsch (1960) and perhaps Sheffield (1966). 
In Deutsch's model, excitation becomes transferred from the primary link 
to the stimulus analyser excited just before the excitation of the Stimulus 
analyser operating the primary link.
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This theoretical position has its shortcomings. It ties behaviour 
strongly to a primary link- Moreover, it implies that all behaviour 
is built up in atomic chains, whereas animals, especially Man, often 
act as though they possessed cognitive maps of the world in which they 
live. The adoption of mechanisms similar to this scenario does not 
mean that the view promoted here is that behaviour conforms generally 
to such narrow limits. On the contrary, the basic attributes of my 
theory of neural integration would appear to contain potential for a 
broader view of neural organisation, e.g. anticipation. Although the 
kind of step-by-step assembly of motivated sequences, as proposed by 
many theorists, provides a rather narrow concept of behaviour, it is 
not necessarily inimical to a broader view. In my model, such mech­
anisms are to be regarded as specialisations which have developed 
from the basic capacity of neural tissue to mediate integrations.
Other mechanisms would have developed, less tied to physiological 
events. Even the mechanisms developed show promise that they could be 
applied to the broader kind of behavioural organisation with which we 
are more familiar in Man. The development of such behaviour is beyond 
the scope of the present project, but some further reference to the 
issue will be made in later chapters.
IV The problem of brain function: a problem of integration
A . Behavioural and psychological aspects
The author has raised a number of questions in the foregoing sections. 
One of the main problems which confronts the designer of a neurological 
model of the brain is not the solving of any one of the problems, but 
proposing a model which at least may seem to hold the promise of con­
tributing to the solution of them all. A model must of course fail in 
that respect. It will fail in two ways. First there will be the 
theoretical shortcomings in the principles of the model which make it 
inherently unable to deal with some aspects of brain function in a 
plausible way. Second, the difficulties of simulation will make it 
progress only a short distance, in some directions at the expense of 
others, and incorporating deficiencies due to the inadequate design of 
the simulations.
What it is hoped has been established in the foregoing sampling of 
psychological and behavioural problems is that the essential task of a 
neurological model is to show how all the aspects of function can be
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co-ordinated into a unified organismic action. Perception cannot be 
entirely separated from motor action, nor from reinforcement and 
motivation, nor can any of these be separated from each other.
B. Neuro-anatomical integration
Alongside the integrative activités of the brain in respect of 
behavioural function, is the co-ordinating function of many discrete 
interconnected ganglia, nuclei and centres of specialised function.
What is the contribution of the archi-cortex and of the neo-cortex?
What is the function of thalamus and basal ganglia? These are not 
questions for a model of neural integration. However, they are ques­
tions upon which the neurological model should be able to say how 
their activities are co-ordinated.
Few neurological models have pursued this question of the co-ordination 
of parts and their separable and distinguishable functions. Old's 
model describes the function of a notional Hippocampus, but does not 
fit that model into an overall neurological model of the brain.
Kilmer, McCullich, Blum, Craighill and Peterson (1968) proposed a model 
of the reticular formation and Stapley and Kilmer (19 74) one of the 
Hippocampus. Again these are not fitted into a model of the overall 
integrative properties of the brain. On the other hand, simulations 
which do show the capacities of overall integration (e.g. Spinelli,
197Û) do not show the differentiation of the function of the parts and 
therefore do not demonstrate how the separate functions would be 
co-ordinated. What is aimed at here is a demonstration that separation 
of function by evolved specialist mechanisms is compatible with overall 
integration without ad hoc co-ordinating mechanisms having had to be 
evolved.
V Conclusion
A number of problems of psychological function have been discussed.
These are topics which it is hoped will orient the reader to the impli­
cations of the model of neural integration to be presented. It is 
hoped that they will enable the reader to see something of the rationale 
behind the neural representation in the model, and the decisions taken 
in the simulations. In considering a model of neural integrations, one 
should bear in mind the tremendous burdens which the integrative 
activities of the brain places upon any model. It is hoped that the 
foregoing discussion has illustrated this burden.
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CHAPTER 4
SOME PRINCIPLES OF ORGANISATION IN CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF NEURAL
INTEGRATION
In the previous chapters some psychological aspects of brain function 
were discussed. In this chapter, some consideration will be given to 
theories of the way in which neurons might be integrated to mediate 
those functions.
I Mechanism, technological analogies
Mechanism and organising principle are often difficult to distinguish 
in brain models. Before reviewing some of the models which have been 
proposed, one may note that one way of considering a model is in relation 
to the technology of the era in which it arises. Griffith (1967) argues 
against the employment of such analogies. " . . .  from an experimental 
viewpoint we are in complete ignorance of a great number of basic 
facts . . ., therefore many people have slid away from the real problem
and have tried to impose upon the brain an alien structure - that of 
electronic circuitry, of a mechanical servo-mechanism, or of symbolic 
logic."
Such attempts have often led to valuable insights. Given essential 
ignorance of facts, analogies with complex artefacts may be the only way 
to proceed. At a time when hydraulic engineering had just come into its 
own, and fountains and waterworks were appearing all over Europe, 
Descartes proposed that "animal spirits" flowed through the nerves rather 
like water through a pipe. It was sent through the "pores of the brain", 
and once the pores had been used, the flow through them was facilitated. 
This may not be so different from contemporary views of transmitter 
function.
The telephone analogy of the brain was a powerful step forward. Its full 
implications have only become apparent with Shannon's development of the 
boolean algebra of telephone switching networks, and was taken even 
father in the theorems of Pitts and McCulloch in the forties. (McCulloch 
and Pitts, 1943; Pitts and McCulloch, 1947).
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More recent examples of importance are Pringle's model of neurons 
acting as coupled oscillators, and the "neural hologram" model of 
Pribram (1971) and Spinelli (1970). There is even a sense in which 
models which proposed some principle of organisation directly related 
to the brain derived those principles from recent technological 
developments. Rosenblatt's Perceptron (see below) can for example be 
referred to contemporary progress in cybernetic engineering.
Valuable as such insights may be, we now appear to be reaching a stage 
where the facts which are becoming available are best understood not 
by analogy with any other subject, but by direct reference to the brain 
itself. In particular, the data coming from electrical implantation, 
neuro-pharmacology, electron microscopy and neuro-behavioural studies 
point to an understanding of the brain in terms of its neurons, pharma­
cology and micro-anatomy. As Griffith urges: "we seek to understand 
the brain not as a computer or anything else, but as an entity in its 
own right". Accordingly in the following section, brain models will only 
be considered insofar as they seem to offer principles which aid the 
understanding of the brain as a biological entity.
II Three principles distinguished
With the elucidation of the neuronal functions in the nervous system 
two earlier types of model have fallen into the background. In one the 
brain was conceived as a connective system of a completely determined 
kind based upon analogy with a reflex arc. In the other, the nervous 
tissue was seen as a single substance in which field forces act, more 
or less independently of the neuronal individuality of the tissue. Like 
the particle and wave theories of light, both these ideas are now seen 
to be aspects of something more complex than either. Most, if not all, 
constructors of contemporary models, interpret the nervous system in 
a statistical sense. A connective theory, even one such as that of 
Griffith (1967, see below), in which connections are determined by 
"neuronal recognition", take into account that such connections are 
probabilistic. In view of the number of elements in the brain, the recog­
nition of the probabilistic factors, tend to bring all models into the 
class of diffuse processing.
There does, however, seem to be a fundamental difference between models, 
such as were initiated by Hebb (1949), which interpose a diffuse central 
process between sensory and motor processing, and those where the
79
complexities are introduced only in the pathways between sensory and 
motor processing. These two kinds of model may again be distinguished 
from those in which there are successive levels of orderly processing 
culminating at an apex from which again there are successive levels 
down to the periphery.
For convenience these may be termed (i) hierarchical models, (ii) discrim­
inative feed-back weighting models, and (iii) distributed memory models.
Ill Hierarchical models of the nervous system
A. The hierarchical organisation of the brain
Much of the support for a hierarchical neural model is the apparent hier­
archical organisation of the brain seen in clinical neurology and in 
the general anatomical organisation of brain areas. At the neurophysio- 
logical level this argument has been developed most powerfully by Luria 
(e.g. 1973) and Konorski (e.g. 1957). Konorski has developed a well- 
defined neurological model in conjunction with his general hierarchical 
view. This will be discussed further in this thesis. Luria does not 
propose a precise neural model. However, his structural and functional 
analysis serves as a background to hierarchical models generally.
Luria distinguishes three functional units in all sensory modalities, 
the primary projection area, a secondary area "which convert(s) the 
somato-topic projection of the individual parts of the retina (in the 
visual area) into its functional organisation", and tertiary "overlapping 
zones". The latter, Luria thinks, are exclusively human developments. 
(Luria, 1973, p.73). They are concerned with the integration of excita­
tion arriving from different analysers. He proposes three basic Laws: 
the Law of Hierarchical Structure of cortical zones; the Law of 
diminished Specificity of the hierarchically arranged cortical zones; and 
the Law of Progressive Latéralisation of function. The last law implies 
that there is a progressive transfer from primary cortical areas to 
secondary and finally to tertiary areas.
In considering Luria's work, it must be borne in mind that the aim is not 
the understanding of neural integration, but rather the relationship of 
structure to function. Luria may well be right in thinking that anatom­
ically that the relationship is hierarchical. However, the point which 
was made in connection with pattern recognition models must be made again 
here: functional hierarchy does not necessarily imply the existence of an
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hierarchical neural structure. Consider the extended template system 
described in Chapter 2. The section of the template which matches 
strokes is functionally hierarchical to the section matching "letters" 
(i.e. the simple template section). Non-hierarchical theories of neural 
integration, including that to be described in this thesis, can mediate 
an extended template of this kind.
There is now evidence throwing doubt upon the strictness of the hier­
archy proposed in Luria's Laws. Singer and Tretter (1976) investigating 
the receptive field properties of contour deprived cats, found recep­
tive fields in Area 18 very similar to those in Area 17. Their methods 
of investigation, which included electrical stimulation from the LGN, 
suggests that these projection cells in Area 18 were at least partially 
innervated by direct projection from the LGN. Baizer, Robinson and Dow 
(19 77) investigated visual responses of Area 18 neurons in awake behaving 
monkey with the specific aim of determining whether such neurons were 
organised on an hierarchical basis from Area 17 neurons or by "indepen­
dent chains". Neurons in Area 18 were found to be preferentially 
responsive to six kinds of stimulus parameter: orientation, colour, 
border, direction, spot, light inhibition. The receptive fields served 
by Area 17 neurons described by Hubei and wiesel (1962) were simple, 
complex and hypercomplex. All preferred elongated stimuli and all were 
sensitive to stimulus orientation. Baizer et alia conclude: "The find­
ing that different populations of cells in Areas 17 and 18 are maximally 
sensitive to different stimulus parameters implies that, at least in 
this stage in visual processing, the neural representation of visual 
stimuli is accomplished through the simultaneous activity of cells in 
different groups rather than through the activity of cells with compound 
specificities".
Luria also proposed Three principal Functional Units: (1) Tone or level
of activity, associated with the reticular formation, hypothalamus and 
metabolic links with medulla and mesencephalon (2) Unit for processing 
and storing information, comprising principally the lateral regions of 
neo-cortex, convex surface of the hemispheres and posterior regions,
(3) Programming, regulating and verifying activity, located in the ant­
erior regions of the hemispheres, i.e. the frontal lobes. One of the 
difficulties with hierarchical neural models is how these functional 
links would be brought into the hierarchical neural network. Perhaps the 
most detailed effort to explain this was that of Konorski (1967).
81
/1\\
il
FIGURE 3a
FIGURE 1+FIGURE 3G
Figure 4.1 (reproduced from Uttley,195^a) Hierarchical 
organisation of neurons.
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Luria himself draws attention to certain aspects of behaviour which 
one would have thought difficult to fit into an hierarchical scheme 
of neural organisation. For example, "This motor task, or model of the 
future need, is constant or invariant and it demands an equally constant 
or invariant result . . . It is a most important fact that the invariant 
motor task is fulfilled not by a constant, fixed set, but by a varying 
set of movements which, however, lead to the constant invariant effect". 
(Luria, 1973, p.248). Again, with respect to memory, "All, however, 
unanimously agree that system of connections into which traces of infor­
mation reaching the subject are introduced are coded with respect to 
different signs, and consequently they form multi-dimensional matrices 
from which the subject must choose each time the system which, at that 
particular moment, will form the basis for coding". (Luria's italics). 
It would be out of place to pursue the difficulties in hierarchical 
systems here in depth. They are argued by Feeney, Pittman and Wagner 
(1974) and Pribram (1971). Some further aspects of the difficulties 
in such systems will appear in discussions of models below.
B. Conditional probability, temporal sequence; Uttley 
Shannon's elucidation of the boolean algebra of networks led to the 
realisation of the possibilities of logical networks as an explanation 
of brain function. Pitts and McCulloch developed further the concept 
of a "formal neuron". This was a neuron which fired or failed to fire 
as a function of excitatory and inhibitory inputs from other formal 
neurons. The "Formal neuron" enabled a logical calculus to be applied.
In such analyses Pitts and McCulloch challenged the apparent rigidity 
of logical networks by demonstrating that "reverbertory circuits" could 
remove the dependence of the networks from the particularities of a 
specific input event and so mediate Universels (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943; 
Pitts and McCulloch, 1947).
Uttley (1956, 1959, 1961) put forward an hierarchical model which dif­
fered from former network proposals in taking into account not merely 
the conjunctions and disjunctions of inputs, but the probability of 
those conjunctions. He had already outlined (Uttley, 1954) an analog- 
digital conversion system. The essential form of the nervous system, as 
proposed in Uttley*s model, can be seen in Figure 4.1. This figure, 
however, only represents the hierarchical convergence of a network. The 
essential idea of Uttley"s "conditional probability machines" is that 
units count not merely the occurrence or non—occurrence of inputs (or
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SUPERCONTROL
 s u b c o n t r o l
Figure 4.2 (reproduced from Uttley,1956b). Conditional 
probability in an hierarchical system implemented 
by Super contro and Sub control connections. These 
enable the units at the j and k levels to register 
the probability of jk given j or k.
Figure 4.3 (reproduced from Uttley,1956b), The 
introduction of a delay into one of two convergent 
pathways enables units to register the sequence
jk'.
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conjunctions and/or disjunctions of inputs), but that they also count 
probability that such an input should occur if another neural event 
has occured. Thus the units at the J and K level of Figure 4.1. would 
contain "a quantity representing unity probability" if "the set J" 
actually occurs. If neither J nor K occurs, the unit is to contain 
not zero, as in the classification machine, but the unconditional 
probability (my italics) of J as determined by prior experience. If 
K occurs, the unit must contain the probability of J given that K 
occurs . Uttley compares such a machine to an Unconditional probab­
ility Machine. The unconditional probability machine computes only the 
unconditional probability of J when J does not appear, or unity when it 
does appear.
For calculation of the conditional probabilities, it is necessary for 
the lower (J,K) level of units to refer to the next highest level (JK). 
This necessitates what Uttley refers to as "Supercontrol" and "Sub­
control" (See Figure 4,2 from Uttley, 1956b). There are, of course, 
other units than K to be considered. This brings in the difficulty of 
multiple control. First it must be noted that "There must be a con­
nection from every unit to each of its superunits" and "the system of 
subcontrol is a duplicate of the supercontrol system, but it has a 
different function, operating in a reverse direction". There are also 
necessary rules for sub-control and super-control which avoid false 
control, i.e. changes supporting false inferences.
Lack of simultaneity of events was expressly excluded from Uttley's 
analysis of the conditional probability machine. In a separate paper 
(1956b) he shows how the network can be extended to compute temporal 
sequence. For the unextended conditional probability machine, events 
(impulses) must be considered as occurring together or not at all. By 
introducing delays into the pathways, then events which occur in temp­
oral sequence can be represented as conjunctions at points in the 
hierarchy (see Figure 4.3). This can, of course, be extended to include 
representations of conjunctions resulting from two, three or more delays.
Although it is frequently assumed that Uttley's demonstration of delay 
in pathways as a mediator of temporal sequence is peculiar to hierarch­
ical network models, this is not in fact so. A considerable use of 
this principle to mediate temporal sequence is made in later versions of 
my model.
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The main objection to Uttley’s proposals lies in the number of units 
and pathways involved (Uhr, 19 73). Sutherland (1959) points out that 
to make a discrimination of two points on a retina as to their rela­
tive position and brightness, "we would require more units than there 
are units in the central nervous system". Dodwell (1964) proposed 
that a shape coding system, similar to that described by Deutsch (1960) 
or Sutherland (1957) is interposed between sensory receptors and a 
"Recognising system" of the kind contained in Uttley's Unconditional 
Probability machine. The outputs from this can then be applied to 
the Conditional Probability machine. Dodwell points out that his 
"coupled system" would provide an economy of units, serving to remove 
the objection raised against the Uttley type of system.
Although connections would be reduced by Dodwell*s coupled system 
other questions are raised. There is the nature of the precoding device. 
If he means feature analysers of the kind discovered by Hubei and Weisel, 
then, according to the hierarchical model, this only constitutes a 
lower hierarchical stage, and the overall numerical questions remain 
unchanged. If, however, as seems to be intended by Dodwell, the pre­
coders are of the kind suggested by Sutherland, one must ask where the 
neural apparatus would be situated. If in the cortex, the non hierarch­
ical computational network would be immersed within the recogniser and 
conditional probability apparatus, leading to further complications of 
structure and function. If sub-cortical, it is difficult to explain 
the topological mappings of sense organ onto cortex. These would be 
obviated by codings of the kind suggested by Sutherland. Moreover, 
there would have to be a precoder for every different form of analysis 
available to the animal. There would also be the difficulty noted by 
Luria (cited above) that the subject can choose coding according to his 
immediate purposes.
In general it seems to the present author that there is an implausibility 
in the interpretation of the neuro-anatomy and histology in terms of 
hierarchical systems. Nature appears to be capable, not only in nervous 
systems but elsewhere, of controlling the most precise ordering of 
fibres. Although it is admittedly possible to account for an hierarchical 
system in terms of random diffuse connections, if the main principle of 
neural organisation were really hierarchical, one would expect to see the 
kind of layout of fibres implied by such a system. Instead one finds a 
highly specialised, morphologically developed, histology of a different 
kind (see Chapter 5).
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In summary, there are the numerical difficulties inherent in hierarchi­
cal systems; the evidence from Singer and Tretter (1976) and Baizer, 
Robinson and Dow (1977) against the proposed hierarchical relationship 
of areas 17 and 18, and there are the difficulties posed by the 
apparent lability and coding of attention.
Finally, many will find it implausible that the perception (recognition) 
of unitary concepts in the world should depend upon the response of a 
single neuron, to which impulses have converged. This will be more 
fully discussed in connection with Konorski's gnostic unit model, and 
in the last section of this chapter.
C. A complete hierarchical model of the brain: Konorski 
Konorski (1967) has presented what is perhaps the most definitely 
specified verbal model of the brain in neural terms. My model is in 
some respects at the opposite end of the spectrum from hierarchical 
models like Konorski's. Yet there are several strong resemblances with 
his formulations. Accordingly, some space is devoted to his theories, 
both here and in later chapters.
Konorski uses the evidence of receptive fields to support his proposal 
of convergent and divergent networks. "As it was indicated by Hubei 
and Weisel, the units of higher levels of the visual afferent system 
are formed by the convergence of appropriate units of the lower levels.
In other words, a unit of the highest level represents the top of a 
pyramid whose basement consists of receptive organs . . . However, 
neither humans nor animals notice lines, corners, or "tongues" or 
"rods" . . .  It may be supposed that particular units of the so-called 
associative areas of cortex become interconnected in various ways, form­
ing what Hebb has called cell assemblies corresponding to particular 
perceptions. . . But having at our disposal the recent data from Hubei 
and Weisel's experiments, we can extrapolate their findings and explain 
the origin of perceptions according to the same principles which were 
found to operate on the lower levels of the afferent system". (This 
was, of course, written before the data from Singer and Tretter (19 76) 
and Baizer, Robinson and Dow (1977) called this assumption into 
question). "In other words, we can assume that perceptions experienced 
in humans' and animals' lives, are represented not by assemblies of 
units but by single units in the highest levels of particular analysers.
We shall call these levels gnostic areas and the units responsible for 
particular perceptions, gnostic units". (Konorski, 1967, p.75).
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In respect of the proposed convergence upon a single cell, Konorski 
qualifies his proposal by introducing the idea of redundancy; "each 
unitary perception may be represented in a given gnostic field not by 
a single gnostic unit but by a number of them, because, if in a state 
of arousal of that field a new stimulus pattern is presented, all 
unengaged units which potentially include its elements are capable of 
becoming actual gnostic units representing that pattern". (Konorski, 
1967, p.90). He uses this explanation to deal with the fact that 
brain damage in older persons damages recent memory more than older 
memories. "In younger subjects the number of gnostic units largely 
prevails over the number of actual units . . .". Consequently in 
older persons, the sets of gnostic units representing recent memories 
are in general smaller than those of early memories and more vulnerable 
to damage. A prediction of this kind, which appears to be specific to 
a particular model, may in fact be general to all models incorporating 
certain assumption, e.g. a stock of memory elements. In my model, the 
provision of a finite stock of elements yields similar predictions, 
although in a very different kind of system. In my model the stock 
of elements is being constantly turned over: briefly, the allocation 
to the storage of a memory undergoes decay, upon which the memory 
element becomes available for contributing to the storage of another 
memory. In such a system, there is a change in the statistical distri­
bution of the probable duration of memories. This will be referred to 
later. These aspects are not specific to either my model or Konorski's.
Another feature of Konorski's model which is in common with mine is the 
assumption that representation in the nervous system is generally in the 
form of complementary balanced systems. For every unit signalling an 
event there is a unit which would be active when that event did not 
occur, e.g. on-receptor and off-receptors. At the time this was intro­
duced into my model, I had not read Konorski*s (1967) book; nor had I 
appreciated the significance of Uttley's provision of similar elements. 
Konorski makes extremely powerful use of the principle. For example, 
letters of the alphabet which have parts in common, say, E and F , are 
not confused because the extra tail of one appears as a "not-tail" in 
the other. These considerations apply equally within my model. In my 
model, the balanced system was introduced because otherwise the model 
would have suffered from great inadequacies of processing.
Konorski's model has not itself been simulated. However, a model of
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attention utilising lateral recurrent inhibition was simulated by 
Walley and Weiden (1973). The basic idea is that gnostic units do 
not inhibit each other within a set but do so between sets. This idea 
seems to be very close to the mutual inhibition between cell assemblies 
introduced into Hebb's model at Milner's suggestion (Rochester, Holland, 
Haibt and Duda, 1956). "The encoding of one stimulus will tend to 
interfere with tlie simultaneous encoding of other stimuli. This inter­
ference is termed cognitive masking, and is attributable to recurrent 
lateral inhibition between gnostic units". ( Walley and Weiden, 1973).
Feeney, Pittman and Wagner (19 74) have criticised the Walley and Weiden 
model and take the opportunity to mount some criticisms of hierarchical 
neural interpretations of perception in addition to those previously 
mentioned here. They also raise objections to the attribution of 
attention solely to inhibition.
Konorski's neurological model has been considered above only in its 
embodiment of an hierarchical structure of neurons. His other theoret­
ical formulations, especially his discussions of behaviour in condition­
ing, are discussed elsewhere in this thesis.
IV Feed-back weighting adjustment: discriminative models
In Chapter 2 reference was made to a number of pattern recognition 
models, e.g. Rosenblatt, 1958, Selfridge, 1958 which exercised a pro­
found influence on notions of neural processing. Essentially these are 
"discrimination models" in the sense distinguished in the discussions 
in that chapter. Their function is to connect responses to input 
patterns, patterns being distinguished, i.e. discriminated, only by the 
responses attached to them.
The characteristic feature of these models is that the connections 
defining the pathways through the system remain unchanged by experience. 
What changes is the weighting given to the messages which pass along 
the pathways. This variation of weighting may be as simple as an all-or- 
none passing on of the signal at a substation. Although the direction 
of the pathway of signals is afferent-efferent, there are interposed 
sub-stations at which conjunctions of afferent fibres determine the 
state of the fibre which emerges at that stage to proceed to the next. 
These connections are not changed with learning. The conjunctions are 
generally random selections of fibres, taken in bundles the size of which
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Figure 4.4 (Redrawn from Rosenblatt, 1958b) A simple 
perceptron.
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is also random. The only efferent-afferent connections in the system 
are feed-back fibres which vary the weighting of the transmissions at 
the sub-stations. The feed-back system provides a discriminative 
mixture of correlations of inputs at each sub-stage.
The purest form of this principle is seen in Rosenblatt's Perceptron 
(Figure 4.4). (Rosenblatt, 1958(a), 1958(b), 1960). In this model 
one can see most clearly the implication of the principle as providing 
a direct through-put of signals between sense-organ and effector. In 
conjunction with the model, Rosenblatt proposes a principle of 
separability. In effect this argues the self-organising nature of the 
system. Any set of input patterns will be discriminatied into sub-sets 
if a randomly distributed feed-back function, acting in accordance with 
some criterion assessed at the output, varies the weightings given to 
the conjunctions of the transmission fibres at a substation. The 
perceptron has been critically analysed by Minsky and Papert (1969) and 
summarised in Scott (1977).
A similar principle may be seen in a number of models which however con­
tribute other insights. In the well known Pandemonium of Selfridge 
(1958) weights are used to form what may be seen as feature analysers. 
There is a stage of "computational demons" which "shout" according to 
some feature of the input. "The computing demons are constructed from 
only a very few operational functions which are carefully non binary". 
These sub-demons shout at a set of "cognitive demons" whose "sole task 
is to add a weighted sum of the outputs of all the computational demons. 
The system offers the prospect of being able to vary the feature analysis 
so that those are found which optimise the operation.
Selfridge discusses the concept of "hill climbing". As this concept con­
veys the mathematical flavour of many models (e.g. Kilmer, McCulloch,
Blum and Craighill, 1968; Marr, 1969, 1970), it will be briefly summar­
ised. " . . .  the complete set of weights for all the cognitive demons 
is a vector . . , Now for some (unknown) set of weights the behaviour 
of this whole Pandemonium is optimum, and the problem of feature weight­
ing is to find that set". Considering the vector space, one climbs the 
hill to the optimum point by taking small random steps in all directions. 
When a direction is found which improves the "score", take that step 
and start again. The technique is similar to that employed in solving 
equations in the discipline of statistical mechanics. One problem is 
discerning false peaks. Such models work by small steps, computing a
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score at each step, following false trails to false peaks, until finally 
it finds a peak.
This process would seem to throw light upon the general principles of 
evolutionary development. As an explanatory model of an highly evolved 
nervous system, there are difficulties. What is the principle by which 
each step in the hill climbing is assessed? According to the model, the 
only changes required to be brought about in the neural apparatus by 
evolution are the weightings of the connections. In that case the highly 
evolved nervous system should retain essentially the structure of the 
primitive one except for modified feed-back connections.
A model which attempts to apply the same kind of principles to discov­
ering what those evolutionary changes have been is that of Marr (1968,
19 70). The model is too complex to be summarised here, and only an 
indication will be given. In the (1968) model of the cerebellum, the 
Purkinje Cells are the key elements, each controlling an elemental move­
ment and receiving a feed-back via the climbing fibres from the Olivary 
Nucleus. These feed-back signals act essentially as reinforcements. 
Alternatively they can be seen as mediating the feed-back modifications 
of a Rosenblatt Perceptron. The climbing fibres control the synaptic 
modifications of the input of the parallel fibres to the Purkinje cells.
A key concept of the model, which differentiates it from other feed-back 
weighting modification systems, is the Codon. The idea is analogical 
with the codon by which the structure of DNA was analysed. An almost 
unlimited differentiated structure can be built up of different combina­
tions of relatively small samples.
In Marr's model. Mossy Fibres are input fibres reporting sensory con­
texts. The mossy fibres act on granule cells which act upon the 
parallel fibres which act upon Purkinje cells. The only synapse which 
is modifiable is the feed-back control synapse of the climbing fibre upon 
the Purkinje cell. The other arrangements provide selective sampling.
A Codon is a small sub-set, about 4-12, of the mossy fibres. There are 
about 200,000 parallel fibres capable of exciting any one Purkinje Cell. 
The reinforcement action on the parallel-fibre-Purkinje Cell synapses 
serves therefore to vary the selection of codons which will excite 
that Purkinje Cell. Marr (1970) suggests that the system can be general­
ised to provide a model for the neo-cortex; "The key idea behind the 
present theory is that the brain decomposes its afferent information into 
what are essentially its natural cluster classes". During life the
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clusters are refined and decomposed until they fall inside classes 
"which in real life have to be discriminated".
Albus (1971) considered the anatomy and probable function of the 
cerebellar cortex. Whilst not working out a detailed model, he suggests 
that the cerebellum acts as a Perceptron. His contribution was to 
suggest that a "list processing" could be undertaken, the iterative 
aspects of the processing being implemented by the recursive loop con­
sisting of motor efferents reporting to cortex, reporting back to 
cerebellum.
These models have been mentioned in some detail to give some indication 
of their theoretical flavour. That character can only really be 
appreciated by a study of the original presentations (see e.g. Marr,
1968). There seems to be little doubt that the principles offered in
such models are valid. In particular they enable one to understand how 
information carried by neuron-like systems can be analysed merely by 
chunking and sampling information, and by feed-back variation of 
connectivity. To what extent those principles actually describe the
structure and function of the brain is another matter. Of course, the
answer need not be simply yes or no. Marr gives a convincing descrip­
tion of the cerebellum, and it may be that the operation of that organ 
is at least partly carried out by a feed-back codon adaptation as he 
suggests.
Kilmer and his associates (Kilmer, McCulloch, Blum, Craighill and 
Peterson, 1968; Kilmer and Olinski, 1974; Stanley and Kilmer, 1975) have 
used feed-back weighting adjustment to construct models of various 
anatomical structures in the brain, i.e. the Reticular Formation and the 
Hippocampus. These will be discussed further in la later chapter.
One of the purely mechanical difficulties in feed-back adjustment models 
is that of the retention of the values of the weightings. For example, 
in the Kilmer models, the feed-back weighting is measured by the number 
of synapses which have been facilitated from an input upon the integrat­
ing cell. This raises questions concerning the permanence of the 
connections. If they are permament, there would appear little difficulty 
in retaining the invariance of the feed-back. If they decay it 
would be necessary for the decay to operate equally upon all the synapses 
concerned: otherwise decay would lead to a change of the feed-back and 
accordingly a change of the pattern discriminated. Moreover to mediate
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a large number of patterns, the system imposes a tremendous burden on 
the synaptic aspect. This is increased if no decay is permitted.
However, it is not really upon such points that the discriminative 
model will be judged. The question is rather whether the model is 
considered to be satisfying in relation to the general problems of 
neural integration discussed in earlier chapters. The strength of this 
kind of model is its efficiency in pattern recognition. Essentially 
it is a Stimulus-response model, and what the Gibsons have categorised 
as a Discriminative model (see Chapter 2). In the weighting feed-back 
model, memory takes the form of the retention of the values of weight­
ings applied to particular random correlations of input fibres. It is 
difficult to see a place in such a system for the registration and 
recall of individual discrete memories, enrichment and imagination would 
be even more difficult to explain. Perhaps the salient point is what 
is missing from its explanation. How do we perceive essential dif­
ferences between objects which are equivalent in the reinforcement 
they obtain from the environment: for example, how do we distinguish 
between a brown cup and a blue one?
In such models, the neurons performing the integrative functions are 
isolated from each other. Each neuron receives inputs from neurons 
or receptor cells nearer the periphery and passes them on to cells 
further along the line. There is little communication between neigh­
bouring cells. In this respect the feed-back weighting model is a long 
way from the isomorphic view that there is a psycho-physical correspon­
dence between physical structure and perceptual function. It is 
similarly at a distance from views of living things as co-operative 
relationships between cells.
V Collateral Interaction models
In a large number of models, it is the collateral communication between 
neurons which is the basic principle of operation. The characteristic 
feature is that afferent fibres stimulate cells which do not pass on 
their excitation directly to the next stage. Rather they enter into 
diffuse contacts with their neighbours. Pathways through the system are 
complex. The activity in the efferent fibres cannot be related in any 
simple way to the activity in the afferent fibres: it is determined by 
the lateral connectivity of the integrative tissue interposed between the 
afferent and efferent fibres.
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The essential idea of Hebb's (1949) model is probably that such lateral 
connectivity supports a diffuse central process which is dynamic in its 
own right: in tliat respect it proposed a model of "thought processes".
The detail of Hebb's model is too well known to require description 
here. He assumed that cells with diffuse random connections would tend 
to form reverberator/ circuits if they were excited in sequence.
Rochester, Holland, Haibt and Duda (1956) simulated this aspect of the 
theory. By incorporating an inhibitory modification of Hebb's proposals, 
suggested by Milner, cell assemblies did form. Hebb further argued that 
if cell assemblies were excited in sequence a larger scale relationship 
would form capable of mediating more complex processing. These "phase 
sequences" were the core of Hebb's discussion of psychological processes.
A number of models utilising lateral connective systems have analogies 
to wave functions in optical and electrical artefacts. As long ago as 
1942, Lashley had suggested that a solution to the dynamic apsects of 
perception and memory (see Hebb, 1949) would be to regard the cortex as 
built up of "millions of transmitting loops of various lengths and 
refractory periods, actually consisting of an indefinite number of 
resonators". Excitation started at any point would give rise to waves. 
"With several or many points of excitation, interference patterns would 
be formed". Lashley acknowledged earlier sources of the idea.
Beurle (1956) presented a probabilistic mathematical analysis of con­
nectivity and argued that, provided that the activity was unsaturated 
by inhibitional damping, waves would be propagated. A simple synaptic 
facilitation mechanism would lead to the learning of such waves. "The 
mass will always tend to reproduce as a trial response the one which has 
been found most satisfactory in the most nearly similar circumstances 
in the past". (Beurle, 1959). Learning would particularly concentrate at 
interference points where waves crossed each other.
With the development of the hologram, a number of authors proposed that 
the brain might operate upon similar principles. (Van Heerden, 1963; 
Willshaw, Buneman, and Longuet-Higgins, 1969; Pribram, 19 71; Pribram, 
Nuwer and Baron, 19 74; Landfield, 1976. Spinelli (19 70) simulated a 
neural hologram. These models are examined in a later chapter when their 
implications can be better related to the model to be presented here. 
Essentially they are the extension of Lashley's proposal that what is 
registered is the interaction (interference patterns) between neural 
excitations.
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A model which appears to be even closer to Lashley's suggestion was that 
of Pringle (1951), This has already been mentioned in relation to "key 
trigger patterns", and the relevance of that idea to innate patterns as 
represented in my model. Pringle stressed the "parallel between learn­
ing and evolution" and sought a mechanism which would parallel "repli­
cation" ; the presence of a unit in the system causes more similar units 
to appear. Oscillators would provide such units, because of their 
tendency to couple. " . . .  the beats of the chambers of the vertebrate 
heart, (which) behave like relaxation oscillators. The coupling here is 
so strong that the whole heart normally beats as a single unit . . . "  
(Pringle, 1951, p. 189). He argued that a reverberatory loop would act 
as a non-linear oscillator. The non-linearity imparts a unique config­
uration of response of the tissue to each afferent pattern, and this is 
registered in terms of coupling. Although there are many differences 
between the organisation proposed in the model to be presented here, 
there are many similarities. In both, the input induces a unique con­
figuration of coupled units. In both there are the equivalent of "key 
trigger patterns". In both there is a similar assumption of a sensori­
motor configuration, so that motor action follows from sensory reactiva­
tion of the sensori-motor configuration. On the other hand there is an 
essential difference. Pringle's philosophy centres upon the idea of 
replication of units. Consequently the configurations caused by a 
particular pattern, or set of patterns, would grow as a mass with exper­
ience. One of the particular attributes of my model is the notion that 
essentially the record laid down by a particular event is "isolated" and 
unmodifiable, except in certain fairly obvious ways.
Kilmer, McCulloch, Blum, Craighill and Peterson (1968) prelude their 
model of the Reticular Formation by confirming Pringle's view that "any 
chunk of nerve tissue . . . can be viewed as an assembly of coupled non­
linear oscillators" . . . Nevertheless, "we (Kilmer et alia) abandoned 
all coupled oscillator and neural net approaches to RF theory construction 
as utterly hopeless". Their model accordingly takes a form dictated by 
an interpretation of the reticular formation in canonical information 
theory equations. In philosophy the resulting model is quite close to the 
feed-back models. There is a sense in which certain feed-back weighting 
models have both hierarchical and lateral interactionist characteristics.
In Kilmer et alia's (1968) model, the outputs from stage to stage converge. 
At the same time the transmission lines are subject to weighting modifica­
tion. In this model of the Reticular Formation, the idea is that a
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number of modal" computers represent anatomical divisions of the core. 
These incorporate weighting functions from neighbouring computers, so 
simulating lateral coupling in addition to feed-back. It would seem 
that the model applies iterative network feed-back weighting techniques 
to a more general interactionist concept of neural function. In 
implementation the model resembles the iterated network expressed in 
canonical equations.
A similar marriage of lateral interaction and hierarchical convergence 
was used in a pattern recognition model by Taylor (1959). Taylor extended 
his ideas to a neurological interpretation of the structure of the neo­
cortex not unlike the later interpretation by Marr (1969, 1970). An 
unusual aspect of Taylor's model was that it was essentially analogue.
Taylor's model is used in some detail in J.Z. Young's "A model of the 
brain" to illustrate his argument for an "engineering" approach to brain 
function. In spite of its title. Young's (1964) work is not so much a 
neurological model as the interpretation of his work on Octopus to 
suggest some principle of brain function. He is concerned with coding, 
filter stages and general organisation. He suggests that the vertical 
and horizontal pattern recognition attributes of Octopus may be mediated 
by the shape of the dendritic trees of specific "detector cells". He 
proposes simple paradigm models of their use to control a dichotomous 
"attack or retreat" pathway.
In past times both hierarchical and feed-back models were thought to 
suffer from severe limitations. Collateral interaction theories, such as 
those of Hebb and Pringle, arose mainly to overcome those limitations. It 
might now be argued by proponents of the switching models that many of 
the limitations they were supposed to suffer from have been shown to be 
inapplicable. For example, it was thought that the ability to recognise 
a gestalt pattern regardless of its size and position on the retina could 
not be accomplished by a switching model. In fact many such models have 
since been produced. It might be argued further that many of the neuro­
logical considerations which argued against switching models have also 
been reinterpreted. Lashley's well known experiments in search of the 
engram had made it extremely unlikely that a model of fixed connections 
could mediate learning. It is now known that there is a measure of locali­
sation of memory. Nevertheless, something of Lashley's concepts of 
mass-action and equipotentiality remain. For one thing, the connectivity
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of the brain is so complex that complete localisation of function is 
out of the question. One can attempt to explain this connectivity 
within an hierarchical model. Konorski (1957) enters into much clini­
cal detail to do so. To some workers, however, it seems simpler to 
assume some fundamental lateral interaction principle rather than an 
ad hoc interconnective convergence. This matter will be looked at 
again in a later chapter.
Other advantages of the distributed memory approach to neural integra­
tion have been argued by Hebb (1949, 1955) , Pribram (1971) and Feeney, 
Pittman and Wagner (19 74). At root they concern aspects of brain func­
tion which demonstrate an elasticity and unification which seem foreign 
to other kinds of model. This impression may of course be misleading. 
Nevertheless, models such as those of Hebb and Pribram seem to many 
more plausible explanations of the overall integrity of action of 
nervous systems than do those based upon either hierarchical convergence 
or feed-back discrimination.
If hierarchical and feed-back models suffer a certain "credibility 
gap" in some respects, then lateral interaction models suffer a "credi­
bility gap" in others. They have an indefiniteness of structure which 
gives them a vagueness in application. Although some have been simulated 
(Hebb's and Spine Ill's) , the demonstration was only of the general 
characteristics of the system. How such systems would actually mediate 
the intricate peculiarities of behaviour is far from clear. Moreover, 
systems like those of Beurle, Pribram, Pringle and Hebb, do not seem to 
possess sufficient structure to mediate the highly specific innately 
programmed aspects of behaviour. It is true that these limitations apply 
generally to all simulations in the present stage of development. But, 
in contrast to the simulations of distributed memory models, those of 
hierarchical and iterative networks actually do something, e.g. pattern 
recognition or emission of responses. Also, it appears quite clear what 
form further development of such models would take : they would be extended 
simply by including more transmission lines, more points of convergence 
of more functions of feed-back weighting adjustment.
This definiteness of network models appears to proponents of the distrib­
uted memory models as a limitation in itself. What attracts them is the 
very lack of rigidity in diffuse models. In such lack of definition they 
may see the possibility of the whole being greater than the part, in 
unknown attributes arising from the complexity.
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One of the aims of my model is to pursue the simulation of a diffuse 
lateral connectionist model to a point where it loses some of the vague­
ness generally attributed to such models.
VI Models related to neuronal mechanisms
To give a general indication of the present state of the art of explain­
ing brain function by a neurological model, it is perhaps necessary to 
mention a number of formulations which do not fit easily into the classi­
fication suggested so far in this chapter. Many of these models concern 
the neuronal processes by which it is suggested that nervous tissue 
incorporates experience.
My model, like many of those already described, is based upon a principle 
of organisation. It is not more demanding of neuronal mechanism than 
of most of such models, e.g. Marr (1969, 1970); Hebb (1949); Kilmer and 
Olinski (19 74). Nevertheless, the interpretation of my model might be 
affected by the mechanism of neuronal alteration by which it is considered 
to be implemented. Essentially this may be seen as a question of the 
intimacy of the connections between neurons. My model proposes a co-opera­
tive network between neurons. That network could be implemented by 
simple reciprocal orthodox synaptic connections or by the more intimate 
kinds of connection disclosed by contemporary research, e.g. gap junctions, 
tight junctions, dendro-dendritic synapses(Schmitt, Dev and Smith, 1976; 
Reese and Shepherd, 1972; Gilula, 1975; Palay, 1975). To consider the 
model in the light of different possible mechanisms of neuronal communi­
cation would be premature at this stage. However, some mention of models 
utilising different neuronal mechanisms helps to complete the background.
At a formal level, Brindley (1967) classified modifiable and unmodifiable 
synapses according to the logical functions they generate. He listed ten 
examples of synaptic arrangments appearing in models, e.g.: "(9) Excita­
tory, facilitated but not excited by axo-axonal synapse". He produced 
paradigm networks capable of mediating conditioning, extinction and temp­
oral separation of stimuli. In this respect his work has affinities 
with that of Uttley (1954, 1956) and Burke (1966) cited earlier. Brindley 
developed a number of theorems relating to the properties of networks.
By extending his classification of synapses, incorporating "repeater cells" 
and delays, he is able to develop networks which he proposes provide 
analogies in principle of verbal sequence and association learning. It
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would be going too far from our present concerns to consider them here. 
Like those of Burke, the models of Brindley are essentially logical 
abstractions. Marr (1969) acknowledged his debt to Brindley's (1969) 
paper.
Brindley exhaustively analyses the logical possibilities provided by 
different kinds of neuronal connection without becoming involved in the 
micro-biological implementations and controversies. There is however, 
one form of connection which he does not consider, that which would 
enable two or more neurons to act so that their excitation is effec­
tively averaged. This would be the effect of reciprocal axonal-somatic 
synapses, or of dendro-dendritic connections, or perhaps tight junctions. 
The logical effect of such "lateral" interconnections is not easy to 
see and therefore they do not feature in neural network models. It is 
this kind of relationship required for my model.
Griffith (1967) developed a matrix algebra of connections to analyse a 
very different type of model from that presented in logical network 
theory. The basic idea is a biochemical principle of neuronal recogni­
tion. The model is embryological in presentation, tracing the structural 
and connective form of the nervous system in ontological development. 
Utilising the notions of genetic suppression and release of complementary 
enzymes, Griffith explores the possibilities of cell division on connec­
tivity. Synaptic links from the axonal tip of cell A to the dendrites 
of cell B are assumed to be maintained by a growth substance. There are 
a nun±)er of such substances, and cell A will only synapse with cell B 
if that cell produces the particular substance which it requires. Upon 
division, the daughter cells may differ in enzymatic specificity from 
the parent or be the same. The set of daughter cells resembling the 
parent is called a "clone". Griffith uses variants of this basic idea 
to show how an orderly system of cells linked to each other would be 
generated. He then uses the resulting connective sets and principles to 
build a dynamic model of the nervous system. Only the briefest indica­
tion of the model can be given here. What perhaps cannot be conveyed 
here is the sophistication of the concepts of neural processing by the 
resulting system.
In Griffith's model a set of cells linked in an excitatory manner is 
called a "mode". Two "modes" may be linked through two sets of inhibi­
tory meurons. When both such "modes" are active, then, because of
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habituation, first one and then the other will dominate, forming a 
neural oscillator . In the mammalian brain there is a "centre" (sub- 
cortical) divided into a set of N mutually exclusive "modes". When a 
mode in tiie centre is active it excites "certain corresponding cells 
in tiie cortex which after a "very complicated transformation" in 
turn excites cells back in the centre. There is consequently a shutt­
ling of patterns of excitation between "centre" and "cortex". In 
addition to 'centre" and "cortex" there are "moderators", each of 
which has modes" of its own. These control sequences of "modes" at 
the centre. The intention of these moderators seems to be the imple­
mentation of innately programmed behaviour. Learning is effected by 
modification of "synaptic area" by the intervention of "facilitating 
molecules". Molecule X facilitates excitatory synapses. Molecule Y, 
inhibitory synapses.
Griffith uses the model to discuss conditioning and some more general 
aspects of neural integration, e.g. sleeping and breathing. It is 
in fact possible to follow his accounts of these functions in terms 
of the overall operation of the model. Its actual operation to mediate 
these functions is less clear. As I understand the model, the "centre" 
is fairly rigidly structurally defined. The "cortex" acts as a kind 
of random scrambler. The "moderators" modulate the process. How 
they do this is not clear. It is difficult to grasp the rationale 
of the model. Is it purely random, or is the "complicated transfor­
mation" effected by the cortex, a directed process?
The model has been partly simulated in a computer. However, as far 
as can be discerned the simulation was in the form of the solution of 
canonical equations concerned with the formation of connections and the 
oscillation of modes. Consequently it is difficult to judge how the 
system would act as a whole. Would it really effectively mediate 
behaviour?
The model has been described at some length because it is one of the few 
which attempt to derive a highly defined global neural system from 
principles derived from contemporary research. The biochemical and enzy­
matic mechanisms utilised in Griffith's model are well established 
aspects of present-day genetic, immunological and developmental research. 
At the same time it does not seem to have been developed with sufficient 
specificity of detail to say whether it could perform what its designer
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claims and, if it did, whether the resulting system would really resemble 
the brain.
Landauer (1964) summarises suggestions of biochemical mechanisms 
mediating learning: an unspecified mechanism involving direct coding
of information on RNA molecules in terms of base sequences (Gaito, 1961) ; 
enzyme induction with respect to transmitter substances (Briggs and Kitto, 
1962; Smith, 1962) ; changes in proteins in terminal vesicles (Hyden,
1961) ; and changes in ionic binding which influence firing rates.
Landauer himself offers a more highly defined neurological model. He 
suggests that glial cells produce RNA which renders the membrane of a 
particular cell receptive to particular frequencies of the electrical 
signals. Neurons become "tuned" to the neural activities representing 
the CS.
Another model which utilises the work of Hyden and his associates is 
that of Hendrickson (1972). He proposes that the timing of nerve 
impulses codes the sequence of nucleotides in the RNA chain. The code 
consists of the permutation of four possible interval values between 
successive action potentials in spike trains.
Mcllwain (19 79) has applied the results of recent discoveries of biochem­
ical mediators of synaptic events to suggest a complexity of function 
of the individual neuron. Biochemical mediators, e.g. cyclic AMP and 
GMP, may last for some seconds, and even have effects for up to 30 
minutes. He suggests that such mediators are cytoplasmically trans­
ported and activate in sequence a "precisely ordered system of synaptic 
connections". The augmentation of activity at the synapses by the 
modulators expresses "an expectancy based upon terminal placement". The 
idea is that the travelling biochemical mediators would simulate previous 
actual activiy. He develops the idea to deal with actual neural struc­
tures, such as "complex" cells in visual cortex. Mcllwain*s proposal 
seems important in stressing the possibilities of neurons being able to 
carry out truly complex functions. This contrasts with the simple func­
tions attributed to neurons in most models including my own. I do not 
doubt that neurons can carry out such complex functions. However, it 
seems to me possible that such complex functions would be superimposed 
upon a simpler basic system rather than representing a fundamental mode 
of operation of nervous systems.
The mechanisms proposed by the models mentioned are not perhaps
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implausible in themselves. Intra-cellular transport, the codon basis 
of RNA and DNA and complex interactions of macromolecules undoubtedly 
pl^y important part in neuronal function. The difficulty is in 
deciding exactly what that part is. To utilise the knowledge which is 
rapidly appearing from biochemical research it seems necessary to show 
how it fits into a neural organisation. A model proposing such an organi­
sation it seems should show more than a likely neuronal mechanism, or 
even a likely principle of neuronal communication. It should also show 
a working system which bears a close correspondence to what is known in 
other respects about the brain.
VII Concluding remarks
In this chapter some attempt has been made to give a general picture of 
models which have been proposed in recent years to explain neural 
integration in the brain. In order to bring a vast amount of material 
within a reasonable short account, models were classified under 
three types: hierarchical, discriminative feed-back, and distributed mem­
ory. In addition some models which centre around the mechanism of 
neuronal alteration were mentioned. Individual models do not, of 
course, conform closely to the principles of any one category, nor 
can their contribution be conveyed by the relegation to one of a number 
of simple categories. Nevertheless it is hoped that the presentation 
has enabled some of the main differences between models to be seen.
This account has been intended to serve two purposes. First it may
have served to remind the reader of other solutions to the problems
which I have attempted to solve in ways characteristic of my model. In 
that respect it provides the customary introduction to work presented. 
However, it also serves the purpose of summarising the many insights 
which brain models have made towards the understanding of brain func­
tion. It does not seem necessary that brain models be seen as exclu­
sive and mutually antagonistic explanations. Of course in some respects 
explanatory principles are empirically opposed. An hierarchical network 
is not the same as a distributed memory system, such as the neural 
hologram. Even in the case of such oppositions, it is possible that one 
principle acts in one location or level of processing, and another in a
different situation. They may even act hand in hand. Although my model
proposes a neural template system very different from an hierarchical 
network, the latter seems too good an idea for nature not to have utilised
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it where appropriate. Moreover some models may be seen as exemplifying 
principles whiclr are essentially independent of the form of model in 
which tliey are embodied. For example, the use of temporal delays to 
convert temporal sequence into spatial conjunction (Uttley, 1956b). 
Although feed-back modification of connections dependent upon results 
has been presented generally in a certain kind of model, it may be taken 
as a principle which is merely brought into prominence in that kind of 
model. In every model where the results of action leads to a modifica­
tion of connectivity, the same principle necessarily operates.
Models may be seen as aids to understanding a very difficult subject 
matter rather than as different descriptions of what the brain is supposed 
to be like. At the present stage of development we may not be ready to 
propose a single model which definitively describes the function of the
brain. It is hoped that the model to be presented will provide a
contribution in this sense to our understanding of neural integration.
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CHAPTER 5
OUTLINE OE A THEORY OF NEURAL INTEGRATION
Ihis chapter gives the main elements of the theory of neural integra­
tion underlying tiie simulations. The presentation of the model is 
preceded by the citation of some contemporary research concerning the 
anatomy and histology of brain tissue which is intended to show that 
the requirements of the model are concordant with what is known of the 
structure of nervous tissue.
I The anatomy and physiology of brain tissues
A . Columnar organisation
The neural tissues of Man and the higher animals present an abundance 
of highly diverse neuronal constituents (iSzentagothai, 1976) inter­
acting in models of great complexity which are little understood.
Amidst this complexity, what has emerged as a most widely applicable 
and well established feature of the mammalian cortex, and of other 
centres, is the columnar organisation.
In simple terms the functional organisation of the cortex consists of 
replicated columns, the cells of which are "activated by stimulation of 
the same single class of peripheral receptors" (Mountcastle, 1957). 
Mountcastle recorded from single units in the cat's somatic cortex 
using penetrating microelectrodes. The stimuli were mechanical de form­
ations of peripheral tissue, skin, hair and joints. "The neurons 
encountered in a perpendicular traverse of the cortex are activated 
from almost identical peripheral receptive fields at latencies which on 
the average are not a function of the position of the cell in depth 
within the cortex". Modality pure columns were intermingled in a mosaic 
like fashion. Within the limits of the experimental numbers, there 
was a topographical mapping. Cells belonging to the different modalities 
were found in all cell layers. Cells driven by joint movement "signal 
the steady position and phasic chnages in positions of joints and are 
suitably arranged to subserve position sense. Pairs of closely adja­
cent cells were seen to respond reciprocally to alternating joint
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A p ica l segm ent
Figure 5.1 (Reproduced from Hubei and Wiesel, 1953a) Reconstruction of 
two parallel micro-electrode penetrations^in the anterior part of the 
post lateral gyrus. Longer lines intersecting the electrode tracks rep­
resent cortical cells. Receptive-field axis orientations are shown by 
the direction of these lines. Shorter lines represent regions in which 
unresolved background activity was observed.
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movements, a form of reciprocal afferent innervation". The cells of 
the vertical columns "are related to peripheral fields which are very 
much alike in size and shape and which occupy more or less the same 
peripheral area . . . .  when slanting penetrations are made . . .
the deceptive fields of neurons successively encountered shift grad­
ually, in conformity with the surface pattern of representation directly 
above the successive positions of the electrode tip in the depths". 
Mountcastle suggests that the width of the columns has an upper limit 
of about 0.5 mm.
The work of Hubei and wiesel. (1959, 1962, 1963(a) & (b)1968; Wiesel,
Hubei and Lamm, 1974; Drager and Hubei, 1976) is too well known to 
require elaboration here. The relevance for the present context is the 
finding for the visual cortex of the cat and monkey a columnar organisa­
tion similar to that discovered by Mountcastle for the cat's (Mountcastle, 
1957) and Monkey's (Powell and Mountcastle, 1959) somatic cortex. As is 
well known, Hubei and Wiesel discovered neurons responding to specific 
receptive fields, especially oriented bar stimuli (see sub-section C 
below). Each column was found to be organised in relation to a single 
orientation of the stimulus. The receptive fields extended about 4 
degrees. They suggested a range of 100 p. to 2 mm for the width of the 
columns (Hubei and Wiesel, 1963). Figure 5.1 (Tex-fig 1 of Hubei and 
Wiesel, 1963) illustrates two parallel penetrations of electrodes about 
175 p apart. Hubei and Wiesel report that the transition of orientation 
from one column to the next is not continuous but in regular shifts. 
Figure 5.2 (Hubei and Wiesel, 1963) shows the surface shapes of columns 
and the receptive fields of sample penetrations, and the general distri­
bution of orientations in a small area of striate cortex. These figures 
illustrate the appropriateness of the representation for the mediation 
of the "letter stroke" template described in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.4 ).
In the somato-sensory region of mouse cerebral cortex, Woolsey and 
Van der Loos (19 70) found a columnar organisation taking the form of 
"barrels". The walls appeared densely populated with cells, with rela­
tively sparse "hollows" within, and separated by sparse divisions. They 
are centred on Layer IV and are about 250 p across and 300 p high. Each 
of these barrels represents the sensory innervation of a single contra­
lateral whisker follicle (Van der Loos and Woolsey, 1973). The barrels 
were further investigated in rats and mice by Killackey, Belford,
R. and D. Ryugo (1976) who found that whisker removal in the newborn
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Figure S . 3 (Reproduced from Asanuma, 1975) Asanuma and Rosen's 19 72 
reconstruction of the electrode tracks and associated input and output 
relations in the thumb area of monkey motor cortex. The cells activated 
by tactile stimuli were shown to have receptive fields within cortical 
efferent zones projecting to finger muscles. Each efferent zone was 
found to receive tactile inputs exclusively from an area of finger or 
hand located in the direction of movement produced by stimulation of the 
zone.
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animals disrupted barrel development.
The columnar organisation of the motor area was demonstrated by Asanuma 
and his associates (e.g. Asanuma and Sakata, 1967-, Asanuma and Rosen,
1972) and by Welt, Aschoff, Kameda and Brooks (1967, cited in Woolsey 
and Van der Loos, 1969). Asanuma et alia mapped corticospinal projec­
tions which facilitate or inhibit monosynaptic reflexes of foreleg 
muscles of the cat. "The low threshold points were confined within a 
cylinder of cortex which extended along the radial fibre into the gray 
substance. The diameters of the sector ranged from 0.5 to a few milli­
metres and the fringes overlapped". Asanuma (1975) reviews work carried 
out by his group indicating that the sensory feed-back from movement 
is mapped into columns close to the efferent column. Afferent signals 
reached the efferent zone from deep structures such as periosteum, joint 
and connective tissue within the muscle. A given efferent zone in the 
hand of tlie monkey received proprio-ceptive inputs from joints or 
muscles which that zone projected. (See Figure 5.3 from Asanuma and 
Rosen, 1972). (This work is relevant to topographic mapping, and is com­
plimentary to that of Werner et alia, cited at B, below).
There remains the cortical areas receiving cortico-cortical fibres. The 
columnar organisation of somato-sensory cortico-cortical fibres was 
demonstrated by Jones, Burton and Porter (1975) and Shanks, Rockel,A.J. 
and Powell, T.P.S. (1975). Because they felt that the columnar organ­
isation might still be attributed to a representation of the receptor 
surface, Goldman and Nauta (19 77) investigated by autoradiography cortico- 
cortical fibres in the frontal association, limbic and motor cortex of 
developing Rhesus monkey, including the U fibres joining gyri. "Labelled 
axons originating in these various regions of the frontal lobe have topo­
graphically diverse ipsilateral and contralateral destinations, but 
virtually all these projections share a common mode of distribution: they 
terminate in distinct vertically oriented columns, 200-500 p wide that 
extend across all layers of cortex and alternate in regular sequence with 
columns of comparable width in which grains (of label) do not exceed 
background" .
With regard to sub-cortical organisation, Szentagothai (1973a) reviews 
evidence of projection columns in the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) 
and concludes that they consist of overlapping cylinders containing 
Golgi type II cells (cells whose axons terminate locally) which in turn
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Figure 5.4 (Reproduced from Szentagothai, 1973a) Szentagothai's 
hypothetical reconstruction of the lateral geniculate nucleus, illu­
strating the columnar structure. Diagram at left illustrates over-all 
arrangement in the termination of bundles of retinal afferents and 
their relation to relay cells (Re) and Golgi 2nd type cells (Go).
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synapse upon relay cells (see Figure 5.4 from Szentagothai, 1973a).
A number of authors (Hubei and Wieselj Bishop, Kozak and Levick; and 
Vakur; reviewed by Freund, 1973) consider that neurons of the LGN 
have a common direction and are arranged along bundles of optic tract 
axons originating from the retina. The topographic mapping of the 
LGN indicates that neurons are organised into local neuronal pools, 
if not columns, and this is one of the basic assumptions of my model.
An interesting columnar organisation is reported of the Superior 
Colliculus. Drager and Hubei (19 76) showed that in the mouse , the 
three upper layers responded only to visual stimuli, whereas the lower 
layers are driven by somatosensory and auditory stimuli. Each of 
these representations is topographically mapped. The scale of the map­
ping differs with modality, so that in any column are represented 
visual and somatosensory stimuli which more or less correspond to the 
external environment. The environment is coded in terms of the visual 
co-ordinates of (that) eye and other sensory modalities merely endorse 
the visual plane. Stein, Megalhaes and Kruger (19 76) report almost 
identical results for the cat Superior Colliculus. Tactile representa­
tion revealed a somatotopic plan which was in register with the overlying 
visuotopy.
In my model it will be proposed that although all the cells within a 
colimin are directly activated by afferent signals, either monosynapti- 
cally or via one or two synapses only, there is a lateral distribution of 
excitation across column boundaries. This lateral connectivity is either 
polysynaptic or by some non-synaptic mechanism of neuronal communication. 
Communication between columns is also by means of radial fibres of 
stellate cells which exit from the cortex (see later chapters).
Relevant to the proposed lateral communication may be Mountcastle's 
(1957) comment that the analysis into columns was based strictly upon the 
first response of cortical cells to a repetitive stimulus. According to 
my model the first response would reflect the afferent specificity, sub­
sequent responses the integrative effects. Many studies show rather a 
change of threshold across columns (Albus, 1976; Lee, Heggelund, Holme 
and Creutzfeldt, 1976) rather than the all or none effect which would be 
expected from a totally radial (vertical) organisation. This gradation 
of threshold is to be distinguished from the discrete organisation of 
columns: the latter relates to the allocation of neurons to a particular
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class as a consequence of their maximum response characteristics.
Burns et alia (1962) in their investigation of the effects of an oscil­
latory dark boundary stimulus showed that the response of a particular 
single neuron responded in some degree to all positions of the stimulus, 
although maximally in a single position.
In an important paper, Mountcastle (1978) examined the parietal lobe 
Area 7 of primates. This area is associated with Body-Image, visuotopy 
and eye-movements. He found evidence of mini-columns of about 30 ji 
radius. Each hypercolumn of Hubei and wiesel (about 500-1000 p) con­
tained about 225 minicolumns. Mountcastle estimates about 140,000,000 
minicolumns in the neocortex of man. Other aspects of Mountcastle's paper 
relate to the response characteristics of individual neurons and to 
possible neuronal wiring implications. These are dealt with in the next 
two sections. It must be mentioned that although his data and even his 
general interpretations are cited in support of my model, his own conclu­
sion differs. He proposes that each column is an independent module with­
out lateral communication, an idea close to that proposed by Szentagothai 
(1973) and Scheibel and Scheibel (1970).
In summary, the cerebral cortex of mammals appears to be organised in 
discrete columns perpendicular to the surface. This applies to sensory 
projection areas, motor areas, afferent innervation to motor area, and 
"intracortical fibre distribution of all the conventionally distinguished 
categories of the cortex". (Goldman and Nauta, 1977). The size of 
columns vary according to report in the 0.3 to 1.5 mm range. These 
columns do not appear to be entirely unitary (e.g. Mountcastle, 1978;
Hubei and Weisel, 1972; Asanuma, 1975). Asanuma suggests that these large 
columns represent several afferent columns measuring between 0.1 to 0.4 mm 
which together control an individual muscle in a column about 1 mm wide.
B . Topographic mapping
An aspect of neural organisation closely associated with the columnar 
structure is the topographic mapping of sense organs at all stages to the 
cortex. Summarising the results of a "prodigious burst of investigative 
work along traditional hodological lines", Palay (1972) comments; "These 
studies emphasised the precision with which the nervous system is organ­
ised. For example, the retention of the topographic order as the 
synaptic links were followed from level to level became more impressive".
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This mapping is not directly represented by any particular computa­
tional feature in the simulations of the proposed model. It has, 
however, a considerable relevance to its rationale. It may be seen 
as mediating a relational equivalent to the isomorphism of earlier 
models of the Gestalt school (e.g. Kohler, 1942). Implicit in the 
proposed model is the idea that the topographical mapping enables 
spatial templates to be constructed: these templates may act as
models of the external world within the brain (Craik, 194 3).
Almost all the work cited in the previous section on columnar structure 
discloses also that both the sensory field and the effector array is 
mapped precisely into the nervous system. Earlier work on the general 
representation of the body surface and the "sensory homunculus"
(Penfield and Rasmussen, 19 52) needs little mention. This work has been 
extended recently especially by Werner, Whitsel, Mountcastle (e.g. 
Werner, Whitsel and Petrucelli, 1972; Werner, 1970). Werner et alia 
(19 72) demonstrated the regular mapping of parts of the digits, palm 
and leg surfaces of the macaque somatosensory area I, disclosing the 
customary columnar arrangement. This work complements that of Asanuma 
and Rosen (1972). Werner et alia developed a scheme of topographical 
mapping. Iwamura and Tanaka (1978a) confirmed that receptive fields 
such as the pad and digit of the cat are topographically mapped onto 
the somatosensory cortex in a focal sense. They also demonstrated a 
second representation of the forepaw with a different receptive field 
organisation from the first (1978b).
The Odour perceptual system is topographically mapped (Moulton, 19 76).
Retinotopic mappings of the retina on the cortex have been found by 
Talbot (1942), Cowey (1964) and Daniel and Whitteridge (1961) in the 
monkey; Choudbury (1978) in the rabbit, where it develops over the first 
14-21 days of life. A mirror-like topographical arrangement of area 17 
and 18 with adjoining location of the vertical meridian was found. It 
may be relevant to theories of pattern recognition and the confusion of 
mirror reversals, that Hubei and Weisel (1965) report a third retino- 
topically organised projection. Kinston, Vadas and Bishop (1969, cited 
in Freund, 1973) report a second mirror image of the visual field in the 
medial interlaminar nucleus of the cat.
A retinotopic organisation of Area 18 in the rat was not changed by 
lesions in Area 17 (Olavarria and Torrealba, 1978). If area 18 was
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innervated in an hierarchical manner from Area 17, as has been suggested 
by proponents of hierarchical models (see Chapter 4), one would have 
expected degeneration of the retinotopic representation in Area 18.
This supports the interpretations by Baizer, Robinson and Dow (19 77) of 
their experiments.
The topographical mapping of the Superior Colliculus is very precise 
(Drager and Hubei, 1976; Stein et alia, 1976); Weiskrantz and his 
group (Brooks and Jung, 1973) demonstrated that cortically ablated mon­
keys can locate and grasp objects when only their brain stem visual 
connections including their tectum opticum remain intact. Brooks and 
Jung also cite work in the same volume (Sprague, Berlucchi and Rizzolati, 
1973; Doty, 19 73) which suggests that in cats and rabbits considerable 
form vision may be mediated in the tectum. They propose that the tectum 
acts in close co-ordination with the visual cortex.
A similar conclusion may be drawn from the organisation in the Superior 
Colliculus of eye-movements (Mohler and Wurtz, 1977). As mentioned in 
Sub-section A, there is a layered visual, tactile and somato-topic 
topographical mapping in the Superior Colliculus, which does not, how­
ever, arise from direct sensory projections (Drager and Hubei, 1976; 
Stein, Magalhaes-Castro and Kruger, 19 76). In Chapter 2 it was 
suggested that templates might be superimposed so as to employ the 
topographical mapping of projection fibres with maximum economy. In 
the Superior Colliculus it would appear that Nature may have gone one 
better. By superimposing templates immediately upon each other with 
adjustments of scale to ensure coincidence with external events, the 
greatest measure of integration would be achieved of externally co-ord­
inated events with the shortest possible connections.
C . Feature analysis and receptive fields
The concept of feature analysis has been prominent in many approaches 
to perception and pattern recognition (see Chapter 2). The discoveries 
by Lettvin, Maturana, McCulloch and Pitts (1959) of selective signalling 
by the frog's retina, by Young (1964) and Sutherland (1968) of feature 
detection of octopus and goldfish, and the demonstration of structured 
receptive fields by Hubei and Wiesel, cited above, played a large part 
in this conceptualisation. If feature analysis is used to imply an 
explanation of how the nervous system recognises high level characteri- 
istics of objects, e.g. noses and legs, the idea should perhaps be
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treated with reserve. The term "feature analyser" implies that there 
are inbuilt neural arrangements by which we recognise aspects of objects, 
whereas the organisation disclosed by neuro-anatomy and physiology is of 
elements, such as orientated lines, spots of colour, only.
Work on visual receptive fields in the Lateral Geniculate Nucleus is 
reviewed in Freund (19 73) and in respect of the cerebral cortex, in 
Brooks and Jung (1973, same volume). In tlie lateral geniculate nucleus, 
the receptive fields are generally concentric with either an excitatory 
centre and inhibitory surround, or vice versa. In the cortex, Hubei and 
Wiesel encountered primarily orientation selective neurons (Hubei and 
Wiesel, 1962). They characterised as simple fields those having, for 
example, excitatory and inhibitory strips lying side by side, with fine 
orientation selectivity. They are binocularly activated, but not 
necessarily without retinal disparity. They prefer slow moving stimuli. 
They are recorded most often in Layer IV (see next section).
The edge of a moving bar elicits the response (Henry and Bishop, 1971). 
Moving stimuli in all non-preferred orientations were shown to inhibit 
the simple cells. Brooks and Jung point out that only a small propor­
tion of the total neuronal population representing a restricted region of 
the visual field will be activated at a given moment by an appropriate 
stimulus.
Neurons responding to a wider range of angular displacement and not so 
easily mapped into excitatory and inhibitory regions, were classed as 
complex. Of relevance to the next section (D), Hubei and Wiesel found 
that simple cells were generally located in Layer IV, and complex cells 
in upper layer of the same column.
Hubei and Wiesel (1965) reported complex fields in Areas 18 and 19. 
Special higher order receptive fields were encountered in Areas 18 and 
19 which responded selectively to a variety of complicated angular forms. 
They inferred that these were mediated by hierarchical neural convergence 
from Area 17, but as already noted. Singer and Tretter (1976) and Baizer 
et alia (1977) consider that this is not so. Bazier et alia divide area 
18 cells into six groups, orientation, colour, border, direction, spot 
and light inhibited. Although they do not report upon neurons of the 
hypercomplex type, they do consider that most of the orientation type 
cells encountered were of Hubei and WieselJ s complex type.
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Zeki (1978) has found that whilst cells responsive to various aspects 
of the stimulus are found in all parts of five prestriate areas of 
rhesus monkey cortex, there is very considerable specialisation from 
area to area in, say, orientation detection, colour or motion.
The analysis by the nervous system of information relating to iiiod- 
alities other than vision parallel the feature analysers found in that 
system. The work cited in connection with columnar organisation and 
topographical mapping also indicates that signals relating to touch, 
hair movement, movement of whiskers, deformations of tissue, movement 
and positions of joints report isolated aspects of overall sensory or 
motor configurations. Single neurons respond to one particular form 
of stimulation. Their receptive fields relate to small local areas 
of the sensory field.
Mountcastle (1978) found that in the parietal lobe of primates, indi­
vidual neurons in a mini-column organisation reported specific 
behavioural correlates. He distinguished neurons responding during
(i) visual fixation, (ii) visual tracking, (iii) saccade, (iv) light 
sensitive (v) special and (vi) hand manipulation and projection.
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate what may be termed the "atomic" 
character of sensory organisation in vision and somatic sense respec­
tively. In a convergent hierarchical organisation such atomic ele­
ments would fall at the lower levels of the hierarchy. If the hierarchy 
were organised within a column then one would expect to find cells 
within each column which represented higher order convergences beyond 
the atomic level. Although some "complex" visual fields are found 
within projection columns, these are still essentially atomic and relate 
to the topographic locality. There is nothing reported corresponding 
to a gestalt or even a configurational convergence of inputs from the 
whole visual or somatosensory field. If the hierarchy were mediated 
from area to area of cortex, then it is surprising to find that Areas 17, 
18 and 19 are organised in the same atomic manner.
Looking at the feed-back adjustment kind of model, feature analysers 
would be formed by converging a variety of random samples of inputs and 
varying the weightings given to the samples. In that case, one would 
expect to lose the topographical mapping and to see the "successful" 
feature analysers differing from element to element. In contrast, 
there is a regular variation of the character of fields from column to
117
column, the variation relating to only one parameter which changes in 
some precise characteristic, e.g. orientation. The atomic nature of 
the columnar organisation and the precise ordering of the representa­
tion is as difficult to reconcile with this kind of model as with the 
hierarchical.
In comparison, the preservation of the localised atomic nature of 
receptive fields would be ideal for a template system. In each set of 
fields, e.g. orientation bars or joint-moveinents, a sub-set of the 
reporting neurons chosen from selected coluirjns could be combined to 
form the basis of a template representing some aspect of the whole 
stimulus configuration. The subsets of different analysers can be 
considered as providing separate template systems, each looking at 
the total stimulus event in a different way. These template systems 
may be set side by side, that is to say, in adjacent areas of cortex, 
as in the case of Areas 17 and 18, or may be overlaid as in the 
Superior Colliculus or parietal cortex. In area 18 colour, border and 
orientation elements are intermingled in a topographical mapping.
The sub-sets of different analysers in such an area may be considered 
as templates stacked close together to take advantage of the overall 
topographic projections.
The atomic nature of columnar representation appear only during invest­
igations in which it is being investigated, that is when the stimulus 
is appropriately controlled. It is the first response. The template 
interpretation is supported by the contrasting complex neural response 
of cortical neurons during normal complex sensory stimulation.
D. Tissue structure in relation to the model
"It would indeed be unrealistic to underestimate the difficulties that 
any attempt at constructing the interneuronal network is bound to meet 
in a structure of such lack in apparent regularity and such an abund­
ance of highly diverse neuronal constituents" (Szentagothai, 1976). 
Lorente de No identified more than 40 basic cell types (Jones, 1975b) . 
Recently there have been a number of exhaustive studies utilising con­
temporary techniques (Valverde, 1971; Hubei and Wiesel, 19 72; Lund, 
1973; Szentagothai, 1973, 1975, 1976; Jones, 1975a and b, to mention 
only the most relevant).
These studies have greatly clarified three aspects of cortical neural 
structure: (a) the morphology of the various cell types (b) the
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distribution of these cells, and therefore the clarification of the 
Layers of the cortex, and (c) the termination of the afferent fibres.
By comparison, there are two aspects which remain more or less a 
mystery: (i) the morphological basis of the columnar structure and
(ii) the actual inter-relationships by which neural processing is 
mediated.
In briefly summarising this work, it is hoped to show that the evid­
ence is consistent with the model to be proposed. Essentially this is 
that afferent fibres synapse upon a large number of neurons within a 
localised region. Some of these neurons are assumed to act simply as 
distributing neurons, transferring excitation to sub-sets of neurons 
within the column layer. A large population of integrating neurons 
are to be regarded as excited by afferent terminals. These integrat­
ing neurons are of different morphological types, the variation of 
which, in accordance with the model, is directed towards ensuring a 
wide distribution of inter-connection between them. Thus as will be 
seen from the following review, the majority of such neurons have 
locally organised dendritic and axonal arborisations. Other integrat­
ing neurons at or near the termination of the afferent fibres in Layer 
IV have ascending axons ending in diffuse arborisation, whilst others 
in upper layers (i.e. nearer the cortical surface) have descending 
axons. Some have axonal and dendritic fields extended to great dist­
ances horizontally. Many neurons have axons and dendrites extending 
into Layer I, which forms a dense neuropil (see Jones, 1975a and b) . 
According to the model, these varied shapes enable the integrating 
neurons to interchange excitation with each other in a dense network 
which extends across column boundaries. This explains the failure of 
research to find a morphological equivalent of the column boundary 
other than at afferent level, or efferent level. According to the 
model, the column is purely the effect of afferent and efferent 
organisation.
For the purposes of considering the model, the integrating neurons may 
be loosely identified with stellate-like neurons. Many stellate 
neurons have long fine axons which leave the local region of cortex. 
According to the model, these enter the cortex elsewhere, and thus 
join up the network of integrating cells in one location of cortex 
with the network of another. It will also be tentatively suggested that 
such axons form part of the reticular network of the brain, the large
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disc like neurons of the reticular formation acting as integrating 
neurons. The model suggests that the integrating neurons may be con­
sidered as an interconnective network extending throughout the entire 
brain.
A similar columnar structure may be seen to underly efferent organisa­
tion. The model suggests that corresponding to the columnar afferent 
termination, the integrating neurons drive the pyramids. The pyramids 
in upper layers may act partly as collecting cells feeding the larger 
pyramids of Layers V and IV, and partly as a fine differentiation of 
the columnar structure. In approximate terms, the columns are 
suggested to be functionally organised with a main pyramid in Layer V 
acting as an efferent neuron, and a number of other secondary efferent 
neurons from subdivisions of the column, the total efferent neurons 
constituting a bundle. In motor areas, the efferent organisation would 
be organised around a Betz cell.
In addition to the afferent terminals, integrating neurons and efferent 
neurons, the model requires a variety of inhibitory neurons. These are 
assumed to be reactively stimulated by the neurons already described.
Before considering the data to support this arrangement, it is perhaps 
necessary to anticipate by stating that my model distinguishes two 
kinds of connections between neurons. One kind, termed for convenience 
morphological connections, mediate the structural layout of the brain, 
e.g. afferent, efferent connections and columnar organisation. The 
other kind of connection, integrative connections, mediate learning and 
genetically determined connectivity analogical to learning. Some very 
important recent evidence relating to the termination of afferents upon 
spiny-dendrite stellate cells, may be speculatively fitted into this 
scheme. It is speculatively suggested that the spines which may be seen 
on the dendrites of the stellate-like cells which receive afferent term­
inals, and the spines on dendrites of pyramidal cells indicate morpholog­
ical connections, the integrative connections being without spines.
E . Cytoarchitectural Data
Detailed light microscopic studies of the cortex disclosed a great variety 
of forms densely packed (Cajal, 1899; Lorente de No, 1949). There was 
little to suggest that the cortex would be found to be functionally 
organised in columns. The laminar structure seemed to contradict the
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physiological findings of Mountcastle and Hubei and Wiesel.
One of the difficulties in clarifying the structure was the lack of 
information concerning the termination of the afferent fibres. Since 
electron microscopic studies showed degenerating afferent terminals 
mostly on dendritic spines, it was assumed that these were the den­
drites of pyramids. Scheibel and Scheibel (1970) and Szentagothai 
(1967, 1971 and 1973) were amongst those who evolved a "modular con­
cept" of columnar organisation on this supposition. The clarification 
of the distribution of the various cells in the Layers and the precise 
location of the afferent terminals made it more probable that the 
afferents terminated on a certain kind of spiny dendrite stellate cell 
(Valverde, 1971; Hubei and Wiesel, 1972; Lund, 1973; Jones, 1975 and b; 
Szentagothai, 1975).
In visual cortex of monkey, Valverde found stellate cells in Layer IV.
"Short axon cells have been found in clusters or glomeruli upon which
terminal branches of cortical afferents have been observed. It is
suggested that periglomerular stellate cells with ascending axons con-
*
nect clusters of clewed cells with small, medium and large stellate and 
pyramidal cells of Layers II and iVa, which in turn activate the giant 
solitary cells of Layer V through synaptic contacts along vertical 
descending axons" (Valverde, 1971).
Valverde considers that Layer IVc is about 250-300 p in thickness and 
the lower limit is 950-1,200 p from the pial surface. "In Nissl prep­
arations it appears filled with small round bodies with scanty cytoplasm 
and 6-10 p in diameter". "A columnar arrangement in lower levels is 
most patent in Nissl sections. The cell bodies appear piled up forming 
vertical columns of eight to ten elements, or are grouped into elong­
ated clusters (glomeruli) with major axis in a radial direction, and 
separated by clear vertical narrow passages . . ."
Hubei and Weisel (1972) using an original technique of limited lesions 
in the LGN, were able to show the termination of afferents from the 
parvocellular layers to Layer IVc with a second minor input to Layer I. 
Magnocellular layers of the LGN sent afferents only to IVb. They con­
cluded " . . .  Certainly the results of the present study, given the
dense packing in Layer IVc of an almost pure stellate population (my 
italics) provide little encouragement to the idea that the afferents 
end primarily upon pyramidal cells".
* Valverde defines "clewed" cells as having tangled dendrites i
resembling a ball of thread, sometimes called spider cells 
or granular cells.
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Incidentally, by destroying separately the afferents from either eye, 
they were able to demonstrate two orthogonally organised systems of 
columns or slabs, mediating respectively the orientation of recep­
tive fields and ocular dominance. They also qualified earlier 
assumptions concerning columns, by demonstrating clear differences 
in responses to visual stimuli from different layers. "Not surpris­
ing ly, cells of Layer IV . . . have the simplest properties and show
the least intermingling of inputs from the two eyes. The more complex 
cell types, for the most part binocularly driven, are found in the 
layers above and be low".
Lund (19 73) divides the neuron population of Area 17 of the monkey into 
pyramidal neurons, stellate neurons with spinous dendrites and stellate 
neurons with spine free or sparsely spined dendrites. The spinous 
dendrite stellate cells are restricted to lamina IV. Lund found three 
groups of thalarno-cortical axons, synapsing respectively to lamina 1, 
the upper half of IVc, and the deeper half of IVc and to IVa.
Jones published two exhaustive researches on the somatic sensory cortex 
of monkey, one (1975a) dealing with distribution of afferents, the 
other (1975b) with the morphology and distribution of non pyramidal 
neurons. A feature of the latter was its quantitative assessments.
Most of his work confirms that reported for other areas of cortex, par­
ticularly the striate, in primates and cats. Two differences were
(a) the relatively low numbers of spine bearing stellate cells of the 
type reported in layer IV of the striate cortex. The majority of cells 
found by Jones did not have a true star shape, but had a major dendrite 
from Layer III; and (b) the thalamic afferents terminate not only in 
Layer IV, but also in Layer III. His research also covered the motor 
area, and in that area terminals fill much of Layer II. In all areas a 
small proportion also end in layer I.
In support of the proposed tissue structure outline for my model, it may 
be worth summarising Jones' nine classes of cell: Type 1 are large multi­
polar cells with ascending axons found predominantly in layers III and 
V. The dendrites may extend over three or more layers and over 500 p. 
Type 2 resemble type 1, but in miniature. They have thin sinuous den­
drites in fusiform or ovoid fields. By contrast with the mainly horizon­
tal disposition of type 1 cells, the terminal axon branches of type 2 
are oriented primarily in the vertical direction. Type 3 cells are small
122
multipolar or bitufted cells with vertical axons as long as 1,000 p.
The soinata are small and round and found exclusively in layer II and 
the upper part of III. Type 4 cells are small with radially arramged 
dendrites and local bush like axonal ramifications. They have true 
stalked dendritic spikes, although sparse. Those witli descending axons 
are in Layer II, tliose with ascending in Layer IV and III. Type 5 
cells have round somata in Layer II and pronounced dendritic tufts in 
Layer I. The axons first descend then ascend, giving rise to horizon­
tal and recurrent brandies at each stage.
Type 7 cells are spiny cells witli recurrent axons found only in 
Layer IV. They include both the "star cells" of Cajal, and the "star 
pyramids" of Lorente De No. There is no basal dendritic display as 
in pyramids, the soma being surrounded by dendrites radiating in all 
directions. The axon arises from the deeper surface of the soma, then 
divides into two or three branches "which recurve very sharply and 
often divide again, so that up to six vertically oriented branches 
ascend over the cell somata and into Layer III".
Type 8 cells are modified pyramids, the dendrites bearing true spines. 
The axon descends into the white matter. In addition to these eight 
types, Jones found only three examples of a giant type of cell. The 
somata lay at the junction of layers II and III, and the longest den­
drite measured 600 p.
Jones considers that thalamic afferents basically terminate on type 7 
cells in Layers IV and part of III. He points out that the cylinder 
of cortex which could be influenced by a single type 7 cell is too 
small to account for the column size of the order of 300 p. To this 
must be added the density of packing of such cells. "The number of 
type 7 cells contacted by a single afferent, however, remains unknown". 
The tentative interpretation for my model, is that the afferent fibres 
directly contact a number of type 7 neurons, which act primarily as 
distributing neurons to the integrating cells, which are the class of 
stellate cells generally. The extent to which neurons receive direct 
rather than indirect thalamic afferentation is reflected by the number 
of dendritic spines.
The modular concept of Scheibel and Scheibel and Szentagothai was 
mentioned above. Scheibel and Scheibel had argued that "all the 
elements are exposed to the same input, although the degree of
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=600 um^
Figure 5.5 (Reproduced from Szentagothai, 1975) Szentagothai's 
modified hypothetical elementary neuron circuit incorporating evidence 
of the termination of afferents. Specific sensory afferents (heavy 
black vertical lines at right) terminate (separately) on spiny 
stellates S^, so called star-pyramids S^, and another type of spiny 
stellate S^ as well as on neurogliform non-spiny stellates N S , in Layers 
IVa eind IVc. The vertical plane at left shows the strictly oriented 
axonal arborisaition of a large basket cell, which Szentagothai considers 
inhibitory.
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SURFACE PARALLEL INTRACORTICAL 
SYSTEM •  6 -8  mm
PYRAMID c o l l a t e r a l  SPREAD 
M O D U LE " 3  m m *^
n c o r t ic o c o r t ic a l  a f f e r e n t
\^ B O R IZ A T K )N  COLUMN
Figure 5.6 (Reproduced from Szentagothai, 19 78) Illustrating the 
diffuse connections described by Szentagothai. Note that, all cells 
shown in his diagram have extensive spread parallel to the surface. 
Many authors assume that pyramid collaterals are inhibitory.
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contamination by inputs by immediately adjacent components varies . . . "  
This conclusion implying a modular concept would remain valid, even if 
one modifies the original target of the afferent fibres from pyramids to 
spiny-dendrite stellate cells.
Although not explicitly stated, both Szentagothai's and Scheibel and 
Scheibel's modular concept would appear to differ from that of the 
model presented here, and described in the opening of this sub-section. 
Like Mountcastle's (1978) interpretation based on parietal cortex, the 
concept appears to be of entirely self-contained cylinders within which 
some unknown computational process takes place. Although in general 
terms a modular concept remains valid after the modification of assumed 
afferent termination from pyramids to stellate cells, it would seem 
that the notion of independent cylinders is weakened by that change.
As far as is known the processes of stellate and other morphological 
varieties of cell, other than pyramids, does not conform to any partic­
ular columnar boundary. Szentagothai produced a modified neuronal 
wiring diagram, with afferents terminating upon stellate neurons 
(Szentagothai, 19 75) reproduced here as Figure 5.5. The only aspect 
of that diagram which really needs to be contradicted in my model is 
the representation of stellate cells as falling necessarily entirely 
within a cylinder. My model assumes additionally that stellate cells 
communicate with each other, and that these connections extend across 
column boundaries.
Szentagothai (19 78) has further qualified his earlier assumptions by 
describing "more diffuse local connections" which extend beyond the 
boundaries of columns as defined by afferent terminals. Figure 5.6 
from his paper illustrates these connections. "The remarkable feature 
in the connections illustrated . . . particularly in the pyramid col­
laterals is that this system is completely (and circularly) symmetric 
in the surface parallel plane . . .  In such a system the conditions for 
co-operativity and the emergence of dynamic patterns are given also at 
the macroscopical level of the neuron network . . ."
Szentagothai stresses the pyramids, but his figure shows other neurons 
with an even greater spread. Moreover, the descriptions of neuron 
morphology cited earlier, (e.g. Jones, 19 75) provide suitable candidates 
for the task. The fact that my model predicted both the columnar 
structure and the diffuse connections shows that whether those predictions
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turn out to be right or wrong in the long run, the model has strong 
empirical predictive value.
A feature of Szentagothai's proposal is the function of inhibitory 
neurons. For this he utilised the inhibitory and excitatory synaptic 
distinctions argued by Colonnier (1968). He assumes that the large 
disc like cells are inhibitory and provide the substrate of the boun­
daries of columns. He assumes that Jones' type 4 cells are inhibitory, 
which he describes as "chandelier cells". Other candidates for inhib­
itory cells are "columnar baskets" and "large basket cells"
(Szentagothai, 1975). Except that his inhibition assumptions are far 
more specific than need to be adopted for my model, there would prob­
ably be no conflict with his proposals.
Some conmient may be necessary to relate the template idea to some 
complex neuronal evidence: (1) receptive fields are not entirely iden­
tical within a cylinder, complex fields being nearer the surface 
(Hubeiand Wiesel, 1972) ; (2) binocular dominance columns ; (3) the size
of tlie coluirms compared with the size of any particular kind of cell.
The only corresponding magnitudes are between degenerating afferent 
terminals and the functional column size. The nearest in size is the 
large pyramid shown by Szentagothai to have a spread of over 300 pj
(4) composite nature of cylinders controlling individual muscles;
(5) Mountcastle's discovery of mini-columns in the parietal cortex.
The spatial template idea does not require any particular representa­
tion of detail in the projection. The finer the detail, the greater 
the discriminative power of the template system, but clearly the smaller 
the differences to be detected. As already pointed out, local conjunc­
tions and convergences of afferent information need not be ruled out 
simply because my model is not an hierarchical network one. The idea 
of superimposition of templates has already been mentioned. The most 
obvious arrangement would be for the main template system to be defined 
roughly at the level of the afferent terminals, and to have a grain 
size equal to one of Hubei and Wiesel's or Mountcastle's columns. The 
binocular dominance columns provide at this level the necessary basis 
for a template matching taking into account what appears on both retinas. 
Nearer the surface the afferentation may be result of convergences from 
nearby afferent fibres. Thus the mini-columns may be seen either as 
separate finer grain template systems or, functionally, as fine tuning
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apparatus for the main template system. In the case of Hubei and 
Wiesel's complex cells, such a neuron may be driven by a conjunction 
between two neighbouring afferent fibres, the one having a delay 
relative to the other, and so register temporal sequence.
It would be useful in my model to assess the number of excitatory 
neurons within a coluirin. This must depend on how one defines tJie column. 
Sholl (1956) estimated 5,000 neuron somata within the compass of any 
single afferent fibre. Cragg (1975) counted by light microscopy on 
cresyl violet stained sections. His density was considerably lower 
than Sholl's and was around 15.6 x 10^ per cu cm. Taking a column as 
measuring 0.5 across and 2.5 mm deep, gives about 9,500 neurons per 
column. This figure includes pyramids and inhibitory neurons. Never­
theless, the order of magnitude is close to that of Sholl. Mountcastle 
(19 78) suggests about 110 neurons in each mini-column, which gives 
about 25,000 cells per hypercolumn. In considering these numbers, the 
possibility must be taken into account that the neuron may not be the 
element of integration. Each integrating neuron might contribute a 
large number of such elements. This possibility will be considered in 
greater detail when more speculative aspects of the model are discussed.
Summarising a vast amount of information, there is now strong evidence 
for the following: afferent terminals enter columns : in striate areas 
they synapse upon stellate neurons with spiny dendrites in Layer IV: 
in somatic areas they synapse upon both stellate and modified stellate 
neurons with spiny dendrites in Layers III and IV. Some afferents 
proceed in all areas to Layer I. In motor areas the main destination is 
Layer II. The neurons of the cerebral cortex can be classified into a 
number of morphological types, with characteristic soma and dendritic 
and axonal arborisation. All workers agree upon the main distributions. 
There are pyramids in various layers. Most of these have axons 
arborising in Layers V and VI which contain mostly large pyramids. 
Amongst the stellate cells some have ascending, some descending and some 
horizontal processes. These reach distant cells or terminate locally. 
Afferent terminals form profuse and extended arborisations capable of 
reaching many stellate neurons.
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II The theoretical model
A. The general layout
In simple terms tiie anatomical organisation of the mammalian cortex 
may be regarded as consisting of arrays of replicated coluirms of neurons. 
Each colunm contains a variety of neurons, amongst them inhibitory 
neurons, efferent neurons and distributing neurons, the function of 
which will be described in due course. A proportion of the neurons to 
be found within any column are assumed to be excitatory neurons capable 
of forming connections. The columns may each be regarded as containing 
a neuronal pool of these integrating neurons. For the puipose of 
visualising the system, each column may be considered to contain a few 
thousand integrating neurons.
Afferent columns and efferent columns are defined functionally, the 
neurons of an afferent column being possibly also the neurons of an 
efferent column. Afferent columns are each served by one afferent fibre. 
Efferent columns are each organised around one efferent fibre. However, 
for the purpose of following the main idea, the columns may be regarded
as segregated into separate spatial regions containing only either
afferent or efferent columns respectively. Also for purposes of 
exposition, the columns may be regarded as discrete; that is, the inte­
grating neurons within a particular column receive excitation only from 
the one afferent fibre which serves it; the integrating neurons of an 
efferent column drive one efferent fibre only. These restrictions are 
not considered to apply in the brain? but simplify the presentation. 
Initially it is convenient to consider the cerebral cortex as consisting 
of a sensory area comprising a set of afferent columns, and a motor area
comprising a set of efferent columns.
The set of afferent columns may be considered as receiving a topographical 
mapping of the receptive fields of the sensory system. Similarly, the set 
of efferent columns maps onto the elements or effector fields of the 
motor system.
Each of the integrating neurons within a given neuronal pool serves an 
essentially identical role as able to represent that pool's participa­
tion in neural activity. All the integrating neurons reached by a 
particular afferent fibre "are exposed to approximately the same input", 
(Scheibel and Scheibel, 1970). For the purposes of exposition, the
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Figure 5.7 The concept of Linked Constellations. Each column of 
circles represents a neuronal pool of integrating neurons. Each 
afferent fibre is assumed to activate all the neurons of its pool 
uniformly. Two columns are shown in which' the integrating neurons 
within a column send their impulses to a neuron with a fibre lead­
ing out of the tissue. The heavy curved lines represent selective 
diffuse connections by which the neurons concerned are able to dis­
tribute their excitation amongst members of the sub-set with which 
they share mutual connections. Different Linked Constellations will 
reach maximum states of excitation depending upon the pattern of 
activity in the afferent fibres. The differential excitation is 
transferred to neurons in the efferent pools.
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activity of the afferent fibres may be taken to be all-or-none. At 
any instant a particular selection of afferent fibres will be active, 
the remainder passive. Within those neuronal pools served by active 
afferent fibres all the integrating neurons will be excited simultan­
eously. The model assumes that all integrating neurons which are 
excited simultaneously above an appropriate threshold and are within 
"connective range" of each other (see below) become linked to each 
other. The linked system formed is exclusive and unique : that is, 
neurons linked together in this manner cannot form connections else­
where until they are released from their current association. 
"Connective" or "Synaptic range" simply means that the neurons con­
cerned each possess a process (e.g. axon) which approaches closely 
enough to the process of another excited neuron (e.g. a dendrite) for 
a connection to become effective. The connections form both between 
integrating neurons within a neuronal pool and also across neuronal 
pool boundaries between neurons belonging to simultaneously excited 
pools.
The resulting linked structure will contain neurons from excited 
neuronal pools (columns) but not from non-excited neuronal pools. It 
will represent the pattern of excitation across the set of afferent 
fibres at the time it was formed.
Integrating neurons can only belong to one such linked structure at a 
time. The model as simulated assumes that linkage connections decay.
In this way neurons are released and become available again for con­
nection into a new structure. This assumption may however be replaced 
by others; the idea is not central.
The joining together of integrating neurons from excited neuronal pools 
to form linked structures is illustrated in Figure 5.7. Such struc­
tures or their residues would remain in the system as learned records, 
or more informally, memory records. The many structures would be 
intertwined within the feltwork of the cortex. A feature of the model 
is that they are both structurally and functionally separate. Subject 
to certain qualifications to be detailed, they are functionally isolated 
from each other. They remain in the system unaltered except for the 
possible decay of the structure due to decay of connections.
The linked structure is not to be considered as restricted to a local 
region of cortex, or even necessarily to the cortex. Linked structures
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would be formed locally within many regions of the cortex: at the same 
time the local structures would also be joined together to form wide- 
ranging networks, linked constellations, extending throughout the 
cerebrum.
B. Integrative and morphological connections
As mentioned in an earlier chapter, it is convenient to refer to two 
classes of neuronal connection or communication. In the first class 
are those which are innately or developmentally determined and which 
define the morphological structure of the brain- For example, columns 
are defined by the synaptic connections which afferent fibres make 
upon the integrating neurons, or in the case of an efferent column, by 
the synapses which the integrating neurons make upon a neuron with an 
efferent fibre, e.g. a pyramid. A second class of connections are 
those which mediate linked structures. These are mainly across column 
boundaries. They are proposed as the substrate of learning and of the 
genetically determined adaptations analogical to learning (e.g. innately 
recognised patterns). The first class will be referred to as 
morphological connections, the second as integrative connections.
Morphological connections are almost certainly Gray type synapses.
Current knowledge of neuronal alteration mediating learning (and analo­
gical inbuilt information) is too uncertain to enable the form of 
integrative connections to be specified. Provisionally the model will be 
described as though both morphological and integrative connections were 
mediated by orthodox synapses. A non-synaptic mechanism would not 
appreciably modify the model as simulated, but might have considerable 
relevance to its further interpretation.
In terms of orthodox synapses, integrative synapses formed to mediate 
learning would require a rule assumed by many other neurological models 
(see Chapter 4); for a connection to become effective both the pre- 
synaptic and post-synaptic neuron must be simultaneously excited. The 
synapses may be considered to be structurally existing, but ineffective 
prior to the fulfilment of the condition. In my model such connections 
are not progressively facilitated by use. When the linking conditions 
are fulfilled, i.e. post-synaptic and pre-synaptic cell excited above 
threshold, the connection becomes fully operative.
C. Formation of linked constellations
Consider a number of neurons within synaptic range of each other, some
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only of which are simultaneously excited. One of the excited cells 
will probably possess a potentially effective synapse upon each of 
several of the other excited cells. These synapses will become effec­
tive, whereas the potentially effective synapses it possesses upon 
unexcited cells will not. Some of the excited neurons upon which it 
possessed a potentially effective synapse may possess potentially 
effective synapses back upon itself. If not one or other of them will 
probably possess a potentially effective synapse upon another excited 
cell which possesses a potentially effective synapse upon the first 
cell, even though that first cell may not possess a potentially effec­
tive synapse upon it. Only the connections between the simultaneously 
excited neurons will have been made effective. Accordingly, after 
excitation, the subset of excited neurons would have a randomly distri­
buted synaptic system in which every neuron would receive synaptic feet 
from some other neurons of the subset and possess synaptic feet upon 
others. By contrast none of the neurons of the subset would possess 
synaptic feet upon any neuron outside the subset, nor would any neuron 
outside the subset possess effective synaptic feet upon any neuron 
within it. The neurons of the subset form a Linked Constellation (LC).
If upon a subsequent occasion some of the neurons belonging to the LC 
are excited directly whilst others are not, the excitation will spread 
from those directly excited to those which are not. The effect will 
be to average the excitation received by the directly excited cells 
over all the neurons of the Linked Constellation.
In the simulation, the hypothesised exchanges are mediated by notional 
Spikes. Those neurons which are receiving excitation direct from 
afferent terminals impart spikes to those in neuronal pools which are 
not currently receiving direct excitation but which are members of 
the same LC because they were excited simultaneously on a former occa­
sion. These latter neurons, being at a lower level of excitation, do 
not return so much excitation to the directly excited neurons; so, as 
just described, the level of excitation within the linked subset moves 
towards the mean of the excitation of all the neurons of the LC. In 
theory these exchanges could be by way of a non-synaptic mechanism: or 
perhaps, although synaptic, achieved by local micropotential changes 
within the membranes concerned, without actual spike emmission, as 
suggested by Pribram (1971).-
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D. Operation of Linked Constellations
In brief, each afferent fibre excites only one neuronal pool. At any 
instant an afferent pattern would excite a corresponding selection of 
neuronal pools above an assumed threshold for discharge and formation 
of integrative connections. A Linked Constellation would be formed 
comprising cells from only the excited pools. Linked neurons can 
excliange excitation more readily than non-linked neurons.
Upon repetition of the sensory pattern the same selection of neuronal 
pools would become excited. The matching LC formed upon the former 
occasion would become more excited than other non-matching Linked 
Constellations within the system, formed during different sensory stim­
ulation. The matching LC has all its member cells excited (on the 
sensory side). The non-matching has fewer member cells excited, since 
some of the neuronal pools in which its members reside are not excited 
by the current afferent pattern. Consequently the level of excitation 
rises faster in the matching Linked Constellation than in non-matching 
ones. The effect is one of degree. Linked Constellations containing a 
greater number of neurons situated in currently activated pools would 
rise to higher levels of excitation than those having a smaller number 
of directly excited neurons.
Effectively the afferent excitation may be said to be shared amongst 
the member neurons of each Linked Constellation. However, the idea of 
sharing implies the idea of the conservation of the amount of excitation. 
This is an interesting idea, which will not however be pursued here. It 
may perhaps be mentioned in anticipation, that a simulation of the 
Linked Constellation concept in terms of orthodox synapses showed that 
the system could be made either attentuating, amplificatory or conserva­
tive, depending principally upon the quantitative distribution of the 
potential connections. The amplificatory version showed certain advan­
tages, the attentuating system, other advantages. In fact these issues 
proved to be rather different in operation from what was expected of 
them in advance, and their discussion will therefore be left for later.
For the purposes of exposition, the system may be thought of as essentially 
conservative, with, however, the facility to reduce the excitation in a 
Linked Constellation after it has served its immediate function of being 
raised to dominance by the current input pattern.
E . Linked Constellations as extended templates
Each Linked Constellation provides a learned record of the state of
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excitation of the set of neuronal pools (columns) occurring at the time 
it was formed. In a simple sense it is a template. If the sense organ 
were mapped in a strictly isomorphic fashion onto the array of columns, 
the Linked Constellation would provide a simple template (Chapter 2 and 
Neisser, 1967) of the stimulation falling upon tlie sense organ. For 
example, when a leter 'A' fell upon such a retina, the Linked Constel­
lation formed in the isomorphically mapped visual array of columns would 
also represent an 'A'. In reality the mapping of sense organs is not 
strictly isomorphic. There are complications such as orientated receptive 
fields. There are some aspects of neural processing where it would not 
make sense to speak of a topographic mapping. Nevertheless, Linked 
Constellations are templates in the sense of providing a spatial config­
uration to be matched against the spatial configuration of the input 
pattern.
The templates provided by Linked Constellations are not suggested to be 
templates of the external world, nor even of the sense organ. Each 
Linked Constellation would be a template of one particular state of 
activity of the set of neuronal pools. Because of the distributed char­
acter of each Linked Constellation, extending between different projec­
tion areas, it would provide an extended template as illustrated in 
Figure 2.4
III Inhibition
A. Main role of inhibition in the model
A class of neurons are assumed to exert an inhibitory effect upon the 
integrating neurons. These will be termed inhibitory control neurons, 
or less formally, inhibitory neurons. Inhibition is used here purely 
in a neuronal sense, and does not refer to behavioural inhibition.
The general purpose of inhibition, according to the model, is to control 
the excitation of the integrating neurons. To provide a comprehensive 
control one may envisage the system of inhibitory control neurons as 
organised at various levels of range of action. There would be inhib­
itory neurons acting locally. Such an inhibitory neuron acting 
recurrently upon an individual integrating neuron would ensure that when 
that integrating neuron discharged it was subsequently inhibited. At the 
local level some inhibitory neurons would act laterally upon neighbouring
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integrating neurons. At a broader spatial level, neuronal pools would 
contain inhibitory neurons which recurrently inhibit all the integrating 
neurons within that pool, and laterally all the integrating neurons of 
neighbouring pools. At a still broader spatial level, there would be a 
system of inhibitory neurons which controlled the general levels of 
excitation over a set of pools. It is this latter level with which we 
are particularly concerned at this point.
For purposes of exposition we are here concerned with the main function 
of inhibition in the model, which is to keep the average amount of 
activity in the system below threshold levels. In a dynamic system of 
distributed excitation, some excitation will be reaching most integra­
tion neurons most of the time. It is necessary to distinguish those 
which are receiving more excitation from those which are receiving less, 
rather than those receiving some excitation from those receiving none.
In relation to the formation of integrative connections, large numbers 
of integrating neurons receiving little excitation must be stopped from 
being linked into a Linked Constellation. In relation to spike emission, 
it is necessary to prevent all the Linked Constellations becoming supra- 
threshold and discharging at once.
For the purposes under discussion, the inhibitory neurons are activated 
either directly or indirectly both by afferent fibres and by the inte­
grating neurons themselves. Accordingly inhibition is reactive. The 
precise method of activation of the inhibitory neurons is not central to 
the model, but it is important that their activity can be finely adjusted 
to the spike activity of the integrating neurons.
In neurological models inhibition may be looked at in a number of ways.
In models involving logical conjunctions, an inhibitory spike is con­
sidered as a discrete signal of opposite sign to an excitatory spike. In 
distributed memory models, there are massive excitatory effects and inhibi­
tion may be considered as a means of control. Magoun (195 8) proposed a 
concept of this kind. The present model takes into account that a 
neuron may receive many thousands of synapses. Cragg (19 75) gives 40,464 
as the mean per neuron.
Integrating neurons may be considered to be excited by large numbers of 
synapses from afferent terminals (See Section I). The inhibitory neurons 
are assumed to possess abundant synapses (morphological connections) upon 
the integrating neurons. All the integrating neurons within a pool will
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receive equal excitation from the afferent fibre. The level of excita­
tion will however vary from neuron to neuron (see below) according to 
the integrative connections each possesses. If they are all subject to 
the semie inhibitory influence, many of the less excited integrating 
neurons will have their spike activity totally inhibited. Only the most 
highly excited will discharge.
For the present purposes it is not necessary to consider the physiological 
mechanisms of inhibition within the cells. The treatment is essentially 
no different from that of other neurological models. In effect inhibition 
is algebraically subtracted from excitation. The treatment was in fact 
somewhat more complicated in the main simulations, in an attempt to 
guard against a too simplistic view of inhibitory neuronal processes.
The representation of inhibition in these versions of the simulation was 
to provide a variable threshold for the discharge of integrating neurons 
and for the forming of integrative connections between them. This rep­
resentation was also found to have its limitations. This aspect will be 
left until later in this chapter.
During development of the simulations a number of different strategies 
were adopted to try to control the application of the inhibitory system 
with maximum effectiveness. Eventually a rather simple conceptual 
approach was adopted. In this approach, the main inhibition system 
was assumed to apply its influence equally upon all the integrating 
neurons within an array, i.e. across a set of neuronal pools. This also 
helped to define an array as a set of columns having common inhibitory 
control. Lateral and recurrent inhibition, at various spatial ranges, 
was then considered as serving only the functions commonly attributed to 
them (see below) and were given subsidiary systems which modulated the 
main system.
B. Control of inhibitory activity
In the model an important aspect of differences of excitation of inte­
grating neurons is in which columns the most excited neurons are situated. 
The aim was to adjust the output of the inhibitory system so that there 
would be some neuronal pools in which no integrating neurons were dis­
charging, whilst in other pools discharges were taking place. This 
condition would enable the discharge pattern to be equated with a selec­
tion of neuronal pools, and accordingly with an afferent pattern. Referring 
to Figure .5.7, it will be seen that whatever pattern of afferent input
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occurs, many Linked Constellations will be excited to some degree 
(numerical examples will be given in Section IV). Selecting the most 
hightly excited Linked Constellations is a matter of suppressing the 
partial excitation of tlie less excited ones. This could be acheived 
by applying inhibition across the whole array at an appropriate level.
The level of inhibitory activity of the main inhibitory system was con­
trolled by feed-back from the excitatory output of the integrating 
neurons. Unexpected and poorly understood difficulties were encountered 
when it was attempted to develop the model beyond a simple stage. It 
was relatively easy to define a feed-back criterion which allowed 
those integrating neurons to discharge which were in columns whose 
afferent fibres were currently active. To take full advantage of the 
theoretical model it was required, however, to discern both the direct 
effects of afferent input and the effects of the most highly reactivated 
Linked Constellations, whilst excluding the effects of less highly 
reactivated LCs. It was impossible to find a criterion for the feed-back 
system which would do this. In fact, the solution of problems of 
inhibitory control, and of related excitatory controls, was not achieved 
until very late in the development of the simulations, when notional elec­
trical rhythms were introduced.
C. Neuronal mediation
To achieve the equalising of inhibitory action across an array, it would 
seem probable that the integrating neurons and afferent fibres do not 
activate the inhibitory control neurons directly, but through intermediary 
neurons. These intermediary neurons would need to possess connections 
across column boundaries if they are to average inhibition across an array. 
Such connections could be orthodox excitatory synapses genetically or 
developmentally determined. The intermediary neurons would be excitatory, 
but may perhaps be termed inhibition distribution neurons, since they 
would control an inhibitory effect upon the integrating neurons (Figure 5.8)
The connection of afferent fibres direct to such neurons would provide a 
measure of "feed-forward inhibition" (of. Scheibel and Scheibel, 1970).
This would enable the integrating neurons to be prepared for the massive 
arrival of afferent excitation. It would protect the tissue and the system 
from sudden changes. It would adjust the tissue crudely to its task, 
whilst the contribution of the discharges of integrating neurons effected 
the fine adjustments. These neuro-histological speculations are, of
12)9
course, intended merely to indicate a possible neuronal implementation 
of the model concordant with contemporary knowledge-
D . Recurrent and collateral inhibition
In the theoretical model in the form just described, recurrent and 
lateral inhibition would be superimposed upon the main system of inhibi­
tory control neurons. These would have the effects customarily ascribed 
to them in the literature (see e.g. Mach, 1959; von Bekesy, 1967;
Ratliff £ind Hartline, 1959; Jung, 1972).
After the introduction of the revised inhibition approach just described, 
these aspects of the system played little part. They were however, 
included in many of the simulations, especially the earlier versions.
Both lateral and recurrent inhibition was reactive to the spikes emitted 
by integrating neurons. Lateral inhibition acted immediately whereas 
recurrent inhibition was subject to delay. Lateral inhibition acting 
between neuronal pools, enhanced signal contrast. Recurrent inhibition 
has the effect of cutting short the discharges of neurons in excited 
neuronal pools and gave rise to a "negative after effect" in those pools 
which had received active afferent volleys.
These functions, although apparently not central to the main idea of the 
model, may be useful in rounding out the account of brain function.
There is, moreover, one particular aspect in which lateral and recurrent 
inhibition might prove crucial in the interpretation of the model beyond 
the stage to which it is developed in this thesis. This relates to the 
possibility of the system being able to reproduce a sequence of events. 
Lateral and recurrent inhibition acting between individual integrating 
neurons would enable the neurons of the most highly reactivated Linked 
Constellation to rise to dominance: its activity might then be reduced 
by recurrent inhibition, so making way for the neurons of another Linked 
Constellation to become dominant.
IV Formal statement of the model
Some simple numerical examples may make the system clearer. The formal 
statements are only intended as an aid to exposition. They are intended 
to provide reasonable algorithms to express the theory.
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A . Some rules of the model
1. Integrating neurons receive excitation from:
(a) afferent volleys
(b) other integrating neurons with which they have integrative con­
nections: i.e. the averaging effect over Linked Constellations.
2. Integrating neurons discharge excitation upon:
(a) efferent neurons
(b) other integrating neurons with which they have integrative con­
nections: i.e. the averaging effect over Linked Constellations.
3. Integrating neurons become linked together into Linked Constella­
tions if:
(a) the excitation in the cell is above the sum of the inhibition 
and the intrinsic threshold
and
(b) the cell is free to be linked (see next chapter).
4. At any given moment only one Linked Constellation involving all 
supra-threshold cells is formed. The time taken for the formation 
of a Linked Constellation is finite.
5. An integrating neuron is either linked or unlinked. If linked it 
has integrative connections with members of one Linked Constellation 
only.
6. At the end of a randomly determined duration, an integrating neuron
ceases to be a member of a Linked Constellation and becomes available
to form fresh integrative connections with a new Linked Constellation. 
This is known as decay (see next chapter).
B. Some further algorithms
(i) (a) Integrating neurons are either linked or unlinked
(b) only unlinked cells are available for linking into new Linked
Cons te nations.
(ii) Integrating neurons which are unlinked and are simultaneously
excited above -a threshold level (TH ) become linked into the jth Linked
np
Constellation.
(iii) TH^^, being the threshold of the nth integrating neuron in the pth
neuronal pool, is partly attributable to Inhibition (I) and partly a
natural threshold individual to each neuron, NTH . So:
np
TH = 1 4  NTH ... 1np np
(iv) The jth Linxed Constellation is that formed at a particular instant
t.. The instant t. comprises the finite time interval between t. and t. 4 1
] ] 3 3
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(v) Integrating neurons whether linked or unlinked emit spikes when 
excited above threshold. The frequency of tlie spikes emitted is a 
function of the level of excitation above threshold, i.e.
D = k(E - TH) ... 2
where D is the frequency of emitted spikes, E is the level of excita­
tion and k is an operator. k is not necessarily linear, but may be 
taken for convenience as some simple proportion, say 1/3.
(vi) Ë, the excitation, is expressed as tlie number of spikes which 
would be emitted by an integrating neuron: (1) in the absence of fur­
ther received excitation; (2) assuming the threshold remained constant; 
and (3) until such time that an instant occurs during which no spikes 
are emitted.
(vii) The values of excitation of all of the integrating neurons of
a particular Linked Constellation tend to move to equality over the
passage of time. If E .is the excitation of the mth neuron in the jth
m]
Linked Constellation, then ignoring additions or reduction of excita­
tion by neurons within the LC or changes in threshold, all E . move to
mj
the same value.
M
E ' . = ^ E E .  ...3
mj M m]
m = 1
(viii) The application of equation 3 is qualified by the assumption 
that all neurons, whether linked or unlinked, lose excitation by emis­
sion of spikes, and possibly by dissipation over time. As will be 
noted from (vii) above, the assumption was adopted that only a propor­
tion of excitation may be discharged over a single instant. This gives 
expression to the fact that a neuron may continue to emit spikes for 
some time after being stimulated.
Let A W  (the afferent volley value) be the number of spikes impinging
upon the neuron N at some instant, t.. Let R be the reduction of 
np 1 np
excitation occurring in this neuron at t^. R^^ will be dependent upon
the discharge of N and upon other assumptions concerning dissipation of 
excitation. Then :
E ' = E + ( A W  - R )  4
np np np
(ix) For exposition, all the neurons of a neuronal pool may be consid­
ered to be receiving excitation from the afferent fibre of that pool or 
not.
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E = (3x30)/4 
= 22.530
Dis = 0.33x 
(30-15)25(ii) 225
E = (3x25)/4 
=18.75(iii)
LC Cb ) 30 E = (2x30)/5 
=  12
Dis = 0 . 33x 
(30-15) 
= 5
(ii)
E = (2x25)/5 
=  10
(iii)
»
E = (1x30)/4 
= 7.5
Dis = 0 . 33x 
(30-15) 
= 5
E = (1x25)/4 
= 6.25
6.25(iii) (6.26.25
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Figure 5.9 (a) Integration across Linked Constellations.
(i) Before integration; (ii) integration ignoring Discharge and
Inhibition; (iii) integration assuming Discharge before transfers
of Excitation and that Inhibition is maintained at 15. (See text
and further calculations in Figure 5.9 (b) next page.
Dis = Spike Discharge. E = Excitation. E = mean Excitation after
distribution. LC(A), LC(B), LC(C) are the Linked Constellations 
shown in Figure 5.7.
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5.9c The above calculations are given for comparison 
with those shovm. in Figure 5*9a, The figures are now based upon 
the assumption that the first and second Afferent Fibres are 
Active instead of tlie first and third, as shown in Figure 5,9a; 
i.e. the Input is 110 instead of 101. The Linlced Constellation 
which ma,tches the revised Input becomes tliat with the greatest 
mean Excitation.
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c. Some simple examples
Consider the simple arrangement shown in Figures 5.7 and 5.9a. Suppose, 
for illustration, that the first and third fibres are active at a fre­
quency of 30 (spikes per unit time). Then ignoring all the above 
qualifications for t)ie moment, each integrating neuron within an active 
column will have received 30 spikes by the end of the first time unit.
Take each of tlie Linked Constellations in turn. LC (A) has two cells in 
tlie first column and one cell in the third column, all of which will 
receive 30 spikes, since the first and third columns were assumed to be 
active at the instant under consideration. The constellations LC (A) 
will therefore have received 90 spikes in all. The fourth neuron 
belonging to this Constellation is in efferent column 2, and we shall 
assume that this received no excitation from an afferent fibre. Then, 
assuming that the received excitation has been averaged over the neurons 
of this Linked Constellation, the excitation of each neuron will be 
90/4 = 22.5. LC (B) also has two neurons in the first column, receiving 
60 spikes between them. It has two in the second column. These receive 
no excitation from the afferent fibre of that column, since that fibre 
is assumed to be inactive. It has a neuron in efferent column 1.
Accordingly the total excitation received by LC (B) is 60 and the mean 
excitation across this LC is 60/5 =12. LC (C) has no neurons in the 
first column, two in the second which are unexcited, one in the third, 
receiving 30 spikes, and a neuron in efferent column 1. Its mean excita­
tion is 30/4 = 7.5. LC (A), which may be said to match the input pattern, 
has a mean excitation of 22.5 as compared with 12 and 7.5.
If the input pattern is changed so that the first and second columns are 
now active (Figure 5.10 (b)), it will be readily seen that figures become:
LC (A), Ë  = 60/4 = 15.0; LC (B), Ê" = 120/5 = 24.0; LC (C), Ë  = 60/4 = 15.0; 
Linked Constellation B is maximally excited, as it is the matching LC.
This is the essential aspect of the model. However, as will be seen 
below, inhibition also has an essential part to play. Discharge may also 
be taken into account quite simply.
Assume that the inhibition level of all neurons is 15 at the end of the
first instant. Spike emitted by a neuron in an active column will be
( 3 0 - t h ), according to Expression 2. Ignoring the individual threshold
NTH , TH = I = 15, for all neurons, so D = 5. For convenience it may 
np ' np
be assumed that all reduction of excitation is attributable to spike dis­
charge, i.e. R = D. Then at the end of the first instant, the excitation of 
a neuron in an active column has been incremented by 25, allowing for discharge
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After distribution across Linked Constellations the resulting excita­
tions for different LCs will be lower than those calculated above, but 
the relationships are preserved. For example, with input pattern "101", 
i.e. first and third columns active, the revised figures are;
LC (A), Ë  - 75/4 - 18.75; LC (B), Ë  = 50/5 = 10.0; LC (C), Ë  - 25/4 = 6.25.
D. Physiological treatment of inhibition
It will be noted that in the last example, although inhibition was used 
to calculate discharge, it was not subtracted from excitation. The 
reason is tliat, in most of the simulations to be reported, inhibition and 
excitation are treated as though they are independent neuronal processes 
except for their effect upon spike initiation. They act algebraically to 
determine spike discharge in accordance with orthodox neuro-physiology.
This may be contrasted with the treatment in most formal neurological 
models, in which inhibition immediately cancels out excitation, leaving 
excitation at a lower level.
In order to compare the two treatments, the simulations were also run in 
versions in which inhibition was immediately subtracted from excitation.
In many ways this was easier to handle. The main postulates of the 
Linked Constellation concept was equally demonstrated in both forms. The 
effects upon the basic assumptions may be readily compared by recalculat­
ing the above illustration, subtracting inhibition (see Figure 5.9):
LC (A), Ë  = (3 X (30 - 15 - 5))/4 = 7.5; LC (B), E = (2 x (30 - 15 - 5))/5 
= 4.0; LC (C), E = (1 X  (30 - 15 - 5))/4 = 2.5. It will be seen that 
the matching Linked Constellation still bears the same relationship to the 
others.
It was later appreciated that either form of simulation ôf inhibition is 
inadequate to represent inhibition more than in a very rough manner. 
Inhibition and excitation are useful terms at the overall level of des­
cription of a neural system. They are however only labels for extremely 
complex processes taking place at neuronal level.
Inhibitory transmitter does not, as far as is known, act directly upon 
excitatory transmitter. They have separate loci on the membrane (see for 
exaiTiple, Bradley, 1968; Iverson, 1979; Stevens, 1979). Accordingly it is 
not necessarily the case that a given quantity of inhibitory transmitter 
reaching a neuron destroys a given value of excitation. Aside from what 
may happen within neurons, there may well be an accumulation of transmitters 
at synaptic terminals which would effectively make excitatory and
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Figure 5.11 (Reproduced from Purpura, 1967) Purpura and McMurtry's 
diagrams showing probable distribution of currents and intracellular 
recordings of activities of a pyramidal tract neuron in the motor 
cortex during stimulation of ventrolateral thalamus and surface cort­
ical polarisation. Upper channel records are surface responses. Weak 
anodal surface polarisation (C and D) and weak surface cathodal polari­
sation leave patterns of intracellularly recorded activity during 
dramatic changes in surface evoked responses. a, fraction of current 
flowing along surface; b , extraneuronal current flow ; c , proportion of 
current inwards at terminals of apical dendrites, outwards across prox­
imal dendrites.
Strong cortical polarisation (G-L) has different effects. Strong surface 
anodal polarisation (I cind J) produces depolarisation of soma regions and 
increase in cell discharge. Cathodal polarisation (K and L) hyperpola- 
rises soma and prevents EPSPs from attaining firing level. Cited to 
illustrate that neurons may be both inhibited and excited at the same time
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inhibitory action independent in the short term, i.e. within one instant 
of the simulation.
What is not yet clear is whether a neuron can remain excited although 
inhibited, so that after release from inhibition it emits its excitation 
as "post-inhibitory rebound". (Compare Andersen, 1974). Although 
largely independent of the operation of the model as simulated, the 
answer to this question would be relevant to the further interpretation 
of my model.
Purpura (1967) summarised work indicating that the dendrites of a neuron 
may well be in an excitatory condition whilst the axon hillock is inhib­
ited. Moreover, the extent of the inhibitory influence affects the 
behaviour of the neuron (See Figure 5.11). Andersen and Lomo (19 70) 
support the notion of excitation and inhibition concurrently at differ­
ent location of the same neuron. They argue, however, for a dendritic 
spike.
The presentation of my model in this thesis is as a principle of neural 
organisation. The consideration of neuronal processes of excitation and 
inhibition accordingly lies outside the scope. However, at the time the 
main simulations were designed it was thought to be better to reserve 
one's options by treating the two aspects of cell function as independent 
except in relation to the action of spike discharge. Practically, the 
difference between the two modes of representation was probably not 
significant. Inhibition was still reduced at each iteration of the simu­
lation, as was excitation. In relation to very short intervals, the state 
of a neuron is perhaps better expressed by the values of accumulated 
inhibitory and excitatory substances than by the opposing effects of inhib­
itory and excitatory postsynaptic potentials which occur within the 
membrane.
In summary, in some respects inhibitory influences on a neuron may be 
seen as cancelling out excitatory influences. In other respects inhibi­
tion may be seen as imposing a threshold upon the neuron which then 
requires to receive more excitation before it fires. In the model, the 
important role expressed by either formulation is that inhibitory 
influences control the capacity of neurons to emit spikes and to form 
integrative connections.
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y Motor aspects
A. General principle
It will be seen from Figure 5.7 that the motor aspects of the model are 
essentially the reverse of the sensory aspects. Linked neurons belong­
ing to the more highly reactivated Linked Constellations will be at 
higher levels of excitation than those belonging to less highly reacti­
vated ones. The corresponding efferent columns within which they are 
situated will be more highly driven and the efferent fibres serving 
those columns will carry spikes at higher frequency.
B. Significance of inhibition
Consider the efferent columns in the examples given earlier. The figures 
can be followed from Figure 5.9. First, assuming no inhibition across 
the efferent columns and that the input pattern is 101 (first and third 
afferent fibres active), the integrating neuron in efferent column 1 
belonging to LC (B) will have an excitation of 10.0 and that of LC (C) 
6.25. The only linked integrating neuron in efferent column 2 is that 
belonging to LC (A) which has a notional excitation of 18.75. With a 
Discharge Rate of 0.33 (k in Expression 2, Section IV (vi)), the spikes 
emitted by the two linked neurons in efferent column 1 are 3 and 2 
respectively, whilst 6 spikes are emitted by the linked neuron in effer­
ent column 2. Efferent column 1 will receive 5 spikes whilst efferent 
column 2 will receive 6. It will therefore still be possible to distin­
guish the efferent output indicating which Linked Constellation was 
most highly reactivated. Suppose, however, that there were other Linked 
Constellations with linked neurons in efferent column 1, but no more 
with linked neurons in efferent column 2. The discharge driving efferent 
fibre 1 might then exceed those driving efferent fibre 2. This might 
occur even though none of the linked neurons in efferent column 1 had 
excitations as great as that of the single linked neuron in efferent 
column 2. It is a matter of a large number of integrating neurons 
emitting a small number of spikes in unit time overpowering a smaller 
number of integrating neurons emitting a greater number of spikes.
If the level of inhibitory action is set at the level of excitation of 
the nearest challenger to the most highly excited neurons, the competi­
tion is abolished. Setting inhibition at 15.0, the discharge of the 
integrating neuron in column 2, belonging to the matching LC, becomes 
(18.75 - 15.0) X 0.33 = 1 spikes. The integrating neurons in efferent
149
column 1 do not discharge at all, since their excitations of 10.0 and 
6.25 do not exceed tlie inhibition level. At this level of inhibition 
it does not matter how numerous such less-excited neurons may be.
The principle can be applied to sensory arrays. However, as already 
mentioned, the application to sensory arrays discloses difficulties 
which at first were poorly understood. If one ignores the effects of 
continuous afferent input and assumes that the integrative connections 
have had their effect in equalising excitation within Linked Constel­
lations, there is little difficulty in setting inhibition so that 
only the neurons belonging to the most highly reactivated Constellations 
may discharge. Whilst the afferent fibres are constantly active 
problems arise. In the presence of active afferent fibres, it is pos­
sible to set inhibition so as to exclude discharge from neurons within 
columns having silent afferent fibres. The pattern of columns which 
contain discharging neurons then directly reflects the afferent pattern.
A problem arises when one wishes to consider the pattern of discharge 
resulting from reactivation of Linked Constellations rather than the 
afferent pattern. This made it impossible to distinguish the effects 
of secondary transfers of excitation through Linked Constellations 
from the direct effects of afferent input.
As it turned out the same problem affects efferent columns, if they are 
more realistically represented. Although no afferent fibres are shown 
to the efferent columns of Figure 5.7 this was an omission of convenience 
to make the main principle of the model clear. As will appear, it is 
necessary that efferent columns should possess afferent fibres.
These problems were eventually solved in the model by interrupting 
inputs periodically. During the gaps in afferent transmission, the 
effects of the integrative connections brought the system to the con­
ditions indicated in the analyses of this and preceding sections. The 
inhibition levels could accordingly be adjusted at different times to 
detect either the afferent pattern or the discharges of the most highly
reactivated Linked Constellations. This matter will be discussed at
greater length after the presentation of the model.
C. Linking of integrating neurons in efferent columns; Afferent motor
fibres
One may ask the question as to how the linked neurons shown in the 
efferent columns of Figure 5.7 came to be there. The linked neurons in 
the afferent columns are explained by the hypothesis of connectivity
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when afferent fibres are active simultaneously (Section IV (ii)). The 
explanation of the linked neurons in the efferent columns is that there 
are assumed to be afferent fibres to motor columns. These may be 
regarded as afferents arising from sub-cortical motor centres, the oper­
ation of which will be described in due course. Such afferent fibres 
to motor cortex do occur as, for example, in the cerebellar-thalamo­
cortical pathway through the ventro-lateral nucleus of the thalamus.
The presence of afferent fibres in both sensory and motor areas accounts 
for the integrative connections shown in Figure 5.8. The Linked Constel­
lations shown may be regarded as having formed as the consequence of 
activity in afferent fibres from (a) sensory sub-cortical centres and
(b) motor subcortical centres, arriving at the cortex simultaneously.
In a similar way afferent columns may be considered as possessing 
efferent fibres. These are able to transport the pattern of excitation 
across an array of sensory columns to some other centre where they may be 
required.
The most likely candidates for such efferent fibres would seem to be 
the pyramids which possess axons leading outside the cortex. These might 
be compared to the more prominent Betz neurons, which may correspondingly 
be regarded as the principal efferent output of a motor column. Within 
the theoretical model, such neurons possessing efferent fibres may be 
referred to as efferent neurons. Speculating further on neuronal cir­
cuitry, it seems probable that the secondary pyramids within a column act 
as "collectors" of efferent output, which they convey to the Layer V 
pyramids (Jones, 1975; Valverde, 1971; Szentagothai, 1975). Figure 5.12 
illustrates the modifications discussed applied to the arrangements 
shown in Figure 5.8.
VI Innate Linked Constellations
Linked Constellations have been described as occurring as a consequence 
of neurons forming integrative connections when simultaneously excited. 
Such integrative connective systems are assumed also to occur by 
genetic determination. Recent research on the developmental specificity 
of the nervous system discloses that the morphology is genetically
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defined in great detail (see e.g. Gaze, 1970; Barondes, 1976). Griffith's 
(1967) model, described in Chapter 4, illustrates how complex patterns 
of activity of the kind required might result from relatively simple 
labelling assumptions.
In the model, Linked Constellations present at "birth" are termed Preset 
Linked Constellations, Developmental or maturational Linked Constella­
tions are those that form by genetic influence after "birth".
Although some plasticity is certainly attributable to sub-cortical centres, 
it is small in relation to cortical plasticity (Chow, 19 70; Buchwald 
and Brown, 19 73). On the other hand, innate patterns of activity remain 
substantially unaltered when cortex is removed (e.g. Shik and Orlovsky,
1976; Buchwald and Brown, 1973; Flynn, 1976), although their control may 
be fundamentally modified, e.g. sham rage. For simplicity it is assumed 
in the model that the cortex is the home of learning, whilst sub-cortical 
centres,especially the basal ganglia, contain Preset Linked Constellations.
Pringle (1951) proposed that innately determined "key trigger patterns" 
would occur in his oscillatory model of the cortex. These innate sensori­
motor connections would pass excitation to motor neurons only when the 
key trigger pattern appeared in the environment. He proposed this as a 
bridge between the proposals of the ethologists, Lorenz and Tinbergen, 
and those of conditioning theory. A key trigger pattern could be simply 
an Unconditioned Stimulus with its Unconditioned Response, or it could 
be an Innate Releasing Mechanism with its corresponding Innate Behavioral 
response. The Preset Linked Constellations may be seen as fulfilling 
similar roles in the present model.
Although there are considerable similarities between Pringle's formula­
tion and the present one, there are also significant differences.
Pringle assumed, in company with most theorists, that integrating neurons 
could form further connections upon subsequent occasions. The innate wir­
ing would provide cores around which learned aggregates accumulate. Upon 
subsequent occasions, in which similar but not identical input occurs, 
further neurons are added to the aggregate. The neurons of the associa­
tions (oscillatory couplings) formed earlier become further coupled to 
the neurons added on the subsequent occasions. This goes together with 
the assumption that connections are progressively made more effective 
with use. This is in contrast to the assumption of my model that connec­
tions are formed upon one, that is, the first, occasion. An essential
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principle of my model is that Linked Constellations once formed, remain 
unaltered. They do not gather further similar connective structures 
into their orbit.
This aspect of my model may be both a strength and a weakness. The 
capacity of a neuron to make further connections on subsequent occasions 
would be much more economical of neurons. In my model, one does get 
strengthening effects on repeated presentation. They are however dif­
ferently mediated from the Pringle model- The strengthening effects in 
my model arise because, although each Linked Constellation remains 
separate, the number of them representing similar input patterns increases 
The reactivation of these LCs contributes activity to the current pattern 
of excitation across neuronal pools. Accordingly the Linked Constella­
tion formed on each occasion is partly determined by the response of LCs 
already in the system. Consequently in my model, the Linked Constella­
tion formed on any occasion represents the input as enriched by stored 
information. Of course these differences may be of little significance. 
The Pringle type model is also an enrichment model. It does, however, 
seem difficult to discern exactly how the aggregates implied in such a 
model would operate in practice.
There would appear to be no reason in principle in my model why Preset 
Constellations should not occur at both sub-cortical and cortical levels: 
nor why integrating neurons available to register events should not be 
provided at all levels. In fact the first simple simulations to test the 
theory were carried out in a system in which a single set of neuronal 
pools contained both integrating neurons initially linked into Preset 
Constellations, and others available for integrative connections. The 
system was effective but at a very low level of efficiency. This 
efficiency was greatly improved by allocating the Preset Constellations 
to their own set of Neuronal Pools, whilst another set was provided 
with initially unlinked Integrating Neurons. This led to the general 
design of the models simulated. In those models a notional sub-cortex 
and cortex are each represented by a set of neuronal pools. The basic 
organisation is the same in both, except that the integrating neurons 
of the sub-cortical arrays are assumed to have been already linked into 
Constellations ab initio. These Preset Constellations represent 
Innately Recognised Patterns on the sensory side and Innately Determined 
Responses on the motor side. (This description is for purposes of 
exposition only).
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The division into sub-cortex and cortex is to be regarded as one of con­
venience, but one nevertheless representing a real division of emphasis 
in nervous systems. The capacity for learning is greatly reduced in 
decorticate animals and may be of a limited kind. Nevertheless, the 
terms sub-cortical and cortical describe the design of the simulations 
rather than any necessary implication of the theoretical model.
This question arises mainly from the difficulty, at this stage of 
development of the model, of allocating parts of the proposed apparatus 
to any specific anatomical location in the cerebrum. For example, for 
concreteness of exposition, the neural apparatus supposed to contain 
Preset Constellations may be loosely identified with the corpus stria­
tum. It is known that the basal ganglia are heavily implicated in the 
organisation of innate behavioural systems, and that they have a sen­
sory input (Barr, 1974; Vanderwolf, Bland and Wishaw, 1973). The ques­
tion then arises as to differences of function of paleo-striatum and 
neo-striatum. It might be that the paleo-striatum acts in conjunction 
with archicortex to organise automatic behaviours, whilst instrumental 
behaviours are mediated by neo-striatum in conjunction with neo-cortex. 
These matters are regarded as beyond the scope of the present project. 
They are only mentioned to illustrate the general intention underlying 
the design of the simulations.
Figure 5.10 represents the basic relationships proposed. Sensory 
fibres activate neuronal pools at both sub-cortical and cortical levels. 
The sensory information need not be identical. If the sensory pattern 
at the Lower (sub-cortical) level matches a Preset Constellation, an 
efferent response appears on the motor side at that level. The efferent 
fibre acts as an afferent fibre to the Upper (cortical) level. In the 
simulation the efferent fibre passes to a general co-ordinating centre, 
which passes it on to the Upper (cortical) array as an afferent. The 
thalamus may perhaps be visualised as such a centre. At the Upper Level 
the sensory imput lays down a Linked Constellation record on the sensory 
side, whilst on the motor side the Lower Level-coordinating centre-Upper 
Level volley lays down a record of the released motor response, forming 
a Sensori-Motor Linked Constellation. Consequently a learned Linked 
Constellation is laid down at the Upper (cortical) level. This records 
the temporal conjunction of a certain sensory event with the release of 
a certain innate response at the Lower level. In one sense the learned 
sensori-motor Linked Constellation is a copy of the innate Linked
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Constellation. In another sense it may differ considerably. The sen­
sory information recorded in the cortex is likely to be far more precise 
and detailed than the sensory information requited to excite the Preset 
Constellation. The information recorded in the motor cortex concerning 
the action taken is also likely to be far more detailed than its Lower 
Level equivalent, and will include sensory feed-back (Asanuma, 19 75).
The information represented by afferent fibres entering the Lower Level 
will be required only to act upon innate structures mediating species 
specific behaviour, and behaviour which can be characterised as reflex 
and instinctive. Lorenz has suggested that such arrangements need only 
represent the skeleton of the actual adaptive behaviour. In the model, 
the Preset Constellations would mediate these skeletons, and the learned 
copies of behaviour in the cortex would expand its detail from actual 
events.
VII Temporal sequential effects
There is a qualification of the rule that a Linked Constellation is 
independent and functionally isolated from other integrating neurons 
of the population. This qualification concerns the temporal sequential 
overlapping of Constellations. The overlapping would appear to follow 
from the continuous nature of neuronal processes. Physiological proces­
ses are rarely discrete synchronised events (but see the effects of 
rhythmic interruption of afferent inputs. Chapter 15). It later 
appeared that the overlapping is not central to the model, as the same 
effects can be obtained by other means.
In the model integrating neurons form integrative connections when they 
are simultaneously activated; thereafter they are assumed to make no 
further connections until released from their former connections. Some 
admittedly ad hoc possibilities of how these rules might come about serve 
to illustrate the temporal implications. One mechanism might be that 
the making of the first connection might release an inhibitor of further 
connectivity, which however takes some time to become effective. Dur­
ing the interval a large number of connections might be made effective. 
Alternatively, the making of each connection might contribute towards 
an inhibition of further connectivity, so that only a given number of 
connections can be made. Another possibility is that the capacity to make
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effective connections depends upon a slowly maturing biochemical 
process; cells become "ripe" at a critical time. Whatever mechanism 
is assumed, if the rule is to be implemented, the capacity to make 
effective connections is restricted to a finite time interval.
Suppose that the state of activity of the integrating neurons is not 
strictly synchronised, either because of the non-synchronous arrival 
of afferent volleys, or by differences of thresholds. One sub-set of 
integrating neurons might be sufficiently activated to form connec­
tions before another set, and so forth. The first sub-set will not 
make integrative connections with the second sub-set until the latter 
becomes active. Suppose that the first sub-set has already been 
making connections with other integrating neurons active earlier. Then 
by the time the second sub-set becomes active, it will have already 
made some of its permitted connections. Consequently it will cease 
making connections with the second sub-set whilst the second sub-set 
still has some unexpired time and/or connections. By that time the 
third sub-set will become active and the second sub-set will be able 
to make some connections with the third.
In such circumstances each Linked Constellation would have some 
integrative connections with neurons of the one formed just before 
and that formed just afterwards. A Linked Constellation is to some 
extent a concept of analysis pointed towards discrete simultaneous 
processing. It is modified by continuous non-synchronous processing.
Most theoretical models since Hebb possess temporal sequential prop­
erties. One characteristic of the present model is that when a Linked 
Constellation becomes reactivated it passes some of its excitation 
forward, temporally speaking, into the neurons of the Linked Constella­
tion formed just after its own formation. It also passes excitation 
backwards temporally: such backward movement of excitation however, has 
little effect on the model. First, in a repeated sequence of events, 
the Linked Constellation formed just before that matching the current 
input will have just been reactivated by the preceding input, and will 
be subject to recurrent inhibition. Secondly, there would be a roll 
forward effect, each subsequent Linked Constellation in a reactivated 
temporal sequence adding a little more feed-forward excitation to pre­
pare the next one. This provides a priming excitation in the model, 
similar to that hypothesised by many theorists, e.g. Grey Walter (1969), 
Konorski (1967) , Neisser (1967) .
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It seems probable that any system which does not have simultaneity of 
neural events would possess similar temporal sequential properties.
In the early formulation of the model, considerable stress was laid 
upon this aspect. This was because of the emphasis which I placed 
upon temporal integration in the nervous system (see Chapter 2) . It 
now seems to me that this aspect of the system is merely a special 
example of the principle proposed by Uttley (1956,b). Uttley proposed 
that delays introduced into pathways would result in the representa­
tion of temporal sequential events by a spatial pattern. (See also 
Brindley, 1969) . In terms of the model now being proposed, consider 
a delay of two sequential steps introduced into the sensory pathway 
between sense organ and cortex (Figure 5.10). A sensory pattern match­
ing a Preset Constellation (an Innately Recognised pattern, or Innate 
Releasing Mechanism) would reach the Lower Level (sub-cortex) and 
release the efferent response in time for it to reach the cortex at 
the time the step just before the releaser arrived. A Linked Constel­
lation would be formed in the cortex containing a record of the sensory 
stimulation preceding the IRM and the response released by the IRM. 
These Uttley style delays are utilised considerably in later develop­
ments of the model, but were not employed in most of the runs of the 
early versions. The latter relied upon the general sequential prop­
erties attributed to Linked Constellations themselves.
In later developments it was in fact found that temporal sequential 
properties can be an embarrassment. A strong sequence can lead to such 
a high priming excitation that the model does not adapt to changed 
inputs. This may be one of the reasons for the very slow rhythms of 
some phases of sleep. Assuming that processing only occurred at the 
peak of the waves, excitation would have time to dissipate between pat­
terns. The temporal sequential process would be broken up. This would 
prevent too strong a "set" arising in the system from the constant 
repetition of similar sensory information.
VIII Summary
Neurological data is interpreted as indicating that neural tissue con­
sists of neuronal pools of integrating neurons. Each pool is driven 
by an afferent fibre and drives an efferent fibre. Representative
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neurons from excited pools are connected together across pool bound­
aries to form Linked Constellations. Sensori-motor Linked Constella­
tions are formed by sending active afferent volleys to motor pools at 
the same time as sensory volleys arrive at sensory pools. Linked 
Constellations are isolated from each other and remain in the brain 
unaltered except for decay. There is some communication between a 
Linked Constellation and the one formed just before and that formed 
just after its own formation.
A Lower Centre is similarly organised except that its neurons are 
assumed to have formed integrative connections innately. This may 
correspond to the Striatum. Preset Linked Constellations mediate 
Innately Recognised Patterns. Preset Constellations may be sensori­
motor so that IRP's act as releasing mechanisms or Unconditioned 
stimuli, triggering responses at the Lower Level. The efferents from 
the Lower Level act as afferent fibres to the motor pools of the 
Upper Level.
Upon repetition of a sensory pattern the Linked Constellations which 
registered the earlier occurrences are reactivated. This results in 
a learned motor output from the Upper Level (cortex). When a Linked 
Constellation is reactivated some of its excitation passes forward 
temporally speaking to the next Linked Constellation in a familiar 
sequence, priming it.
Inhibition acts as a variable threshold. Only the most highly excited 
neurons are permitted to discharge and to form integrative connections,
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CHAPTER 6
SOME FURTHER ASPECTS OF THE MODEL
In this chapter some aspects of neural integration will be considered 
which are not exclusive to the model presented, but to which the model 
lends a distinctive character.
I. Balanced receptor and effector systems
A limitation of the model as so far described appears if one considers 
the effects of patterns of stimulation involving unequal numbers of 
active afferent fibres. Consider, for example, receptors in an hypo­
thetical primitive nervous system signalling on some occasion a retinal
image of a large filled circle, and on others, a small spot falling 
within the same retinal field. The Linked Constellation representing 
the large circle would possess neurons in many columns; that represent­
ing the spot, neurons in only a few. Moreover those few columns would 
be activated equally by both images. The Linked Constellation represent­
ing the spot would be maximally reactivated by many large retinal images 
which happened to cover the retinal area of the spot, in particular by 
the larger circle. A large and complex image would maximally reactivate 
many Linked Constellations representing fragments of that image. By 
comparison there would be few images which would maximally reactivate 
the Linked Constellation representing the large image.
The consequences of such inequalities would be far reaching. A retinal
image covering a large number of receptors would maximally reactivate 
so many Linked Constellations in addition to the one representing the 
truly matching pattern, that discrimination or identification of that 
pattern would be impossible.
There are a number of ways of alleviating this weakness. One way is 
by the development of feature analysers, e.g. contrast sensitive recep­
tors, which would not signal the large circle and small spot in an 
identical manner. Such analysers are of course known to be present in 
sophisticated nervous systems.
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Another way of alleviating the problem in a system with temporal 
sequential effects is by a temporal sequential variation of patterns 
associated with an object. If perceptual events consist of inte­
grated sequences, the nun±)er of active fibres would balance each 
ther from step to step by randomisation. An individual pattern 
ght not be recognised, but a non-matching sequence would be rejected.
o
mi
A more reliable way of dealing with this difficulty is to provide a 
rule whereby every sensory pattern stimulates an equal number of 
fibres. Such a rule would result from a system of receptors which 
signals the absence of stimulation as well as its presence.
In sophisticated animals Nature seems to have provided both the mech­
anisms required to obviate the difficulty.
With regard to the randomising effects of sequence, eye movements 
randomise the relative proportions of bright parts to dark parts. In 
a system reporting relative intensities whis would equalise the number 
of active afferent fibres. The elements reported by Hubei and Weisel 
(1959) and Jung (1961) would also have the effect of transforming a 
perceptually unitary event into a sequence of events. Some units 
would signal the beginning of illumination, some the end. Eye movements 
and the shuttering of eye-blinks do not only randomise the image, they 
also convert a continuous pattern into a kind of tachistoscopie 
viewing.
With regard to neural arrangements whereby all patterns would activate 
an equal number of fibres, sophisticated nervous systems exhibit mech-r-. 
anisms directed to this end. Hubei and Weisel (1959) reported some 
elements which have their spontaneous firing inhibited when a spot of 
light falls upon the centre of the field; their firing indicates an 
absence of light. Others fire when light falls upon the centre of the 
field. More generally, the receptors reported by Hubei and Weisel 
show a considerable variety of coding. Any pattern is likely by random 
sampling to balance the stimulation of a large number of receptors of 
one kind by the stimulation of a smaller number of receptors of another 
kind, so that the total number activated over the whole system remains 
constant. Jung (1969, 19 72) described the system found in his 
researches with Baumgarten: "Our concept regarding the coding of lumi­
nance is based upon the existence of two reciprocally organised and 
interacting sub-systems, B and D, which signal brightness and darkness 
respectively",
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A similar effect may be achieved in nervous systems from naturally 
reciprocal states. Agonist and antagonist muscles move in concert,
A joint in one position cannot be in another at the same time. 
Mountcastle (1957) shows the interlocking responses of two reciprocal 
elements which fire alternately as the limb is extended and retracted 
at the elbow.
Mason (1975) argues that "the three effector or motor systems which 
mediate the integrative functions of the brain" are all regulated by 
a balance of opposed forces. The endocrine system, the Autonomic 
nervous system, and the skeletal muscle system each have a positive 
and a negative component. Hunger and thirst are also mediated by 
reciprocal systems (Deutsch and Koopmans, 1976),
Some of the sensory systems of sophisticated animals are intrinsically 
balanced by their nature. Whether colour vision is mediated by recipro­
cal pairs of colour sensitive elements, as has sometimes been suggested, 
or not, colour vision implies an overall equality of the number of 
active fibres in most visual patterns, A greater proportion of an 
image stimulating receptors sensitive to one colour implies that fewer 
receptors sensitive to other colours are being stimulated. Similar 
considerations apply to the sense of taste,
A number of other model designers have incorporated reciprocal receptor 
systems in their formulations (Konorski, 1967; Uttley, 1956; Marr,
19 70). These authors do not describe what would be the effect in their 
respective models of omitting the reciprocal aspects, Uttley demon­
strated formally that a signal reporting the absence of stimulation is 
necessary to identify inputs in an hierarchical system. As earlier 
mentioned, Konorski also utilised the idea extensively in his model.
It is difficult to argue with authority concerning models other than 
one's own without going too far from relevant concerns. There does 
however appear to be one way in which the effect of these considerations 
is different in my model from those mentioned. In an hierarchical or 
other logical switching model of the nervous system, the overlapping of 
a pattern involving a small number of active fibres by one involving a 
large number produces calculation errors which in theory prevent iden­
tification. The same effect appears in my model, and in both kinds of 
model can be obviated by the means described above. However, the 
effects of inadequately compensating for the weakness would appear to. be
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different in the two kinds of model. My model, being an analogue 
distributed process, would mean that a pattern involving a large num­
ber of active fibres would cause a large inflow of excitation into 
the system whereas a pattern involving a small number of fibres would 
only energise the system at a much lower level. This consideration 
would appear to have two consequences: first, there is an additional 
powerful reason for equating all input patterns, either by equalising 
the number of active fibres in each possible pattern, or by temporal 
sequential randomisation : secondly, failure to equalise would produce 
an arousal effect. The latter aspect is dealt with further in the 
next section. Here it may be noted that a large bright retinal image 
seems to have greater attentional power than a small bright image.
II Binary coding of intensity: arousal
Binary coding of information is a generally accepted convention in 
neurological models. It represents a simplification enabling the 
main princple of à model to be seen without complication. In my model 
binary coding of information is regarded as an actual, although secon­
darily evolved, aspect of the organisation of sophisticated nervous 
sytems. The binary coding leaves a parameter of neural activity, the 
spike frequency, free to represent a second aspect of events, their 
biological importance to the animal.
A. The coding of intensity
It is well established tha the transduction of energy at the sense 
organ produces a frequency coding of intensity (Granit, 1955; Ochs, 
1965; Horridge, 1968; Uttal, 1973; Kandel, 1976). In contrast the 
neural coding of intensity in the higher centres is by no means clear 
(Uttal, 19 73). Although there is considerable evidence of a partial 
binary coding there is much evidence to the contrary.
The phenomena of "range fractionation" and "line labelling" (Horridge, 
1968) are more or less general attributes of nervous systems. Range 
fractionation combined with a graded response of the receptors leads 
towards binary representation of intensity. For example, in the eye 
of the worker bee, light of varying intensities will stimulate either 
one, two, three or four of the four categories of colour receptor 
(Autrum and von Zwell, 1964, cited in Horridge, 1958). Many of the
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studies of feature analysers and columnar organisation of the cortex 
cited earlier showed graded responses of more than one column depend­
ing upon the intensity of stimulation.
Kluver demonstrated in 19 41 that in the absence of striate cortex 
macaques can discriminate the brighter of two panels but cannot dist­
inguish a smaller from a large figure if the total luminous flux is 
the same (Doty, 1973) . Doty also cites work by Schilder (1966) and 
Schilder, Pasik and Tauba (1967) which adds further circumstantial 
evidence that brightness is coded by numbers of units.
On the other hand there is abundant direct evidence that frequency of 
discharge of cortical receptor cells is related to intensity of stimu­
lation at the sense organ. This is implicit even in the range 
fractionation results cited above, and in the response of feature 
analysers by Hubei and Weisel, Asanuma and his associates and Mountcastle 
cited earlier. For example, Jung (1969, 1972) found a frequency rela­
tionship between intensity at the retina and spikes at the cortex. "The
brighter the light stimulus, the more rapidly the B neurons fire and the
stronger is the inhibition of the D neurons# (Jung and Baumgartner,
1955) .
Uttal (19 73) reviews his own and other work on somato-sensory, visual 
and auditory generator potentials. Uttal considers as candidate codings 
for central processing (i) the number of responding elements, (ii) res­
ponse amplitude as measured either with the amplitude of a graded
potential or (ill) with the integral of a pooled response. He also
considers favourable the possibility of "the interpulse irregularity 
of the spike train". Granit (1955) considers that the frequency code 
cannot in itself account for intensity discrimination and suggests a 
combination of frequency coding and the number of units activated.
In summary, what is known of neural coding, suggests that the frequency 
aspect of the representation of intensity remains but is overlaid by 
the complexity of stimulus analysis.
B. Stimulus intensity
For purposes of analysis one may assume that in a primitive nervous 
system organised according to my model, differences of intensity are 
reflected in the frequency of the afferent fibres driving columns 
(Figure 5.7). Fibres from elements stimulated intensely would contribute
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more excitation to the distributed excitation matching process than 
tiiose from less highly stimulated elements. This would provide an 
effective weighting of some elements over others.
It may be noted that, in the absence of other forms of coding than 
frequency or amplitude, the registration of intensity implies a 
statistical distribution of individual neuronal thresholds. If all 
integrating neurons possessed identical thresholds, all the unlinked 
neurons would either be linked or not by an afferent volley, depend­
ing upon whether its frequency was sufficient or not to bring the 
neurons above the threshold level. A statistical distribution of 
individual thresholds was in fact provided in my model. Accordingly 
the number of neurons linked in a column was related to the frequency 
of the afferent volley.
One of the effects of this system is that Linked Constellations 
recording high intensity events would contain a greater number of 
neurons than those registering low intensity events. Given a memory 
decay, these Linked Constellations remained effective longer in the 
system. Similar considerations would apply to portions of a Linked 
Constellation registering intense stimulation of selected receptors.
Such inequalities would have considerable attentional effects. For 
example, compare the discriminative value of a pattern with or with­
out a bright spot, as against with or without a spot of the average 
brightness of the presentation. Upon subsequent presentations of the 
pattern with the bright spot, the matching Linked Constellation will 
be reactivated relative to the non-matching one to a greater degree 
than would be accounted for by the number of columns activated by the 
spot. The greater number of linked integrating neurons in those 
columns contribute a relatively large proportion of the total excita­
tion. Frequency representation of intensity provides a natural 
discriminative system in which intensity is identified with importance 
of discrimination. The function of intensity, insofar as there is a 
frequency coding, may be seen as an attentional mechanism.
In terms of the extended template system described in Chapter 2, high 
intensity stimulation reaching one of the template systems will draw 
attention to the information contained in that part of the system.
It is probably not possible to discover what a primitive nervous system 
would be like. Those that are with us, however low we might choose to
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put them on the evolutionary scale, have all been subject to a 
similarly long period of evolutionary development. However, look­
ing at what we consider primitive aspects of animals and their 
behaviour, the proposition does not seem unreasonable. Loud noises, 
bright light, strong smells and similar intense stimuli seem natur­
ally to attract the attention.
C. Arousal
Although it may be true, especially in the environment of primitive 
animals, that intensity of stimulation is correlated with signifi­
cance, this would be a dangerous generalisation for an animal to 
make. Upon occasion it might be urgent to pay attention to an aspect 
of the environment with low intensity stimulation which by an associa­
tion of either learned or innatq, signalled some important event.
The hissing of a snake against a background of louder animal noises 
is an example. The development of feature analysers may have played 
its part in converting what would be a low intensity aspect of a 
mixed template presentation into a high intensity aspect of a special­
ised or "feature" template.
Sophisticated animals can learn to pay attention to cues of low inten­
sity and small magnitude if they signal events of importance.
The effect in the model of increased frequency of volleys in affer­
ent fibres resulting from intensity, suggests that the frequency of 
spikes might be utilised to control the level of arousal of the 
system or of parts of the system, by mimicking intensity. The devel­
opment at the same time of neural mechanisms moving towards a binary 
reciprocal coding of both intensity and of the number of active 
elements, would render the animal more independent of actual inten­
sity and image size in adjusting the system to its needs. Such an 
hypothesis suggests that as animals became able to judge the meaning 
of events rather than their natural stimulus qualities, the arousal 
system moved from one based upon intensity towards one which was more 
independent of intensity.
In the model as so far presented, the information from the environ­
ment is coded in binary form. The binary pattern can be fully 
specified by the pattern of activity and inactivity regardless of 
the actual frequency of spikes which characterises an active volley. 
Moreover, the binary pattern will remain fully specified even if the
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nominally "inactive" fibres carry spikes, provided that the "active" 
fibres have a higher frequency. The difference in frequency of 
trains of spikes signalling activity or inactivity of fibres provides 
a variable^ which may be adjusted to weight the operation of the 
model in ways analogical to the effects of intensity.
In the model this variable is termed the Discriminative Volley Value 
(DW) . The frequency of the inactive fibres is termed the Diffuse 
Volley Value (Diffav). By reason of its definition Diffav will be 
applied to all fibres whether active or not, the active fibres hav­
ing a frequency of the sum of D W  and Diffav. These variables are 
to be regarded as parameters of the system in the sense used by 
Ashby (1952), that is, they change only as step functions to set the 
level of operation of the neural apparatus. They would be indepen­
dently adjustable in different parts of the system, parts correspon­
ding with the separate template aspects of the system. The action 
of D W  and Diffav would be analogical to the contrast and brightness 
controls respectively of a television receiver.
It must be confessed that although the notion of D W  and Diffav as 
attentional and arousal mechanisms were considered important in the 
formulation of the model, their incorporation led to very great 
problems. As will be seen when the results of the initial simula­
tions are reported, they worked well in the early versions of the 
models. Nevertheless, the way they worked seemed quite different 
from what is known of real physiological attentional and arousal 
mechanisms;. Moreover, in more ambitious versions, the attentional. 
and arousal mechanisms overwhelmed the integrative functions. The 
theoretical solution of these problems was found to be involved with 
similar problems relating to inhibition. A more convincing hypothe­
sis of these functions could not be formulated until a more 
sophisticated model of the overall control functions of the brain 
had been worked out. Anticipating, it was found that control of 
excitation and inhibition in the model could be readily achieved by 
introducing notional Inhibitory Gates into the afferent pathways to 
the arrays. These Gates periodically blocked the volleys which would 
otherwise have entered the arrays. By varying the proportion of the 
cycle during which the Gate was open or closed, the amount of excita­
tion entering an array could be controlled even though the frequency 
of spikes in the active fibres remained constant. In effect the basic
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concept of arousal remained as before, being dependent upon the 
amount of excitation penetrating to a particular array.
In sunmiary, this Section proposes tliat there is a natural connec­
tion between intensity and attention. The complexities of recipro­
cal representation, range fractionation, line labelling, and feature 
analysis frees the system to a large extent from this natural depen­
dence upon intensity and magnitude of the sensory image. Attention 
may then be controlled by the brain itself according to the meaning 
attached to the stimulation. The brain accomplishes this by adjust­
ing the amount of excitation reaching the various arrays so as to 
control the relative contribution of each array to the ongoing over­
all distribution of excitation. Essentially, the amount of excitation 
is achieved by frequency coding, although in sophisticated nervous 
systems this frequency aspect is complicated by hypothetical rhythmic 
mechanisms.
Ill Decay of connections : ripeness for linking
One or two matters which are not of central importance to the model 
must be mentioned before reporting the simulation.
The extent to which learning decays in the central nervous system 
is not clear. Recent studies suggest that what diminishes with time 
may be the ability to retrieve. Nevertheless, a decay factor has 
been incorporated into the model as the most likely substrate of log­
arithmic forgetting. There are a number of reason for this. One 
may assume that the neuronal mechanisms of alteration which underlies 
learning, whatever it may be, is a complex biochemical process invol­
ving molecular changes. It is now well established that such processes 
have characteristic half-lives. Secondly, although some forms of 
neuronal mechanism by which the model might be mediated would provide 
an ample number of "elements" without having to use them over and 
over again, this would not apply if the element is an entire neuron.
One of the difficulties with any model utilising neurons as its ele­
ments is the apparently limitless capacity of the brain to store infor­
mation. Even with the very large number of estimated neurons in the 
brain (10^^) it still seems difficult to reconcile the system of the 
present model with the ability to remember in great detail an incident 
which occurred many years earlier. This difficulty is relieved by a
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decay system in which elements released by decay of connections 
become available to be used again. Thirdly, the decay of a Linked 
Constellation by the gradual dropping out of the elements of which 
it was originally formed, seems to coincide very well with our 
subjective fading of the vividness of memory.
To accord with the general rules of the model, it is necessary to 
assume that neurons which have made connections with one subset of 
the neuronal population can make no further connections until they 
have been completely released from their former connections.
It is possible that learning elements, such as neurons, may have 
characteristic "memory-life". The statistical distribution might 
vary from area to area of the brain, and would be a useful parameter. 
An implication of such an assumption would be that each Linked 
Constellation would contain a sample of the distribution of memory- 
life of the population at the time of linking. This distribution 
would change with the age of the animal. As Linked Constellations 
decayed, short-term memory-life neurons would be released and come 
back into the general population. Long-term neurons would remain 
locked into Linked Constellations. Consequently the proportion of 
short-term neurons in the general population would increase. This 
would be in accordance with the general opinion that memories laid 
down in youth are more permanent than those laid down in age.
Other possibilities that suggest themselves are a correlation of 
duration of connections and threshold. This would mean that learn­
ing laid down during arousal would last longer. These examples are 
merely intended to indicate possibilities. They are probably not 
specific to the present theory.
One matter of mechanics must be mentioned. As described so far, the 
first afferent volley reaching a column would link all the available 
integrating neurons in that column. Virtually the whole of the infor­
mation storage capacity would be exhausted. This difficulty can be 
overcome in a number of ways. First, it may be assumed that only a 
limited number of neurons (or other elements) mature at each instant. 
Secondly, a proportional rate of decay would mean that immediately 
after the formation of a Linked Constellation, a number of neurons 
would return to the general pool to be available for use in further 
learning. More probably there would be random factors which restrict 
linking to only a random proportion of those neurons fulfilling the
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required conditions for linking. Such factors might not be random. 
Since integrative connections are likely to be controlled by com­
plex biochemical processes, it would be reasonable to assume that 
they might be the subject of cyclic metabolic syntheses. The 
neuron might be only "ripe" for linkage at one particular phase.
When released from a Linked Constellation, a certain time might need 
to elapse before the cell would be once again "ripe" to make inte­
grative connections.
IV Perception and sensation
An impression may have been given that, according to the model.
Linked Constellations register only the pattern of afferent excita­
tion: that what is laid down in the brain is simply a record of 
sensory and motor events. This would reduce the model to an older 
kind of enrichment model which consisted of "bare sensations" en­
riched by additions of stored information (Gibson and Gibson, 1955a 
and b; Postman, 1955) .
On the contrary, the concept of a bare sensation is foreign to the 
model. One may for simplicity provisionally accept that a partic­
ular sensory event results in a certain pattern of afferent excita­
tion to the cortex. (Even this is probably untrue : there is 
considerable evidence of afferent neuronal inhibition at the sense 
organ and abundant evidence of modification of sensory signals at 
thalamic level, e.g. Sokolov, 1960). However, the pattern of 
afferent excitation is immediately modified when the afferent impulses 
interact with the integrating tissue.
It is true that the arrival of afferent excitation will have as its 
first effect the activation of all the integrating neurons within 
the respective neuronal pools activated. Immediately the recipient 
neurons will begin exchanging excitation with each other differentially 
according to their integrative connections. The pattern of excitation 
in the tissue will be partly dependent upon the afferent excitation and 
partly upon the Linked Constellations present in the tissue. The rule 
for formation of integrative connections relates to the state of 
excitation. Consequently, the Linked Constellations laid down will 
not register the afferent excitation itself, but rather the afferent
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excitation as modified by the tissue response.
The implications are increased by temporal sequential processing.
In a sequence of patterns, the state of excitation of the tissue will 
grow. In effect the afferent excitation will meet a tissue already 
excited by a dynamic central process (compare Hebb, 1949).
In the model, what the animal perceives at any instant is assumed to 
be correlated to tlie activity of the population of integrative neurons. 
This will not be a function only of the afferent signals but of the 
resultant of the interaction of the signals with the stored informa­
tion. The Linked Constellations which are laid down of later events 
will be more complex than those laid down by earlier events. Linked 
Constellations are records of perceptions not sensations.
It may also be noted that the model is not perhaps atomic in quite 
the sense which has been conveyed. Emphasis has been laid upon the 
atomic character of the receptive fields, which it is suggested are 
the elements from which neural templates are composed. However, in 
contrast with such atomicism is the integrated unity of action of 
the templates, i.e. the Linked Constellations. The atomicism of the 
model may be compared with the atomicism of contemporary physics as 
contrasted with an earlier concept of atoms which were immutable 
elemental objects, unchanging even when combined with others to form 
compounds. In contemporary physics an atom is itself a complex 
object, and when combined with other atoms, loses its individual iden­
tity. The resulting molecule can only be considered a unique object 
in its own right.
V Brain organisation: a simplified model
The main characteristics of the model may be seen by ignoring many 
of the complications of motor organisation and considering a clas­
sical conditioning paradigm.
Volleys in afferent sensory fibres activate the neuronal pools in 
both a sub-cortical and a cortical array. The sensory representation 
is not necessarily identical in each. The sub-cortical (striatum) 
level has Innate Linked Constellations. These mediate Innately
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Recognised Patterns, which may be thought of as UCS or as the Releaser 
part of Innate Releasing Mechanisms. The innate Linked Constellations 
are sensori-motor and so correspond to Unconditioned Reflexes or to 
IRM's.
The cortical level lays down a record of events in the form of Learned 
Linked Constellations. When the sensory input at the sub-cortical 
level matches the sensory side of one of the innate Linked Constella­
tions, that Linked Constellation is maximally reactivated: a motor 
response appears across the efferent fibres of the sub-cortical level. 
This efferent volley is sent via the Thalamus to the cortex, where it 
acts as an afferent volley to its corresponding efferent neuronal 
pool. This afferent motor volley causes integrating neurons to be 
linked into the Linked Constellation forming at that time. The latter 
accordingly registers both the sensory input to the cortex and the 
response emitted at the sub-cortical level. It is a sensori-motor 
Linked Constellation.
When a familiar sequence of sensory patterns is repeated, the sequence 
of matching Linked Constellations formed earlier in the cortex is 
reactivated. These Linked Constellations have temporal sequential 
integrative connections. When the first pattern of the sequence 
arrives it brings the matching Linked Constellation to maximum excita­
tion. Additionally, some of the excitation flows forward, temporally 
speaking, to the second Linked Constellation of the sequence. This 
sequence is primed before the second pattern arrives. After the sec­
ond pattern has arrived, the third Linked Constellation becomes 
primed, and so forth. Because each subsequent Linked Constellation 
receives an increment from the preceding one, the level of excitation 
grows through the sequence.
Accordingly, the system should anticipate events when a familiar sequence 
is repeated. The anticipation takes the form of a rise in the excita­
tion of those Linked Constellations about to be stimulated by the next 
pattern in the sequence.
A special case of this anticipation occurs in situations corresponding 
to the classical conditioning paradigm. The CS may be thought of as a 
sequence of sensory patterns, or cue sequence. The UCS is represented 
by an IRP (Innately Recognised Pattern). However often it has been 
repeated the cue sequence will have no especial effect upon the innate
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Linked Constellations of the sub-cortical level. It will however 
reactivate the matching Learned Constellations in the cortex. Before 
the step in the sequence when the Learned Linked Constellations 
representing the IRP are reached, they will have been primed. In 
trials when the IRP is actually presented ("reinforced trials") the 
sensory input reactivates both the sub-cortical level Preset Linked 
Constellation and the cortical Learned Constellation. A motor res­
ponse occurs at both levels, due to transfer of excitation from 
sensory to motor neurons of the Linked Constellations.
Suppose the IRP is not presented after the cue sequence (an "unrein­
forced trial"). The sensori-motor Linked Constellations registering 
previous presentations of the IRP are nevertheless primed by the cue 
sequence (CS). Consequently there is a discharge from the cortical 
motor pools. It is proposed that this cortical motor response corre­
sponds to the CR of the classical conditioning paradigm.
In the model the Conditioned Response can be distinguished from the 
Unconditioned Response, because the latter occurs primarily at the 
sub-cortical level, the former primarily at the cortical level. This 
is necessarily a simplification. There is evidence of circular arcs, 
so that either response might activate the other level. Nevertheless, 
the model indicates that the CR is the effect of reactivation of 
learned records and is an independent process from the UCR which is 
a reactivation of innate arrangements.
It will be noted that CRs are only one special case of anticipations 
in the model. Such anticipations occur whenever a familiar sequence 
is repeated. In later developments of the model these anticipations 
at cortical level are used to initiate motor action. However, this 
does not imply that instrumental motor action is controlled by 
Classically Conditioned Responses, as discussed in the controversy 
between single process and dual process conditioning theories (see 
e.g. Rescorla and Solomon 1967). What is suggested is that 
anticipation in the form of a priming excitation underlies both the 
phenomena seen in classical and in instrumental situations.
The main points about the model at this stage concern: (a) the laying
down of a comprehensive learned record of events; (b) the release of 
innate responses by innate connective systems at sub-cortical levels and
(c) the reactivation of sensori-motor records at cortical level when 
familiar events occur.
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CHAPTER 7
SIMULATION OF INITIAL VERSIONS OF THE MODEL IN THE ATLAS
COMPUTER
I Introduction: general form of the model
The simulations consisted of a series of programs which underwent 
continuing modification and development. The aim of these modifica­
tions was to improve performance and to introduce additional notional 
neural mechanisms. A natural break in programming occurred when the 
University of London Atlas computer was closed down. Computing was 
then transferred to the CDC 6600 computer. The opportunity was 
taken at this point to revise the general form of the model. These 
later programs will be reported as a separate set later in the thesis.
In presenting the simulations, terras will be given initial capitals 
when it is desirable to distinguish physiological concepts, as they 
appear in their simulated or more speculative form in the theoretical 
model, from those concepts in their well established forms in contem­
porary neurophysiology. For example. Inhibition refers to aspects of 
the theoretical model and its simulations, whilst neuronal inhibition 
refers to aspects of neurophysiology as well established.
One aim of the simulations was to demonstrate some of the properties 
claimed for the system; for example that it would store inputs in the 
form of spatial templates and notionally recognise those inputs when 
they were presented on subsequent occasions.
A second aim was to find a design which would demonstrate the system 
as a basis of overall neural integration and at the same time would 
produce behaviour comparable in some sense with that of animals. The 
classical conditioning paradigm offers a number of advantages as a 
test of the basic characteristics of the model. It avoids many of the 
complications of motor organisation whilst providing a measurable 
response. The kind of response seen in classical conditioning (e.g. 
salivation, chewing, eye-blink, leg-withdrawal) corresponds to the 
kind of response attributable in the model to the action of Preset
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Constellations (genetically determined Integrative Connections). 
Moreover one can avoid many of the theoretical problems concerned 
with the instrumental modification of behaviour and the relation­
ship of that modification to the consequences of action upon the 
environment.
A simple model built around a classical conditioning paradigm offers 
an essential ingredient for a first step in pursuing the aim of 
simulating sensori-motor integration: it provides an observable res­
ponse with a particular character. The initial model attempted to 
show that the particular behaviour observable in the classical con­
ditioning situation would occur in an extended neural template 
system in the form of Linked Constellations, in which effector acti­
vity was included within the template scheme. This scheme was later 
developed to account for behaviours outside the range of those 
observable in a classical conditioning experiment.
II The basic layout
The basic form of the initial simulations followed the general
arrangements shown in Figure 5.10. The essentials of that diagram
are a Cortex, a Sub-cortex (possible Striatum) and a Thalamus, act­
ing as a routing centre.
The Cortex and Sub-cortex each consisted of a set of Neuronal Pools 
organised as shown in Figure 5.7. The Cortex followed the further
arrangements shown in Figure 5.12, i.e. it incorporated Sensory eff­
erents and Motor afferents.
Motor action in the Cortex depends upon inputs from the Motor Aff­
erents. It will be recalled that when those Fibres are active, the 
Integrating Neurons of the Motor Columns of the Cortex become 
excited and so are able to become linked to the Integrating Neurons 
excited in the Sensory columns. In this way Sensori-Motor Constel­
lations are formed. In the simulation, activity was initiated in the 
Motor Afferent Fibres to the Cortex by the output of the Motor Effer­
ent Fibres of the Sub-cortex. The Motor Efferent Fibres of the 
Sub-cortex passed to the Thalamus from where they were sent as Motor 
Afferents to the Cortex.
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The functions of the Thalamus shown in Figure 5.10 comprised various 
processing procedures. Although most of these procedures seemed to 
be analogical of processes which might be mediated in the thalamus 
and associated reticular tissues, to avoid undue theoretical commit­
ment, the Thalamus of the model will be termed a Control Centre. It 
was more than a notional relay station. Before the output of the 
Sub-cortical Array could be applied to the Cortical Array a certain 
amount of processing took place. Processing has to be applied to 
determine the notional frequency of the spikes in Afferent Fibres.
This was partly concerned with the formal distinction between an 
Active and Inactive Fibre and partly to give effect to a primitive 
form of "arousal" assumptions discussed in Chapter 6. As the system 
developed it was also found necessary to control levels of Excitation 
and Inhibition in the Arrays. This control seemed to derive naturally 
from a variation of the Afferent Excitation passing through the Con­
trol Centre.
It will be appreciated that the suggestions of correspondence between 
parts of the model and regions of the brain is intended to be sugges­
tive only. The aim is to assist in visualisation of the system and 
in the general interpretation of the brain organisation proposed.
On the physiological side, the initial simulations implemented
(a) the concept of Linked Constellations (b) afferent and efferent 
excitation (c) neuronal inhibition (d) spike discharge of neurons 
(e) a primitive form of the arousal proposals discussed in Chapter 6 
and (f) a representation of the decay of Integrative Connections.
These will now be discussed in detail.
III Simulation of Linked Constellations
In the main body of the simulations the actual connections by which 
Linked Constellations are mediated were not directly simulated. A 
separate simulation demonstrated the mediation of Linked Constella­
tions by orthodox formal synaptic connections. Although the model is 
not restricted to such a connective medium, the separate simulation 
served to demonstrate the practicability of the Constellation concept, 
It will be reported in due course.
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In the main simulations, a Linked Constellation was simulated by 
assigning a marker to the representation of an Integrating Neuron 
in the computer. This marker, the Constellation Label indicated 
which Constellation, if any, the Neuron belonged to. The Constel­
lation Label was an integer which became attached to the Integrating 
Neuron when it satisfied the conditions for forming Integrative Con­
nections. All Integrating Neurons which bore an identical 
Constellation Label were regarded as being interconnected in a 
manner necessary to fulfil the functions attributed to Linked Constel­
lations. These functions were then simulated by processing the 
notional set of physiological variables by which Integrating Neurons 
were represented in the computer.
In particular the two main functions simulated were:
(i) the Excitation of the Integrating Neurons belonging to a particu­
lar Linked Constellation was pooled and redistributed so that all 
Neurons in the Constellation had the same Excitation, equal to the 
arithmetic mean of the individual Excitations of the Neurons concerned.
(ii) as discussed in Section VII, Chapter 5, some of the Excitation 
of a Linked Constellation was transferred to the Integrating Neurons 
of those Constellations which had been formed just before and just 
after the time of formation of the one being considered.
Each main cycle of the program indicated a notional passage of time and 
was termed an Instant. A new Linked Constellation was formed at each 
Instant. The Constellation Label used to indicate membership of a 
particular Linked Constellation was in fact the number of the Instant 
at which the Constellation was notionally formed. This number was 
used to identify all those Neurons to be treated as a Linked Constel­
lation and served merely as a computing device to simulate Integrative 
Connections.
IV Simulation of Integrating Neurons
Each Integrating Neuron was represented by a set of six variables and 
Constants held in computer store. These comprised (1) the Constella­
tion Label; (2) the Excitation Count; (3) the Inhibition Count;
(4) the Natural Threshold as discussed in Section IV, Chapter 5;
(5) Connection control constant characteristic of the individual Neuron
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(6) Connection control representing passing of time.
These sets of variables were arranged in computing arrays, so as to 
represent the neural organisation proposed. Each Neuron belonged to 
a particular Neuronal Pool or Column. These Neuronal Pools were in 
turn organised in Neural Arrays (or Arrays) which represented the col­
umnar arrangement of cerebral tissue discussed in Section II, Chapter 5. 
The variables representing Integrating Neurons were updated at each 
main loop, i.e. Instant, of the program.
A. Excitation: Spikes
The Excitation Count recorded the state of Excitation of each Integrat­
ing Neuron. For convenience an arbitrary unit of Excitation was termed 
a Spike. A Spike was the Excitation which an Integrating Neuron 
received from an action potential at one of the notional synapses upon 
it, or the Excitation which it imparted to other Integrating Neurons 
when it underwent an action potential.
The Excitation Count was initially zero (in early simulations) and 
subsequently recorded the net results of any additions or subtractions 
of Excitation. These transactions, which represented events taking 
place during the Instant, may be considered under three heads:
(a) Excitation received from Afferent Fibre (addition); Excitation 
lost in emitted Spikes (subtraction). The Spike emitted by a Neuron 
within a particular column was added to the Spike Frequency of the 
Efferent Fibre of that column.
(b) Transfers of Excitation within Linked Constellations (Linked Con­
stellation sharing effect).
(c) Dissipation of Excitation (e.g. cell wall leakage, metabolic effects)
With regard to (a) at each Instant a Spike Frequency was calculated 
in the Control Centre (Thalamus) for each Afferent Fibre. This value 
was added into the Excitation Count of every Integrating Neuron notion­
ally driven by that Fibre. After processing the various neuronal 
exchanges of Inhibition and Excitation (see below) in each Integraing 
Neuron, the Discharge of each Integrating Neuron was calculated (Section 
IV, item (v) of Chapter 5). The Discharges of all the Integrating 
Neurons within a column were supposed to excite the Efferent Neuron 
(e.g. pyramid) of that column and so contribute to the Spike Frequency 
of the Efferent Fibre of that column. In practice the Spikes emitted 
by the individual Integrating Neurons within each Pool were simply
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aggregated to provide the Efferent Spike Frequency.
Within each Integrating Neuron the calculation was as detailed in 
Section IV, Chapter 5. The number of Spikes emitted by each Neuron 
was the excess of Excitation Count over Inhibition Count multiplied 
by a proportional (i.e. reducing) constant. Neurons would be unlikely 
to reduce their state of Excitation to the point of cessation of Spike 
emission within the short interval represented by an Instant.
The exchanges of Excitation through the Integrative Connections were 
simulated by adding the Excitation Counts of all the Neurons in a 
Constellation and sharing the total equally among the Neurons in the 
Constellation. A proportion of the total of Excitation Counts in 
Constellation 'T' was then transferred to the Neurons in Constella­
tion 'T + 1' and Constellation 'T - 1'. At each cycle these opera­
tions were carried out for all Constellations.
The effects of the dissipation of energy in the action potential and
its possible further dissipation over time was represented by 
reducing at each Instant the Excitation Count of each Integrating 
Neuron. The reduction consisted of the subtraction of a fixed arbi­
trary number of Spikes and a proportion of the Excitation Count of 
each particular Integrating Neuron in the system. This was intended 
to represent in rough form losses through a leaky channel. This 
aspect of the simulation was later seen to be related to the particu­
lar form which the operations in the simulation had taken. This
became clearer in later versions of the model.
B . Inhibition
Inhibitory Control Neurons impose inhibitory synapses upon the Inte­
grating Neurons. The number of Inhibitory Spikes received by an 
Integrating Neuron controlled a variable threshold at which the Neuron 
propagated an action potential (emitted a Spike). It also controlled 
a variable threshold at which the Neuron could form Integrative Connec­
tions .
It was unnecessary to simulate Inhibitory Control Neurons individually, 
since in these simulations their effect was always considered to be 
distributed evenly across all the Integrating Neurons of a Neuronal 
Pool.
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The Inhibition Count was a variable which recorded in each Integrating 
Neuron the results of any additions or subtractions of Inhibition on 
that Neuron during the Instant. The mode of calculation of the quan­
tities of Inhibition to be added or subtracted from Inhibition Count 
varied from version to version of the simulations. In principle an 
increment represented a release of inhibitory transmitter from the 
Inhibitory Control Neurons, and a subtraction the destruction of 
inhibitor transmitter or the dissipation of inhibitory effects within 
the Integrating Neurons. The increment to Inhibition Count was always 
made partly dependent upon some aspect of the Excitatory system at the 
preceding Instant, i.e. a representation of reactive inhibition. It 
was sometimes also made dependent upon the Spike Frequency of the 
Afferent Fibre at the Instant concerned, i.e. a feed-forward inhibition.
The simplest form was to add to the Inhibition Count of every Inte­
grating neuron within a particular Neuronal Pool an amount intended 
to balance precisely the excess of Excitation Count over Inhibition 
Count, taken as an arithmetic mean over all the Neurons within that 
Neuronal Pool, as it had stood at the preceding Instant. To effect 
this as a reactive variable. Inhibition was related to the sum of the 
Spikes emitted by all the Integrating Neurons within the Pool, i.e 
the Efferent Spike Frequency of that Pool, i.e.
Increment to Inhibition Count ^ _ .. „
 ^ Efferent Spike Frequency
(to each Integrating Neuron in = —  x --------------------------
Number of Integrating
Neurons in Pool
Here k has the same meaning as in item (v), Section IV, Chapter 5, 
i.e. it represents the proportion of Excitation emitted as Spikes in 
one Instant. Accordingly multiplying by its reciprocal calculates 
the amount of Excitation within the Neurons from which the Efferent 
Spike Frequency derived.
C . Threshold
The assumption adopted in the initial simulations was that there is an 
excitation threshold at which an Integrating Neuron (a) discharges and 
(b) is able to form Integrative Connections. This threshold was depen­
dent partly upon a natural threshold attributed to each cell, and 
partly to the influence of neuronal inhibition. As mentioned above, 
initially a single value was used as threshold for both functions (a)
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and (b) . It was, however, found later that thresholds applied to 
emission of Spikes introduced too great a variablility into the oper­
ation of the simulations consistent with the number of Neurons 
simulated. In later versions. Spike emission depended purely upon 
the excess of Excitation Count over Inhibition Count, and the Intrin­
sic Natural Threshold provided in each Integrating Neuron applied 
only to formation of Integrative Connections.
To simulate this idea an Intrinsic Natural Threshold was entered 
into each Integrating Neuron at the beginning of each run. This was 
a random number drawn from a rectangular or other statistical distri­
bution. The range was chosen so that maximum Spike Frequencies 
would cause those Integrating Neurons with the highest Thresholds to 
form Integrative Connections, whilst minimum Spike Frequencies (i.e. 
low arousal) would cause at least some of the Integrating Neurons to 
form connections, i.e. those with Thresholds at the bottom of the 
range.
Since the random numbers entered in Neurons at the beginning of each 
run differed from run to run, no two runs of the model were entirely 
identical.
D. Formation and destruction of Linked Constellations 
Reasons were given (Section III, Chapter 6) for including a notional 
decay principle. Since the method adopted is not central to the 
model, it will be briefly indicated without comment. Each Integrating 
Neuron contained a pair of numbers, one a constant and the other a 
counting variable indicating the passing of time. The constant, termed 
Memory Life Duration specified the number of Instants the Neuron could 
remain part of a Linked Constellation. It was an integer selected as 
a random number. This constant was used in conjunction with the count­
ing variable. Memory Life Count, which indicated how long the Neuron 
had already been linked into its current Linked Constellation.
When an Integrating Neuron satisfied the conditions for formation of 
Integrative Connections, i.e. if it was (a) currently unlinked and
(b) above threshold, then its Memory Life Count was set to zero. The 
Instant Number was written into the Constellation Label location of 
the Neuron to signify that it was now linked into the Constellation 
formed at that Instant. At each Instant all Memory Life Counts in the 
system were incremented by unity. When, in any Integrating Neuron,
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Memory Life Count equalled Memory Life Duration, the Constellation 
Label was reset to zero, thus effectively releasing the Neuron from 
the Linked Constellation and returning it to the unlinked pool.
One of the rules which an Integrating Neuron had to satisfy before 
it was linked was that its Memory Life Count should exceed its Memory 
Life Duration. This had three consequences: (a) Each Neuron is a
member of no more than one Constellation at any given Instant. No 
Integrating Neuron could be made part of the currently forming 
Linked Constellation whilst already a member of a Constellation.
(b) Integrating Neurons were released from Constellations in a stat­
istically determined manner, dependent upon the distribution of 
Memory Life Durations. The system gave an approximately logarithmic 
decay of the number of Neurons held in a Linked Constellation.
(C) At any Instant only a proportion of the Integrating Neurons were 
available for linking, even if in other respects they satisfied the 
conditions for the formation of integrative Connections.
E . Summary
Integrating Neurons were represented in the computer by variables 
and constants which simulated in a simple way the neurophysiology of 
neurons as seen in the theoretical model. The aspects represented 
were Excitation, Inhibition, Integrative Connections in the form of 
a Constellation Label, and decay of Integrative Connections controlled 
by Memory Life Duration and Memory Life Count. There was also an 
Intrinsic Threshold.
V Some further particulars
As mentioned, the notional anatomy simulated was that shown in 
Figure 5.10 of Chapter 5. Both the Cortex and Sub-cortex were divi­
ded into a Sensory Division and a Motor Division. These were simul­
ated in the form of Arrays. Each Array consisted of a set of Neuronal 
Pools (columns) and each Neuronal Pool consisted of a column of 
Integrating Neurons.
The Integrating Neurons of the Sub-cortical Arrays differed from those 
of the Cortical Arrays only in two respects: first, they were already 
members of Preset Constellations written in at the outset of the run;
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second, they were given an indefinite Memory Life Duration, so that 
they would remain linked throughout the run, i.e. they represented 
permanent connections.
Each Neuronal Pool in the Cortical Arrays consisted of 100 Integrating 
Neurons. There were 16 Neuronal Pools in the Sensory Division and 4 
Neuronal Pools in the Motor Division of the Cortical Arrays, i.e. a 
total of 2,000 Integrating Neurons.
Each Neuronal Pool of the Sub-cortical Arrays (Striatum) consisted of 
16 Integrating Neurons. This was sufficient to accomodate the number 
of Preset Constellations written into the model, with some to spare.
There were 16 Neuronal Pools in the Sensory Division and 4 Neuronal 
Pools in the Motor Division of the Sub-cortical Arrays. (See 
Table 7. lA) .
The numbers just given represent the first layout of the simulation 
and enable the basic design to be seen. These were in fact increased 
for most of the runs reported as part of the initial set of simula­
tions. This increase was to accommodate a system of reciprocal 
(balanced) representation, discussed in Section I, Chapter 6. The 
number of Integrating Neurons was also increased to 200 per Neuronal 
Pool (Table 7. IB) .
The Thalamus (Control Centre) acted as a relay station which performed 
processing functions, such as the calculation of the Spike Frequencies 
of the Fibres leaving it. Theoretically its functions would be per­
formed by Neuronal Pools, but in view of the simplicity of the opera­
tions, they were not formally simulated in terms of Neuronal Pools.
The main function of the Thalamus was to send Afferent Fibres from the 
Cortex and transmit them through Afferent Fibres to the Sub-cortical 
Array. Accordingly the Thalamus may be regarded as having an equal 
number of Locations as there were Neuronal Pools in the Cortex (Table 
7. 1) .
Effectively the Sensory Input of the model consisted of a set of 
binary digits, the Input Pattern. This consisted of 16 bits as first 
run, and 32 bits in later versions. This could arbitrarily and con­
veniently be regarded as a simple retina of 4 x 4 elements. The 
justification and significance of the isomorphic aspects of the model 
will not be pursued in this thesis.
TABLE 7.1
SUMMARY OF LAYOUT OF MODEL 
IN INITIAL SET OF SIMULATIONS
183
Sensory Division Motor Division
No. of No. of Int. 
Neuronal Neurons in
Pools each N.P.
No. of No. of Int. 
Neuronal Neurons in 
Pools each N.P.
A. As first run
Cortex 16 100 100
Sub-Cortex 16 16 16
Thalamus 16 Not
(Locations) represented
Not
represented
B. In later versions
Cortex
Sub-cortex
32
32
200
16
200
16
Thalamus 32 Not
(Locations) represented
Not
represented
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VI Arousal; functions of Control Centre
The Spike Frequency of both Motor and Sensory Afferent Fibres was 
calculated as the sum of two parameters: (a) The Diffuse Volley
Value, added to all Fibres of an Array; and (b) The Discriminative 
Volley Value, which had the value zero if the Fibre was notion­
ally inactive and some other value, set by the system, if the 
Fibre was notionally active.
The events of biological significance to the model were the occur­
rence of Innately Recognised Patterns (IRPs) in the Input, that is, 
patterns which matched the Sensory part of Preset Linked Constella­
tions. The appearance of such patterns in the Input could be 
identified by the occurrence of increased Motor output in the Sub­
cortex. As a consequence Motor output Spike Frequency was used to 
vary the arousal level.
The values of the two parameters were set as functions of the Spike 
Frequencies in the Efferent Fibres of the model. One of the func­
tions of the Control Centre (Thalamus) was to calculate these values 
and to apply them to the Sensory Afferent Fibres. In the case of 
these Fibres, the signal status, active or inactive, was determined 
simply by reference to the corresponding bit of the Input Pattern.
In the case of the Motor Afferent Fibres, i.e. the Fibres whose state 
derived from the Efferent Fibres coming to the Thalamus from the Sub­
cortex (see Figure 5.10, Chapter 5), the Control Centre acted as an 
inhibitory filter. The Spike Frequencies of the Sub-cortical Effer­
ents were subjected to simple arithmetic procedures which simulated 
a competitive inhibition system in a simple fashion. For example, in 
the simplest version, the arithmetic mean of the Spike Frequencies in 
all the Efferent Fibres was subtracted from each, any negative results 
being put equal to zero. The resulting Spike Frequencies were added 
to the Diffuse Volley Value and applied as the Spike Frequencies of 
the Motor Afferent Fibres to the Cortical Array.
VII Concluding remarks
In this chapter the mode of simulation of the essentials of the theoretical
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model have been outlined. The structure of the model as simulated 
has been described and some indication given of the representation 
of physiological variables. The mode of calculation of Spike 
Frequencies in Afferent Fibres, including an arousal system, was 
also given.
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CHAPTER 8
PERFORMANCE OF INITIAL SET OF SIMULATIONS
In this chapter will be reported the behaviour of the set of simula­
tions which were in the form which has been described in the previous 
chapter. These were run in the University Atlas Computer and pro­
grammed in Atlas Basic Language.
I Demonstration of Linked Constellations as spatial templates
A. Registration of Input Patterns
In order to see whether the model functioned internally as predicted, 
samples of the Integrating Neurons taken from every Neuronal Pool in 
the model were monitored at intervals. The Constellation Label 
printed out for each Neuron enabled the identification of which Inte­
grating Neurons belonged to a particular Linked Constellation. This 
indicated, for the benefit of the programmer, the Instant at which 
that Neuron had become notionally linked with other Neurons.
To form a spatial template of an Input Pattern, the Integrating 
Neurons belonging to the Linked Constellation concerned should be 
located in those Neuronal Pools which were excited by that Input Pat­
tern. Clearly this was the intention of the design of the model, and 
in the case of a single Instant and a single Input Pattern, the demon­
stration would be trivial. It is however, a different matter when the 
process is set within a neural integrating system as a whole. The 
question arises as to whether it is practicable to suppose that adequate 
templates can be laid down of a large number of inputs occurring 
successively within a system containing a limited number of Neurons.
It also seems necessary to demonstrate that this is possible in a 
system of variable physiological units like neurons, in which there are 
myriad exchanges of excitation and inhibition.
To confirm that the registration complied with the template notion,
the Input Pattern presented at a particular Instant was considered
bit by bit. The Neurons bearing the Constellation Label for that Instant
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were then searched for in the printout and the Neuronal Pools to 
which tliey belonged ascertained. It was then checked that the pat­
tern of Neuronal Pools containing Neurons with that Constellation 
Label matched the Input Pattern, i.e. that where a 1 appeared in the 
Input Pattern then in the corresponding Pool there were Neurons 
bearing the relevant Constellation Label. Conversely, where a 0 
appeared in the Input Pattern there were to be no Neurons in the 
corresponding Pool which bore the relevant Label.
The system worked well. In the initial runs there were between 115 
and 140 Instants. For purposes of reference a 'run' of the model 
means a run of the computer program in the computer for a given num­
ber of Instants during which its performance and operation could be 
investigated. A 'run' may be alternatively referred to as an investi­
gation or experiment as appropriate in context. In each run some 15 
to 20 different Input Patterns were presented. It was found that the 
location of the Linked Neurons corresponded to the Input Patterns 
presented at the Instant they were notionally linked.
The representation of the most recently presented pattern was natur­
ally most profuse. It also had the greatest number of errors, that is. 
Neurons linked from Pools which had been notionally inactive at the 
relevant time, and an absence of Neurons bearing the relevant Constel­
lation Labels in the Pools where they should have been found. The 
representation of Patterns presented earlier in the run was more limited 
in numbers, because of the timed destruction of Connections, but many 
of the errors had disappeared, that is. Neurons linked into the wrong 
Pools had disappeared. The spatial templates provided by these "older 
memories" were incomplete, but often contained a smaller proportion of 
errors. There was usually some representation of almost every Input 
presented. For example, in a printout made at Instant 73, there was 
adequate representation of the Linked Constellation formed at Instant 28.
B. Recognition by spatial template system
When a Pattern is presented we expect a matching Linked Constellation 
to be formed. When the same pattern is presented later we expect this 
Constellation to be energised to a degree greater than any other Con­
stellation. This was indeed found to be the case. In that sense, the 
model could be said to be 'recognising the input' in terms of previously 
presented patterns.
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Figure 8,1 State of Excitation in Constellations at Instant 
123* Note effects of temporal sequence and Arousal in 
Constellations registering IRPs.
1Ü9
It is necessary to anticipate somewhat and say that these predictions 
were fully confirmed in later versions of the model. They may be seen 
with clarity in tlie outputs of the separate simulation which demonstra­
ted the mediation of Linked Constellations by orthodox synaptic connec­
tions, (see Figures Ib.l and 16.2, Chapter 16). In those Figures it may 
be seen that the Neurons belonging to the Constellation which matches 
the Input Pattern are at the highest level in the system, with the excep­
tion of those just formed by the current Input. Similar results were 
confirmed from tlie numerous runs reported. The Linked Constellations 
showing tlie maximum Mean Excitation Counts were in fact those formed at 
Instants when the same Input Pattern was currently in the Input.
In the monitor outputs of the initial simulations, this effect occurred 
but was seriously complicated by the temporal sequential and arousal 
effects. Figure 8.1 reproduces part of a table in a monitoring output. 
Each line in the table summarises a Constellation and reports (a) the 
sum of the Excitation Counts of all the Integrating Neurons identified 
as belonging to that Constellation; (b) the number of Integrating 
Neurons belonging to that Constellation; and (c) the arithmetic mean of 
the Excitation concerned.
Examination of many such monitor printouts disclosed that the matching 
effect was only clearly seen at certain phases of the experimental runs, 
notably when the model went step by step through the sequence of Input 
Patterns leading to the Instant of presentation of the IRP. Because of 
the build up of Excitation in the system at that point, the Input Pat­
terns which arrived after the IRP, were unable to influence the main 
pattern of distribution of Excitation.
In Figure 8.1 the position is shown when a Neutral Pattern is in the 
Input following a presentation of the IRP. The Linked Constellation 
matching the Input Pattern responds by rising to an Excitation level 
slightly higher than its neighbours, but does not approach the high 
levels still remaining in the Constellation representing the consumma- 
tory climax of the sequence.
The full implication of these complications were not appreciated at the 
time. They became of considerable importance in the later development 
of the model where they will be discussed more fully. Here it may be 
noted, that where a familiar sequence is repeated, the Excitations of 
the Linked Constellations representing that sequence tend to dominate an 
individual input which does not match one of the patterns included in the 
sequence.
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II Testing the initial simulations; design of investigatory experiments
The runs were designed to test the general account of brain organisa­
tion given in Section IV of Chapter 6. As mentioned earlier, a "run" 
in this context means a run of the program in the computer during 
which the performance of the model could be compared with prediction, 
i.e. an investigatory experiment. Each run simulated a simple classical 
conditioning or cue learning experiment. The model was expected to 
emit a notional response when presented with a specific stimulus pat­
tern. The aim was the detection of a response when a cue stimulus or 
Conditioned Stimulus (which during training had preceded the Uncondi­
tioned Stimulus) was presented without being followed by the UCS 
(specific stimulus pattern).
For the purposes of the tests, the Motor Response of the model was 
indicated by the Efferent Fibre which carried the greatest Spike Fre­
quency. For convenience the Efferent Fibres were numbered 1 to 4, so 
the Motor Response could be a number, 1 to 4, or a combination of num­
bers. The Motor Response to be conditioned was that obtainable by 
presenting to the model an Innately Recognised Pattern (IRP). It will 
be recalled that an IRP was an Input Pattern which matched the Sensory 
portion of a Preset Constellation written into the Sub-cortex. The 
Motor Response to be conditioned was therefore determined by which 
Efferent Columns of the Sub-cortex contained Neurons linked into the 
Preset Constellation concerned. In some runs the Preset Constellations 
were written so that the response of two Efferent Fibres was elicited 
when its corresponding IRP appeared in the Input. In many early runs, 
in order to produce a clear demonstration, the Responses consisted of 
either Efferent Fibres 1 and 2 or Efferent Fibres 3 and 4, designated 
respectively Action A and Action B.
In addition to the designation of Motor Response as a particular Fibre 
Fibres carrying maximum Spike Discharge, the actual value of that 
Discharge (Efferent Spike Frequency) gave a measure of the strength of 
the Response.
A preprogrammed sequence of Input Patterns was prepared for each run.
A Cue Sequence (or, less formally, a Cue) simulated a sensory event.
It consisted of a set of three or four successively presented Input 
Patterns in a fixed order. These patterns were selected from an
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Input Pattern Library as being indifferent, that is they were shown 
to produce no appreciable Motor Response before training. A further 
nuJTiber of indifferent patterns were selected to be used as Neutral 
or inter-trial patterns. These represented the experimental environ­
ment in the absence of a special stimulus.
A Training Trial consisted of a few Neutral Patterns followed by a 
Cue Sequence, followed in turn by an IRP (Innately Recognised Pattern 
or Releaser).
A Test Trial generally consisted of the Neutral Patterns followed by 
a Cue Sequence only, i.e. without the IRP. The preprogrammed sequence 
of patterns for the whole run consisted generally of a Training 
Session, consisting of a number of Training Trials, and a Test Session, 
consisting of Test Trials, i.e.
A. Training Session
TRAINING TRIALS each comprising:
Neutral Patterns - Cue Sequence - IRP - Neutral Patterns
B . Test Session
TEST TRIALS each comprising
Neutral Patterns - Cue Sequence - Neutral Patterns.
This design corresponded in many ways to a Classical Conditioning 
situation. Like the Conditioned Stimulus, the Cue Sequence does not 
eleicit a response prior to its pairing with a special kind of stimu­
lus. Like the UCS, the IRP is a special kind of notional sensory pat­
tern which elicits a response in the absence of prior experience. The 
choice of this design is not meant to imply that the model explains 
learning in terms of Classically Conditioned Responses. The explana­
tion of learning in the model is the formation of Linked Constellations. 
What the model suggests is that in conditions analogous to the Classical 
Conditioning situation, the theory of neural integration would produce 
phenomena comparable to those seen in the Classical Conditioning 
situation.
Ill Demonstration of notional classical conditioning
The experimental run illustrated in Figure 8.3 was one of a number 
which approximated most closely to a straightforward classical con­
ditioning experiment. In the particular run illustrated, a single
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Cue Sequence, of 4 Input Pattern, termed Cue B, was used throughout 
the run. In seven Training Trials it was followed by a particular 
Innately Recognised Pattern. In three subsequent Test Trials Cue B 
was presented without being followed by an IRP. The general experi­
mental design is illustrated in Figure 8,2.
The behaviour of tlie model is indicated in the Figure by curves 
showing the number of Spikes in each of the two sets of Response Fibres. 
The curve labelled Action A shows the sum of the Spike Frequencies in 
Efferent Fibres 1 and 2. That labelled Action B shows the sum of the 
Spike Frequencies in Fibres 3 and 4. The abscissa represents succes­
sive Instant of the run. The time of presentations of the IRP is 
shown by deflections of the line marked PPB. The Line marked PPA was 
reserved for indicating the presentation of another IRP, but as only 
one IRP was used in this run, it was not needed. Generally PPA was 
used to refer to the IRP which elicited an unconditioned response 
from Fibres 1 and 2, i.e. Action A, and PPB for the IRP which elicited 
a response from Fibres 3 and 4, i.e. Action B. Cue A was used to refer 
to the Cue Sequence which was presented prior to the presentation of 
PPA, i.e. the CS for PPA; similarly Cue B was the CS for PPB. The 
presentation of Cue B is shown in Figures 8.3 and 8.4 by deflections 
in tlie appropriately labelled line. In this run and in related 
experimental runs sharing the design shown in Figure 8.2, only one IRP 
and one Cue were used.
It will be noted that during Training (Figure 8.3) each presentation 
of PPB (the particular IRP used in this run) produces a sharp peak in 
the relevant Motor Response output (Action B). This signifies the 
directly elicited Motor Response analogous to the Unconditioned 
Response.
During Testing, a clear peak in the curve for Action B follows each 
of the three presentations of Cue B, notwithstanding that during the 
Test Trials no IRP was presented. These peaks represent Spike Frequen­
cies occurring in the relevant Fibres 3 and 4, and are analogous to 
the Conditioned Respone.
Latency of Response. In the first Training Trial, Spikes only appear 
in Action B upon actual presentation of PPB. In the second Training 
Trial, some Spikes occur during the presentation of the Cue Sequence, 
i.e. before the presentation of PPB. In subsequent Trials these 'anti­
cipatory' Spikes increase in number and occur earlier from Trial to
195
Trial. The latency of the notional Conditioned Response may be said 
to diminish as the number of Training Trials increases. However, 
this statement really only applies to the relatively small 'antici­
patory' rises in the curve and not the main peaks. The latter are 
clearly seen as occurring only when an IRP, in this case PPB, is 
actually in the Input. The response curve during Training indicates 
an overlaying of the 'conditioned' and 'unconditioned' responses. 
Action A, the irrelevant response. Although Action A was not inten­
tionally utilised in the run concerned (Figure 8.3) small peaks occur 
in the curve for Action A whenever, during Training, a large peak for 
Action B occurs. This effect is attributable to the arousal system. 
Although Action A is not implicated in the experimental presentations 
of the run concerned, the Preset Constellation capable of emitting 
Action A was present in the system. The presentation of PPB elicited 
a massive output in Action B. It may be recalled that two arousal 
parameters. Diffuse Volley Value and Discriminative Volley Value, were 
in early versions of the model, both adjusted by reference to Spike 
Frequencies across the Efferent Fibres. It may be assumed that the 
small peaks seen in Action A were attributable to the increase in 
Diffuse Volley Value, which affected both Responses. It was effects 
of this kind which disclosed the problems associated with the use of 
Diffuse Volley Value as an arousal parameter. It may be noted that 
the disturbances in Action A occur only at the actual Instants when 
Action B has been elicited. Elsewhere, and in particular throughout 
the entire Test Session, Action A remains at the baseline.
In a number of different runs which followed the design indicated in 
Figure 8.2, PPA was substituted for PPB. A different set of Input 
Patterns was used as a Cue Sequence preceding the presentation of PPA, 
and was accordingly termed Cue A. PPA naturally elicited Action A 
during Training Trials and Cue A elicited a notional Conditioned 
Response of Action A during Test Trials. Further testing of the pro­
gram was carried out by using different sets of Input Patterns as 
Cue A or Cue B, as the case may have been in the particular run. In 
all these variations the basic kind of performance achieved was simi­
lar to that illustrated in Figure 8.3.
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IV Discrimination of Cues
Figure 8.4 illustrates one of many experimental runs in which two 
different Cue Sequences and two different IRPs were used in the Scime 
run. The general design is indicated in Figure 8.5. The design of 
this and related computer investigations does not correspond with 
arrangements generally seen in classical conditioning experiments, 
although some experiments have not been entirely dissimilar (e.g.
Varga and Pressman, 1963). In most classical conditioning experiments 
only a single UCS is conditioned. The system of "double-conditioning" 
was adopted here to make sure that the model could not only discrimi­
nate two different Cue Sequences but could produce a discriminate 
"anticipatory" response to each of them when each had been consist­
ently followed by a different IRP.
As may be seen from Figure 8.4, there were ten Training Trials. On 
odd-numbered Trials Cue B was followed by IRP 2; on even-numbered 
Trials Cue A was followed by IRP 1. The Instants of presentation of 
Cue Sequences and IRPs can be seen from the deflections in the 
appropriately labelled lines in the Figure. IRP 1 was the Innately 
Recognised Pattern which caused the model to emit Action A (i.e. an 
'UCR') -f IRP 2 was the IRP which caused the model to emit Action B 
(the other 'UCR') . Cue A and Cue B were two different Cue Sequences, 
each made up of four indifferent Patterns.
Figure 8.4 (b) is a magnification of that part of the curve shown in 
Figure 8.4 (a) which relates to the Test Trials only. In the particular 
run illustrated, Cue B was presented at each of the three Test Trials, 
a fourth Test Trial being interrupted by expiration of computer time.
It will be seen that the curve for Action B, i.e. the CR to the rele­
vant CS, Cue B, has three clear peaks, each coming at the end of the 
presentations of the Cue Sequence.
In this run, the curve for Action B does not return to base line between 
Presentations of the Cue, as it did in the run illustrated in Figure 8.3, 
This was because fewer Neutral Patterns could be interposed between 
presentations of the Cue if three Test Trials were to be accommodated 
within the available computer time. After the third Test Trial a 
larger number of Neutral Patterns were presented and it will be seen 
that the curve falls.
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After each presentation of the Cue, the curve rises and then falls.
It then begins to rise again. It will be noted that it does this 
in the middle of the next presentation of the Cue Sequence, demon­
strating an 'anticipatory' effect similar to that demonstrated in 
Figure 8.3. In this run, as compared with that shown in Figure 8.3, 
the curve for Action A does not remain at the baseline during Test 
Trials utilising Cue B. Nevertheless, the response of Action B is 
clearly distinguishable.
To test that the Responses shown in Figure 8.4 were not an artefact 
resulting from the particular patterns used for Cue A and Cue B, 
these patterns were varied in different experimental runs, different 
selections from the Pattern Library being used altogether. In some 
runs completely different patterns were used as "pseudo-cue 
sequences" in the Test Trials, to show that no analogical CR appeared.
In the run shown in Figure 8.6^), the experimental run shown in Figure 8.4 
was repeated except that the pairing in Training Trials was reversed, 
i.e. Cue A was paired with IRP 2, Cue B with IRP 1. All three 
Test Trials produced an analogous CR appropriate to the new pair­
ing. (See Figure 8.5 (b).
Many runs further tested the operation of the model and demonstrated 
that the notional Conditioned Responses were in fact elicited by the 
pairing of Cue Sequence and IRP and were not due to the variability 
of the system, chance or artefact. For example. Figure 8.7 shows an 
experimental run in which in the Test Trials a presentation of Cue A is 
interposed between two presentations of Cue B. The output of Action A 
and Action B varies appropriately. (A magnifiction of the curve for 
the Test Trials alone may be seen in Figure 9.1).
In the runs described Cue A followed by IRP 1 was presented alternately
with Cue B followed by IRP 2 during Training Trials. The order of 
presentation was varied in many experimental runs. For example, that 
shown in Figure 8.7 has the order broken up somewhat. In Trials 
numbers 5 and 6 Cue B was presented followed by IRP 2, whilst in Trials 
7 and 8 Cue A was followed by IRP 1. The appropriate analogous CR's 
were still obtainable. The order of presentation was, however, found 
to have some effect. In early versions of the model, the first Train­
ing Trial was found to have an undue effect. This was corrected by a 
modification of the model (see next chapter). The last Training Trial,
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i.e. that immediately preceding the Test Trials was also found to 
have an undue effect, which may be seen, for example, in Figure 8.7. 
These aspects of the model, which were interpreted as resulting from 
the decay and linking control system, were considered to be analog­
ical to possible attributes of actual nervous systems.
V Conclusions
(1) The Linked Constellations responded to input patterns appropriately.
(2) When a particular sequence of Input Patterns consistently preceded 
a Special Input Pattern (and IRP) which produced an inbuilt response 
from the model, the Linked Constellations recording the events could be 
trained to induce similar Motor Responses following the appropriate 
input patterns, i.e. a form of conditioned responding was demonstrated.
(3) The system was able to distinguish two sequences of input patterns 
which had been followed by different specific eliciting patterns (IRPs), 
by producing appropriate different responses to each .
These conclusions confirm the main predictions of the model as a poss­
ible mediation of a neural template hypothesis in the form of Linked 
Constellations. The performance of the initial version of the model 
was examined further, but before reporting those investigations it is 
necessary to report some modifications which were introduced in the 
course of developing the initial set of simulations. These are dealt 
with in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 9
SOME FURTHER ASPECTS OF THE FIRST SET OF SIMULATIONS
I Some modifications introduced in the course of simulation
As explained at the outset of the thesis, the simulations were 
used as a tool of development, not as the exposition of a fully 
developed model. In fact the first trial simulations were very 
simple indeed, and the results of computer experiments reported 
in the previous chapter were in relatively advanced versions in 
which the general structure described earlier had been developed.
Most of the modifications introduced into the initial set of 
simulations have been discussed theoretically, and the following 
is mainly a matter of bringing the reader up to date before 
reporting further results.
A . Balanced systems: receptor system
The theoretical implications of sensory patterns of activity invol­
ving different numbers of active fibres were discussed at some 
length in Chapter 6, Section I. It will be recalled that it was 
there argued that patterns with a large number of active fibres 
would reactivate a large number of Linked Constellations which rep­
resented only fragments of the Input Pattern. Moreover, an Input 
Pattern with a large number of active Fibres would send more Excita­
tion into the system and so have an arousing effect. These two 
effects would disturb the retreival of information from the system.
In the first versions of the simulations Input Patterns consisted of 
permutations of 16 bits. Virtually the model did not work in this 
form. Some improvement was made by selecting patterns at random 
with varying numbers of notionally active fibres (i.e. I's). However, 
to obtain a high level of performance, it was necessary to restrict 
all the Input Patterns in the Library to those having the same number 
of active Fibres, i.e. I's.
It was considered somewhat unsatisfactory to demonstrate the model in
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a form subject to this restriction. Accordingly the simulation was 
extended to permit the Input Patterns to be increased from 15 to 32 
bits. In this extended form, the second 16 bits were the 1 comple­
ments of the first 16 bits. The whole model had to be expanded, 
that is, the number of Neuronal Pools doubled (to 32), so that each 
bit of the Input Pattern still had its corresponding Neuronal Pool.
The system then represented in principle a set of receptor elements 
with the property that when one receptor was excited by a certain 
stimulation, there was another which had formerly been in an excited 
state in the absence of such stimulation, which was now suppressed.
The theoretical implications of this hypothesis have already been 
discussed in Chapter 6.
The remainder of the results illustrated were all in this extended 
version.
B. Balanced systems: motor system
It was suggested in Chapter 6 that motor systems might be organised 
in some way analogical with the balanced input aspect of the recep­
tor system. The reciprocal aspects of effector systems may offer 
certain explanatory possibilities, as indeed they have to others, 
notably Konorski (1967), and it was wished to try to introduce such 
aspects at the earliest moment. The theoretical aspects of such 
systems will be discussed later. Here it is sufficient to say that 
animals learn not to do things just as they learn to do things. It 
seems plausible that there would be a representation of response 
suppression as well as a representation of response activity.
The representation of this idea in the initial set of simulations 
was rudimentary. It differed from version to version. These versions 
conformed however to a general principle. In the versions having a 
balanced effector system representation, the number of Motor Neuronal 
Pools was increased from 4 to 8 in the Cortical Array. As will be 
explained below, in some of the versions the Sub-cortical representa­
tion was also increased from 4 to 8 Neuronal Pools, and in some 
versions the Sub-cortical representation remained at 4 Neuronal Pools.
In the versions in which the Süb-cortical representation had been 
increased to eight Neuronal Pools, the Preset Constellations in the 
Sub-cortical Array were then rewritten so as to include the represen­
tation of 8 Motor bits, the second four bits being the 1 complements
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of the first four (in analogy with the balanced receptor system).
This is not of course the only possible interpretation of a bal­
anced effector system, and indeed others were investigated (see 
below, and later chapters). In the system just described, if 
one of the Preset Constellations had Fibres 1 and 2 excited by 
its sensory pattern, it also had Fibres 7 and 8 excited. Inter­
preting the second four Motor Neuronal Pools as Response Suppres­
sion Pools, this meant that if the model notionally performed the 
action represented by a Discharge in Efferent Fibres 1 and 2, it 
also emitted Discharges indicating that it was suppressing the 
actions represented in Fibres 3 and 4.
There is an alternative manner of implementing a balanced effector 
system, which was not investigated in the model. This is the imple­
mentation of response suppression based upon the active neuronal 
inhibition of fibres representing the emission of the response. As 
mentioned in Chapter 6, Konorski (1967) discusses these two alterna­
tives in considerable depth. The present author follows Konorski in 
believing that Response Suppression is the function of a separate 
excitatory system which actively signals the suppression of responses. 
These matters do not play a significant part in the initial set of 
simulations, but were of more importance in subsequent extensions of 
the model.
The arrangement just described worked, but not well. An alternative 
method which was tried was a reciprocal system in which whenever a 
fibre to one of the first four Neuronal Pools was active, its corre­
sponding fibre to the second four Neuronal Pools was inactive, and 
vice versa. In tdiis version it was only necessary to have four Neur­
onal Pools in the Motor Division of the Sub-cortical Array, because 
the eight Afferent Fibres could be controlled by the pattern of out­
put across the four Sub-cortical Efferent Fibres.
A number of other similar arrangements were experimented with. However, 
it was appreciated that they were all equally unsatisfactory as a 
representation, however simple, of actual neural arrangements. One of 
the main troubles was that, since the model was not doing anything 
most of the time, the fibres to the suppression Neuronal Pools were 
active most of the time. This soon exhausted their stock of available 
unlinked Neurons. For another thing, the suppression representation 
was being applied to the kind of directly elicited response analogical
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to a UCS, and it is doubtful whether the animal learns not to do such 
things in quite the same way as it learns not to move in a certain 
situation. These initial attempts were however found useful when the 
later extended versions of the model were attempted. They are in any 
Case reported for the sake of completeness.
C . Conditioned Arousal system
In the runs so far illustrated the effect of the arousal system can 
only be seen when an Innately Recognised Pattern (innate releasing 
pattern) is actually in the Input. It seemed to be a good idea to 
show that an increase of arousal could be made to occur during the 
presentation of the Cue Sequence and in anticipation of the IRP. Such 
an arousal might be termed a conditioned arousal. This was feasible 
because, as noted in connection with the computer experiments already 
reported, the output of the relevant Efferent Fibre began to rise 
before the actual presentation of the Innately Recognised Pattern. It 
will be recalled that the arousal parameters varied according to the 
output across the Efferent Fibres. Accordingly arousal should have 
resulted from the increase in Motor Nerve activity immediately pre­
ceding an anticipated innate releasing pattern.
In the runs so far reported, an arousal effect can be clearly seen 
when the IRP is actually in the Input. This results from the large 
Motor output initiated by the reactivation of the Preset Constella­
tion at Sub-cortical level. The operation of arousal as an effect 
of the Conditioned Response was less definite. An attempt was made 
to increase the effect by magnifying the relationship between Motor 
Discharge and arousal. However this made the output during an 
Unconditioned Response too great for the model to accommodate reason­
ably. The system was then made non-linear. Small variations in 
Discharge of Motor Nerves were made to have a larger proportionate 
effect than large ones, i.e. arousal levels were a logarithmic func­
tion of Motor Nerve activity. The result of these modifications was 
to make performance of the model unstable. The trouble was a self­
fuelling loop. A small variation of Motor Output caused an increase 
of arousal; this magnified the next variation of Motor Output, which 
in turn magnified the next. Nevertheless a number of runs gave a 
good analogous Conditioned Response and also gave evidence that the 
system was responding at a higher level of activity in anticipation of 
the Innately Recognised Pattern (Figure 9,1).
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D. Notional maturation of Integrating Neurons
It was mentioned that in early versions of the model, the first 
Training Trials had an undue influence on later performance. This 
appeared to be because at the outset of the run the system had a 
large number of unlinked Integrating Neurons.
Such a state of affairs was considered not to be an adequate repre­
sentation of a neural system, since it implied that a nervous system 
came into being fully operative. Accordingly it was thought justi­
fied to introduce a correcting assumption. At the outset of each 
run only a proportion of the Integrating Neurons provided was actually 
made operative. This number was increased from Instant to Instant 
during the first 15 to 20 Instants of the investigatory run. This 
expressed the idea that at birth many of the Integrating Neurons 
would not participate in neuronal integration, and would gradually 
come into the system as they mature.
The revised system worked well. It reduced the undue effect of early 
Training Trials (see later in this chapter), and it made later Trials 
more effective by providing economy of the use of Integrating Neurons 
to store information at successive Instants.
E . Summary of modifications
During the course of the simulations a number of modifications were 
introduced. These included a balanced receptor system. This was 
effective in freeing the model from restrictions upon the notional 
patterns of stimulation presented to it. Less successful was an exten­
sion of the principle to provide a balanced effector system. It worked 
but failed to add to the efficiency of the model in the manner expected. 
However, it disclosed a number of characteristics of balanced effector 
system which proved useful in later extensions of the model.
Experiments were made to increase the effects of the arousal system.
This led to instability in performance. The difficulties in solving 
the consequent problems of control played a large part in the later 
emergence of a fresh concept of arousal and attention, notably to the 
introduction of rhythmic mechanisms.
The number of Integrating Neurons in the system was increased progres­
sively over the first Instants of the computer runs. This reduced the 
undue effects of early Training Trials and assisted in economy of storage
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Figure 9.5 Stimulus generalisation and discrimination. The full line 
and the dotted line show respectively the responses in two different 
runs to a Cue Sequence presented at a Test Trial without "reinforcement". 
The runs were identical except for the composition of the Cue Sequences 
presented at this Test Trial. In one run (shown dotted) the Cue Sequence 
used in the other run was varied. The last pattern of the four used in 
the Sequence was varied by one pair of complementary bits from that used 
in the run shown by the full line.
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II Some further results of the initial simulations: Stimulus
generalisation
The effect of a stimulus which resembles the conditioned stimulus 
but differs from it along a dimension such as the pitch of a tone 
was somewhat loosely simulated by presenting patterns in the Test 
Trials which differed only slightly from the patterns used as Cue 
Sequence in the Training Trials.
9 5"
Figure compares the outputs during a Test Trial in two almost
identical experimental runs ^ one being the control for the other.
The only difference between the two runs was the Input Pattern pre­
sented at Instant 121. In both runs a sequence of Input Patterns
was presented over Instants 118 to 121. In the run whose output is
shown in the heavy line the sequence presented was identical with 
Cue Sequence B as used in both runs to precede the IRP which induced 
an emission of Action B. In the run whose output is shown in the 
dotted line the sequence presented in the Test Trial illustrated 
was identical with Cue Sequence B except for one pattern, the last 
of the sequence, presented at Instant 121. This pattern differed 
from the last pattern of Cue Sequence B by only one pair of comple­
mentary bits, e.g.
1001 0110 1000 0111
1100 0011 1100 0011
0101 1010 0101 1010
0101 1010 0101 1010
(a) Indifferent Input Pattern (b) Example of Input
forming part of Cue Sequence Pattern differing from
during Training Tests (a) by one complemen­
tary pair of bits
It will be noted that the notional Conditioned Response is definite 
in both runs. However, the peak reached by the curve showing the 
output for the experimental run which substituted the slightly dif­
ferent pattern at the end of the Test Cue Sequence does not rise 
quite so high as that for the run using the true Cue Sequence B. The 
output in the former reached a Spike Frequency of 123 against a Spike 
Frequency of 160 induced by the true Cue Sequence B.
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These runs demonstrated that the system could respond critically to 
differences of input as small as the minimum consistency change in 
the notional pattern of stimulation, i.e. a pair of complementary 
bits. It was also demonstrated that although the system discriminated 
between the two similar patterns, it nevertheless produced a response 
to the slightly different pattern which only differed by a small 
degree of strength from the response it produced to a complete match.
It seems important that a system of neural integration should have 
this capacity so that useful generalisations can be developed to 
essentially identical (i.e. behaviourally equivalent) inputs. Never­
theless, if one such pattern should prove to be biologically desirable 
and the other harmful, it is important for the system to be able to 
distinguish them. This , the model has been shown to be able to do.
Ill Competing responses: recency and primacy effects
Some runs investigated the effects of inconsistent pairings between 
Cue Sequence and IRP. For example, in some Training Trials within 
the same experimental run. Cue A would be followed by IRP 1 and in 
others by IRP 2, whilst in other Training Trials Cue B would be fol­
lowed by IRP 1 and in yet others Cue B would be followed by IRP 2.
This resulted at Test Trials in emissions of Responses in both Action 
A and Action B to any Cue presented, with one or other dominating.
It will have been noted in the experimental runs already reported that 
when in Test Trials a Cue was presented and a notional Conditioned 
Response obtained, the curve for the output of the irrelevant Action 
rarely remained at base level as it did in those runs where only one 
Cue Sequence and one IRP was employed. In one sense this emission of 
Spikes in both Action A and Action B merely pointed to inadequacies in 
the Inhibition system, which should have reduced one output to zero. 
However, the actual emission of Spike Frequencies in both notional 
Motor Nerves gave the clue to what was happening within the model. In 
the case of the experimental runs now under discussion this aspect of 
the output became exaggerated. This was to be expectedj the presentat- 
tion of a Cue Sequence in a Test Trial would reactivate several matching 
Linked Constellations which would however contain a representation of 
Action B in some of them and Action A in others.
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The point of these runs was to see to what extent the order of presen­
tation of particular pairing affected the results at the Test Trials. 
The effects were not studied systematically, and are reported here for 
completeness to explain how it was known that the first Training Trials 
had an undue effect on the results.
It was in fact found that when the pairing was equally balanced over 
the run, the Response which dominated at the Test was that emitted in 
the last of the Training Trials, i.e. a recency effect. It was also 
found that a pairing in the first Training Trial of a run could out­
weigh two or even three Trials with a different pairing in the middle 
of the Training Session. It has already been mentioned that this 
effect was reduced by introducing a notional period of maturation for 
the Integrating Neurons.
IV Equipotentiality and Mass Action
Lashley's (1949) principles have been considerably modified by the 
more detailed knowledge which we now possess concerning the structure 
and function of the localised regions of the cortex. Some of his 
results may be explained in terms of redundancy arising through multiple 
representation (see for example, Zeki, 1978). Nevertheless, many con­
temporary workers remain convinced that there is a core of necessary 
truth in Lashley's demonstration that the engram must be distributed 
throughout the brain (e.g. Oatley, 1978). Some workers consider that 
specialisation in the cortex is less simple than it appears at first 
sight and is dependent upon inter-regional interaction (e.g. Iversen,
19 73). Others that a theory of neural function which relies upon the 
integrity of individual circuits is implausible (Pribram, 1971).
The present model offers a reconciliation of a local specialisation 
of function with a distributed memory concept. In the extended template 
idea, the Linked Constellation provides an extended system of special­
ised parts situated in different regions. Partial destruction of such 
a structure would be expected to affect the function of the whole only 
insofar as the information contributed by that part was missing or 
destroyed.
An analogy of Lashley's experiments in destroying parts of the cortex 
was to remove parts of the Neuron Arrays of the Cortex of the model
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Table 9.2 Notional ablation of Cortex after Training Session and 
before Test Session
Each figure displayed is a learning mark assigned to an experimental 
computer run. The learning mark was based on the numbers of Spikes 
appearing in tiie Motor Outputs relevant to the expected Conditioned 
Response, in excess of the numbers of Spikes in the Outputs relevant 
to the Conditioned Response to the discriminated stimulus. This was 
the aggregate of Spikes over the three Instants following the presen­
tation of the last of the Input Patterns of the Cue Sequence.
No. of Neuronal Cues and their expected Responses
Pools notionally
ablated Cue A Cue A Cue B Cue B
Response 1 Response 2 Response 1 Response 2
Control (none 
ablated)
957 1200
1 Neuronal Pool
2 Neuronal Pools
1443
871
0
2237
2659
1225
1112
3 Neuronal Pools
4 Neuronal Pools 
8 Neuronal Pools
540
587
0
2276
0
1287
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either before or after learning. A large number of runs were made 
in which various randomly selected Neuronal Pools were skipped by 
the program, simulating lesions. These varied from a single Pool to one 
quarter the total number of Pools. In some runs the notional lesions 
were made from the beginning of the run and in others they were made 
after the Training Trials, just before the Test Trials.
The strategy in which the notional lesions were made from the begin­
ning of the run was not extensively investigated, since it soon 
became apparent that the procedure of removing Neuronal Pools from 
the beginning of a run merely reduced the effective size of the model. 
Provided the effective input pattern was taken as consisting of only 
those bits of the whole input pattern which corresponded with the 
Neuronal Pools allowed to remain, the system differed in no way from 
the whole mode1.
The effects of notional lesions after Training and before Test was 
investigated more extensively. Figure 9.3 incorporates the results 
of 13 such experimental runs.
The standard of performance in the versions of the model used for 
the runs concerned was less tidy than those reported so far. At this 
time efforts were being made to improve the Inhibition system. These 
efforts were unsuccessful, and this was one of the troubles which
impeded the development of the model and which are reported late in
the thesis. Consequently in these runs there were copious outputs 
in all eight Efferent Fibres. The information presented in Figure
9.2 is based upon a Learning Index calculated for each run. This
Learning Index was produced by summing the effective outputs over the 
three Instants which followed the termination of presentation of the 
Cue Sequence. The effective output was calculated by simple arith­
metic operation on the Spike Frequencies of the Efferent Fibres which 
established which response was dominant. Notwithstanding the necessity 
for these subsidiary procedures there is little doubt that the results 
represent a valid assessment of response of the models. In Table 9.2 
the results in each of the runs concerned is displayed separately and 
it may be seen that notwithstanding permutations of design of the run 
pairing Cue Sequences and IRP's, the notional Conditioned Response of 
the models, as measured by the Learning Index, is always dominant in 
the appropriate Response, and considerable. As in the case of the
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tidier performances of earlier versions, the permutations of presen­
tation remove any possibility that the results could be artefacts or 
chance variation.
In summary it will be seen that the magnitude of the notional Condi­
tioned Response varies considerably, and not necessarily consistently 
with the notional ablation of Neuronal Pools. What is quite apparent 
is that the conditioned response remains reliable with up to 4 Neuronal 
Pools removed, after Training. When 8 Neuronal Pools were notionally 
ablated, and these Neuronal Pools were removed completely at random, 
an appropriate notional Conditioned Response was still obtained.
However, when the 8 Pools removed consisted of a set of four Pools 
and the four Pools representing the 1 complements of those Pools with 
reference to the Input Pattern, no relevant conditioned response was 
obtained. This suggests that at least part of the capacity of the 
model to continue to display learning after notional lesions is to be 
attributed to the redundancy implied in the balanced receptor system.
These results are hardly surprising. The removal of part of the model 
leaves a smaller version operating upon the same principles. The 
random variability of the system remaining depends upon the relation­
ship of the missing pools to the information which would have been 
held in those pools. Although this relationship is necessarily more 
complex than the more obvious implications of removing Pools at the 
beginning of a run, the basic principles are the same.
It may be concluded that the system is of the kind indicated in Lashley's 
Laws. Removal of parts of the model after training does not prevent 
the successful performance of a notional CR but renders it more variable. 
Since only a few runs were made under each condition of ablation, it 
is not surprising that increasing unreliability of response should pro­
duce a complete failure with the removal of a large number of pools.
V Sequential dependence
In view of the emphasis placed upon temporal integration in the intro­
ductory chapters, it was felt desirable to demonstrate that the output 
of the simulations was not the function only of the last pattern of 
the Cue Sequence (of four patterns), and was the result of the whole
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sequence. As now seen, the temporal sequential effect in the model 
is not necessarily to be derived from an inherent sequential attri­
bute of the proposed integrative connections. Differential delays 
in sensory pathways (i.e. Uttley-type delays) would produce a similar 
effect in my model. Nevertheless, the demonstration of temporal 
sequential effects was carried out in versions of the model without 
Uttley-type delays, that is, without specific delays introduced into 
selected pathways.
A large number of experimental runs of the model presented Cue Sequences 
at the Test Trials which differed in various ways from the Cue Sequences 
used in the Training Session. In general the same Input Patterns were 
employed but the Test Cue Sequence differed from the Training Cue 
Sequence either in the number of patterns in the sequence or in the 
order in which they were presented.
In one set of such experimental runs, reported in Figure 9 . 4 ,  in dif­
ferent runs instead of the full Training Cue Sequence of four patterns, 
a sequence of either three, two or even a single pattern from the Cue 
Sequence was used. The versions of the model in which these results 
were obtained were similar to those reported in the preceding Section, 
and a similar Index of Learning was used.
The results may be summarised by saying that the magnitude of the 
Response and its reliability was greater the more closely the Training 
Cue Sequence was reproduced in the Test Cue Sequence. A consistent 
regression curve cannot be seen, and in any case, the derivation of 
such a curve would be of little validity in the circumstances of the 
investigation. It is however clear that the notional conditioned 
response is diminished greatly when in the Test Trial only the last 
pattern or last two patterns of the Training Sequence are presented as 
compared with the response when the complete sequence or three of the 
four patterns are presented.
VI Discussion of initial simulations
A. Demonstration of basic attributes of the model
The simulations which have been reported in this and the preceding 
chapters showed a number of deficiencies and disclosed difficulties
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The performance of which they were capable was very simple. This is 
the result of trying to simulate a system resembling in principle 
the physiological characteristics of neural tissue, even in a simpli­
fied manner. Many aspects of neural processing which do not arise 
in a formalised model become the occasion for difficult decisions and 
solutions. For example, the control of excitation and inhibition and 
their precise function in the nervous system are only poorly under­
stood at the present time, and there is therefore no clear direction 
towards which the system can be guided.
In spite of these drawbacks, the simulations confirmed the essential 
properties attributed to the theory in its verbal form. These prop­
erties may be considered in relation to earlier discussions of the 
problems with which systems of neural integration must eventually 
deal.
(i) Neural templates. The simulation has demonstrated that a system 
of the kind proposed could register the pattern of excitation in both 
sensory and motor fibres in the form of extended spatial templates 
encompassing both aspects of nervous activity. A large number of 
such templates could be held in the system at one time in the form of 
integrative neuronal connections. It was shown that such templates 
would be differentially reactivated by subsequent inputs, the state of 
excitation of each of the templates being dependent upon the extent
to which the current pattern of afferentation matches each template.
The discriminative capacity of the system was effective at the level 
of one complementary-pair of bits difference in sequences of four con­
secutive patterns each having 16 pairs of complementary bits.
(ii) Temporal sequence. It was shown that a temporal sequence of 
patterns is more effective than a single pattern in reactivating the 
system of neuronal templates. This demonstrates that, aside from the 
appearance of special effects in relation to inputs of a special 
kind, i.e. innate releasing patterns, the system acts generally as a 
Conditional probability machine, that is, its operation is modified 
at each step by what has happened at the preceding step. The special 
effects which appear when a Motor Response is elicited, i.e. the 
conditioning response, are not in themselves the mediators of learning 
in the system; they are events which enable the underlying process
to be observed in motor behaviour. The temporal sequential aspects of 
the system are relevant to the general position urged in the introduc­
tory chapters that behaviour is implemented by an extended sensori-motor
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template system which is capable also of temporal sequential inte­
gration.
(iii) Innate and Learned behaviour. The model provides a structural 
organisation which shows how innately determined neuronal connections 
could interact with those formed as the result of individual experi­
ence .
(iv) Classical conditioning paradigm. The model showed motor 
behaviour analogical to that observed in classical conditioning experi­
ments. Notional conditioned responses appeared after training even 
when Cue Sequences, which were indifferent prior to training, were 
presented without the notional UCS (IRP), i.e. in unreinforced trials.
In tests in which two notional reflexes were conditioned in the same 
run, the conditioned responses discriminated between two notional CS.
(See also next Section). In other respects the behaviour of the 
model resembled the conditioned response which appears in animals, 
although many aspects of conditioning, e.g. partial reinforcement, 
were not tested for. It may perhaps be mentioned that one of the 
reasons for not testing the model further in such respects were the 
limitations on the length of computer runs with reasonable turn-round.
The number of Trials necessary to investigate such effects would have 
been prohibitively large, even if a run of sufficient length had been 
appropriate to a model having the number of Integrating Neurons 
provided.
Insofar as the behaviour of the model may be judged to represent the 
characteristics of classical conditioning in animals, one or two 
points may be noted.
The first is that the model exhibits a very clear distinction between 
the UCR and the CR. The UCR occurs primarily as the direct response 
of the genetically determined network. The CR does not involve the 
genetically-determined network at all, but is the indirectly induced 
response in the Learned Records.
In the model, as compared with that of, say, Pringle (1951) that 
part of the neural apparatus which might be compared to the reflex 
concept in Conditioning Theory, remains unaffected by experience. The 
model does not constitute a substitution theory in the sense that the 
CS, substituting for the UCS, now acts through the reflex apparatus.
The model proposes a separate apparatus which consists entirely of 
traces laid down in experience. In the model this apparatus is shown
223
as structurally separate from the apparatus mediating genetically- 
determined response. This complete structural separation is probably 
an oversimplification. More probably there would be evolutionary 
specialisation in which one structure specialised in Learned traces, 
the other in innate mediations. Still the essential idea remains 
that tlie two are functionally separate. It is in the separate appara­
tus mediating traces laid down in individual experience that the 
response, corresponding to the CR of classical conditioning, is 
initiated.
A second point concerns aberrations and lack of tidiness in the out­
puts of some of those versions representing something akin to a double 
classical conditioning, for example, that shown in Figure 9.1. The 
curve in that Figure demonstrates a very clear notional CR of Action B 
to Cue B in the first Test Trial, and a clear CR of Action A to Cue A
in the second Test Trial. In the third Test Trial there is a clear
CR in Action B to the presentation of Cue B, but there is also an unex­
plained rise in Action A. Outputs of this kind are, it is suggested, 
not to be considered as demonstrating déficiences in the model, but 
rather characteristics of the system which may, or may not, be analogi­
cal to characteristics of nervous systems.
In the case in point it will be recalled that the aberrations were 
attributed to the action of the feed-back "conditioned-arousal" 
system. However this only exaggerated tendencies in the system which 
must have been present. In this context it may be borne in mind that 
although the performance of the simulations is simple in the sense that 
it involves only one or two outputs, so is the behaviour of the animal
as measured in a classical conditioning situation. In fact the intro­
duction of two Unconditioned Responses and two different Conditioned 
Stimuli to operate on those responses is rare in the laboratory, and 
the resulting performance is difficult to analyse. That the operation 
of the system simulated here may not be unlike that of an actual nervous 
system does not seem implausible in view of the results of Varga and 
Pressman and Lelord (see Konorski, 1967, p.293 et seq.). These workers 
used two "relatively neutral" unconditioned responses and two CS. Each 
of these CS established its own CR. However, when presented separately 
each CS produced in addition to its own CR occasionally the CR associated 
with the other. These responses are analysed by Konorski in terms of 
pseudo-conditioning and backwards conditioning, in terms which would apply 
to the simulations.
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(v) Independence of external assessment of events. "Reinforcement" 
may be used without theoretical commitment to refer to an event 
which increases the frequency or strengthens the kind of behaviour 
which is associated with it. The point was made earlier that many 
simulations of neurological models have relied upon an external ref­
erence or reinforcement line which signals to the model whether its 
responses have been judged as correct or incorrect. In my model the 
assessment of the character of the notional stimuli and the response 
to them is determined entirely by the internal structure and function 
of the system.
(vi) Behaviour and arousal; two modes of response to events. It may 
be noted that the presence of an internal criterion of that character 
of events is evidenced in the simulation in two ways: behaviour and 
arousal. With regard to arousal the point has been made that, in 
spite of its inadequacies, the system did enable the model to vary the 
number of Integrating Neurons incorporated into its Neural record of 
events according to the assessment made in relation to this internal 
criterion. This capacity could be seen in a straightforward sense in 
the effect of the presentation of an IRP on the Motor Response curves. 
(Although the system is referred to as an "arousal", this term is used 
for convenience of reference only).
It was also shown that the arousal system could vary the level of 
activity, both in retrieval and registration, according to its notional 
conditioned response, that is, in anticipation of actual events. How­
ever, the hope to show that it could do this without undermining its 
basic processes of neural integration was only partially successful.
There were some indications that the response of the arousal system was 
not always entirely appropriate to the behavioural response and pro­
duced distortions, e.g. in the third Test Trial shown in Figure 9.1. 
Nevertheless, as may be seen in the first two Test Trials of this run, 
the basic operation of the concept was demonstrated.
There were a number of clues to the causes of the disturbances of func­
tion which were exaggerated when it was attempted to increase the 
effectiveness of the system. One was the inappropriateness of variations 
of a diffuse excitation parameter which had the effect of magnifiying 
irrelevant responses. Another was the explosive feed-back implications 
of the methods employed. Because these were embarassments to the obtain­
ing of tidy performance does not necessarily mean that they are not
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aspects of real nervous systems (see next sections).
It seems an important step in relating attentional mechanisms to 
theories of neural integration that it can be shown that levels of 
activity of retrieval and registration may be varied during neural 
processing. This applies not merely to concepts of general states 
of activation, as in sleep and wakefulness, but also in connection 
with directed attention. The present approach was outlined in 
Chapters 2 and 3, where selective attention was referred to as a 
combination of temporal and sensori-motor integration in conjunction 
with a variation of the weighting applied to parts of the proposed 
extended template system. Temporal integration and sensori-motor 
co-ordination co-operates with such a differential weighting. For 
example, if the signals reaching the auditory part of the template 
indicate (by the matching of templates already present in the ner­
vous system) that important information may accompany the source of 
sound, then the head and eyes will turn in that direction: it is 
suggested that visual processing would then be highly activated not 
only in the optical mechanisms such as contraction of pupil, con­
vergence and focussing, but also in the neural template dealing 
with visual signals.
Although it seems important to establish the principle of the possible 
variation of levels of activity in the system, it is not suggested 
that the control need take the form simulated, that is, of a simple 
variation of the parameters of the Spike Frequencies. On the con­
trary, difficulties in fact arising from the arousal aspects of 
excitation and inhibition led to a considerable modification of con­
cepts of the mechanisms by which levels of activity are modified in 
the system. These will be related in due course.
(vii) Anticipatory discharges. In Chapter 3 the possible relation­
ship of anticipation to two aspects of behaviour was discussed: one 
was the anticipatory motor image as the source of motor action; the 
other was the possible function of anticipatory images as test crit­
eria in feed-back systems of the kind envisaged in Pribram's TOTE 
paradigm. It was therefore felt to be important to demonstrate that 
such anticipatory images would arise in the system of neural inte­
gration.
The occurrence of a possible neural substrate for such images was 
clearly demonstrated in the simulations in a number of ways.
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The rise in the curves representing Motor Response is evidence that 
when a familiar sequence is repeated there is a rise in the Excita­
tion of those Linked Constellations about to be stimulated by the 
next pattern in the sequence. This was also confirmed by printouts 
showing the state of the system. This rise demonstrated an actual 
temporal anticipation of events. However, for the purposes mentioned 
it is not necessary that the indication given of future events should 
temporally precede the customary times of occurrence of those events.
It is sufficient for the system to provide a logical anticipation of 
events which have previously followed those which have occurred on 
the current occasion. The notional CR of the model, as does the 
actual CR in the animal, gives a clear indication that within the 
nervous system such a logical anticipation is present, since the CR 
occurs in the absence of the UCS. As already mentioned, in my model 
the CR is an indicator of this anticipatory process rather than the 
instrument of its mediation.
With regard to the use of the anticipatory aspects of the system to 
monitor its own behaviour (i.e. the relating to Pribram's TOTE con­
cept) it seemed possible that changes in the,level of the anticipatory 
Discharges might be used to inform the system as to the probable out­
come of its actions. Briefly, if Excitation were rising in the output 
relevant to the CR then the model must be "on the right scent". If it 
were falling, then something was wrong.
These possibilities were pursued in attempts to extend the model to 
provide more ambitious explanations of behaviour. In the event they 
offered greater difficulty of implementation than expected. They will 
be discussed further in connections with later versions of the model.
B . Some difficulties and drawbacks
These will only be mentioned briefly here, since they will be referred 
to again in conjunction with the action taken later to remedy them.
Problems in the simulation revolved around the control of the levels 
of variables representing the physiological aspects of the system, 
i.e. inhibition and excitation. In the later versions of the model 
fluctuation of the variables tended to swamp the differential responses 
of the model. These difficulties extended into the versions of the 
model to be reported later, and were only understood late in the devel­
opment of the model.
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At this point it may be sufficient to indicate two sources of these 
difficulties :
(a) Inhibition and Excitation were represented as
being independent neuronal processes: i.e. Inhibition did not can­
cel out Excitation. In the nervous systems of animals it may be 
assumed that although inhibition and excitation act at different 
neuronal sites, they interact in the membrane in the actual spike 
function. Yet it is inadequate to represent the interaction as a 
simple cancellation; that would ignore the facts of temporal and 
spatial integration of excitatory events in the initiation of action 
potentials. For this and other reasons mentioned earlier, rather 
arbitrary assumptions were incorporated in the model aimed at retain­
ing one's options. The alternative to the choice made, that is, 
cancelling out Inhibition also seemed inadequate, since it did not 
allow for the accumulation of excitatory and inhibitory transmitters 
as a carry over from Instant to Instant of the simulation, nor for 
a possible post-inhibitory excitatory rebound, as proposed by a num­
ber of authors, notably Andersen (1974). The difficulties could 
accordingly be artefactual in the model and due to an inadequate rep­
resentation of neuronal processes. On the other hand there is the 
possibility that the difficulties encoutered in the model represent 
actual difficulties which the nervous system has had to remedy. 
Experience in the later development of the model suggests that this 
latter alternative is at least possible.
(b) It may be thought that it would be possible to solve the problem 
by reducing the excitation level of a given cell by some fixed pro­
portion at each Instant. This was in fact the method used, and it 
did work in the sense that given short periods of operation it gave 
sufficiently adequate control to produce the results which have been 
presented. What was not recognised in the early stages was that what­
ever proportion of Excitation is removed from the system at each 
Instant, so long as some remains as a carry over to the next Instant, 
that carry over must build up and eventually swamp the system, given 
continuous, that is, uninterrupted operation. On the other hand, if 
there were no carry over there would be no temporal sequential build 
up of Excitation and the temporal sequential aspects of the system 
would be negated.
(c) The explosive implications of feed-back arousal assumptions has 
already been mentioned. With continuous operation of the system a
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feed-back arousal would inevitably lead to the eventual magnification 
of fluctuations of output and the corruption of processing.
In support of the work presented in this thesis, it may be considered 
that the difficulties and deficiencies in the simulation emphasise the 
desirability of simulating models of a physiological rather than a 
formal logical character, even if the simulation of physiology is 
rather crude. The simulation disclosed problems relating to levels 
of Excitation and Inhibition not contemplated at the outset. The 
attempt to devise a working system led to concepts of the control of 
these variables, which, even if they prove to be mistaken, demonstrate 
the capacity of simulation to highlight problems which may otherwise 
be generally overlooked.
C . Simulation of Linked Constellations mediated by orthodox synapses 
As mentioned in Chapter 7, Section III, a separate simulation demon­
strated the possibility of mediating Linked Constellations by ortho­
dox formal synaptic connections. Since that simulation utilised 
methods of control of the physiological variables which had not yet 
been developed in the initial set of simulations run in the Atlas 
computer , it will be reported later.
D . Summary of discussion on the results of the initial simulations 
Notwithstanding the difficulties referred to, the simulations were 
able to confirm that the theory of neural integration outlined earlier 
would in practice possess the general properties claimed for it.
The important aspects of the theoretical model demonstrated were the 
practicability of the neural template idea, together with the demon­
stration of a notional response analogous to the conditioned response 
in a classical conditioning experiment. The simulations demonstrated 
that the performance of the model was not due to artefact or chance.
It was shown that an anticipatory rise in the Excitation of Linked 
Constellations occurred when a familiar sequence of inputs was repeated. 
The model was able to identify inputs and to "recognise" them in the 
sense of relating them to earlier presentations of the same input. The 
model also demonstrated a possible functional relationship between 
genetic programming of behaviour and learning from experience.
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CHAPTER 10
DISCUSSION PRELIMINARY TO PRESENTATION OF LATER VERSIONS OF THE
MODEL
I Introduction
At this point some preliminary remarks may assist the reader to 
orient to the rather changed approach of the later simulations of 
the model. Moreover, having considered a simulation of the basic 
theory of neural integration it is possible to comment futher upon 
a number of other solutions in the literature.
II A notional brain
The computer simulations described so far may be considered to bear 
some resemblance to nervous systems. Nevertheless they fail to 
demonstrate many attributes which seem fundamental to animals with 
brains. In particular they cannot deal with their notional environ­
ment in any effective way. Putting this another way, the simulations 
represent classical conditioning rather than instrumental condition­
ing situations. The model as simulated is both structurally and 
functionally too simplistic to represent a brain: it has no appara­
tus by which it could alter the contingencies of its environment.
Another way in which the model fails to represent a brain is its 
neglect of functional and structural features which research has shown 
to be important, e.g. the limbic system and motivational factors.
Of course an attempt to model a brain must be taken in the context of 
an explanatory model and of a computer simulation. The aim is to 
model the overall capacity rather than its detail. In many cases a 
rather simple solution to a problem will be adopted, even though there 
is evidence that it is pretty far from the truth, simply because to 
model that function realistically would take one too far from the main 
purpose.
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A difficulty in attempting a more realistic model of a brain may 
be expressed in the question: what brain? Many of the capacities 
of the brain which most interest us only appear in a definite form 
in the case of the higher animals. Some of them only in Man. An 
attempt to simplify the model by trying to represent the simplest 
of nervous systems directly would fail to deal with this problem. 
One can however to some extent resolve the difficulty by modelling 
a notional brain, that is a brain which could not really exist but 
which represents some of the capacities which real brains possess. 
It would be immeasurably more simple than any real brain. Never­
theless it might exhibit explanatory principles in a form in 
which the essentials rather than the complexities are reproduced.
In the context of the present effort, the main aim would be to show 
how an overall sensori-motor integration might be achieved.
Ill Some continuing aims
One aim of endeavouring to extend the model so as to bring within 
its compass a wider concept of behaviour is as a demonstration of 
the explanatory potential of the basic theory of neural integration. 
Clearly, the greater the capacity of the system to mediate life-like 
behaviour then the greater the plausibility of the theory as an 
account of neural integration. This would apply whether the ways in 
which such behaviour is achieved bear much resemblance to the ways 
in which it is achieved in the animal or not.
One is also interested in developing a convincing model of the brain. 
For example, one wishes to see to what extent a sensori-motor temporal- 
sequential integration would explain brain function. At another level 
one may wish to explore hypotheses in general circulation and to follow 
up those suggested by the model itself.
In general one may consider the attempts at extended simulations as 
utilising a tool, the computer, to develop one's thoughts concerning 
brain function in a definite and directed fashion. A simulation pro­
vides a unique form of understanding. It is hoped that the reported 
attempts to develop simulations in a computer may take the effective 
representation of brain function a step forward.
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IV Ad hoc solutions and general principles
To bring a model closer to the representation of behaviour, it is 
necessary to adopt mechanisms of action which are able to solve the 
notional problems of environmental choice. These mechanisms are 
not inherent in any obvious sense in the theory of neural integra­
tion. For example, there is the manner in which the model is 
motivated towards its goal, the manner in which responses arise, and 
the manner in which they are selected and witheld.
There is bound to be a certain ad hoc character in the means chosen 
to implement behaviour in a model. This is justified on the basis 
that in the nervous system mechanisms have evolved as the result of 
interaction of the organism with its enviornment, that is, that 
they reflect ad hoc solutions taken by evolution. Of course, simu­
lations cannot hope to imitate evolution. They merely hope to 
approximate in a general way to the kind of mechanism which has 
developed. In that sense the simulations represent a general inter­
pretation of behavioural mechanism rather than a set of hypotheses 
of actual neural function.
There is however a sense in which the solutions taken by evolution 
are not ad hoc. The mechanisms of living things reflect the poten­
tiality of living matter. This is expressed in the model in two ways. 
One is by using a particular theory of neural integration to implement 
the mechanisms. The other is by attempting not merely to deal with 
isolated problems but to look for solutions which may have some 
generality.
The problem of modelling a notional brain may be considered from two 
aspects. First there are the problems of the nature of specific 
mechanisms mediating learning, perception, selective motor action and 
so forth. Second, there is the problem of the integration of these 
activities into a co-ordinated whole.
Both aspects are closely related and are dependent upon the way 
neurons are organised. Evolutionary development over millions of 
years has operated at all levels. At the level of the neuron, there 
are molecular mechanisms which impart to neural tissue its power to 
adapt and respond. In turn these molecular mechanisms are integrated 
into specific neural mechanisms of behaviour and perception. At the
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level of the unity of the animal these mechanisms are themselves 
integrated to perform what Konorski (1967) calls the "Integrative 
Activity of the Brain" and Hebb (1949) "The Organisation of 
Behaviour".
The rationale of the neurological model presented here is that all 
three levels of integration express a single principle. This 
principle has been expounded at some length. It may be summarised 
as the capacity of the elementary particles of living matter to 
respond to the environment by forming a selective association. Each 
such association represents a particular instantaneous state of the 
environment as signalled by the energy configuration falling upon 
the particles at that instant. The development of multi-cellular 
organisms is seen as an expression of the principle. Within such 
organisms a certain modicum of the unity of the single-celled 
organism is preserved by such selective associations. In animals 
with complex nervous systems the principle is suggested to find ex­
pression in the formation of Linked Constellations. These intimate 
associations of selected neurons provide unified structures within 
the system which represent the unity of the organism at the moment 
they are formed.
The problem which confronts the designer of a brain model is two­
fold: "The premise underlying the "integrative" or "synthetic" 
approach . . .  is that ultimate understanding of the living organism 
lies not only in knowing its component parts, but that a unique and 
fundamental task in biology is to determine how the many separate 
parts or processes are integrated into the organism as a whole". 
(Mason, 1975).
V Some other models revisited
At this point it may be useful to make some further mention of other 
models in the literature, which were cursorily mentioned earlier.
A. Anatomically inspired models
Generally no model of neural integration has been simulated to repre­
sent an overall brain model in which the different functions of parts 
of a nervous system are represented and their overall integration 
explored. However, some models have utilised a principle of neural
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integration to represent particular aspects of the brain in a separate 
model. For example, various models utilising different applications 
of the feed-back weighting principle have been used to explain:
(i) pattern recognition (e.g. Rosenblatt, 1958a, 1958b, I960; Selfridge,
1958); (ii) The structure and function of the cerebellum (Marr, 1969;
Albus, 1971); (iii) selection of motor response (Kilmer and Olinski,
1974); (iv) temporal sequence (Stanley and Kilmer, 1975); (v) setting
modes of behaviour (Kilmer, McCulloch, Blum, Craighill and Peterson, 
1968) .
It is no criticism of these models, in respect of the purpose for 
which they were framed, to suggest that they do not demonstrate how 
the overall activities of the brain might be co-ordinated. Of course, 
by implication they suggest that the problem of overall integration 
is merely a higher step of the integration shown in the separate models. 
That implication is not, however, a simulation. The point is made in 
order to clarify the main aim of the simulations which follow, which 
is to simulate the manner in which different aspects of neural process 
integrate different aspects of behaviour.
One of the aims of many of the models which have been mentioned is to 
interpret the neuro-anatomy of some particular part of the brain in 
terms of some particular integrative model. To illustrate what has 
been achieved in this direction, two examples will be considered.
Kilmer et alia (1968) examined the available anatomical and histolig- 
ical data relating to the Reticular Formation. They interpreted this 
data on the analogy drawn by Scheibel and Scheibel (1962, 1967) as 
a stack of poker chips. Each disc-like anatomical unit is then con­
sidered to be a modular logic unit. The model converges upon a partic­
ular disc, as representing the best selection from input.
This selection of discs acts, it is proposed, to determine the mode 
of behaviour of the animal. "Its primary job is to commit the organism 
to one or another of about 16 gross modes of behaviour - i.e. to run, 
fight, sleep, speak, as a function of the nerve impulses that have 
played on it during the last fraction of a second, and also to send 
out control directives to the other more specialised nerve centres so 
that in turn they can behave in an integrated fashion".
The psychological value of this principle is not to be doubted. The
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model has been cited because it demonstrates, in relation to one 
particular anatomical region, one possible approach to the overall 
integrative activities of the brain. In effect, this approach is 
an hierarchical one. There is a controller which sets "the mode" 
within which separate activities can be integrated.
The computational sophistication of the model is extremely powerful.
It shows a practical, if exceedingly complex, manner in which bund­
lings of a large number of inputs may be rearranged to select the 
sixteen (sic) best groupings, as a result of feed-back from results.
Although not explicitly spelled out, the model implies a solution 
to the problem of overall co-ordination. At the top of the hierarchy 
the RF* (the conceptual Reticular Formation) selects a mode. Presuma­
bly the control directives supposed to be issued by the selected module 
in turn select basic input conditions for a similar computational unit 
elswhere, whose function is to apply the mode to the particular 
circumstances of the moment. What is not demonstrated in the model is 
how this co-ordination would actually work. It is not clear how an 
effective strategy would develop, and how it would be organised. Does 
the "speak" mode merely switch to a particular computational unit 
handling speech? In which case, how is the mode of speech, e.g. con­
ciliatory, aggressive, determined? Or are the control directives con­
cerned with the latter aspect, that is, do they control parameters of 
the functions, so as to determine that speech is agressive or 
conciliatory?
At a purely practical level it is not clear what happens. It is con­
ceivable that one of about sixteen, or even for that matter, sixteen 
hundred, modes might be selected in the manner proposed. At the next 
lower stage of the hierarchy, either a selection of motor responses 
is fixed in relation to each RF* disc, or a combination of lower level 
responses is subject to further computation. If the former, then the 
behavioural repertoire would be too inelastic to represent behaviour.
If the latter, then it is not clear upon what inputs the weightings 
would operate upon at that level and what criterion of success the 
weightings would use. Would it be the same criterion as used by the 
RF*? In which case the computational conjunctions are enormously 
increased numerically.
As has been said, these criticisms do not fall upon the model for the
235
main purposes for which it was constructed. Such models aim at 
showing that the neuro-anatomy of particular regions could perform 
certain computational functions, and demonstrate that such a com­
putation, in this case one of considerable psychological importance, 
could be achieved. Nevertheless, the function of the model as 
representing a particular brain function, must remain the analysis 
of a number of input lines and the derivation of an output. In 
order that a model may truly represent the function of a portion of 
the brain, it seems necessary to show how the inputs to that region 
and the output from that region fit into the overall pattern of 
inputs and outputs across the brain. Otherwise, we are left with a 
number of parts to fit together.
The principle of co-ordination suggested by Kilmer et alia's (1968) 
model may be compared with the approach in the ensuing simulations.
In those simulations, the individual computing power of the parts is 
developed to a far less degree of sophistication than in Kilmer et 
alia's model. What is aimed at is an overall co-ordination of func­
tion in which the different aspects of behaviour - instrumental 
activity, consummatory activity, protective activity, the maintenance 
of metabolic and humoral conditions, - are themselves simulated in 
relation to a notional environment. The overall co-ordination is 
achieved by the principle of an extended neural template, the Linked 
Constellation. Thus the two sets of models (those of Kilmer and his 
group, and my models) demonstrate two approaches to neural integration. 
In particular they represent two conceptions of hierarchy. In the 
Kilmer model, the hierarchy is of a controller and controlled units.
In my models, the hierarchy is rather that observed by Tinbergen 
(1951), a progressive targeting of behaviour, each step in the hier­
archy being a comprehensive co-ordination. Of course, that is the 
aim of Kilmer et alia's model of the RF. The comparison is between 
the different ways of achieving the same end, co-ordinated behaviour.
Some of the answers to the questions raised with regard to the rela­
tionship between the RF* model and the subordinate computational systems 
controlled by it, may have been in mind in Kilmer and Olinski's model of 
the Hippocampus (1974), as supplemented by a model of temporal sequence 
by Stanley and Kilmer (1975). In a separate paper Kilmer (1975) reviews 
the anatomical and functional research concerning the Hippocampus.
Kilmer and Olinski interpret the particular neural arrangements of the
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Hippocampus as an iterative feed-back weighting adjustor, similar 
in principle to those described. Each Hippocampal pyramid is seen 
as an integrator, registering a particular permutation of input 
lines, and enabling tlieir adjustment on principles similar to those 
laid down in Se If ridge's Pandemonium and Rosenblatt's perceptron. 
Naturally this brief description does not do justice to either the 
computational ingenuity, nor to the correspondence drawn between 
the known inputs to the Hippocampus and the function performed by 
the model. The model computes an output based upon a sequence 
rather than an individual input pattern.
The implementation of the model is by means of canonical equations 
rather than neuronal in concept. For example, the temporal sequen­
tial aspects are simulated by the inclusion of a "Markovian factor".
"Vb interpret this term (p^(q)) to represent an intracellular or 
multineuronal process whereby sequential response habits are taken.
The tendency of neural tissue to take such habits is not contested, 
though the mechanisms remain unknown. Our purpose is to obtain an 
estimate of a Markovian predictor term for our model . . ." For a 
criticism of the application of the Markovian model to behaviour the 
reader is referred to Mackintosh (1974, p.13). To some extent this 
defect is remedied by the model produced by Stanley and Kilmer (19 75) . 
The latter model is too complex to be described here. It also 
relates to the Hippocampal region. By a complex selection mechanism 
involving impulses travelling along parallel transmission lines, 
temporal sequential conjunctions are represented. The model has a 
rhythmic aspect which is apposite to any explanation of the Hippocam­
pus, in view of the importance of that region as the origin of the 
Theta Rhythm (Landfield, 1976).
To return to Kilmer and Olinski's (1974) model, although the function 
of the model is motor, the output of the model remains undefined as to 
its precise effects of the environment. The action of the Hippocampus 
is controlled by a notional "reinforcement line". It is trained by 
rewarding some responses and not others by an external decision. In 
other ways as a model demonstrating the contribution of the Hippocam­
pus to behaviour it lacks the representation of the differing charac­
ter of different aspects of behaviour as well as the probable complexity 
of the contribution which the Hippocampus makes.
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As Kilmer himself points out (Kilmer, 19 75) a number of complex 
functions have been attributed to the Hippocampus. These include 
attention, habituation, inhibitory control, arousal and movement, 
initiation of voluntary movement, match and mismatch between mem­
ory store and current input. Kilmer cites Gloor as referring lim­
bic structures to experienced emotion. As Mogenson and Phillips 
propose "the noradrenaline and dopamine pathways are at the interface 
between neural systems concerned with the "intention to respond" and 
those concerned with "motor control" . . . the ascending dorsal NA
bundle projects profusely to the cerbral cortex and Hippocampus by 
a number of routes". It is of course, implicit in Kilmer and Olinski's 
model that the inputs themselves signal these functions. As has 
earlier been stated, the point made here is not intended as a critism 
of the models cited in respect of their aims, but rather to show that 
they are unable to tackle the overall integration of differentiated 
function except in the abstract sense in which functions do not 
differ from each other but are merely sets of inputs and outputs.
It is perhaps permissible to interpolate here a few remarks in support 
of the present simulations as representations of the neuro-anatomy 
of the brain. The models of Kilmer and his associates are closely 
related to the neuro-anatomy of particular brain regions. However, 
their interpretations are by no means the only ones possible. For 
example. Olds' motivational model, cited in Chapter 4, also closely 
follows the known anatomical configuration of the Hippocampus, yet it 
is a very different model from that of Kilmer and Olinski. In the 
present simulations the aim has been towards an anatomical correspond­
ence of a broader kind. It would be possible to relate parts of the 
models to be presented here to different anatomical regions, i.e.
Septum, Hippocampus, Amygdala and Dentate Gyrus, Putamen, Globus Palli- 
dus and so forth. In fact I have succumbed frequently to the temptat- 
tion to do so. However, it would appear that at the present state of 
knowledge to allocate functions and interpret working in this way 
would be unduly speculative. What has been attempted in the simula­
tions to be reported is the representation of function, e.g. motivational 
drive, energisation of innate response, motor selection, the relationship 
between cons ummatory and appetitive mechanisms, and so forth, by neural 
implementations which are, it is hoped, similar to the general kinds 
of cytological and anatomical arrangements seen in terms, for example, 
of specific transmitters. It is not suggested that these arrangements
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directly resemble the actual neural tissue, but rather that it 
approaches a realistic representation.
B . A distributed memory solution: the neural hologram 
In giving some indication of the present state of the art consider­
able attention has been paid to those solutions which in general 
are at the other end of the spectrum to that proposed here, that is, 
to hierarchical and iterative feed-back models. Before proceeding 
to develop the present model further, one should perhaps give some 
further attention to a proposed solution which is a diffuse distrib­
uted model, the neural hologram.
The development of the hologram as a physical principle led to the 
formulation of a number of neurological models based on the principle 
(e.g. van Heerden, 1963; Willshaw, Buneman and Longuet Higgins, 1969). 
Pribram(1971) uses the hologram principle in the setting of a synthesis 
of existing knowledge on brain function. His work is closely 
associated with the simulation by Spinelli (19 70).
Pribram's proposals, insofar as they specify a model of neural inte­
gration, may be summarised under three heads:
(1) He proposes that the function of neurons is expressed in two 
processes rather than a single one, that is the propagation of spikes 
usually ascribed to neurons. The second process consists of changes 
in the "slow potential micro-structure". It is through these that he 
considers that neurons communicate with each other in the felt work 
of the cortex. In this my model is close to Pribram's view of neural 
function. Although I have been at pains to specify my model in terms 
of orthodox synaptic connection^, I have hinted that the intimate mode 
of communication between neurons of a Linked Constellation would prob­
ably be mediated by some non-synaptic or at least some more subtle 
mode of communication.
(2) Pribram carries forward the two process idea by distinguishing the 
"state" from the "operator on the state". This conceptualisation was 
not present in my model initially, but it may be seen to be implied
in later developments. In my model it became necessary to introduce 
rhythmic gate mechanisms. These slice up the inputs into discrete 
temporal frames cxnd give intermediate periods of silence in which the 
response of the integrative system can develop. In my model the input 
function is mediated by what were termed morphological connections.
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whilst during the period on input silence it is the Integrative 
Connections which mediate the Linked Constellation function. 
Analogically, the input phase may be seen as creating the "state" 
and the silent phase, "the operator upon it". There are therefore 
considerable affinities between Pribram's formulation and that 
developed in this thesis.
Pribram considers the two-process mechanism in terms of his well 
known TOTE hypothesis. A number of points of interest arise in 
that connection which are not directly related to the neural holo­
gram model. These will be discussed in a subsequent section of 
this chapter.
(3) Pribram proposes that the junctional microstructure gives rise to 
a neural hologram which stores the total configuration of sensory 
and other events, in the same way as the holographic photographic 
process stores the total information concerning the visual scene in 
a distributed form across the whole negative. It will be immediately 
apparent that this view coincides with that underlying the model 
developed here in the sense of the comprehensive nature of the record 
of information. It differs fundamentally in mechanism, because my 
model depends upon the precise spatial location of information, i.e. it 
is a spatial template, whereas the neural hologram is at the other 
extreme, information is distributed so that one can say that all the 
information is at one spatial point, and at the same time at every 
other point.
Pribram stresses this aspect. "The hypothesis is based on the premise 
that neural representations are not photographic but are composed not 
only by an initial set of feature filters but by a special class of 
transformations which have considerable formal resemblance to an opti­
cal image reconstruction process devised by mathematicians and engineers 
This optical process, called holography, uses interference patterns". 
(Pribram, 1971, p.141).
Pribram's proposals can be understood by reference to a neural imple­
mentation simulated by Spinelli (1970). The design incorporates all 
three of Pribram's concepts; junctional microstructure, nerve-impulse 
input and output; match and mismatch. The neural hologram works as 
follows. "An input fibre enters the cortex and connects itself to a 
receiving cell; this cell in turn gives rise to many branches that 
connect themselves to a number of interneurons . . . the interneurons
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Figure 10.1 (reproduced from Pribram,1971) Spinelli*s 
OCCAM. A neural implementation of the hologram 
concept, (spinelli,1970)
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in turn connect themselves to the dendritic ramifications of a 
further cell. This last cell generates an axon which leaves the 
cortex and is therefore part of the output system . . . Both the 
input cell and the output cell generate collaterals which con­
nect themselves to a third cell called the Match cell. The Match 
cell in turn generates an axon which is also part of the efferent 
system". (Figure 10.1).
Spinelli himself appreciates that the arragements proposed could 
only learn a single pattern. His solution of this problem is to 
assume that different "words of addressible memory", that is, the 
ladder structures described, would respond differentially to dif­
ferent patterns of input. Therefore for each pattern one such 
structure responds more than the others and inhibits them (after 
Milner's modification of the Hebb model). Therefore only one or 
a few such structures learn each pattern.
Whilst one cannot but admire the ingenuity with which a hologram 
is reproduced in neural terms, one cannot help thinking that 
the assumptions just outlined detract considerably from advantages 
of the hologrammatic idea as an explanation of brain function. If 
each pattern is to be restricted to one or a few of the ladder 
structures, then the registration of the patterns is no longer dis­
tributed generally. Rather, the neural hologram is simply a means 
of holding a pattern at a localised region of the nervous system.
The system then approximates in effect to a convergent model.
Konorski's Gnostic Units are replaced by a ladder mechanism.
Spinelli's simulation successfully demonstrated that when a wave­
form is input to a collection of the structures and is repeated 
some 50 times, then a further application of the wave-form produces 
a response in that model of the wave-form. Moreover a second wave­
form can then be learned. "Upon presentation of parts of wave-form 
number 1 or wave-form number 2, Occam retrieves the remainder of 
the wave-form appropriately".
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Section III (a), Spinelli proposed that 
motivational and reinforcement could be represented. These aspects 
of the model were not, however, simulated.
SpineIll's simulation serves to demonstrate some of the inherent
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limitations of the neural hologram concept. His model demonstrates 
that neurons can effectively act as mediators of neural holograms.
It also demonstrates that the storage of more than one pattern in­
volves departing from the hologram concept. Certainly one of the 
major conceptual difficulties in applying the hologram or any other 
interference pattern concept (e.g. Beurle, 1956; Lashley, 1942) is 
in solving the problem of multiple representation of patterns.
Essentially the hologram stores information concerning an entire 
configuration by recording in every location of the holographic 
record the interference pattern resulting from the unique configura­
tion. The registration requires to be able to reproduce both ampli­
tude and phase. The neural hologram must thereforehold considerable 
information at adjacent points. In Spinelli's implementation this 
is held by the strength of relative connections in a ladder formation. 
To store more than one pattern holographically requires that the 
points recording one set of interference patterns be distinguished 
from the points recording another. Spinelli solved this problem in 
the manner described, by making the registration apparatus differen­
tially sensitive to different patterns. Put in this way, the 
difficulty of principle can be seen. An apparatus which is differen­
tially sensitive to different patterns is already a registration 
system, and the holographic aspects are subsidiary.
Since the holographic explanation receives much support in contem­
porary literature (see for example, Landfield, 1976), and is a 
distributed memory model which is supported by many of the conceptual 
arguments used to support my model, some further points may be made.
There is the question of the topological mapping in the nervous system. 
As considered in some detail in Chapter 5, this topological mapping 
is everywhere evident. Palay (1975) has emphasised the precision with 
which the nervous system is organised, "the retention of topographic 
order as the synaptic fields were followed from level to level became 
more and more impressive".
Chow's (19 70) experiments are amongst those which Pribram uses to 
reject the proposition that "some sort of "image" (is projected) from 
the receptor surface onto the cortical surface much as a photographic 
image is projected onto the plane film surface in a camera". He men­
tions that Lashley removed 80-90% of the striate cortex of rats
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without impairing their ability to discriminate patterns, Galambos, 
Norton and Frominer (1967) cut up to 98% of the optic tracts, and 
Chow removed more than three fourths of the visual cortex without 
preventing the animals from discriminating patterns. In the case 
of Chow's experiment, visual discrimination became disturbed initially 
but the animals relearned the task in about the same number of trials 
required to learn prior to surgery. Roger Sperry and his group (1955) 
surgically cross-hatched a receiving area and even placed mica 
strips into the resulting brain troughs . . . Lashley, Chow and 
Semmes (1951) tried to short-circuit the electrical activity of the 
brain by placing strips of gold foil over the receiving areas. And 
I (Pribram) have produced multiple punctate foci of epileptiform 
discharge within a receiving area of the cortex by injecting minute 
amounts of aluminium hydroxide cream**. . . 'such multiple foci \  . . 
do not interfere with its execution (pattern discrimination) once it 
has been learned".
These are impressive experiments of the kind which made Lashley wonder 
how learning was possible. These results would not however seem to 
support the neural hologram more than they do the Linked Constellation 
concept. If anything they may be taken as favourable to the latter.
Taking Chow's experiments as an example, Chow points out that Galambos, 
Norton and Frommer (1967) cut about 90% of both optic tracts. This 
left, in Chow's estimation some 4,000 fibres intact out of 200,000.
This is less reconcilable with the hologram hypothesis than with the 
"photographic" (i.e. Linked Constellation). Only this limited infor­
mation was available to form the hologram, and if this were further 
distributed over the reception area, which is the whole point of the 
hologram hypothesis, then each point of the hologram could hold only 
the limited information. The further blow to the hologram hypothesis 
was dealt by Chow when he conducted an experiment in which he made 
combined lesions of optic tract and visual cortex. In this case the 
small amount of information entering the cortex is further diffused, 
and although in fact the registering holograms could only take effect 
in the intact cortex, the hologram model would imply that the pathways 
which would normally have distributed the hologram over the entire 
receiving area would be lost. In the neural hologram model the infor­
mation would be reduced not by a factor of 2% but by a further factor 
of approximately 25% (approximately three-quarters of cortex having 
been destroyed). This leaves only 0.5% to support the learning.
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A point made by Chow is that feature analysers must enter into the 
problem. "One model for explaining this redundancy is to have 
a small number of cell types, each responding to one specific fea­
ture of a patterned stimulus, and at the same time to have a large 
number of duplicates of them". It may be relevant in this respect 
that in describing the visual pathways, he says; "The LCD (lateral 
geniculate) cells send axons to the visual cortex, area 17 . . . 
and axons and collaterals to area 18". It may be that different 
feature analysers are projected to different mapping systems, an 
hypothesis which would accord well with Hubei aid Wiesel's finding 
of adjacent columns which map different degrees of the orientation 
of receptive fields.
One may contrast the answer given by the neural hologram to those 
difficult facts, and the answer given by the Linked Constellation 
concept. First one may note that discriminable patterns are usually 
discriininable over the whole of their area. This is certainly true 
of the upright and inverted triangles used by Chow in one of his 
experiments. Suppose that a small area taking in part of the base 
of such a figure remains in the intact pathway and projection area.
In Chow's figure, the area would contain in one case (the upright 
triangle) a fragment of a line, in the other (the inverted triangle) 
either nothing at all or part of the angle. Perhaps, the two com­
parable patterns might be a pair of corner angles as against a 
central inverted angle. Actually his animals could move their heads 
and he notes that they moved their heads and held them in a peculiar 
fashion. They were therefore able to focus the two base angles of 
the upright triangle, involving left hand and head movements, as 
against the centrally seen apex. Either way, it is clear that this 
task is equally as easy in information terms as the discrimination 
of the whole triangles, if not easier because of the removal of the 
complexity of irrelevancies.
Applying the Linked Constellation concept to the case where the tracts 
only were severed, by attentional inhibition of the remaining areas of 
projection cortex, the task became one of more or less straightforward 
mathcing of constellations of smaller size. That is, the input of 
only 4,000 fibres was compared with the portions of the already present 
Linked Constellations covering those 4,000 projections. This would be 
no harder than the original discrimination.
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The case of the combined cortical and tract lesions demonstrated 
by Chow would be even easier to account for in the Linked Constel­
lation model. Provided the lesions did not provide disturbing 
inputs, there would be no need to control attention, that is, 
to inhibit unwanted parts of the Linked Constellations. They would 
have been extirpated, leaving only the parts to be matched which 
were served by the remaining 4,000 fibres.
The case of the epileptic foci produced by Pribram is admittedly 
more difficult to explain. Epileptic foci might disturb the Linked 
Constellations. An argument could be made that they would disturb 
all Constellations approximately equally and so preserve discrimina­
tion. That is probably doubtful. However, they are just as damaging 
to the neural hologram hypothesis as to the Linked Constellation one.
The preservation of function in face of insults points to the amazing 
stability of the nervous system. Probably the answer given by Chow 
is closest. The redundancy and specificity of analysis given by 
multiple representation and feature analysis protects the system from 
all but the greatest injuries.
An opportunity has been taken to consider the hologram hypothesis as 
an alternative to the spatial template hypothesis developed here.
For present purposes the differences have been somewhat emphasised.
In the next section some note is taken of similarities of interpretation,
VI Beyond the stimulus-response concept
In Pribram's (1971) formulation he considers his TOTE concept in 
relation to his two-process view of neuronal function. "Classically 
the function of the nervous system has been conceived as a direct 
input-output, stimulus-response device, expressed neurologically as 
a reflex arc. The ubiquitous presence of feed-back and feed-forward 
mechanisms (e.g. central nervous system control of receptor function) 
necessitates modification of this view. Feed-back and Feed-forward are 
best conceptualised as a Test-Operate-Test-Exit servo mechanism, an 
elementary logic structure of which more complex organisations are 
composed".
Perhaps the main difficulty in achieving a satisfactory model of the
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brain is in providing an actual neural mechanism which will accom­
plish this. It should perhaps be said immediately that the goal 
is not reached in the work reported in this thesis. However, some 
progress may have been made, and it is perhaps worth considering 
the problem a little further.
Unfortunately, TOTE is a systems analysis solution, not a neural 
mechanism. Pribram's example, the muscle system servo mechanism, 
does not give any indication as to how the system would be imple­
mented in the feltwork of the cortex. It is true that match and 
mismatch are represented in Spinelli's implementation of a neural 
hologram, as they are in my Linked Constellation model, but in it­
self it is not sufficient that there should be a match and mismatch 
mechanism. It is also necessary to show how a mismatch is detected 
and acted upon. In Spinel^t's model as in mine, in the normal opera­
tion, it is the match which is operated upon.
The solution seems fairly clear in principle in my model but proved 
difficult to demonstrate. Perhaps this was because the key to its 
solution, the rhythmic mechanisms necessary to discern what Pribram 
calls the Test phase, were not discovered until late in the develop­
ment of the model.
In the initial simulations an anticipatory discharge was demonstrated. 
This discharge, in the form of the notional Conditioned Response of 
the model, represented a logical expectation of the occurrence of an 
event. When the model goes through a familiar sensori-motor sequence, 
the anticipatory response should increase. Any sudden drop in this 
expectancy discharge should signal that things are not going according 
to expectation. Unfortunately, as already stated, the mechanism 
proved impracticable, at least in the state of the apparatus at the 
time. As will be reported, considerable conceptual changes were intro­
duced late in the development. Some progress was made towards setting 
conditions in the model where it might be possible to detect a mismatch 
of the kind described. These will be related in due course.
On the conceptual level, an example suggested by Pribram may illustrate 
how a match-mismatch detection in an extended template system would 
explain how a model may transcend the Stimulus Response concept. As 
Oatley (19 78) points out, most models which attempt to avoid that con­
cept remain essentially limited by it, because in the event the only
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discernible purpose of the model is to produce a response in relation
to an input. In its standard mode of operation that is how my model
works, and that mode is later termed the Stimulus-Response mode- The
ability of a model ‘to exanjine". its q y n  operations, and tp declare a
halt when a mismatch occurs introduces a hew dimension.
/ "
:v';vV '. - • '
Pribram dsks what happens when-we try t o .ascend a stationary escalator. 
How do we know when we move our eyeball and see the world move, that 
it is really stationary? Both of these examples demonstrate the 
results of match and mismatch. In terms of the Linked Constellation 
model, when we step onto the escalator, the sequence of Linked Con­
stellations registering the familiar sequence of events which have 
occurred in the past, is reactivated. There is an anticipatory ener­
gisation of the next Constellations in the sequence. These register 
from a former occasion the feed-pack to be expected from a moving 
escalator. The actual feed-back from the stationary escalator is 
quite different. Consequently there is a'mismatch. It is this mis­
match which a brain is capable of immediately detecting.
In the case of a movement of the eye-ball resulting from our own 
actions, the effect is the reverse. At first the unaccustomed con­
junction of events, i.e. finger pressure and a moving world, may 
lead the neural apparatus to attempt a wrong match. The strong 
matching between Linked Constellations in the system registering 
retinal motion and, say a moving head, will lead to a mismatch, because 
the signals from the muscle and joint receptors will fail to show head 
movement. The first time we attempt this, the system may be somewhat 
upset. As soon however as we have established Linked Constellations 
registering the conjunction of finger on eyeball and a moving retina, 
a satisfactory matching occurs, and we "understand" the situation.
The factors limiting the stimulus-response concept are well stated by 
Horridge, 1958. "Aspects of the theory which have been available if 
not acceptable for the whole of this century are that simple reflexes 
and two neuron arcs have no place in the elementary nervous system.
Even in quite advanced vertebrates we find that co-ordination mechanisms 
are dominated by local pacemakers forming centrally controlled programs 
which can be released or inhibited by particular stimuli . . .".
According to the philosophy of my model, the essential concept by 
which the Stimulus Response view may be transcended is by considering the
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nervous system as having developed from the single celled creature 
as a three-neuron rather than a two neuron arc. Two of the neurons 
have taken over the functions of internal transport. In the single 
celled creature, the stimulus affects the organism directly. In 
the multicellular organism, the sensory neuron carries the signal 
from the now distally placed sensitive apparatus, the sense organ, 
up to the integrative apparatus, the brain. Similary, the motor 
neurons carr^' the signal from the central mechanism to the specialised 
motor organ which is now distally placed at the periphery of the 
multicellular organism. The central neuron must be seen as more than 
a simple connecting device between input and output, if rhe apparatus 
is not to remain a stimulus response device. Elaborated from one 
neuron into many, the central neuron remains between input and output. 
The Linked Constellation preserves the integrity of the central 
neurons, which in the form of an integrated structure within the org­
anism, is the central core of the organism.
Although the simulations fell short of demonstrating attributes which 
go beyond the stimulus-response concept, much of the later development 
of the model was pointed in that direction.
VII Conclusion
Prior to describing attempts to extend the model, some rather general 
matters have been discussed. Some changed aims and a proposed use of 
the computer as a tool for theory development were discussed.
Some models which had received only cursory mention in the introduc- 
troy chapters were more fully described in relation to the present 
effort.
A distributed memory approach, the neural hologram, was compared with 
the extended template concept of the model presented here.
Finally some attempt was made to consider ways in which a model of 
the brain might conceptually go beyond a stimulus-response formulation,
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CHAPTER 11
GENERAL DESIGN OF THE EXTENDED SIMULATIONS
I Introduction: appetitive-consunimatory sequences
As discussed in the previous chapter, amongst the principal aims of 
extending the model was to represent motor behaviour more adequately.
In this chapter it is proposed to describe the main features of the 
simulations which attempted to achieve this aim. The remarks in this 
chapter are not intended as a theoretical discussion of behaviour, 
but merely to enable the reader to follow the rationale of the arrange­
ments in the simulations.
The model was directed primarily at representing appetitive-consum- 
matory sequences. Activities such as seeking and obtaining food, 
shelter, and a mate, are prominent in the behaviour of animals. Such 
sequences may be described without theoretical commitment as related 
motor activities which culminate in the elicitation from the environ­
ment of specific patterns of stimulation which release inbuilt 
responses. They also have the characteristic of approach rather than 
withdrawal. (Maser, 1973; Konorski, 1967). The initial simulations 
already included a notional neural apparatus for producing specific 
responses, which might be considered analogical to consummatory actions. 
This made the extension of the model by a representation of appetitive 
behaviour a convenient subject. In relation to the general aims of 
the model appetitive-consummatory sequences give an opportunity for 
dealing with the integration of what may be somewhat loosely termed 
"learned" and "innate" behaviour.
The specifically elicited responses represented in the initial simula­
tions could also represent a response caused by a harmful or other 
unwanted stimulus, e.g. shock. It was in fact intended later to extend 
the model further with an aversive-behaviour system paralleling that 
for appetitive behaviour. Unfortunately time did not permit this. 
However, there are aspects of appetitive behaviour which suggest the 
necessity of including a representation of stimuli which are innately
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recognised as undesirable and which produce appropriate action, e.g. 
spitting out unwholesome food. For this reason provision was made 
in the simulation for Protective Responses (see below).
The integration of "learned" and "innate" behaviour has been exten­
sively studied in Instrumental Conditioning (Skinner's operant 
conditioning or Konorski's Type II Conditioning) and in maze running 
and problem box experiments. Many such experiments represent 
appetitive-consummatory sequences, for example, pressing a bar to 
obtain food. The behaviour of the model may therefore be analogically 
compared to experiments of this kind. The model was however intended 
to have a wider and more informal interpretation. A kitten walking 
to its accustomed spot to find its saucer of milk is a case in point.
The Responses in the model are, of course, mere indications of a 
principle of organisation. In the broadest sense much of behaviour 
can be understood in terms of the integration of "operants" and 
"fixed action patterns" released by specific stimuli (see Hinde, 19 70, 
Chapter 25).
To model an appetitive consummatory sequence it was decided to pro­
vide four sub-divisions of Motor Response in place of the single kind 
of Response unit included in the initial simulations. These were 
termed: (i) Instrumental Responses; (ii) Preconsummatory Responses;
(ill) Consummatory or Final Responses; (iv) Protective Responses.
These divisions were not intended as hard and fast theoretical cat­
egories. Such rationale as they possess will appear in due course.
In part they were suggested by the form of the initial simulations.
There are certain effector actions, such as those associated with 
eating, drinking and copulation which are strongly under the control 
of specific sensory input, e.g. food or water in the mouth, intromis­
sion, and which customarily form the climax of behavioural sequences.
This character seemed to be reasonably well represented by the motor 
organisation provided in the initial simulations. In an early chapter 
it was suggested that neurological models should differentiate the 
character of motor response, say the difference between manipulation of 
a lever and swallowing food.
In part the divisions were suggested by functional distinctions uncovered 
by research. For example, there is evidence that consummatory and
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appetitive (operant) responses are sensitive to different pharmaco­
logical agents and that the two can be dissociated both in activation 
and suppression. (Review in Margules and Margules, 1973). In part 
the divisions appear to reflect a more or less obvious difference in 
■behavioural effect of phases of the appetitive consummatory sequence. 
The assumption was that these differences of functional relationship 
to the environment would have led to the evolution of corresponding 
differences of mechanism or differences of emphasis of aspects of a 
common mechanism.
It will be remembered that the extended simulation was not the 
embodiment of a pre-existing theoretical model of the brain. It was 
to be used as a tool to develop such a model. In effect the principles 
of action of all four divisions of the motor apparatus would be the 
same. Their separation into different Neuronal Arrays permitted varia­
tions and special modifications to be introduced into each division.
II Extension of the notional neuro-anatomy
The main aim of this section is to acquaint the reader with the general 
form of the extended model .
The basic layout followed that of the initial simulations, being 
based upon Figure 5.10 and 5.12. One of the main extensions was to 
provide for the differentiation of motor actions under the four sub­
divisions described in the previous section (Figure 11.1).
A. Instrumental Response Array
The Motor Response apparatus in the initial simulations consisted of 
a Sub-cortical Array and a Cortical Array. The Sub-cortical Array 
contained notionally inbuilt representations of the motor actions in 
the form of a Preset Linked Constellations. The activation of a Pre­
set Linked Constellation led to activity in the notional Fibres which 
acted upon the Cortical Array and so .a Learned Record of the occurrence 
of the Motor Response was laid down in the Cortical Array.
The overall organisation of all four kinds of notional motor actions 
followed this basic pattern. For each of the four sub-divisions a 
Sub-cortical and a Cortical Array was provided. When a particular 
Neuronal Pool in the Sub-cortical Array was active, its Efferent Fibre
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becciiTie, after passing through the notional Thalamus, or Control 
Centre, the Afferent Fibre to the corresponding Pool of the corres­
ponding Cortical Array.
The only kind of Response provided for in the initial simulation was 
that which occurred primarily following the occurrence in the input 
of an Innately Recognised Pattern (IRP). The latter activated the 
Preset Linked Constellations which included representation of Res­
ponse. Responses elecited by this kind of Preset Constellation 
action will be termed specifically elicited responses. Essentially 
this mechanism continued to apply unaltered in the extended model to 
the Preconsummatory, Consummatory and Protective Responses. Although 
these three divisions had this in common there were of course intended 
to be other differences, many of which were not explored. The set of 
Instrumental Responses was to differ from them more fundamentally. 
Although basically the same Sub-cortical-Cortical principle would 
apply, it was aimed to make emission of Instrumental Responses less 
tightly bound to the appearance of Innately Recognised Patterns in the 
Input.
The Instrumental Responses may be regarded as representing operant 
actions. The reader may wish to object that the distinction between 
operants and respondents is not necessarily a function of either their 
neurological or psychological mediation. The categorisation of beha­
viour as operant or respondent may be regarded as a function of experi­
mental contingency (see Mackintosh, 19 74, p.4) or as referring to the 
most usual application of particular responses rather than their intrin­
sic operation (Moore, 1973; Jenkins, 1973). These objections are not, 
it is suggested, swept aside by the use which is made in the simulations 
of convenient divisions. To pursue such issues would introduce 
unnecessary complication into the presentation and would in any case go 
beyond the scope of the project.
The simple representation of the Instrumental Array is intened to stand 
in place of a great deal of complexity in the brain. It is perhaps 
worthwhile giving some indication of this complexity, and its manner of 
symbolisation in the model.
In the approach of the author all motor actions are morphologically 
determined; that is to say, they are innately programmed in conformity 
with the anatomical and physiological attributes of the particular
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animal. The kitten walking to its milk has been mentioned as the 
kind of motor action intended to be represented by a Response of the 
Instrumental Array. This suggestion may be slightly amplified.
Walking is not independent of species-specific stimulation. "Step­
ping" behaviour of cats is dependent upon sensory feed-back from 
the pads of the paws (Gray and Lai, 1965) and can occur in the 
absence of cortical control (Shik and Orlovsky, 19 76). Walking to 
a particular spot is also dependent on control by species-specific 
neural arrangements. Rats are known to approach dark places rather 
than lighted ones. Upon the first approach or avoidance of an object 
the emission of the response controlling the locomotion has probably
considerable species specific influences; e.g. smell, colour and 
manipulative possibilities. Other examples of approach and avoid­
ance may be influenced by experience. Moreover walking to an object 
is not so much simply an act of walking, but of walking integrated 
with the other movements, e.g. orienting the body.
The aim of the model is to represent appetitive behaviour, that is, 
essentially approach. In the animal such approach can be considered 
as a sequence of a number of co-ordinated morphologically controlled 
motor movements. These co-ordinations may be considered to fall 
under a number of different classes, each of which is probably also 
integrated by innate morphological neural arrangements. Thus walking 
to tine left, walking to the right or walking forward are probably 
innately programmed variations of a basic organisation- Although this 
account clearly greatly simplifies the neurology, one may concede that 
walking to the left, forward or to the right, or turning tail are com­
plex integrations subject to relatively simple commands (Isaacson,
1974). This assumption is supported by such clear relationships as 
the turning of the head in response to specific stimulation of cer­
tain pathways (Hassler, 1978). Nevertheless such actions are subject 
to learned adaptations and to control by sensory feed-back. (See 
Figure 11.2).
In the nervous system the various combinations of integrated movements 
used to approach an object from a given position would be mediated by 
activity in an enormous number of fibres. This activity would consist 
of sequential configurations of activity. Parts of these configurations 
would be controlled by feed-back at lower levels: for example the
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stepping movement of the cat is controlled by sensory feed-back from 
tlie paws. These aspects of the act of approach, however complex, may 
be seen as species specific stimulus-response arrangements, which, in 
principle at least, could be mediated by Preset Constellations. What 
we are concerned with is the activation of that variation of the 
integrated action which leads the animal in one direction rather than 
another, i.e. to approach the object. It is this motor decision 
which is intended to be symbolised by activity in one or other of the 
Efferent Fibres of the Instrumental Response. This representation 
is only a pointer to the principles of operation of a large number of 
fibres in the nervous system: as in most models, the activity of a few 
fibres stands for the activities in a very large number of fibres.
Essentially the model, as so far described, suggests that particular 
co-ordinations of motor actions, e.g. moving to the right or left 
or forward, occur initially at a sub-cortical level at times which 
are less dependent upon "eliciting stimuli" than are consummatory 
responses, such as eating or drinking or copulation. When such Instru­
mental Responses occur then what follows is similar to what has been 
represented of elicited responses in the initial simulations. Their 
occurrence and the occurrence of accompanying and preceding sensory 
stimulation from the environmnet is registered in the cortex.
It may be noted that this function of the motor cortex is compatible 
with the fact that stimulation of the "electrically sensitive motor 
cortex" produces isolated movements rather than co-ordinated movements 
(Towe, 19 73). The Response represented by activity in one or two 
Neuronal Pools of the simulation symbolises the activity in the brain 
of a large number of Neuronal Pools co-ordinated by Linked Constel­
lations. According to the model, the cortex merely registers a 
co-ordination provided to it by sub-cortical emissions. That co-ordina­
tion is probably or primarily innately engineered at sub-cortical level 
(cf. Flynn, 19 76). Stimulation of the motor cortex would therefore 
merely stimulate a few odd Neuronal Pools.
B. Preconsummatory Responses
It was felt desirable to distinguish between different function, and 
consequently probably differing mechanisms, of that class of responses 
elicited by species specific stimulation. In appetitive-consummatory 
Sequences one can, in particular, distinguish between the specifically
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elicited activity which brings the sequence to an effective end, 
e.g. swallowing food or drink, and those stimulus-released responses 
which are on the way to a final act, e.g. chewing, pecking in chicks.
The mechanisms of both Preconsummatory and Final (consummatory) 
Responses were essentially the same as that used in the initial 
simulations for the single class of Response. At Sub-cortical level 
the emission of the Response depended upon the occurrence of an IRP 
in the input. The distinction between the two sets of Responses did 
not relate to their status as fixed action patterns notionally elicited 
by specific stimulation, but rather their functional relationship to 
behaviour and to other aspects of the model. In this respect it may 
be mentioned that the reasons for introducing them were rather dif­
ferent from the character which they later took on.
Briefly, the original concept was related in a general way to the 
ethologists concept of a hierarchy of responses leading to a 
behavioural goal. It was felt that the introduction of a notionally 
inbuilt sign-post on the way to the final goal of a sequence would 
assist the model, as it was presumed to help the animal, to find the 
goal. Later in the development of the model, the motivational 
possibilities of specifically elicited fixed action patterns, acting 
as innately programmed instrumental acts on the way to final goals, 
was more fully appreciated.
"Eating, drinking and sexual behaviours are highly stereotyped activi­
ties, the components of which are recognised by ethologists to be 
fixed action patterns" (Maser, 1973). The presence of a pellet in 
the mouth may be taken to be what is aimed at in providing Preconsum­
matory Responses- The sensory feed-back of taste, smell and palpation 
by the mouth surfaces release mastication and salivation. The sensory 
feed-back may be regarded as IRPs releasing fixed action patterns 
mediated by Preset Constellations. The correct consistency of treated 
food-mass leads to a bolus being passed back to the throat, another 
Preconsummatory Response. The bolus releases swallowing: apparently 
the texture of the bolus is critical to the act of swallowing. The 
latter was originally termed the Consummatory Response, a term which 
was subsequently amended to the less committed one. Final Response.
Of course, the term Final is to be taken with suitable reservations. 
Further events take place in the stomach and metabolism. To consider 
these would take us too far away from what was done.
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At the beginning of extending the simulations, the Preconsummatory 
Responses were principally used to demonstrate the place of Protec­
tive Responses in the scheme of appetitive behaviour. If a Preconsum- 
matory Response were emitted to some other input than the IRP intended 
to elicit that Response, the programme, simulating the environment, 
could present a special IRP representing some harmful effect. The 
protective Response (see below) would then be elicited. This might 
represent ejecting an object if chewing movements disclosed it to be 
other than food.
Later in the development of the model, and principally as the result 
of the influence of Konorski*s discussion of the motivational effects 
of different stages of the eating process, the relationship between 
Preconsummatory and Consummatory Responses was used to control moti­
vational mechanisms.
C. Consummatory Responses
Little more need be said of these than that they represented the 
specifically elicited Responses, which at one level of activity at 
least, closed the behavioural sequence. In simple terms they rep­
resented swallowing, drinking or copulating. As just mentioned, in 
later versions of the model they differed from Preconsummatory and 
Instrumental Responses in their relation to motivational mechanisms. 
Briefly, whereas Consummatory Responses induced a reduction of 
Excitation from Motivational sources, Preconsummatory Responses 
induced an increase (compare Konorski, 1967). Moreover, in terms 
of reinforcement terminology, Preconsummatory Responses, or rather 
the occurrence of the IRPs which induced them, were the primary 
reinforcing events. In early versions, Preconsummatory Responses 
released behaviour which increased the probability of a Consummatory 
IRP, e.g. in a maze situation a notional "standstill".
Like the Preconsummatory Respones they were implemented by mechanisms 
similar to those for the single class of Responses in the initial 
simulations: Cortical and Sub-cortical Array with Preset Constella­
tions written into the sub-cortical Array.
D. Protective Responses
It has already been explained that the Protective Responses were 
intended to represent what occurs in an appetitive sequence when, 
instead of the IRP of a Preconsummatory or Final Response, some other
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IRP representing, say, noxious food, is presented. As mentioned, it 
was intended eventually to incorporate an aversive behaviour system 
paralleling the appetitive one. Unfortunately time and resources 
made this impossible. The protective Responses represented aspects 
of aversive behaviour which it was thought necessary to include in 
the model to give a reasonably ccanplete picture of appetitive 
behaviour.
The program was designed so that if the model emitted a Response which 
was wrong, in the sense that in the situation modelled it would not 
lead to the goal, then the model could be "punished" by being presented 
with an IRP which elicited an aversive response. The Protective 
Responses differed in their conceptual base. One of them was typical 
of the notional results of taking a wrong Instrumental Action. In 
terms of the Instrumental Responses signifying moving Left, Right and 
Forward, the IRP eliciting the Protective Response could be considered 
as representing a "bump" obtained by crashing into the wall of a maze 
and the Protective Response as moving backwards. Another Protective 
Response was related to the emission by the model of a Preconsummatory 
Response to some input other than the IRP which was supposed to elicit 
that Response. This represented what might happen if the animal 
attempted to chew a hard object e.g. regurgitation.
In fact, although these Responses worked well, they did not play a 
large part in the later development. It may be said here that this was 
because they were withdrawn at a time when the model was simplified in 
an attempt to cure the troubles with Excitation and Inhibition already 
mentioned. In the early versions of the model they were quite effec­
tive in producing a (superficially perhaps) life-like behaviour. If 
the model emitted a response considered by the programmer to be wrong, 
it was presented with an input pattern representing the "bump" and 
thereafter the offending Response failed to appear for some time.
E . Computer implementation of Response Arrays
In summary of the foregoing Sections, the Motor Division of the Sub- 
cortical Array of the extended simulations was divided into four sub­
sets of Neuronal Pools. In turn each of these sub-sets consisted of 
4 Neuronal Pools (total 16 pools). They were referred to respectively 
as the Sub-cortical Instrumental, Preconsummatory. Final (or Consum­
matory) and Protective Arrays (see Figure 11.1).
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Corresponding to the 4 Neuronal Pools in each Subcortical Response 
Array, 4 Neuronal Pools were provided in a corresponding Array at 
Cortical Level, i.e. Cortical Instrumental, Preconsummatory, Final 
and Protective Arrays. Each of these Cortical Arrays possessed in 
fact 8 not 4 Neuronal Pools in toto. The first four of each Array, 
as just stated, corresponded to the Neuronal Pools in the Sub- 
cortical Array of the same name. They represented the neural emis­
sion giving an effector response. The second four Neuronal Pools 
in each Array represented the neural emission required to suppress 
an effector response, i.e. Not-do Pools. This was upon the principle 
already discussed in relation to the initial simulations.
As mentioned, the actual arrangements differed from version to 
Version of the simulations. In some runs, for example, eight Neuronal 
Pools were provided in each of the Sub-cortical Arrays as well as in 
the Cortical Arrays. In these versions there was a representation of 
effector and suppressor action at both Sub-cortical and Cortical Level. 
The essential principles of operation did not, however, differ greatly.
The main Motor Connections were, as already mentioned, similar to those 
of the initial simulations. Essentially, the Efferent Fibres of the 
various Sub-cortical Arrays passed to the Control Centre (Notional 
Thalamus) from which they issued as Afferent Fibres (Motor Afferents) 
to the appropriate columns of the corresponding Cortical Array. As 
in the case of the initial simulations, return connections from the 
Cortical Arrays to the Control Centre and back to the Cortical Arrays 
were necessary to ensure registration of Responses emitted by the lat­
ter. These arrangements are omitted from the Figure and will be 
illustrated when the mechanisms of operation are more fully described.
F. Extensions to Sensory Arrays
The basic arrangements were as in the initial simulations. However, 
at the Cortical Level the sensory representation was increased by 
adding an additional Array of Neuronal Pools equal in size to that pro­
vided in the initial simulations.
This duplication of the Cortical Sensory representation allowed for 
the introduction of an Uttley-like delay, that is a notional difference 
of latency of pathway, to each of the two Arrays (see Chapter 4,
Section III, B, and in Chapter 5). Multiple representations have been 
found in the cortex of projections of a number of modalities.
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Celesia (1976) found differences of latency between the arrival of 
signals from acoustic stimuli in two separate projection areas, a 
primary and secondary auditory projection. The effect of the notional 
difference in latency of the pathways to the two Arrays in the simula­
tion was that the same Input Pattern, notionally presented to the 
model at a given time, was processed in one Array several cycles before 
it was processed in the other. Consequently the Linked Constellation 
formed at any particular Instant represented both the Input Pattern 
in the input at one given moment and that appearing in the input some­
what later. This is the appropriate incorporation in the present 
model of Uttley's principle.
In respect of temporal delays, the present model differed from the 
initial simulations. In those, a single Uttley-like delay of 1 Instant, 
between sensory and motor pathways, was later removed to demonstrate 
the independent temporal sequential aspect of the basic Linked Constel­
lation concept. This aspect was later seen to be of less importance, 
since the same effects could be obtained by Uttley-like delays. In 
fact the two principles were seen to be variations of degree of a 
single principle of lack of strict simultaneity of action of operation 
of a system. In the extended model a number of notional delays of this 
kind were introduced and will be described in due course.
It was intended to increase the Cortical representation of Sensory 
Input further by the introduction of further Sensory Arrays. The pur­
pose was to demonstrate that a fuller and different sensory representa­
tion could be registered at the Cortex from that Innately represented 
at the Subcortical Level. Some experiments were carried out and 
showed that, at the least, the model still operated in a similar manner. 
However, the additional representation had to be withdrawn to make way 
for other developments of the model utilising the limited computer 
resources.
Figure 12.2 shows the revised sensory arrangements and temporal delay.
G. Motivational Arrays
The function of notional motivational mechanisms will be described in 
a later chapter. It is, however, necessary to know that a number of 
Neuronal Pools were provided to mediate motivational aspects of the 
system.
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Two sets of Motivational Neuronal Pools were provided, one at Sub- 
cortical and one at Cortical Level. However, the relationship of 
these Arrays differed from those of the Sensory and Motor Arrays 
previously described. The Motor Arrays, for example, had "corres­
ponding" Neuronal Pools at each Level, with characteristic connective 
arrangements. In comparison, the two Motivational Arrays (cortical 
and subcortical) were relatively independent in their action. In 
fact, the notional function of the Cortical and Sub-cortical Motiva­
tional Arrays differed from each other. It must be mentioned that 
it is not intended to imply that the function of each of these sets 
of neuronal pools, insofar as they might actually exist in the brain, 
would be devoted exclusive to Cortical or Subcortical locations. As 
with the allocation of Learning and Innate programming between Cortex 
and Subcortex, the location of the Motivational Arrays was a simpli­
fication of convenience. Nevertheless, in this case also it is thought 
that there is a closer relationship between certain motivational 
functions and cortex on the one hand, and between other motivational 
functions and sub-cortical centres on the other.
As in the case of the other Arrays, the Motivational Arrays consisted 
essentially each of 4 Neuronal Pools, in some versions this being 
increased for representation of Suppression Pools to 8.
There was however an important difference of principle in operation 
which will be described more fully when the Motivational mechanisms 
are dealt with. Essentially this concerned a distinction between two 
modes of operation of Afferent Excitation of the Motivational Pools 
at the Cortical Level. In one mode, the Integrating Neurons of the 
Pool were driven but did not form Integrative Connections, so in that 
mode the Afferent Fibres provided Motivational Excitation but did not 
provide Motivational registration. In a second mode Integrative 
Connections formed in the customary manner of the model. This may be 
regarded as representing a conjunction theory of synaptic or other 
integrative connectivity (see Eccles, 19 72).
Ill Revisions of notional neuro-physiology
The neuro-physiological aspects of the model remained essentially the 
same as in the initial simulations. The Linked Constellation concept
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was simulated in almost precisely the same manner as in the initial 
simulations. Excitation and Inhibition were treated in essentially 
the same way, although there were very big differences introduced 
into the notional flows of excitation to Excitatory and Inhibitory 
Neurons, concerned with the control of their levels of activity.
Most of the revisions of neuro-physiology were not seen as matters 
of physical principle. They were attempts to deal with problems 
of control within the model, which have already been mentioned a 
number of times.
It may be mentioned here that these problems turned out to be the 
principle obstacle in obtaining satisfactory performance from the 
simulations. Many features of the model had to be removed before 
they had been effectively demonstrated so as to simplify the model 
in order to understand its weaknesses better. It was intended to 
reintroduce them at a later stage, but time did not permit. At 
one stage, the difficulties were considered to be the Achilles heel 
of the theory of neural integration. They were not solved until an 
adequate concept of the difficulties had been developed. The solu­
tion involved notionally interrupting the Afferent flows intermit­
tently, thus producing rhythms in the processing within the Neuronal 
Pools. This solution was not seen until very late in the development 
of the model.
These problems and the steps taken to try to remedy them will be left 
until a later chapter. They really pose a different set of problems 
from the mechanisms used to implement sensory-motor integration. The 
latter will be dealt with in the next chapter. The presence of these 
problems does, however, serve to explain why more sophisticated imple­
mentations of the motor mechanisms were not achieved during the course 
of the development of the computer simulations.
One or two points of changes of principle introduced into the neuro- 
physiological aspects are mentioned here for completeness.
(1) The control of levels of Excitation and Inhibition in each Neuronal 
Array of the model was dealt with independently. This was to prepare 
the way for the introduction of attentional mechanisms arising from the 
notion of differential emphasis on different portions of an extended
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template system (Chapter 2, Section III).
(2) A binary coding of afferent fibres was introduced at the Control 
Centre (i.e. notional Thalamus) so that they were either active or 
inactive with no intermediate states. Whereas in the initial simula­
tions, the Spike Frequencies of the Efferent Fibres of the Sub- 
cortical Motor Arrays were applied as re-Afferent Spike Frequencies 
to the Cortical Arrays, in the extended model the set of Spike 
Frequencies of the Sub-cortical Efferent Fibres was first converted 
into a set of binary digits by the introduction of notionalcollateral 
inhibition and relay neurons. It may be recalled that Sensory Affer­
ents were already coded in binary form. This meant that the activity 
of Afferent Fibres to any Neuronal Pool in the system, from whatever 
source it might stem, could be treated as a set of notionally active 
or inactive Fibres. The notional Thalamus (Control Centre) could 
then encode into Spike Frequencies the activity or inactivity of all 
fibres in terms solely of the Discriminative and Diffuse Volley Values 
as described for the earlier simulations.
(3) In the Neurons in the initial simulations. Excitation and Inhibi­
tion Counts were set initially at zero and later transactions were 
recorded from this zero base. This led to an imbalance in the effects 
of reduction compared with additions of Excitation and Inhibition.
When some of the Integrating Neurons notionally lost more Inhibition 
or Excitation than they received, their Excitation and Inhibition 
Counts would have fallen below zero, had an arbitrary rule setting 
them to a minimum of zero not been introduced. In the extended simula­
tions Excitation Count and Inhibition Count were initially set at an 
arbitrary Optimum Excitation and Optimum Inhibition Level. Flows of 
notional Diffuse Excitation and Diffuse Inhibition into the system 
worked in conjunction with notional destruction and dissipation of 
Excitatory and Inhibitory factors to attempt to maintain the system at 
the Optimum Levels. Reductions contained both a fractional and constant 
component. These systems of additions and deductions were intended to 
represent a combination of intracellular metabolic processes and extra­
cellular activation of both Excitation and Inhibitory Neuron systems. 
Signal volleys then modulated the Opitmum Level, and when a particular 
pattern of input ceased, the system attempted to bring levels back to 
the optimum level.
(4) In addition to the overall Inhibition system, collateral and recur­
rent Inhibition was introduced between and within Neuronal Pools. When
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a fresh Input Pattern reached an Array it first produced a collateral 
Inhibition of non-activated Pools. After a slight temporal delay, 
tlie recurrent Inhibition was effective, bringing the levels of Inhibi­
tion in all Pools back to one level. Thus when an Input arrived it 
first effected a heightened contrast between activated and non 
activated Pools, and if the pattern continued to be active, its effect 
was progressively diminished by the recurrent Inhibition.
IV Conclusion
In this chapter the general design of the extended simulations has 
been described. The aim was to demonstrate a sensori-motor integra­
tion in the form of the integration of notional learned Instrumental 
actions and notional species-specific innate behaviours. The original 
Motor Response Arrays were subdivided at both Cortical and Sub-cortical 
levels, to provide facilities for differences of mechanism between 
actions performing different functions in relation to the animals 
relations with its environment. Instrumental, Preconsummatory and 
Consummatory Responses, and Protective Responses were each provided 
with an Array of Neuronal Pools at both levels. Motivational Pools 
were also provided: the Motivational Pools at Sub-cortical level were 
however to be independent of those at Cortical level; in this respect 
the Motivational Pools broke away from the general Sub-cortical- 
Cortical relationship expressed in the model.
Changes in notional neuro-physiology were directed to solving problems 
of control. Certain major changes were described which were not con­
sidered to be matters of principle. These changes were chiefly the 
result of modifying a system of initially'empty' neurons, to one in 
which the neurons were maintained at an optimum level of Excitation 
and this level was modulated by Excitation and Inhibition. Other major 
changes which were matters of principle have only been briefly mentioned. 
Problems relating to the control, of this system will be discussed in 
a later chapter when the scheme by which these problems were solved 
will be described.
266
CHAPTER 12
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION OF THE EXTENDED SIMULATIONS
In this chapter it is proposed to describe further the main mechanisms 
which were introduced in order to operate the various extensions to 
the notional neuro-anatomy of the model described in the previous 
chapter. These were mainly concerned with the Instrumental Response 
Array and the Motivational Arrays.
I Response emission control; general mechanism
It will be recalled that in the initial simulation two kinds of res­
ponse of the system could be detected. In the initial simulations 
these were suggested to be analogical respectively to the unconditioned 
Response and the Conditioned Response seen in animals in a Classical 
Conditioning situation. In future, for convenience in referring to 
them without theoretical implications, they will be referred to as 
the Directly Elicited Response and the Anticipatory Response.
The Response mechanisms of the extended model can perhaps best be 
followed in relation to the detection of these two kinds of response 
of the system. In this section only the Directly Elicited Response 
will be considered.
It will be recalled that in the initial simulations, when an IRP 
actually appeared in the input, a massive motor response occurred.
The mechanism was briefly as follows. The effects of the IRP, reach­
ing the Sub-cortical Arrays, activated the Preset Constellation to 
which that IRP related. Excitation was transferred from the sensory 
neuronal pools to the selected Motor Neuronal Pools represented in that 
Preset Linked Constellation. At the same time as this reactivation 
of the Preset Constellation in the Subcortical Array was taking place, 
a sensori-motor registration of the IRP and its Sub-cortical Response 
was being laid down in the Cortical Array. On subsequent occasions, 
when the effects of the IRP reached the Cortical Array, the Learned 
Constellations were reactivated at this level also. Consequently a
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Directly Elicited Response was also eventually produced at the Cortical 
Level. This joined with the Sub-cortical Response and was sent 
notionally to the periphery. The effectiveness of the IRP is in this 
way enhanced by Learning.
This same principle was applied to the Consummatory, Preconsummatory, 
and Protective Arrays of the extended model. (It could not be applied 
without considerable modification to the Instrumental Array, since the 
Instrumental Responses were not elicited by IRPs (see next section)).
Differences between the mechanism of detection in the initial simula­
tions and the extended simulations were chiefly matters of more 
sophisticated notional Inhibitory Control. When an IRP reactivated a 
Preset Constellation, the Excitation was transferred to member Neurons 
of the Constellation located in the Pools of the Motor division. A 
similar process occurred in the Learned Constellations of the Cortical 
Array. In the numerical examples given in Chapter 5, Section IV, 
it was demonstrated that, although all the Neurons on tiie Motor side 
might be activated in differing degrees, by adjustment of the level 
of Inhibition across the Neuronal Pools of the Motor division it could 
be arranged that only the most highly Excited Neurons would be permit­
ted to Discharge. This ensured, in principle, that the only Efferent 
Fibres to show a Discharge would be those containing Linked Neurons 
from the relevant matching Linked Constellations.
In the event it will be remembered that the results reported of the
initial simulations showed that this control of Inhibition was not
adequately achieved in the initial simulations. This problem was part 
/the
of overall problem of control of Excitation and Inhibition levels which 
will be discussed separately.
II Response emission control: Anticipatory response of system
A. Stimulus-Response chains
It was demonstrated in the initial simulations that after an appropriate 
training session, if a Cue Sequence of patterns were presented without 
being followed by the customary IRP, a response appeared in the rele­
vant Efferent Fibres of the Cortical Motor Array. This response was 
smaller than the Directly Elicited Response, but reliably detectable.
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Moreover, even during trials when the IRP was actually presented, an 
anticipatory Descharge could be detected earlier than the occurence 
of the Directly Elicited Response.
The anticipatory discharge, analogical to a Conditioned Response, was 
demonstrated to be result of an anticipatory effect of the system. 
Anticipation in the system took the form of a rise in the Excitation 
of the Linked Constellations about to be stimulated when a familiar 
sequence was repeated. The anticipatory rise could be observed by 
inspecting a monitor printout of Excitation Counts. It could also be 
detected as an observable effect in the Motor Efferent Fibres. In 
the initial simulations these Discharges were regarded as analogous 
CRs and arose from reactivation of Sensori-Motor Constellations which 
had been formed on rather special occasions, i.e. occasions when an 
IRP in the Input had reactivated a Preset Constellation and elicited 
an UCR. However, such an anticipatory Discharge should be able to 
t>e detected whenever a sequence which was undergoing reactivation con­
tained a Sensori-Motor Constellation. This would apply if on an 
earlier occasion the emission of a Motor Response had been registered 
in the Cortex in conjunction with a Sensory Pattern, even if the 
initiation of the Response had been effected by some mechanism other 
than reactivation of a Preset Constellation by an IRP.
The Anticipatory Response of the system was regarded as the basis of 
motor decision underlying the integration of motor action. As argued 
in Chapters 2 and 3, such an anticipatory response might mediate a 
sophisticated control, of many aspects of behaviour: for example, the 
TOTE paradigm of Pribram. The primary aim, however, was to demonstrate 
its efficacy by using it to control the motor decisions of the model in 
respect of Instrumental Responses.
The most basic aspect of the production of operants may be described 
as Stimulus-Response chaining. Pierrel and Sherman (1963) trained 
food-deprived rats to successively climb spiral stairs, push down and 
cross a drawbridge, climb a ladder, pull in and pedal a car through a 
tunnel, climb stairs, and perform many further feats to reach food 
(Hinde, 19 70, p611) .
To see how this chaining might be mediated in the model, for the moment 
let the problem of production of Instrumental Responses at the Sub- 
cortical Level be ignored, and assume that an Efferent Discharge occurs
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Figure 12.1 The Control Centre (Thalamus) receives the Instrumental 
Motor Response Indication and the Sub-cortical Response Indication, 
and must decide between them (see Figure 12.3). At each Instant it 
must encode the set of Motor Afferent Fibres to the Cortex into Active 
and Inactive Fibres ('O's and 'I's) and calculate appropriate Spike 
Frequencies for them.
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in one or other of the Efferent Fibres of that Array from time to 
time. These Sub-cortical Instrumental Responses pass to the peri­
phery as notional Instrumental actions. The Efferent Discharges 
are also passed via the Control Array to the Cortical Array where they 
are registered with tïie ongoing Sensory input, so that a Sensori-motor 
Learned Linked Constellation is laid down. This provides for the 
registration of a sequence of sensory events integrated with a series 
of motor responses.
Upon repetition of the sensory event which forms the first step of a 
familiar sequence, the matching Linked Constellation is reactivated.
If this Linked Constellation contains a representation of the motor 
action leading to the next sensory input in the sequence, then a Dis­
charge will appear in the Efferent Fibres of the Cortical Array, 
indicating which action is next required. In principle the Discharge 
could actually constitute the initiation of the required Motor Res­
ponse. For various reasons which will be seen in due course, it 
was preferable to have a detecting system aimed at finding in which 
Fibres the Motor Discharges appeared. These were then dealt with 
in the manner already described as typical of the action of the Con­
trol Centre.
The reader may wish to be reminded of what this action was. The 
Control Centre (i) determined which of the Efferent Fibres reaching 
it from some Array were to be classed as Active and which Inactive.
It did this by adjusting a notional Inhibition across them, and 
(ii) it computed the Spike Frequency of the Fibres leaving it to 
become Afferent Fibres to some Array. It did this by applying the 
Diffuse Volley Value to all Fibres and the Discriminative Volley Value 
only to those Fibres which were Active (Figure 12.1).
In the case under consideration the Fibres which had to be coded as 
Active or Inactive were the Efferent Fibres of the Cortical Motor Array 
concerned. This determined which Fibre showed a sufficient Antici­
patory Discharge to be justified in initiating a notional behavioural 
Response. Such an indication, based on the Anticipatory Discharges 
of a Cortical Array, was termed the Motor Indication. Accordingly the 
Motor Indication could be Consummatory, Preconsummatory. Protective or 
Instrumental, depending upon which Cortical Array it originated from. 
The processes by which the Motor Indication was determined was called 
the Motor Release Mechanism.
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When a sufficient Motor Indication had been detected, an Efferent 
Volley was notionally sent to the periphery to effect the Motor 
Response of the model. In addition an Active volley was sent up 
the Afferent Fibre to the same Neuronal Pool of the Cortical Array 
from which the Motor Indication had originated. The purpose of 
sending back to the Cortical Array a controlled volley reproducing 
tlie Motor Indication was to ensure accurate and sufficient registra­
tion of the action released. It also enabled timing of the registra­
tion with particular sensory inputs accompanying the taking of the 
action.
The above arrangements implemented in the Instrumental Array provide 
for the mediation of Stimulus-Response chaining. When a familiar 
sequence of chained stimuli and responses has once been laid dcwn, 
the recurrence of the first Input Pattern of the sequence leads to 
the emission of the first Instrumental Response. Because of the 
notional status of this Response as able to influence environmental 
events, its emission by the model justifies the environmental routines 
of the program in presenting the next Input Pattern of the sequence. 
This causes the emission of the next Instrumental Response, and so 
the Stimulus Response chain is reproduced.
It will have been noted that for this chaining to be effective, 
timing of events within the system is important. The Linked Constel­
lation which registers the current Input Pattern must register the 
next Response. Actually, the model was more tolerant than this.
Because of the temporal sequential effect, it was sufficient that the 
next Motor Response was represented in a Linked Constellation which 
had been formed after the Linked Constellation registering the Input 
Pattern currently in the Input, and that no Linked Constellation inter­
vened which contained some other Motor Response. Nevertheless, the 
planning of Uttley-like delays in the pathways enabled the maximum 
effect to be obtained.
Stimulus-Response chaining of this kind was relatively easy to obtain 
in the model once a familiar sequence of Input Pattern and Instrumental 
Response had been established. The difficulty was to establish the 
sequence which led to the goal: in the case of the model, an IRP 
yielding a Preconsummatory or Consummatory Response.
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Possible mechanisms which enable an animal to learn the required 
operants to reach a "reinforcement" raise all the controversies of 
learning and conditioning theory. It is not proposed to enter into 
those con troversies in this thesis. The mechanisms which v/eie incor­
porated were primarily intended to demonstrate the potential neural 
mediating power of the theory of neural integration. Secondarily 
they represented mechanisms which, in the opinion of the author, 
seem likely to be present in the brain: their essential relation­
ship to the learning process is another matter which is not intended 
to be broached.
B. Contiguity theory : Frequency Principle .
The Stimulus-Response chaining described above represents a Contiguity 
theory of learning (e.g. Guthrie, 1935; Estes, 1959).
Only the briefest mention of these theories will be made here. It 
is however necessary to report that before the introduction into the 
simulation of any further mechanisms of Instrumental action, an 
attempt was made to demonstrate the ability to reach a goal utilising 
the stimulus-response chaining principle only.
The general rationale of that attempt rested upon the following argu­
ment. Suppose that there are a number of Instrumental Responses 
which appear at random, and that one of these responses yields the 
goal. The attainment of the goal, according to the contiguity theor­
ists, brings a sequence of behaviour to a natural close. In the 
simulation the trial was ended when the goal was attained. Now since 
the emission of the "correct" response is the event which signals 
the end of the trial, it must always appear no more than once in every 
trial. The other responses will only appear in those trials where 
their random selection causes them to be emitted before the correct 
response. Consequently the correct response should occur more fre­
quently and establish itself by the single principle of frequency (i.e 
without the introduction of a special reinforcement principle). This 
was one of the characteristic arguments put forward by contiguity 
^theorists.
Considerable efforts were made to produce a convincing performance of 
the model utilising this principle. They were unsuccessful. It 
should however be emphasised that this result is not put forward to 
suggest that the argument is not valid, nor that contiguity theory is
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not sound. Even if the test had been far more exhaustive, a computer 
model cannot in principle provide such a test. Moreover, for a 
number of reasons the attempt was not conducted in the best of condi­
tions. The major problems with the model had not yet been solved. 
However, a brief test was made in the latest and most efficient ver­
sion which demonstrated Instrumental Learning with a reinforcement 
mechanism. The test consisted of running the model without rein­
forcement mechanisms being active (i.e. suspending those mechanisms). 
No convincing learning resulted. The author is of the opinion that 
this was because the runs could not be long enough for the frequency 
principle to establish a superiority of the "correct" response. The 
size of the model restricted its learning capacity and hence the 
practical length of a run, so it was not possible to overcome this 
obstacle.
These attempts are reported for the sake of completeness. It is 
appreciated that many aspects of Contiguity theory were not satis- 
facorily represented, for example, Estes' sampling principle, and the 
importance of contextual association. In some respects the theory of 
neural integration upon which the present model is based is a con­
tiguity theory. It suggests that, subject to attentional selection, 
the whole panoply of events, external and internal, can be registered. 
The author's private opinion is that the contiguity principle is the 
fundamental from which later evolutionary developments have arisen. 
That opinion is however an unsupported conjecture as far as the simula­
tions are concerned.
C. A mechanism of reinforcement
The mechanism of reinforcement used in the simulations reported, is 
not put forward as the only or main mechanism by which instrumental 
learning is mediated in animals and Man. They may nevertheless point 
to principles which are utilised in neural systems.
The simplest form of reinforcement suggested by the model was to 
arrange for the registration of the Instrumental Response in the Corti­
cal Array to take place only if the Response was successful. Success, 
in the appetitive-consummatory analogy of the model, is defined as the 
appearance in the Input of a Preconsummatory IRP. Registration means 
the incorporation in a Constellation of a representation of the 
emitted Response and could be effected or with-held by controlling the
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Afferent Volleys to the Cortical Array. The model could not, of 
course, merely be told whether a Preconsummatory IRP had appeared 
in the Input. It would have to discover this by its own powers, and 
this it could only do by waiting before registration until the Input 
Patterns which followed either did or did not reactivate a Preset 
Constellation in the Sub-cortex.
The computer implementation of this scheme was effected by delaying 
the notional relay of the Motor Response Indication in its passage 
through the Control Centre for a number of Instants before passing 
the encoded Spike Frequency to the Motor Afferent Fibre (i.e. the Fibre 
from Control Centre back up to the Cortex). If during this delay a 
Preconsummatory Response was not forthcoming from the Sub-Cortical 
Array, the notional Volley in the Motor Afferent was blocked. On the 
other hand, if such a Response had been emitted, the volley in the 
Motor Afferent was sent to the Cortex where the Response was registered 
in the Instrumental Array (the same Neuronal Pool from which the Motor 
Indication had arisen).
The basic idea was later implemented without involving a protracted 
delay by incorporating a consolidation analogy. It will be specifically 
mentioned where employed.
In the initial simulations, in which all Uttley-type delays had been 
removed, the Sensori-Motor Constellation which produced the Antici­
patory Response consisted of the Learned Record of the IRP on the 
Sensory side and the directly elicited Motor Response on the Motor side. 
The extended model necessitated the delay of the transmission of the 
Instrumental Response to the Cortex until a Preconsummatory Response 
(or absence of one) had been detected. If no further delays had 
been introduced the Instrumental Response would have been registered 
in the Linked Constellation which registered the occurrence of the IRP. 
Accordingly a notional delay was introduced into the Sensory Pathway 
to the Cortical Array. This approximately matched the delay of the 
registration of the Instrumental Response. Consequently, the signals 
registering the Instrumental Response arrived at the Cortical Array 
at the same time as those from the Input Pattern present just before 
the IRP.
It was mentioned that there were two notional Sensory projections to 
the Cortical Array, differing in notional time of arrival. Both of
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Figure 12.2 The Sensory Input Pattern was projected to three locations in the 
mode 1; to the Subcortex and to two Neuronal Arrays in the Cortex. The pathway 
to projection 2 was delayed in relation to the pathway to projection 1. 
Accordingly two representations of Input Pattern were registered in the Linked 
Constellation formed at any one Instant. That in projection 1 was the Input 
Pattern currently in the input, whilst that in projections 2 was the Input 
Pattern which had been in the input some 13 Instants earlier.
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these projections were now further delayed in relation to the 
notional time of arrival of the signals at the Sub-cortical Array.
In effect, a pattern presented to the model at time T reached the 
Sub-cortical Array at time T + m, the first projection of the Corti­
cal Array at T + n, the second projection at T + o, where o > n > m.
The Instrumental Response reaching the periphery at T was registered 
at T + n. (Figure 12.2).
Aside from the tie-up between Innately Recognised stimulation and 
reinforcement implied in this scheme, the temporal implications appear 
somewhat implausible. In Chapter 3, it was pointed out that the 
dependence of reinforcement upon innate propensities was considered 
as only one of the methods of assessment of results available to an 
animal. Nevertheless, the close relationship between Need satisfac­
tion and Instrumental performance must make such a tie-up plausible 
as one of the mechanisms available. The temporal implications are 
harder to deal with and will be left until the problem can be seen in 
relation to other possible mechanisms and the modification of the one 
just described. However, many instrumental actions of simple animals 
are of a continuous rather than a single event kind. Moreover the 
sensory imput of the animal, unlike that of the simulation, is only 
partly composed of configurations which change. Accordingly the 
Instrumental Response might continue right up to the time that the 
IRP appears, and even beyond its appearance, and so make the temporal 
delay required minimal or even unnecessary. Also, in the advanced 
nervous system there would presumably be neural mechanisms available 
to the animal which enable sequences of patterns to be viewed as 
units. These might be "labelled" by the Instrumental Response in a 
manner similar to that in the simulation. Finally, as mentioned above, 
the system could be supplemented with a consolidation hypothesis. A 
provisional registration could be laid down without utilising delay, and 
this could either be confirmed or not according to subsequent events.
D. Negative reinforcement by suppression
Another mechanism of reinforcement utilised the representation of 
suppression of effector action (i.e. Not-Do Neuronal Pools). The mech­
anism described in C above could be modified so that when a Preconsum­
matory Response followed an Instrumental Response (behavioural success), 
the Instrumental Response was registered in the Activation Neuronal 
Pool of the Cortical Array (Do Neuronal Pool). When a Preconsummatory
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IRP failed to appear, the Instrumental Response was registered in 
the corresponding Suppression Pool of the Array. When on a subsequent 
occasion the Constellation was reactivated by the Sensory Input, then 
in the case of the Instrumental Response having been successful, on 
the former occasion, an Anticipatory Discharge was obtainable from 
tlie Activation Pool: in the case of its having been unsuccessful, the 
Anticipatory Discharge was obtained from the Suppression Pool. These 
could be weighed against each other to determine whether or not the 
Response should be emitted, i.e. to determine the Instrumental Motor 
Indication.
E . Summary of Learned Instrumental Response Arrangements
The output of the Cortical Instrumental Array was examined for the 
Anticipatory Response. The appearance of such an Indicated Motor 
Response led to the immediate dispatch of an Efferent volley to the 
notional periphery (Motor Output of the model). A Spike Frequency was 
prepared but not transmitted to the Cortical Array until an appropriate 
Response had been emitted by the sub-cortical Array. If no such 
Response were received within a given time (13 Instants), the equi­
valent volley was sent over the corresponding Afferent Motor Fibre 
to the suppression Pool.
It will be appreciated that this scheme avoided one of the difficulties 
encountered in the initial simulations in relation to the Suppression 
Pools. In the initial simulations the Fibres to the Suppresssion Pools 
were active whenever the model was notionally doing nothing, i.e. 
most of the time. The new arrangements involved activity in the Motor 
Pools, effector or suppressor, only when it was necessary to register 
the effects of an instrumental action. Neither solution seems entirely 
satisfactory. Konorski's (1967) suggestion that the state of arousal 
governs this activity seems entirely plausible. Such an assumption 
and its incorporation into the general ideas of the model will be 
discussed in a later chapter.
F . Combined Do and Not-do Registration
One scheme of furthering Instrumental Learning must be mentioned, 
as neurologically it seemed to the author to be the most plausible. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain a convincing performance 
utilising it. This may however have been due to the stage of develop­
ment of the model in which it was investigated. It would be useful
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to be able to try it out again in a more advanced version having 
both effective Motivational Respresentation and an adequate Exci­
tation and Inhibition level control system.
This scheme was neurologically very similar to those which have just 
been described. The only difference was the (neural) set of rules 
permitting registration of the Effective Instrumental Response and 
the Suppressive Instrumental Response (i.e. Do and Not-Do). It will 
be recalled that in the schemes described above, either the Do was 
registered only when successful; or in another scheme, the Do was 
registered when successful and the Not-do when unsuccessful. In the 
main scheme intended for the model and now being described, both the 
Do and Not-do Pools were always activated after an Instrumental Res­
ponse, regardless of success or failure. However, the registration 
of the Not-do came somwhat later than the registration of the Do.
The rationale of this mechanism was quite close to that of Con­
tiguity theory. In a problem situation the animal emits several 
responses, which we categorise as wrong in the sense that they do not 
succeed in changing the situation, that is, in eliciting from the 
environment an input radically different from that which pertained 
before the emission of the Response. These wrong Responses are 
registered in one Linked Constellation as the activity of a Do Pool 
and in a slightly later Linked Constellation as a Not-do Pool. These 
balance each other. When the animal produces a "right" Response, the 
input is assumed to change radically. The registration of the Do is 
in a Linked Constellation the sensory part of which matches the sensory 
pattern appertaining to the situation before the emission of the 
Response. The delay in registration of the Not-do, leads to this being 
registered in the Linked Constellation containing the Sensory pattern 
appertaining to the situation after the emission of the Instrumental 
Response. Consequently on a subsequent occasion when the animal is 
faced with the sensory input preceding its emissions, i.e. the problem 
situation, all its previously emitted responses except one will have 
matched Learned Records in which Do and Not-do are balanced. The 
exception will be the Instrumental Response which successfully changed 
the input pattern. This will have only the Linked Constellation 
reactivated which contained the Do. The Not-do will be reactivated 
only after the situation has been changed by the emission of the Res­
ponse. This scheme has the advantage that it also allows for an
279
Instrumental Response to be suppressed after it has acheived its 
purpose. It may also be noted that there is some evidence that, at 
least in the periphery, both effector and inhibitory excitation of 
motor fibres occurs, the balance being modified (See e.g. Groves 
and Thompson, 19 73).
Ill The Sub-cortical and Cortical Control of Motor Actions
The introduction of Instrumental Responses into the model raised a 
problem which appears to have received little attention in other 
neurological models. This may be because the problem is specific 
to the present model. It is the problem of the balance of control 
between the emission of responses as the result of an innate prop­
ensity to do so, and the emission of responses under the influence 
of experience. To avoid a lengthy discussion at this point, the 
theoretical aspects will not be considered here, and only the arrange­
ments necessary to deal with the problem will be described.
The difficulty may be seen in relation to the release of responses 
discussed in the previous section. The model shows how a learned 
indication of the required motor action can be obtained from the 
Cortical Array when the current Sensory input matches that in a Learned 
Constellation laid down on a previous occasion, provided that Constel­
lation has a motor representation, i.e. it is a Sensori-motor Constel­
lation. This means that the learned indication of what to do next comes 
from the cortical Array. Yet the Cortical Array cannot produce the 
Motor Indication unless there has at some time previously been an emis­
sion from the Sub-cortical Array. This is the only way in the model 
that a Sensori-motor Linked Constellation can arise in the Cortical Array 
The Sub-cortical emmission is in this sense primary.
In the present context it does not matter whether the emission from 
the Sub-cortical Array is totally dependent, partially dependent, or 
totally independent of external stimulation for its primary emission.
The point is that on its first appearance, whatever the mechanism, the 
emission of a response must be independent of experience. With sub­
sequent experience the emission of the response comes under the control 
of that experience.
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Figure 12.3 Illustrating the function of the Control Centre 
(notional Thalamus). The Motor Release Mechanism has to choose 
between a Response indicated by the Sub-cortical Instrumental 
Array or the Cortical Instrumental Array. At each Instant the 
Control Centre must encode the set of Motor Afferent Fibres as 
Active or Inactive and then calculate their Spike Frequencies 
accordingly.
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In the model this control must derive from the Learned Records in 
the Cortical Array. As pointed out above, the first emission of 
the Response, at least, must come from the Sub-cortex. A possible 
solution which was considered was to have the first emission only 
coming from the Sub-cortical Array, and subsequent emissions by 
reference to the Cortical Array. However, not only would this hardly 
do from the point of view of plausibility, but in fact it did not 
work in the simulation. The organism will have to emit Responses in 
a variety of situations in its later life: unless the subsequent situ­
ation resembles the former situation sufficiently for the response to 
be derived from an indication in the Cortical Array, then it will be 
unable to emit the Response in that situation. Its power in novel 
situations would be seriously diminished. Additionally, if the situ­
ation were not novel, but was associated with some alternative Response, 
it could only make the latter. Moreover, it may have completely for­
gotten (lost its learning) relating to its earlier use of a Response 
before it needed to emit the Response again. In such a system, an 
animal could 'forget' to be able to emit its most characteristic instru­
mental actions. In the model, a particular difficulty occurred. If 
by any chance it learned a Response as "correct" which afterwards 
became "incorrect" due to a change in contingency, it could never 
remedy the position. As long as it "remembered" the occasion of the 
first emission of the Response, it would repeat it in the "wrong" 
situation, and it could never emit the Response in any other situation 
because there would be no Learned Indication from the Cortical Array. 
After it had forgotten the occasion of the first emission, it could 
never emit the Response at all.
An alternative is to have the mechanism which controls the emission of 
Instrumental Responses sensitive to both the Sub-cortical Array and 
the Cortical Array, and to initiate that Response which is represented 
by the most powerful Efferent volley. This was tried and produced a 
disruption of learning which prevented a convincing performance by the 
model. (Figure 12.3).
The reason for this disruption may be seen by reference to the reasonable 
suppositions controlling the emission of Responses from the Sub-cortical 
Array, that is, from factors other than those due to learning. Although 
opinions may differ as to what these factors may be, it will probably 
be agreed that they would include : the time interval since the last
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emission of that response; motivational factors especially related 
to the response in question; the tendency of the animal to emit 
certain responses in the presence of certain kinds of stimulation, 
e.g. in darkness. These factors, being by definition those which do 
not represent learning, would operate in a probability sense to pro­
duce the response more frequently in some situations than others.
Unless such responses can be suppressed, they are as likely as not 
to appear in the middle of a learned performance and to disrupt it.
This, in fact, is what happened in the model. Just as the model was 
about to make the "right" Response it would be interrupted by a Sub- 
cortical emission.
The next method to be tried out imposed an alternating gate succes­
sively upon the Cortical and the Sub-cortical emission. This seemed 
plausible having regard to the general ubiquity of rhythmic inhibitory 
effects in the system. It worked considerably better than the method 
in which both sources of Response were consulted simultaneously, but 
the performance was still subject to disruption.
Finally the scheme was introduced which seemed both most reasonable 
and which provided a satisfactory performance. In this version, the 
mechanism which controlled the initiation of Instrumental Responses 
looked first to the Cortical Array for the Learned Motor Indication.
Any such Indication suppressed the emission of a Response from the 
Sub-cortical Array. Consequently it was not possible for a Sub-cortical 
emission to disturb an emission indicated by the Cortical Array.
In the early versions of the extended model, this method still gave 
trouble. In these versions the active Suppression had not yet been 
introduced as a negative reinforcement to eradicate "wrong" Responses. 
Although the system should only have registered "correct" Responses 
(see previous Section) it often made mistakes. Once it had registered 
an "incorrect" Response, it was unable to remedy its error, because 
it went on indefinitely emitting this Response under Cortical influence. 
Theoretically it should have ceased to do so by decay of memory. 
Unfortunately the length of runs could not be made long enough to test 
this. In some respects the shortness of the runs magnified theoretical 
difficulties. A primitive learning system would probably only learn 
with great slowness; consequently, one or two errors would not prevent 
learning in this way. To produce a convincing Response in the short runs
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available to the simulation, learning had to be made very strong on 
a single Instant.
To combat this difficulty, before Suppression was introduced, the 
rule that Response Indications from the Cortical Array had preference 
was qualified. If the model had not achieved a Consummatory Response 
within a certain number of Instants, then the Sub-cortical Array had 
preference. This effectively cured the model of its perseverance of 
an error. Actually although replaced by later alternatives, the 
method just mentioned does not seem implausible to the present author. 
The satisfaction of certain needs of the animal are so imperative that 
it seems feasible that if learned behaviour fails, the animal should 
revert to behaviour of a kind from which it gained its original 
learned skills: in the model, to actions emitted under the control of 
the Sub-cortical Arrays.
However, in the simulations the method just described became unim­
portant, because of the introduction of the principle of Suppression 
as an aspect of Reinforcement. A "wrong" Response, even if rewarded 
by an IRP, would on its subsequent "unreinforced" emissions be regis­
tered in a Linked Constellation which included representation in a 
Not-do Neuronal Pool. The Motor Indication from the Cortical Array 
after a number of ineffectual emissions was suppressed by the greater 
Efferent Discharge from the Not-do than from the Do Pool. Consequently, 
a Learned Indication disappeared. Either it gave way to another 
Cortical Motor Indication, or if no such Indication was available, to 
a Sub-cortical emission. In either case the model was released from 
the trap of its own error.
In effect, this behaviour in the model demonstrated the importance of 
extinction in the motor learning process: effectively the negative 
reinforcement of ineffectual Responses mediated a form of extinction.
This aspect of the model has been discussed at some length, because 
it absorbed much effort and time in the development of the model. The 
background of the investigation was the variable and uncertain perfor­
mance of the model due to lack of control of Excitation and Inhibition. 
In this sense the latter difficulties may have contributed towards the 
realisation of the problem of competition between innate and learned 
sources of Instrumental Actions. A model which had been more reliable 
may have produced a learned Response more easily, and tolerated some
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logical indefiniteness in this problem.
Although theoretical implications were to be avoided in this chapter, 
it may perhaps be suggested that the problem discussed above is not 
specific to the present model. At first sight it may appear that the 
problem arises from the individual characteristics of the model: the 
allocation of Learning to the Cortical Array and other aspects of 
Response emission to the Sub-cortical Array; or to the preservation 
of the key-trigger mechanism entirely separate from the Learned 
aggregates of experience (discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 in connection 
with Pringle's 1951 model). This does not seem to be so upon fuller 
consideration. The competition between the emission of responses 
under the pressure of factors independent of learning, and those urged 
by learning, would appear to arise regardless of the particular 
arrangements by which these factors are implemented. Provided one 
accepts that the animal would emit responses independent of its 
having learned the most favourable occasions upon which to do so, then 
it would appear that a neurological question arises as to the neural 
basis of the integration of the two influences.
IV Mechanisms of Motivational Arrays
It remains to explain the principles by which the Motivational Neuronal 
Pools were operated. As the principles of action of the Cortical and 
Sub-cortical Motivational Arrays differed, they will be dealt with 
separately.
A. Cortical Array
The Afferent Fibres of the Cortical Motivational Array were conceived 
as signalling metabolic and hormonal events, such as hunger, thirst, 
sexual urge and so forth. It was intended that each Pool signalling 
a certain condition would be balanced by a reciprocal Pool signalling 
the opposite condition, e.g. hunger and satiation (see e.g. Deutsch 
and Koopmans, 1976). Unfortunately there was no room in the structure 
of the simulation to fit these in. They were planned for a larger simu­
lation which was programmed but not run.
When any Afferent Fibre of the model, e.g. a Sensory Fibre, is active, 
then in accordance with the general principles of the theory. Linked
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Neurons within the Neuronal Pool served by that Fibre receive Excita­
tion. This Excitation is then distributed across the Linked Constel­
lations to which those Neurons belong. In this sense any active 
Afferent Fibre may be seen to drive or bias the system. Accordingly 
if Neurons within the Motivational Pools were to become members of 
Linked Constellations, the activity of the Motivational Afferents would 
bias those Linked Constellations. Had Neurons been linked, in the 
manner characteristic of other kinds of Neuronal Pools, whenever the 
Afferent Fibre was active, then when the Fibre representing, say, 
hunger, was active. Neurons in the Pools would be linked into the 
Linked Constellation forming at that time. The Learned Record of an 
event occurring when the animal was hungry would include such Linked 
Neurons. When the animal was hungry on a subsequent occasion the 
Learned Record of the earlier event would be primed by the current 
activity in the Motivational Afferent signalling Hunger. Consequently, 
the threshold of recognition of the stimuli present on the earlier 
occasion would be lowered. Such a lowering of threshold would repre­
sent a motivational attentional mechanism, by which the animal would 
be disposed to respond more readily to stimuli present upon earlier 
occasion of hunger.
Although such a mechanism appears plausible as a neural attribute of 
nervous systems, it was not considered to attack the root of motiva­
tional function. If the Cortical Motivational Pools operated on the 
same principles as other Pools in the system, they might be considered 
as merely an addition to the Sensory Arrays, the only difference being 
that their Afferent Fibres signalled internal metabolic events rather 
than external or proprio-ceptive events. It is true that such events 
would act as selective cues, biassing in the system in the same way 
as sensory stimuli would bias the system. However, in the context of 
Instrumental behaviour, they would act equally upon "unsuccessful" 
as upon "successful" actions.
So far described the metabolic or hormonal Afferent Fibres are not a 
mechanism of reinforcement. They do not assist the animal in discover­
ing which Instrumental Response led to success in which particular 
environmental situation. For this purpose it is necessary for the 
Excitation from metabolic afferents to feed selectively only to the 
Learned Records of successful Instrumental Actions and not to unsuccess­
ful ones. In terms of my model, the inputs from Motivational Afferents
2ü6
must feed only to Linked Constellations containing Linked Neurons in 
the "right" Response Pools and not the "wrong" ones.
Ideally the way to accomplish this would be to have a double represen­
tation of each need Afferent, i.e. two Fibres for the particular con­
dition of, say. Hunger, and two others for the condition of Satiation.
One of these would act as the Contextual Need Input. Its Neuronal 
Pool operates on the same principles as other Pools in the system. The 
activity of the Pool acts merely to bias the system as described above. 
The other Fibre may be considered as a reinforcement of "successful 
results" Fibre. In fact these two Fibres were amalgamated into a kind 
of compromise in the simulation, since there was inadequate space in 
the structure to accommodate both.
In the simulation, the Afferent Motivational Fibres operated as follows. 
When a Motivational Fibre is active, the Neurons within its Pool are 
Excited. They are not, however, linked. For linking to occur in these 
pools, there is a special switch which had to be turned on only when 
success appears. In the implementation in the simulation, this mech­
anism was devised as the simplest which would be neurologially plausible 
and concordant with the principles of the model. It was not however 
considered to represent the actual mechanism which might perform the 
same function in the brain: in the brain it is suggested that the switch 
would be neuro-chemical in nature(see below). In the simulation the 
switch was modelled as follows. The Integrating Neurons of the Motiva­
tional Cortical Pools were given a second notional threshold, an 
Integrative Connection Threshold. The distribution of these thresholds 
had a mean which was approximately double the mean of the intrinsic 
Thresholds of the Neurons of non-Motivational Pools. These higher Thresh­
olds did not affect Discharge. Their range was set such that the 
Excitation arriving from an Afferent Fibre carrying the Spike Frequency 
customary for an ordinary Active Fibre did not succeed in linking any 
Neurons. When an event signifying "success" occurred, the Spike 
Frequency of the Afferent Fibre was increased to double the Active level, 
thus causing Neurons in the Motivational Pool to be Linked.
The occasion for the switch to be on, that is the assessment of "success" 
was the occurrence of a Preconsummatory IRP in the input. The particular 
Motivational Pool in which the switch was turned on was that Pool which 
was (i) already active, e.g. the animal was notionally hungry when it
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received the sensory signals of food in its mouth, and (ii) the Pre­
consummatory Response was one which was neurally related to the 
Motivational Pool, i.e. the food-in-the-mouth IRP would be related 
to the Pool signalling Hunger.
This scheme is naturally intended to be interpreted fairly liberally 
in relating it to the animal nervous system. There is evidence that 
there are neural receptors which give rise to activity related to 
metabolic states, e.g. sugar and salt content of the blood; these 
would give rise to the normal level activity of the Motivational Fibres, 
exciting, say, the Hunger Pool. This is far too crude a description 
but expresses the general idea. However, there is no reason why an 
empty stomach should not activate an "empty stomach" Pool. Similarly, 
hormonal influences may act as long term clocks ensuring that motor 
actions are released with reasonable frequency: this, however, related 
more closely to the interpretation of the Sub-cortical Motivational 
Pools, dealts with below.
The reader is asked not to construe this theoretical structure as a 
narrow "needs" hypothesis of behaviour. As will be discussed in a 
later chapter, the approach is that all instrumental and consummatory 
responses are equipped with long-term clocks of similar character. If 
a rat does not run for a long time, then the 'run' Motivational Pool 
Afferent will be active. One must assume that the motoviational repre­
sentations in the brain are not a few primary Need Pools, but are a 
vast system of monitoring the behaviour of the animal, with every impor­
tant effector need system represented.
The Motivational Pools in the Cortical Array therefore worked somewhat 
as follows.
The model was assumed to be motivated (say. Hungry) and in a situation 
where the taking of a certain action would bring stimulation appropriate 
to that condition, say, food-in-the-moutn. The Input Pattern repre­
sented the sensory and proprio-ceptive aspects of the situation. The 
state of hunger (or perhaps one should say, food-deprivation) was repre­
sented by having the Afferent Fibre to one of the Cortical Motivational 
Pools active. It will be recalled that in the particular implementation
just described, the Spike Frequency of an Active Afferent Fibre to a
Motivational Pool could take one of two values. At one value the Fibre 
was only capable of biassing and at the other it linked Neurons. For
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convenience these may be referred to as blas-activity and linking- 
activity. In the starting situation the Motivational Afferent was 
only bias-active.
On the first Trial, the activity of the Motivational Fibre had little 
effect on the system, because there were no Linked Neurons in the 
Motivational Pool served by the bias-active Afferent. When the model 
emitted a right Instrumental Response, the Input Pattern was changed 
by the notional environmental part of the program, to the Preconsum­
matory IRP (notionally, say, food-in-the-mouth). The IRP elicited 
the Preconsummatory Response from the Sub-cortical Array. The Precon­
summatory Response, in addition to releasing notional Preconsummatory 
behaviour, e.g. chewing and masticating, initiated an increase in the 
Spike Frequency of the Afferent Fibre to the relevant Motivational Pool 
bringing it to Linking-activity. Consequently the Constellation being 
formed at that time would contain a representation of the Motivational 
Pool concerned.
The timing of the change from bias to Linking in the Motivational Pool 
was arranged so that it coincided with the registration of the Instru­
mental Response (Section II,C). It will be recalled that the registra­
tion of both the Instrumental Response and the Sensory Pattern in the 
Input at the time the Instrumental Resposne was initiated, was deferred 
until a Preconsummatory IRP had had time to appear. If it did appear 
then the IRP, the Instrumental Response, the pre-response Input Pattern 
were all registered in one Constellation (or a series of temporally 
adjacent Constellations). Now, with the Introduction of Motivational 
representation, in the case of a successful Response, the Motivational 
Pool was also registered in the Constellation (Figure 12.4).
On a subsequent test trial, when the same Input Pattern was presented, 
the Sensory input reactivated all the set of Linked Constellations 
matching it. The Motivational Fibre relating to Hunger was active at 
the lower level. On this occasion the Afferent Fibre found Neurons in 
its Pool which were Linked. Consequently Excitation was passed by 
these Neurons selectively to the Linked Constellation which contained 
also a representation of the current input pattern and the Instrumental 
Response. The Input Pattern therefore merely acted as a releasing 
trigger bringing the Instrumental Response above threshold. In the 
absence of a Motivational input, the Instrumental Response would have 
had to be powered entirely by the Sensory input.
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It may have been noted that the mechanism which has just been described 
is in itself a selective mechanism which makes the presence of the 
reinforcement mechanisms described earlier in this chapter somewhat redun­
dant. For example, suppose that all Responses, right or wrong, were 
registered as was assumed by contiguity theory. In this case, an 
Input Pattern would reactivate all the Linked Constellations matching 
it, and all the Responses, right or wrong, included in the various 
Sensori-motor Constellations laid down, would be equally reactivated. 
However, only one of them would have the Motivational Input. It would 
be going beyond the terms of reference of this thesis to try to 
decide which mechanism finds a place in actual neural mechanisms. What 
seems probable is that in a sophisticated animal various mechanisms of 
selection of motor action are available. They represent modes in which 
the system can operate to its best advantage. For example, there will 
be occasions when the motivational guide to activity gives wrong 
answers. It would then be useful to be able to suppress the motivational 
mechanism and revert to mechanisms relying only upon the conjunction of 
sensory patterns and results: and pari passu with other mechanisms.
It may have been noted that the Motivational mechanism just described 
is not unlike Freud's theory of Primary and Secondary Processes. The 
Motivational Pool energises the "goal image" (Primary Process), from 
which Excitation flows into the neural apparatus for achieving that 
goal, the Instrumental Response (Secondary Process). This relationship 
is illustrated in Figure 12.5.
It may be mentioned at this point that considerable difficulty was 
experienced in practice with the effects of Motivational Representation, 
and consequently with the implementation of a concept of motivational 
bias proceeding from "goal" to "current action". At a late stage some 
possible solutions were programmed, although not actually run sufficiently 
to assess the validity as a possible mechanism of behaviour.
B . Response initiation biassing: Sub-cortical Motivation Array 
Unlike the other Cortical and Sub-cortical parts of the model, the 
Motivation Arrays do not bear the customary structural and functional 
relationship to each other. In fact the term Sub-cortical Motivation 
Array is probably misleading, and should be perhaps be something more 
like the Unlearned Response Initiation Biassing Array, or some such.
The author must apologise for introducing inappropriate terms into the
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model. The aim is simply to be able to identify shortly which part 
of the model is being referred to. The difficulty is that parts of 
the model do not necessarily correspond to aspects of psychological 
function: according to the model psychological function is the product 
of the sum of the parts. On the other hand it would be dangerous, 
not to say presumptuous, to label them with anatomical regions of the 
brain.
The term Sub-cortical Motivation Array was chosen because the function 
of the Array resembles that of the Cortical Motivation Array in that 
it biasses Linked Constellations. It was termed Sub-cortical not only 
because its sites would probably be sub-cortical, but because it is 
concerned primarily with innate rather than learned proclivities of 
the organism: it biasses Preset Constellations.
The function of the Cortical Motivation Array was to bias the model 
towards the production of a particular "learned" Instrumental Response: 
that is a Response which may have been emitted originally entirely with­
out reference to experience, but would be emitted again from the 
Cortical Array in circumstances where on former occasions its emission 
had been successful. The state of one or other of the Cortical 
Motivational Fibres defined the kind of environmental result which the 
system was aiming at. The activity of these Fibres was intended to 
represent hormonal and metabolic states such as Hunger, Thirst and Sex.
By contrast, the action of the Sub-cortical Motivation Array related 
to the emission of Instrumental Responses at the Sub-cortical Level, 
i.e. the initial emissions which are not the result of individual 
experience. Since the general mechanisms of Sub-cortical emissions of 
Instrumental Responses have not yet been described, their biassing by 
the Sub-cortical Motivation Array will be left until the next Section, 
where it will be included in the general account.
The general effect was to bias the Sub-cortical emission of Instrumental 
Actions according to the notional passage of time since the last 
emission of a particular response. This gave effect to the view that 
there is a disposition to utilise the motor effector system regardless 
of the consequences of doing so, i.e. an "exercise" urge. The manner 
in which this ties up with the general Instrumental strategy of the 
model will appear in due course.
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c. Preconsummatory, Consummatory and Protective Responses; motivation 
No mention has been made of motivational influences on types of 
response other than Instrumental. This is not because such influences 
were considered to be theoretically unimportant, but because at this 
stage of development of the model their representation was not immed­
iately relevant to the purposes in hand. Theoretically it would appear 
that the mechanisms applied to the Instrumental Cortical Array could 
be applied to the other Arrays. In effect, the threshold of elicita­
tion would be lowered by Neurons in Motivational Pools linked into 
Constellations which recorded Consummatory, Preconsummatory or Protec­
tive IRPs. It seems probable that the system might be developed.
The appearance of a Consummatory IRP might have the effect of linking 
sources of Motivational Excitation into the Constellations recording 
the Preconsummatory event, rather than the Consummatory event itself.
As these possibilities were not investigated in the simulation, the 
matter will not be futher discussed.
V Conclusion
In the previous chapter the main notional anatomical parts of the 
extended model were described. In this chapter the main principles 
of operation were described in some detail. The manner in which a 
Response could be initiated by a Cortical Motor Indication was explained, 
and other details of Response mechanism given. The Cortical Motivation 
Array and its method of operation in two modes, a bias-only mode and 
a linking mode, enable a source of Motivational Excitation to be 
connected to the Linked Constellations representing particular events, 
such as the occurrence of IRPs. The question of selection of response 
emission from cortical or sub-cortical centres was discussed.
It remains to describe the principles of organisation of the sub-cortical 
mechanisms which determined which particular Response would be emitted 
when the Motor Release Mechanism referred to the Sub-cortical Array.
This will be dealt with in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 13
RESPONSE EMISSION: SOME SUB-CORTICAL MECHANISMS
I Organisation of Sub-cortical Instrumental Responses
In Section III the question of the emission of Instrumental Res­
ponses was discussed in relation to the decision which the Motor 
Release Mechanism must make as to whether to emit the Response 
indicated by the Cortical ("learned") or Sub-cortical ("innate") 
apparatus. In the version most frequently adopted the Motor 
Release Mechanism looked first to the Cortical Array for a Motor 
Response Indication. Failing such an Indication, it permitted the 
release of the Sub-cortical Response. (See Figures 12.1 and 12.3).
It remains then to consider the arrangements whereby one Response 
rather than another would be urged by the Sub-cortical Array, that 
is, which Efferent Fibre of the Sub-cortical Instrumental Array 
would be dominant when the Motor Release Mechanism had occasion to 
refer to it.
A. Some comments on the status of differing versions of the model 
As in other aspects of the model, the arrangements for the activa­
tion of Sub-cortical Instrumental Responses differed from version 
to version of the simulation. Since this variation of simulated 
mechanism applied to a nunber of aspects of the model, it is perhaps 
necessary to clarify the strategy adopted.
It is not the case that the most recent version of a mechanism 
necessarily represents the most plausible theoretically, or even 
the one which worked best. In this respect a distinction may be made 
between the means used to implement the basic theory of neural inte­
gration, and the various mechanisms employed to try to develop a more 
realistic brain model. The changes introduced into the simulation of 
the basic theory were aimed at overcoming certain problems which had 
presented themselves in connection with that theory. These were 
mostly concerned with control of Excitation and Inhibition and the 
formation of Integrative Connections. Not all modifications which
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were introduced proved to be improvements, but the aim of such modi­
fications was the remedy of difficulties, and it is felt that 
eventually a solution was obtained. In regard to such basic problems, 
the most recent version may be regarded as the most definitive form 
of the model of neural integration.
The position was rather different in respect of the aspects of the 
model simulating behavioural mechanisms. These mechanisms do not 
go to the root of the model. They are merely illustrations of how 
such medianisms might be implemented by the theory of neural integra­
tion. Theoretically, their aim is suggestive only. A number of 
possible mechanisms seemed worthy of simulation. These are not neces­
sarily alternative explanations; they may be complementary. . . the 
brain consists of very large numbers of sub-divisions . . . each with 
a special architecture and circuit diagram; to describe one is cer­
tainly not to describe them all." (Hubei, 1979). For example, more 
than one of the mechanisms of "reinforcement" described in a previous 
section may find a place in a sophisticated nervous system, and as 
argued in Chapters 2 and 3, these may only represent a part of the 
reinforcement repertoire of an advanced animal.
It would have been satisfying to have been able to simulate a larger 
scale model in which different versions of a behavioural mechanism 
could have been incorporated into a single model. However, this 
would not only have involved a very large model to accommodate these 
variations, but would also have required the designing of mechanisms 
whereby the model could select between the use of one variation and 
another according to circumstances. This was beyond the resources 
available to the author. Accordingly the strategy was adopted of 
simulating one version of a mechanism in one set of runs, noting its 
characteristics and then passing on to another version. These experi­
ments were not necessarily in runs which gave a convincing overall 
performance in the sense of a decisive demonstration of learning to 
solve a particular behavioural problem. Nevertheless the manner in 
which the mechanism worked could be seen, and implications noted which 
may have been difficult to see at a verbal level. No claim is there­
fore made that all the modifications reported were demonstrated as 
necessary to, or even contributory to, the improvement of performance. 
They are intended to illustrate how behavioural mechanisms might be 
neurally implemented.
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Because a number of variations were simulated it is difficult to 
avoid confusing the reader as to what was done on particular occa­
sions. On the other hand, the variations can best be understood 
when described together. Accordingly, it is proposed first to 
describe the mechansim of Sub-cortical Instrumental control as it 
appeared in the most recent version of the simulation. This was 
the version which will in due course be reported as demonstrating 
overall performance analogical with animal behaviour. In the 
subsequent Sub-sections of this Section, a number of other arrange­
ments will be described, and their characteristics briefly noted.
The reader will of course be reminded in due course of the main 
features present in any run when its performance is reported.
B . "Time since last emission" mechanism
This was the mechanism used to activate Sub-cortical Instrumental 
Responses in the most recent versions of the simulation.
It will be recalled that the Sub-cortical Instrumental Array consisted 
of 4 Neuronal Pools. These Pools did not differ in principle from 
other Neuronal Pools in the Sub-cortical Arrays of the model: they 
contained Neurons which belonged to Preset Constellations. However, 
in the version now being described, the Preset Constellations used 
to mediate Sub-cortical Instrumental Responses differed from those 
used to mediate other Sub-cortical Responses, e.g. Preconsummatory, 
Consummatory or Protective.
The Preset Constellations to which the Integrating Neurons in the 
Instrumental Array belonged were not Sensori-motor Constellations, 
as were the Preset Constellations mediating Responses from other Sub- 
cortical Arrays (at least in this version), Instead they were what 
may be termed Drive-Motor Linked Constellations. In the case of 
other Responses (e.g. Preconsummatory), the Sub-cortical Response 
was activated when an Innately Recognised Pattern (IRP) occurred 
which matched the Sensory portion of the Preset Constellation. This 
did not apply to the Neurons of the Sub-cortical Instrumental Array. 
The Preset Constellations to which they belonged lacked Sensory 
representation. They did, however, include linked Neurons located in 
one or other of the Neuronal Pools of the Sub-cortical Motivational 
Array. For example, a number of Integrating Neurons in the first 
Pool of the Sub-cortical Instrumental Array were linked to a number
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of Neurons in the first Pool of the Sub-cortical Motivational Array: 
this formed one Preset Drive-Motor Constellation. A number of Neurons 
in tlie second Pool of the Sub-cortical Instrumental Array were linked 
to a nuiiber of Neurons in the second Pool of the Sub-cortical Motiva­
tional Array, and so forth. (Of course, as with the model generally, 
the idea was intended to extend to selections of Pools acting together, 
i.e. Motor Patterns, rather than single columns, but room within the 
model did not permit the simulation of this).
The action of the Sub-cortical Motivational Array in driving Sub-corti­
cal Instrumental Responses may now be considered. This was extremely 
simple. Like all other Neuronal Pools, those of the Sub-cortical 
Motivational Array possessed Afferent Fibres. When one of these Fibres 
was active, the Neurons within its Pool became Excited. This Excita­
tion was conveyed across the Preset Linked Constellation to the Linked 
Neurons of the corresponding Instrumental Neuronal Pool. If only one 
of the Sub-cortical Afferent Fibres was active, then the Efferent Fibre 
of the Corresponding Sub-cortical Istrumental Pool gave a differential 
Motor Discharge. If more than one Afferent Fibre was active, then the 
Discharges of the Sub-cortical Instrumental Pools were in competition 
with each other. The Motivational Pools drove the corresponding 
Instrumental Response.
The activity in the set of Afferent Fibres to the Sub-cortical Motiva­
tional Array determined which of the Efferent Fibres of the Sub-cortical 
Instrumental Array would be dominant. In the simulation the Afferents 
were controlled by a set of notional biochemical clocks. Each Afferent 
Fibre to the Sub-cortical Motivational Array was provided with a Clock,
i.e. a counting variable which incremented at each Instant. The clock 
was set to zero whenever the Motor Response to which the Fibre related 
was performed by the model. When the clock registered a certain time 
interval since being set (the Sub-cortical Drive Threshold) its 
Afferent Fibre was alloted an increase in Spike Frequency. At each sub­
sequent Instant the Spike Frequency was increased by a further increment, 
The Four Afferent Fibres were subjected to a notional collateral 
Inhibition so that only the dominant Fibre carried a Discharge. In the 
customary manner of the model, this dominant Fibre was defined as Active 
and allotted the appropriate Spike Frequency due to an active Fibre. 
Consequently the active Fibre to the Sub-cortical Motivational Array 
was that Fibre whose related Response had not been exercised for the
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Figure 13.1 Sub-cortical mechanism of motor initiation. Each Response 
Neuronal Pool (R 1, etc) has an accompanying Sub-cortical Motivational 
Pool (pressor pools) (D 1, etc). Excitation from Afferent Fibres driven 
by metabolic or hormonal generators activate the pressor pools. Each 
metabolic generator acts as a biological clock, providing increasingly 
intense excitation according to the time since the clock was last reset. 
The most powerfully driven Sub-cortical Response is passed to the Motor 
Release Mechanism. The emission of a Response through that mechanism 
resets the relevant clock.
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longest time interval. It will be appreciated that the urging of 
Sub-cortical Instrumental Array did not guarantee that it was emitted.
It was only emitted when the Motor Release Mechanism had occasion to 
refer to that Array, i.e. upon a failure of Learned Response Indica­
tion from the Cortical Array. Nor did it mean that the Sub-cortical 
Array urged the emission of Instrumental Responses according to some 
kind of rota. The emission of a Response as the result of a Cortical 
indication still reset the Clock to zero. In fact, the emission of a 
Response according to a Cortical Indication was in effect a "release" 
of the Sub-cortical Response, triggered by the Cortical Indicator 
(see Figures 12.1 and 13.1) .
This system was intended to summarise the notion that for every action 
the animal can take, there is a pool of Neurons which acts as a bio­
chemical drive unit to press for the exercise of that action. Although 
expressed in the form of only two independent Motivational Arrays, each 
having only a few Fibres, the idea is of a principle which may be 
applied both atomically to the myriad motor elements of the animal ner­
vous system, and more integratedly to organisation of those elements.
Each effector unit, i.e. muscle system, would have its own driving 
Neuronal Pool. Co-ordinated innately programmed organisations of 
effectors would have their own driving Neuronal Pools, e.g. pressing 
for the exercise of walking, head turning. These are the Sub-cortical 
"Instrumental Responses" of the model. Higher co-ordinations, effected 
by Cortical functions, relating effector integrations to innately 
recognised behavioural states, e.g. hunger, sex deprivation, would also 
have their own "pressor" Neuronal Pools. These latter co-ordinations 
are the Cortical Instrumental Responses of the model. Their driving 
Pools are the Pools of the Cortical Motivational Array. In this way 
the apparently different principles of operation of the Sub-cortical 
and Cortical Motivational Arrays may be seen as part of a more comprehen­
sive system.
These pressor Neuronal Pools are envisaged as being biochemically 
controlled, and providing the clocks referred to above. In the case 
of the main metabolic drives, hunger and thirst, there can be little 
doubt that such drives exist (Deutsch and Koopmans, 1976). The notion 
of the biochemical clocks driving individual and co-ordinated effector 
actions may seem a little strange. However, it would seem plausible
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that there are mechanisms which are designed to ensure that an 
animal's repertoire is utilised. The emergence of the concept that 
neuro-transmitters are within the cldss of hormonal messengers 
(Nathanson and Greengard, 1977; Iversen, 1979) makes the notion more 
plausible that the neuro-transmitters powering certain classes of 
neuron might act in a manner analogical to the metabolic and hormonal 
processes driving hunger and thirst. If such biochemical states can 
alter the probability of emission of food-seeking and sexual activity, 
it seems possible that transmitter functions could govern the prob­
ability of emission of other more atomic behaviours.
One may conjecture that the afferent fibres to the pressor neuronal 
pools driving a particular effector action would be driven at an 
increasing intensity with the passage of time. When the excitation 
in such a fibre exceeded threshold, there would be a resulting (sub- 
cortical) output, endeavouring to activate that effector action at 
the periphery. The biochemical process driving the pressor fibres 
would be subject to complementary substances directed to its suppres­
sion, i.e. neutralisers, the action of which would be to reduce 
their activity, i.e. to set the Clocks back to zero. In terms of 
the model, these neutralisers would be released when the action was 
performed. Roughly speaking, one may imagine that the sensory-feed- 
back from the movement of a muscle, or set of muscles (e.g. walking) 
would release the neutralising substance (inhibitory transmitter). 
Although in the simulation the Sub-cortical Motivational Array is 
separately organised from the Instrumental Pools, this is a matter of 
convenience only. If the Motivational (driving) fibres are mediated 
by a distinctive transmitter, its fibres may interpenetrate the 
Instrumental Pools. This would make the anatomical arrangements for 
operating the scheme relatively simple.
It would be out of place in this thesis to endeavour to support this 
speculative system at the theoretical level. It will either seem 
plausible to the knowledgeable reader or it will not. In the simula­
tion its representation provided a means whereby the Sub-cortical 
Instrumental Array would urge the emission of a particular Response 
upon the failure of the Cortical Array to provide a solution. The fact 
that the Response emitted was that which had not recently been 
exercised proved a useful strategy in getting the model to emit the 
required Response.
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The reader may be reminded tliat in no case in the model was the 
emission of a Response, whether from Cortex or Sub-cortex entirely 
determined by the Motivational System. In every case the Excitation 
from the Motivational Neuronal Pools merely biassed the system. It 
was necessary for other influences to converge to produce the Response. 
This is intended to apply to the main metabolic drives. As Mogenson 
and Phillips (1976) argue, citing Fitzsimmons (1972), most feeding is 
anticipatory of hunger rather than in satisfaction of it. One advan­
tage of the motivational ideas represented in the model is that they 
leave room for the non motivational influences on behaviour, the effect 
of input pattern, of time since last emission, and for the learned 
influences of the Cortical Array.
C. Generalised Preset Constellations
Prior to the introduction of the above scheme, the mechanism for the 
production of Sub-cortical Instrumental Response was merely a varia­
tion of the mechanism used for the other kinds of Response, say. Pre­
cons ummatory, was the control by the sensory part of the Linked 
Constellation. Instead of Preset Constellations which would be 
uniquely matched by a single IRP (Innately Recognised Pattern) certain 
devices were employed to make the emission of a particular Response 
susceptible to a greater generality of input pattern.
One such method was to have a number of Preset Constellations with 
linked Neurons within a particular Instrumental Pool. Each of these 
Preset Constellations had a different Sensory Portion, so that several 
input patterns would power the Response. Another method was to have 
the sensory portion of the Preset Constellation deficient in its rep­
resentation, i.e. only a few active Sensory Fibres were needed to 
maximally energise the Constellation. Such Constellations were acti­
vated by a large number of different Input Patterns.
The effect of these methods was to produce a fairly random Sub-cortical 
Instrumental emission. There were however difficulties and implausi- 
bilities. One of these was the repetition of an error Response, 
alternately from the Cortical Indication and the Sub-cortical Array, 
since the response urged by both sources was strongly related to the 
input pattern. In the simulation this was offset by the general Inhib­
itory characteristics of the system. It seems unlikely, both in the 
model and in the nervous system, that alternation of Responses could
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result from recurrent neural Inhibition. The time scales for neuronal 
Inhibition and behavioural suppression do not seem to be the same for 
this to be effective. This disadvantage did not apply to the clock­
like action of the notional pressor pools described in item C.
It would seem that there is some merit in a mechanism in which the 
probability of a Sub-cortical (i.e. Unlearned) emission is influenced 
by sensory stimulation. Rats will swim rather than walk when placed 
in water. Although different ideas of Sub-cortical emission were simu­
lated separately in the model, this was chiefly for the clarity of 
observation of the results. For example, it would seem quite possible 
for a biological clock mechanism, such as that described in item C 
above, to be combined with Preset Constellations with fairly definite 
sensory representation. The advantage of the extended template con­
cept is that no difficulty arises in combining such influences. One 
may envisage that the feed-back from the paws is involved in stepping 
movements, and other sensory feed-back in swimming. This would not 
interfere with the clock mechanisms which ensure that the muscular 
co-ordinations involved are exercised upon occasion.
D. Maturational Preset Linked Constellations
This scheme for the Sub-cortical emission of Instrumental Responses 
departed slightly from the design so far described in that a form of 
"learning" was introduced at Sub-cortical level. This may recommend 
the idea to some readers who may consider the Cortical-Sub-cortical 
division of the model too radical. As discussed further below, the 
scheme would provide an explanation of imprinting, but is perhaps 
better regarded as having affinities with developmental processes 
generally, with imprinting as a particular example.
Although not used in the final versions used to demonstrate overall 
instrumental performance, this scheme was used extensively throughout 
the development of the model.
The method was really an extension of that described in C above. In 
that method. Preset Constellations were designed so that a variety of 
Input Patterns would favour one rather than another of the Responses 
at Sub-Cortical Level. In the method now being described, the Preset 
Constellations were formed by a notional maturational development 
combined with a special kind of "learning". The Responses "matured" 
during the course of the run, and the resulting Maturational Constellation
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incorporated the Input Pattern current at the time of Maturation.
In other respects the Maturational Constellation resembled a Preset 
Constellation, i.e. it was located at the Sub-cortical level and was 
fixed for the duration of the run.
The Sub-cortical Neuronal Pools were provided with a number of 
Unlinked Neurons. The unlinked Neurons were only permitted to form 
Integrative Connections upon certain specified occasions. These were 
Instants of notional maturational growth of Connections. The forma­
tion of these connections may be considered to represent dependency 
upon a unique neuro-transmitter system, so that they are only formed 
when certain specific afferent fibres are active. Upon such occasions 
the Neurons of the Sub-cortical Array Sensory Pools were able to 
register whichever Input Pattern happened to have reached the Sensory 
Array at the Instant concerned. At this Instant, by a preprogrammed 
instruction, the Neurons of one or other of the Instrumental Pools 
were excited. Consequently a Sub-cortical Maturational Linked Con­
stellation was formed. This served the same purpose as did the Preset 
Constellations in relation to the Preconsummatory and Consummatory 
(Final) Responses. The Maturational Constellation was a Sensori­
motor Constellation. It contained on the Sensory side a representa­
tion of the Input present at the Instant when its Motor Response had 
been emitted. To ensure that thelatter Response actually reached the 
notional periphery at the Instant concerned, the Cortical Indication 
mechanism had to be suspended at that Instant, i.e. the Motor Release 
Mechanism gave preference to a Maturational Response, over and above 
a Cortical Response.
In the later versions of the Maturational Scheme, the scheme was com­
bined with the Sub-cortical Motivational Array method dealt with in 
Sub-section B. This was effected by including linked Neurons within 
the Sub-cortical Motivational Array in the Maturational Linked Con­
stellation. The actual implementation of this method was consistent 
with the ideas sketched out above. The entire set of Sub-cortical 
Neuronal Pools included Neurons which were Unlinked but which could 
only be linked by Afferent Excitation bearing the required label 
(actually a formal label indicating that the Excitation came from 
Maturationally inspired sources). To form a Maturational Constella­
tion, labelled Afferent volleys were sent through the Afferent Fibres 
to the Sub-COrtical Instrumental and Maturational Pools to be included.
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The Input Pattern to the Sub-cortical Array was also labelled so 
that it would be registered. The result was the Maturational 
Linked Constellation.
The runs utilising these Maturational Constellations were programmed 
roughly as follows: a program of Maturation was worked out. Each of 
the Instrumental Responses and its associated Motivational (pressor)
Pools was introduced in turn. Each Response was introduced not just 
once but several times at spaced intervals. This was so that there 
would be an increased chance that the Instrumental Response would 
be "successful" upon at least one of the occasions upon which its 
Maturation was furthered. The second Instrumental Response was then 
dealt with in the same way, and then the third and so on.
At each time that Maturation took place, the Response incorporated 
in the Maturational Constellation was emitted by the model. In the 
usual manner of operation of the system, a Sensori-motor Constellation 
was laid down in the Cortical Array. In the case where the Response 
was successful (elicited a Preconsummatory IRP from the notional 
environment), then at least in some versions of the model, the Activa­
tion (i.e. Do Pool) Instrumental Response was included in the Cortical 
Learned Constellation. In the case of its being successful, it was 
hoped that the model would have a good start in learning the implica­
tions of the relationship between a Response and the characteristic 
features of its environment.
To attempt to give the background of ideas on which this scheme was 
based would, as in the case of the Motivational Arrays, go far beyond 
the terms of reference of this thesis. Some of the ideas to which it 
gave expression are merely hinted at to assist the reader in orienting 
to the model.
One set of ideas which the author had in mind resulted from Piaget's 
well known descriptions and analysis of the development of behaviour 
in the human infant. The development of effective Instrumental 
behaviour in the human infant does not apparently develop in a manner 
very reminiscent of a problem box or maze in which the infant must 
choose from amongst a number of competing Responses that Response which 
will be successful on the specific occasion. Rather the infant develops 
a particular co-ordination at a particular maturational juncture. It 
then applies this "technique" to almost every situation it encounters.
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In this way it acquires a library of situations when the Response 
is likely to be of use. As is well known, Piaget outlined a Sensori­
motor period. "During the period the infant progresses from a few 
elementary activities to a wide range of well adapted behaviour" 
(Etienne, 1973). "This progress involves a constant interaction with 
the environment, in which the infant tries to apply his pre-existing 
action patterns to persons and objects, and changes these patterns 
if they do not lead to the desired results." . . . "The infant is 
born with a set of elementary action patterns which are relatively 
unconnected with each other. These include sucking and swallowing, 
crying, grasping, or visual tracking . . .  - these are exercised 
through repetition and applied to a variety of different objects."
. . .  "A baby who sucks the nipple of a bottle or the corner of his 
blanket incorporates or assimilates these external elements into his 
sucking scheme; in other words, he applies a pre-existing general 
action pattern to these objects . . ." (Etienne, 1973). Piaget also 
describes how at a later stage co-ordinations of actions become part 
of the repertoire by being applied to almost everything within sight.
For example, an infant which has learned to open drawers will open 
every drawer available. Although Piaget's observations were restricted 
to the human infant, Etienne (1973) has succeeded in applying his 
ideas, especially the development of object permanence, to other 
animals, notably kittens.
Another set of ideas leading to the introduction of Maturational Con­
stellations was that of the ethologists concerning "sensitive periods" 
(see for example, review in Hinde, 1970, pp 460, 462, 516, 517, 565).
The discovery of Imprinting by Lorenz and Tinbergen, and the importance 
of sensitive periods may have been exaggerated in the early days of 
ethological research. However, it seems to be well established, that 
sensitive periods exist not only in respect of Imprinting, but also 
in respect of the development of birdsong, recognition of eggs, and 
many other behaviours (Hinde, 1973). Research on both Imprinting and 
the sensitive periods associated with the kind of learning which seems 
to bear resemblance to Imprinting, has tended to concentrate on the 
sensory aspects of the process. However, considerable work has more 
recently been carried out on the motor aspects. Hogan (1973) has 
examined the sensitive period in relation to the recognition of food 
by the action of pecking; Baerands and Kruijit (1973) have examined 
preference of colour in relation to egg-rolling. Bateson trained day
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old chicks to press a pedal which turned on a flashing light. He 
critically examined the notion of a sensitive period and came to 
the conclusion that it was part of a complex in which experience 
played a part. "So strong are the links between the imprinting situ­
ation and the one in which the flashing light was used as a rein­
forcer, that it seems valueless to attribute the reinforcing effects 
to non-specific stimulus change . . .  I had thought that once a bird 
locks onto an appropriate stimulus, the role which that animal plays 
in the subsequent learning process was a reactive one. Recently, 
however, I have obtained some evidence suggesting that chicks continue 
to play an active part in determining what they learn even after the 
imprinting process is under way." (Bateson, 1973).
One of the advantages of the present model is that it explains such 
complex interactions without having to relinquish either the idea of 
a sensitive period, nor the influence on the animal of species specific 
bias in stimulus selection, nor the influence of "operant conditioning", 
Maturational Constellations express part of the idea; Preset Constel­
lations express other parts. The Preset Constellation would contain 
a skeleton representation of a stimulus configuration linked to a 
Motor Response. When a stimulus occurs which is capable of activating 
the skeleton network at Sub-cortical level, a full account of that 
stimulus is registered in the Sensori-motor Constellation laid down 
at Cortical Level. This is sensori-motor learning guided by the 
influence of genetically determined stimulus-response probabilities.
It would lead to the detailed "learning" of situations of the kind 
described by Piaget. If this principle is applied to the Maturational 
Constellation, it assumes in addition the special characteristics of 
Imprinting: (a) the sensitive period is represented by the period
when Neurons at the Sub-cortical level are permitted to form Integra­
tive Connections; and (b) the permanent effect of Imprinting is 
accounted for in the model by the assumed permanence of the Sub-cortical 
connections. Moreover, the Imprinted Response takes on the character 
of an innate behaviour.
It will be noted that the model does not suggest that the normal 
Cortical mode of learning may not be operative at the same time. It 
also suggests that the Imprinted Response, once formed, takes on a 
similar character to the Preset Constellations subserving "appetitive" 
(or at least, "approach") behaviour. It is not thus surprising that it 
can act as a reinforcer (see Bateson, 1973).
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E . Summary of mechansims of Sub-cortical Response activation 
When a "Learned" Motor Indication was not available from the Corti­
cal Array, the Motor Release Mechanism looked to the Sub-cortical 
Array for the emission of an Instrumental Response. During the 
development of Aries a nuuber of neural mechanisms to simulate the 
Sub-cortical Response apparatus, were tried out.
These were:
1. Neuronal Pools whose function was to drive an Instrumental Response 
at Sub-cortical level. These "pressor" Pools were located in the Sub- 
cortical Motivational Array. They urged that the Instrumental Response 
which would be released upon a reference to the Sub-cortical Instru­
mental Array would be that one which had not been exercised for the 
longest period. This method was used in the runs designed to demon­
strate a definite Instrumental performance in Aries (next chapter).
The method was combined with that of Maturational Constellations in 
many runs.
2. Generalised Preset Constellations were Preset Constellations 
designed to be activated by a large class of Input Patterns. When 
the Motor Release mechanism referred to the Sub-cortical Array, the 
Instrumental Response which would be released was the one most strongly 
activated by the current Input Pattern. That Response would then be 
Inhibited by a recurrent Inhibition mechanism, giving way to another 
Response. This Inhibition did not work satisfactorily, because of 
temporal delays between occasions of reference to the Sub-cortical 
Array. As a result the model failed to solve its problem because one 
or other of the Responses would fail to appear at Sub-cortical level. 
This defect was considered to be mainly due to limitations of the real­
isation of the model rather than inadequacies of the principle.
3. Maturational Linked Constellations were formed at Sub-cortical 
level at preprogrammed Instants of the program. Each Maturational Con­
stellation registered in notional permanent form (i) the current Input 
Pattern and (ii) a preselected Instrumental Response, and (iii) a 
Neuronal Pool of the Sub-cortical Motivational Array. Several Matura­
tional Constellations were formed for each Instrumental Response. The 
Response released upon a reference to the Sub-cortical Instrumental 
Array was influenced partly by the Input Pattern and partly by the 
time which had elapsed since the last exercise of the Response. For 
reasons which will be discussed, in some runs the representation in 
the Motivational Pool was omitted.
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II Protective Responses
Since tliese did not play a large part in the development of the model, 
they will only cursorily be dealt with. The principle was similar to 
that of the Consummatory and Preconsummatory Responses. They were 
emitted when a Protective IRP (Innately Recognised Pattern) was in 
the Input. The presentation of such a pattern was arranged by that 
part of the program representing the environment. It occurred when 
the model emitted a Response which was notionally an "error" in the 
context of the test trial. One of the Protective Responses was named 
Bump, and was elicited when the model attempted to carry out an Instru­
mental Response which was notionally impossible. The other was termed 
Hurt, and was elicited when the model attempted to perform a Consum­
matory or Preconsummatory Response to some Input Pattern other than 
the appropriate IRP, e.g. when it attempted to notionally drink food.
The Protective Responses were initially involved with the simulation of 
a complex system of notional orienting reflexes. These had to be cut 
out when the model was streamlined to produced adequate performance. 
Unfortunately time did not permit their réintroduction. They will 
however be mentioned briefly in a later chapter.
One aspect of Protective Responses which was successfully simulated 
was a hypothetical variation between the neural mediation of "pain" 
mediated responses and appetitive responses. In the simulation this 
took the form of a difference between the sensory portion of the Pro­
tective Preset Constellations and other Preset Constellations. On the 
Sensory side, the Protective Preset Constellations did not consist of 
a complete representation of an Input Pattern, and the Protective IRP 
did not consist of a self-contained complete Input Pattern.
The Protective IRP consisted of an addition to the current Input 
Pattern. This addition had the distinctive quality of consisting of 
a number of "positive" bits together with the corresponding complemen­
tary "negative" bits. The Protective Preset Constellation detecting 
this notional pain was also distinctive in containing a representation 
of just these positive and negative bits. This arrangement represented 
the theoretical possibility that pain occurs when both the receptors 
signalling activity and inactivity are activated simultaneously, a con­
dition which should only occur in abnormal circumstances.
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III Conclusion
In tl-iis and the immediately preceding chapter, the structure and 
function of the extended model has been described. It would not 
be feasible to report in detail the actual performances of the many 
versions simulated. Moreover, general problems with the model meant 
that although the operation of a particular mechanism might be seen 
its overall effect on actual "successful learning" was less clear. 
Accordingly where mechanisms or modifications are not critical to 
the demonstration of the model as a whole, the account of perform­
ance will be restricted to the indications which have been given 
in this chapter. However, a number of test computer experiments, 
similar in intent to those reported for the initial set of simula­
tions, were carried out on the extended model. These are aimed at 
demonstrating its essential rather than conjectural characteristics. 
These will be reported in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 14
SOME DEMONSTRATIONS OF PERFORMANCE IN ARIES
I Introductory remarks
In the previous chapter, the general characteristics of a number 
of mechanisms incorporated at various times into the simulations, 
were described. It has already been mentioned that whilst the 
effects of these mechanisms could be discerned by inspection of the 
internal operation of the model, the overall performance of the 
model in many of these runs was not such as could be cited to demon­
strate to a sceptical observer that its performance resulted from 
more than chance. Some of the failures of the model to reach a 
high standard of performance could be attributed to the exaggera­
tion in the model of certain limitations which might apply to animal 
intelligence. To justify such interpretations and generally to in­
crease the observer's faith in the basic model it seemed desirable to 
demonstrate that it was capable of performance which could quite 
definitely not be attributed to chance factors or artefacts of the 
Input Patterns or run design.
It may be recalled that the computer simulations were referred to by 
the mnemonic Aries, denoting Arrays of Relatively Isolated Excitation 
systems.
II Design of tests for the model
The tests of the initial set of simulations approximated to a classical 
conditioning situation. In a rather general way, the tests of the 
extended simulations could be considered as analogical to an operant 
conditioning situation, or to a simple maze situation.
An Environmental Array was provided in the form of a simple two dimen­
sional computing array, consisting of rows and columns. In the 
demonstration runs this was effectively restricted to a 4 x 4 unit.
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Each location contained the identifying Input Pattern Number of the 
Input Pattern which was to be presented to the model when it was 
notionally positioned in that location of the Array. The notional 
organism {referred to for convenience as "the model" was assigned 
to a particular location in the Array; this was its notional spatial 
position in the maze. The Input Pattern which was presented to the 
model was that indicated by the Input Pattern Nunher written in to 
that location of the Environmental Array. A modification of the 
rule that the Input Pattern was that indicated in the location of 
the model, occurred when the model emitted a Preconsummatory, Consum­
matory (Final), or Protective Response. In that case the environ­
mental aspect of the program changed the Input Pattern accordingly.
For example, if the model were in a location containing an Input 
Pattern Number referring to an IRP representig, say. Food in the 
mouth, i.e. a Preconsummatory IRP, then when the model emitted the 
relevant Preconsummatory Response, representing say, chewing, the 
environmental routines replaced the Preconsummatory IRP by its rele­
vant Consummatory (Final) IRP, which in turn would elicit the Consum­
matory Response from the model.
The model was moved about the Environmental Array, i.e. notional maze, 
by its own actions. Three of its Instrumental Responses were inter­
preted as Left, Right and Forward respectively. It was placed in a 
starting location in the Array, and then moved into other locations 
in accordance with its emitted Instrumental Responses. A notional 
maze could be laid out in the array by making certain locations unen­
ter able . This was effected by entering a specific Number in that loca­
tion of the array. If the model attempted to enter such a location, 
either nothing happened, i.e. the Input Pattern and the location of the 
model was unaltered. Alternatively, in runs where Protective Responses 
were being investigated, the Input Pattern was modified by the environ­
mental routines to give the model a Bump IRP.
During the early development of the model, the mazes laid out in the 
Environmental Routines, involved several choice points. In the 
demonstrations now being reported these were simplified to a simple 
T-maze with a single choice point. In most of the runs, at this choice 
point the model could make one of three Instrumental Responses, termed 
Left, Right or Forward. It was then moved into the location indicated 
by that Response; unless, of course, that location contained an 
Unenterable Number. If it succeeded in entering one of the three
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Figure 14.1 Test maze. Experimental runs consisted of a number of 
Trials, at the beginning of which the model was notionally placed in 
a situation such as that illustrated at B. Whilst in the starting 
location it was presented with a particular Indifferent Pattern. One 
of its three Instrumental Responses took it into a location in which 
it was presented with a Preconsummatory Innately Recognised Pattern 
(notional Food). Either of the other two Instrumental Responses did 
not cause the Cue Pattern to change. Between Trials the model was 
placed in the situation shown at A. In this location it was presented 
with a particular Input Pattern representing a notional Home Nest, in 
which case none of its Responses were successful.
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possible locations, then its Input Pattern was changed to the one 
indicated by the Input Pattern Number in that location. That Input 
Pattern could either be an Indifferent Pattern, as defined in con­
nection with the initial simulations; or it could be a Preconsummatory 
IRP. In the latter case, a Preconsummatory Response would be 
elicited from the model, and the Input Pattern would be changed to the 
relevant Consummatory (Final) IRP (Figure 14.1).
In the demonstration runs, the problem which the model had to solve 
was to emit the "correct" Instrumental Response to be able to enter 
the branch of the maze in which resided a Preconsummatory Input 
Pattern. It then ate the food. Incidentally, the Preconsummatory 
IRP, representing say, food, was altered to the Final IRP, represent­
ing say, "food ready for swallowing", whenever the model emitted the 
appropriate Preconsummatory Response; it was altered back to the 
Preconsummatory IRP when it ceased to emit that Response. Consequently 
the model could spend several Instants in the notional goal box, 
emitting Preconsummatory and Consummatory Responses, i.e. notionally 
eating the food. This behaviour was brought to an end by one of two 
processes: (i) internal motivational processing, not fully investigated
and (ii) removing the model from that location, i.e. ending the Test 
Trial. In the demonstration runs, the latter method had to take pre­
ference in order that a sufficient number of Trials could be accommo­
dation within a run of the model.
In many runs, the Test Trial was brought to an end by notionally 
removing the model from the goal location to a notional Home Nest. In 
this part of the environmental Array, the location in which the model 
was placed was surrounded on all sides by Unenterable Locations. The 
Input Pattern in the Home Nest location was a Neutral Pattern, i.e. 
an Indifferent Pattern which did not occur during Test Trials. The 
model was allowed to remain in the Goal location for a given number 
of Instants before the Trial was brought to an end. This number of 
Instants was independent of whether the Input Pattern in the Goal loca­
tion had been an IRP or an Indifferent Pattern.
In the demonstration Runs, the program ran for about 734 Instants.
The number of Trials varied, as for some purposes it was necessary to
cut down the time spent in the Home Nest location, so as to produce a
sufficient number of Test Trials. The number of Trials varied from 
about six to about seventeen.
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III Recap of general mechanism of operation
In most runs, before the Learning Session proper began there was a 
preliminary portion of the run during which the model was notionally 
placed in tlie Home Nest. In runs where Maturational Constellations 
were incorporated, this gave an opportunity for the Maturationally 
induced Responses to appear in a Neutral Input situation so that the 
subsequent behaviour could not be attributed to a manipulation of 
the Input Patterns occurring at the time of Maturation. Although it 
was desirable to exclude such relationships between events at time 
of Maturation and later events, in runs designed to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of Instrumental Learning, it was of course supposed 
that in the animal there would be a useful relationship of that kind.
In runs where Maturational Constellations were not employed, the 
preliminary Session in the Home Nest gave some opportunity for the 
scheme of Subcortical Motor initiation to be seen independently of 
the Learning Trials.
As earlier mentioned, the Motor Release Mechanism was provided with a 
gate which preferentially passed a Cortical Motor Indication and 
suppressed the Sub-cortical Indication. At the beginning of each 
experimental run there was no Learned Inch.cation, so the emission of 
a Response for the First time was always from the Sub-cortical 
mechanism.
At the commencement of the Learning Session the model was notionally 
placed in a location of the Environmental Array which represented a 
starting box. After a variable amount of time the model emitted an 
Instrumental response. The delay was not under the control of the 
programmer, but resulted from the operation of the Motor Release Mech­
anisms already described. Suppose that the emission was ch ctated by 
the Sub-cortical mechanism: the event was nevertheless registered in 
the Cortical Array.
Suppose that the emitted Response was the one which the programmer had 
decided would take the model into the goal box: then, that location 
would contain the Input Pattern representing a Preconsummatory IRP.
To this the model should respond with a Preconsummatory Response. As 
earlier described, if the model produced such a Response within a 
given number of Instants then an Active Afferent Volley was sent to the
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Effector Neuronal Pool of the Cortical Motor Array. If no such Pre­
cons imima tory Response occurred within the given time, then an Active 
Afferent Volley was sent into the complementary Not-do Neuronal Pool 
of the Instrumental Cortical Array.
It will be recalled that the Linked Constellation in which this posi­
tive or negative aspect of the emitted Response was registered 
contained a representation not of the Sensory Input Pattern actually 
accompanying or following the emission, but the Pattern which preceded 
that emission. Because of the notionally longer Sensory pathway, 
the Sensory Input Pattern which preceded the emission of the Response 
reached the Cortical Array at the same Instant that the delayed 
registration Volley representing the Instrumental Response reached 
the Cortical Array. Notionally the Sub-cortical emission of a Response 
acted very rapidly at the periphery, i.e. on the notional environment. 
The notional pathway of the Sensory information to the Sub-cortical 
Array was also very short. Accordingly it was possible for the Input 
Pattern representing a Preconsummatory IRP to produce a Sub-cortical 
Preconsummatory Response well before it was required to decide whether 
to register the Do or Not-do aspect of the Instrumental Response. It 
is interesting in relation to the plausibility of this arrangement to 
cite some experiments of Libet (1978). In these experiments a shock 
pulse to the skin was accompanied by direct electrical stimulation of 
the cortex with a time interval. Libet tested the hypothesis that 
suitable neuronal activations at cerebral levels must proceed for a 
substantial minimum time period (about 500 ms) in order to give rise to 
a conscious sensory experience. "There was a subjective referral 
backwards in time, after neuronal adequacy was acheived, which ante­
dates the experience to correspond to the time of early cortical 
responses to specific afferent projection signal". This would appear 
to be compatible with the idea that the registration of a sensory event 
can be deferred at the cortex by the requirement of a neuronal 
adequacy of about 500 ms.
When the model emitted a successful Instrumental Response the Do-Pool 
was activated; when unsuccessful the Not-do Pool was activated. The 
Learned Linked Constellation registering the Instrumental Response 
contained: (i) A representation of the Input Pattern just preceding
the emission, (ii) the Instrumental Response of its corresponding 
Complementary Suppression Pool.
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If the Response were successful, the model Responded to the Precon­
summatory IRP. The Input Pattern was changed by the Environmental 
Routine to the Consummatory or Final Pattern. All these events were 
of course registered in the continuing sequence of Learned Constella­
tions laid down in tlie Cortical Array. The operation of the Precon­
summatory and Consummatory Responses was almost the same as in the 
initial set of simulations. With regard to the Instrumental Array, 
the only essential difference was that the Anticipatory rise in 
Excitation was in a Learned Sensori-Motor Constellation which did 
not mirror an equivalent Sub-cortical Preset Constellation. It was 
in a Learned Constellation which registered the conjunction of an 
Input Pattern and the emission of an Instrumental Response. The 
rise in Excitation was used to trigger the Cortical Release of that 
Response on the occasion of a similar Input Pattern being repeated 
which had on an earlier occasion been followed by reinforcement. If 
it had been followed on the earlier occasion by "failure" then it 
was the Not-do Pool which was reactivated by the rise in Excitation, 
and the Response was suppressed.
The model may have emitted a number of wrong responses before it 
emitted the right one. Then there would have been written into its 
Cortical library of Learned Linked Constellations a number of records.
In some of these the representation of the critical Input Pattern 
would be linked to Not Do Responses, and in the case of the correct 
Response, to the Do Response Pool.
When the model had produced the correct Response which took it into 
the goal box, it was removed after a prescribed Interval into the Home 
Nest.
On the next Trial, the model was, say, faced with the same maze situa­
tion as at the first Trial. Upon presentation of the Input Pattern 
in the starting location, all the matching Linked Constellations in 
the Cortical Array were activated. Since the Input Pattern was not 
an IRP it did not match any of either the Preconsummatory, Consummatory 
or Protective Responses, so it did not attempt to emit any of these.
(Had an IRP appeared in the input, the elicited Response would have 
overpowered the Instrumental Response; this was a feature of the 
model which has not yet been mentioned) . The motor Release mechanism 
detected a differential positive Response from the Cortical Array, 
resulting from the Excitation of the matching Linked constellation
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containing a representation of the "successful" Response i.e. the 
Instrumental Motor Indication. It emitted this Response, was moved 
into the goal position, and the events followed as at the end of 
the preceding Trial. On this second occasion, the Instrumental 
Response had been emitted as a result of a Cortical Indication, where­
as on tlie first Trial it had occurred as the result of a Sub-cortical 
initiation.
Barring failure of the notional neural apparatus, the model would 
have then gone on emitting the correct Response and receiving "rein­
forcement". It did not always do so however. In many runs there 
were imperfections of the system. Moreover, the model had to register 
a sufficiently powerful Learning of events to overcome the differences 
in activation of Linked Constellations resulting from the chance 
interaction of non-matching Linked Constellations.
Whenever the model made an error, that is produced an unsuccessful 
Instrumental Response, it laid down an additional Record in the 
Cortical Array which tended to inhibit the production of that Res­
ponse at Cortical Level. Unlike many former versions of the model, 
this one did not persevere indefinitely in an error. When the error 
had been sufficiently suppressed by the Cortical Array, then no 
Cortical Motor Indication was forthcoming at the next Trial. The 
Motor Mechanism then permitted the Subcortical Array to emit an 
Instrumental Response. This was the one which had not been emitted 
for the longest time. In other versions, utilising different Sub- 
cortical mechanisms, it might not be the one which had been longest 
since emission, but in any case, there was an alternation of Sub- 
cortical Response. Eventually, therefore, the successful Response 
was found at Sub-cortical Level.
This mechanism also operated when the notional contingencies of the 
situation were changed from Trial to Trial. An Instrumental Response 
which was Correct in the First Trial would be produced at the Second 
Trial. Unlike earlier versions of the model, this change was adapted 
to. The model Learned that the once successful Response was now 
unsuccessful.
As the Protective Responses and associated mechanisms were partially 
suspended for most of the demonstration runs, they need not be recap­
itulated here. The Cortical Motivation Mechanism has not been mentioned.
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The Motivation mechanism was made ineffective during most learning 
runs, for reasons whicli will be mentioned in the next Section.
They were however tested in runs designed for that purpose, and the 
reader will be reminded of their mechanism in context.
IV Demonstrations in extended model
A. Introductory
It has already been mentioned that the performance of the model during 
development was hampered by a number of problems concerned with the 
control of Excitation and Inhibition. It was also difficult in these 
circumstances to distinguish these theoretical problems from those 
arising from errors in computer programming.
The general progress in obtaining convincing results can be briefly 
summarised. Before the solution of the general problems, performance 
was unreliable and marred by a large number of inexplicable behavioural 
errors. The acceptance of the intelligent aspects of performance 
required the tolerant co-operation of the observer: it was necessary 
to penetrate into the intricacies of operation to be convinced that 
the apparently learned acts of the model really resulted from the 
characteristics of the system, and its stupid acts from deficiencies 
of the kind referred to above. After the solution of these general 
problems, although errors of programming and simulation remained, the 
performance of the model was sufficiently convincing that its charac­
teristics could not be reasonably doubted.
Even in the final versions of the simulation, the methods by which 
these general problems of control were solved were grafted onto a 
simulation which had not been designed with them in mind. In apology 
for the deficiencies in the final versions, it may be claimed that 
the simulation served its true purpose. This may be seen not as the 
production of a technologically high performance simulation but as a 
tool in discovering the problems which have to be solved in proposing 
neurological models.
B. Frequency of Response emission
The first reasonable demonstration that the performance of the model 
obeyed animal-like laws concerned the relationship between the fre­
quency of emission of a Response and its having been Reinforced upon
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a previous emission. This was one of the fundamental relationships 
established by Skinner (e.g. Skinner, 1938; Ferster and Skinner,
1957). It appears implicitly in many demonstrations of Instrumental 
Learning ever since the pioneer work of Thorndike, Konorski and Miller, 
Hull and others, and is one of the most frequently used measures of 
instrumental learning (Hall, 1966, Chapter 3). An alternative related 
measure is the reduction of the emission of "error" responses, where 
the error response is defined as some response other than that being 
reinforced.
Although it has been mentioned several times that clear-cut demonstra­
tions of learning were not obtainable in early versions of Aries in 
which general problems had not been solved, this statement perhaps 
overstates the position. Within the model evidence of learning was 
fairly robust in the face of considerable imperfections. This is 
illustrated in the run now reported, which was in a version in which 
control problems were still present, and in which a relatively 
ineffective mechanism of reinforcement was used.
Table 14.1 summarises the results of a typical run demonstrating 
the increased rate of emission of the "reinforced Response" and the 
reduction of emission of competing Responses. In relation to the 
simulation, the "operant" response of Skinner's experiments was to 
be equated with the Instrumental Response; the "reinforcement" was 
to be equated with the presentation by Environment Routines, of a 
Consummatory IRP, when the Instrumental Response which was emitted 
was the one arbitrarily designated as correct.
Table 14.1 shows the emission of an Instrumental Response at partic­
ular Instants of the run, and the Input Pattern present at that 
Instant. This may give an erroneous impression of the temporal charac­
ter of the simulation. The simulation did not consist of a presentation 
of a different input pattern at each Instant, and recorded an Instru­
mental Response emitted at each Instant. The run reported ran for 
over 400 Instants. Instant 1-100 were occupied in permitting Responses 
to Mature (Maturational Constellations, see Section V (D) of Chapter 10). 
Input Pattern 39 was then presented at each successive Instant until 
the notional animal emitted a "successful" Instrumental Response at 
Instant 135. To give the reader some flavour of the pace of events 
and the temporally continuous character of the simulation. Table 14.2
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TABLE 14.1 Response summary of a run of Aries demonstrating 
effects of reinforcement of Response emission
Response
order
Input Pattern 
when R eminitted
Instrumental 
R emitted
Correct or 
Incorrect 
Response 
Score
Reinforced 
or not
1 39 - Left - No
2 39 " 4" - Right + Yes
3 39 " 4" - Right + Yes
4 47 Home Nest " 4" - Right + No
5 39 I 2” - Forward - No
6 39 II2I - Left - No
7 39 II2I - Left - No
8 39 II4" - Right + Yes
9 39 II4I - Right + Yes
10 47 Home Nest "4" - Right + No
11 39 II2" - Left - No
12 39 II4" - Right + Yes
13 39 I 411 - Right + Yes
14 47 Home Nest 11411 - Right + No
15 39 II411 - Right + Yes
16 47 Home Nest I 411 - Right + No
Summary :
Number of 
responses 
emitted:
Whole Program 
Response No. 2 Response N o . 3 Response No. 4
11
First Half compared with Last Half of run 
First 7 Responses
Number
emitted
"Correct"
3
"Errors"
4
Responses 8-16 
"Correct" "Errors"
1
Note: Reinforcement Rule: Pattern No. 47 
in Input
No Response reinforced
Pattern No. 39 
in Input
Instrumental R. "4" reinforced
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TABLE 14.2 Details of Run shown in Table 14.1 illustrating continuous 
temporal character of simulation
Instants of Input Instrumental Preconsummatory Consummatory
Program Pattern R. emitted R. emitted R. emitted
100 to 111 39 - - -
112 39 II 2 II - -
113 to 134 39 - - —
135 to 137 39 II ^11 - -
137 to 138 9 (PC. IRP) - - -
139 9 - "2" (PC. R.) -
140 to 141 1 (C. IRP) - - "2"
142 to 147 9 - - -
148 to 157 47 Home Nest - - -
(C. R.)
Notes: At Instant 112 an Instrumental Response "2" was emitted. Since 
this was not notionally the "correct" Response, the Input Pattern was 
not changed by the Environmental Routines. No Preconsummatory Response 
was emitted and the Response was not reinforced by the internal neural 
mechanisms. At Instant 135 Instrumental Response "4" was emitted.
This was notionally "correct". The Environmental Routines changed the 
input pattern to 9, the IRP for the Preconsummatory Response (see text), 
The emission of the Preconsummatory Response at Instant 139 operated 
the notioanl internal neural mechansims of reinforcement.
PC. R. = Preconsummatory Response 
C. R. = Consummatory Response
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summarises events occurring during Instant 100-157. Although the 
program was not always consistent in the relationship of an Instant 
to notional real time, some idea may be obtained of what was in 
mind by taking an Instant equal to about 50 ms.
The mechanism of reinforcement in this run, although obeying the 
general principle of the reinforcement mechanisms described in Sec­
tion III of Chapter 12 differed in a significant detail. In the run 
shown in Table 14.1, all Instrumental Responses were permitted to be 
registered in tlie Cortical Array: that is, the Afferent Volley which 
would ensure the Motor representation in the Linked Constellation, 
was not blocked. This registration took place whether the Instru­
mental Response was successful or unsuccessful. The internal criterion 
of success remained the same in this run as in the general principle 
already laid down, that is, the subsequent occurrence of a Preconsum­
matory Response. It was however only implemented in relation to the 
Suppression (Not-do) aspect of the neural processing.
Briefly, after an Instrumental Response had been emitted, an Active 
Afferent Volley was sent to the relevant Effector (DO) Neuronal Pool 
of the Cortical Instrumental Array. This registration of the effec­
tor aspect of the system ("Do Response") happened whether or not 
the Response was later judged to have been successful or not, that is, 
whether a Preconsummatory Response followed the emission of the Instru­
mental Response. Since the Instrumental Response was to be registered 
in the Effector Pool regardless of its notional environmental effect, 
there was no need to delay its registration, as was described in the 
mechanism detailed in Chapter 10. If, within a given number of Instants 
following the emission of the Instrumental Response Preconsummatory 
Response had been emitted by the Subcortical Preconsummatory Array, an 
Active Afferent Volley was sent to the complementary Neuronal Pool 
(Not-Do), so that a Linked Constellation containing the Not-Do repre­
sentation was laid down. If however within the number of Instants 
allowed a Preconsummatory Response had been elicited from the Precon­
summatory Sub-cortical Array, the Afferent Volley to the Not-Do Pool 
was blocked. Consequently, if a Preconsummatory IRP occurred within 
a certain number of Instants (13) of emitting an Instrumental Response, 
that Response was reinforced by the absence of a Not-do represention.
This system of reinforcement combined two principles. On the
one hand it provided a system whereby "successful" Responses were
represented by Linked Constellations having only "Do" represen­
tation, whereas "unsuccessful" Responses had balanced "Do" and 
"Not-Do" representation. On the other hand it possessed 
features in common with the combined "Do" and "Not-do" system 
described in Chapter 10 as a variety of Contiguity Learning.
In the case of the unsuccessful Response, both the Do and Not-do 
representation was in Linked Constellations in which the Sensory 
part was the pre-instrumental Input Pattern. If the Instrumental 
Response succeeded in effecting a change in the Input Pattern, 
then even in the absence of a P re cons ummatory Response, the Not-do 
aspect was registered in a Linked Constellation of which the 
Sensory part was the post-instrumental Input Pattern. The model 
would then be partially independent of having to emit a Preconsum- 
matory Response with sufficient rapidity to block the Not-do 
registration. On a repetition of the pre-instrumental Input 
Pattern, in the case where a previous emission of the Response 
had notionally succeeded in changing the environment, only the 
effector aspect would be directly reactivated. The suppressor 
aspect would only be directly activated after the emission of the 
Response. Of course this would have dangers. The change effected 
by the Instrumental Response might not be beneficial. However, 
in that case a Protective Response might be elicited so that any 
such results would be clearly labelled in the Learned Records.
In the run reported in Tables 14.1 and 14.2, the action of the Motiva­
tional Cortical Array was suspended. The behaviour of the model resulted 
from the effects of notional sensory discrimination. There was no 
attachment of "drive excitation" to the Linked Constellations represent­
ing previous successes.
The reason for the suspense of the Cortical Motivational Mechanism in 
this run illustrates one of the characteristics of the model. Even in 
the early versions of Aries, it was relatively easy to obtain a demon­
stration that the frequency of emission of Responses was a function of 
the reinforcement of previous emissions. This resulted from the very 
powerful effect of the Motivational Array. This aspect of the model 
will be reported more fully below. Here it is necessary to state that 
in early versions of the model in which the Cortical Motivational 
mechanism was active (i.e. those described in Section III, Chapter 10) 
once a successful Instrumental Response had been emitted, it continued
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to take preference in the Learned behaviour more or less indefinitely.
The only way to obtain another Response was for the Motor^ Release 
Mechanism to refer to the Sub-cortical Instrumental Array. The 
Instrumental Response was no longer under discriminative control.
Probably some of this effect was due to the making of the Motivational 
effect too strong. Nevertheless, it was felt desirable to demonstrate 
the relation between reinforcement and probability of emission in the 
absence of this Motivational effect.
Even without the Motivational effect. Table 14.1 demonstrates some 
of the difficulties of demonstrating a clear-cut effect in the model.
It will be noted that the Input Pattern was not restricted only to 
that of the notional trial situation, i.e. No. 39. Pattern 47 was also 
presented, representing the Home Nest (see Section II). This came 
about because the notional maze described in Section II was used for 
the runs. When the model made a Response which took it into one of 
the branches, after some Instants it was placed in the Home Nest for 
some Instants. During this period it might emit a Response. Had it 
responded with sufficient intelligence to this situation it would have 
learned not to Respond when 47 was in the Input. It failed to do this; 
what it learned to do was to Respond with the reinforced Response in 
both situations. However, it can be seen from the Table that the 
unreinforced Responses account for the errors. In fact, from internal 
monitoring, the progress in learning was found to be as follows. The 
model learned too well on the first two occasions of being reinforced 
that Response 4 was the one to emit. When it emitted that Response 
when 47 was in the Input, it was not reinforced. It then learned too 
well, not to make this Response. On the next Trial Response 4 was sup­
pressed, even although Input Pattern 39 v/as presented. This confused 
it. Again at Response No. 10, it Responded to Pattern No. 47 with 
the previously reinforced Response No. 4. It failed to gain reinforce­
ment. Its next Response, which should in fact have been Response No. 4, 
the Input Pattern having changed, was instead an error Response. How­
ever, on this occasion the performance was only disturbed for 1 Instance, 
as against 3 Instances on the earlier occasion.
What seemed clear from this and later runs to be reported was that the 
model could not learn to suppress its Responses or Release them 
entirely as the result of sensory discrimination. Although in this run 
the model failed to achieve a high level of discriminative Response
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Figure 14.2 A variant of the Test situation shown in Figure 14.1. On 
some Trials one Input Pattern would be used as a Cue, i.e. presented 
to the model in the starting location, and on other Trials another 
Input Pattern was used. The Cue Pattern presented to the model indi­
cated in which position it Cfjuld find the Food. Between Trials it 
was, as before, placed in the Home Nest.
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control, its errors were explicable in terms of a tendency to jump 
to conclusions, and in this respect did not seem unlike behaviour 
shown by animals and even the author.
C . Demonstration of Discriminative Instrumental Performance 
In order to demonstrate in a clear way that the model was capable 
of producing a discriminative instrumental performance, the notional 
maze described earlier had to be adapted slightly. Figure 14.2. It 
will be recalled that each run was divided into a number of trials.
At the beginning of each trial, the notional organism (the "model") 
was placed in the starting location of the maze Array. The three 
Instrumental Responses capable of being emitted by the model, may be 
thought of as moving it to the Left, Right or Forward of the starting 
location. The Input Pattern placed in the starting location was the 
Discriminative Cue for that Trial. It was presented to the model at 
each successive Instant of the Trial until the model emitted an Instru­
mental Response to take it into another location. Entry to a location 
could be notionally blocked by inserting a particular Input Pattern 
in that location. In only one of the three locations surrounding the 
starting location, the program placed an Input Pattern representing a 
Preconsummatory IRP (Innately Recognised Pattern). The selected 
Input Patterns and their location could be changed from Trial to Trial.
The Input Pattern in the starting location, that is, the Discriminative 
Cue, was generally used to indicate the location of the Preconsummatory 
IRP. For example, in one run, when the Discriminative Pattern was 
No. 39, the Preconsummatory IRP was to be found by the model emitting 
Instrumental Response NO. 4; that is, it was in the location to the Right 
of the starting location. When the Discriminative Pattern was No. 43, 
the Preconsummatory IRP was situated on the Left of the starting loca­
tion and could be reached by the model emitting Instrumental Response No. 2
In many runs of the model, the model was permitted to enter any of the 
three locations by emitting the relevant Response. It was then presented 
with the particular Input Pattern in that location. This arrangement 
had been useful in investigating a number of aspects of the model already 
mentioned. However, it impeded obtaining a definite demonstration of 
Instrumental performance for a number of reasons. The principle reason 
was the restriction on the number of Trials obtainable in relation to 
the number of Trials necessary to establish an intelligent performance.
If the model were allowed to enter locations not containing the reinforcing
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IRP, i.e. locations which contained only Indifferent Patterns, many 
Trials were unreinforced, and the development of the intelligent 
performance was deferred. Although, by the end of the run the model 
could choose the right branch, there was insufficient time left of 
the run to show that the choice resulted from the intelligence of the 
model and not from pure chance. What was necessary was to show that 
the overall choice of the correct position of the reinforcement 
(Preconsummatory IRP) was at a greater frequency than could be explained 
by chance. For this purpose it was necessary to produce a relatively 
large number of Responses over the length of the run.
Accordingly, in the runs used to demonstrate Discriminative Instru­
mental Performance, in each Trial the only location which the model 
was permitted to enter was that containing the Preconsummatory IRP.
In effect, this meant that the model could emit one of the three 
Reponses, but only one of these, the one that led it into the loca­
tion containing the IRP, had any effect on the Input Pattern. The 
other two left the model in the starting location, and the Input Pat­
tern unchanged.
The procedure for each Trial was then as follows. The model was pre­
sented with a particular Input Pattern, the Discriminative Cue, until 
it emitted the particular Response which had on that Trial been desig­
nated by the program as successful. Emission of the other two Responses 
had no effect on the Input Pattern. Emission of the Response designated 
as successful caused the program to change the Input Pattern to the 
Preconsummatory IRP. This elicits the Preconsummatory Response from 
the model. The Preconsummatory Response operates the internal rein­
forcing mechanisms. Its emission also causes the Environmental Array 
to change the Input Pattern once again, this time to the Consummatory 
(Final) IRP. The Cons ummatory and Preconsummatory Reponses were per­
mitted to alternate for some Instants, representing the eating of food 
or drinking of liquid. After a given number of Instants in this situa­
tion, the Trial ended. The model was then presented with an Indifferent 
Pattern, one unrelated to any of those occurring within Trials. This 
represented placing the animal in a Home Nest, in which it spent its 
time between Trials. After a given number of Instants the next Trial 
began.
A run which has been selected as showing in the clearest form tlie basic
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TABLE 14.3 
Discriminative Instrumental Performance
First Subsequent First
Trial Instants Input Response of Responses Resp.
Second
Resp.
No. Pattern Trial 2nd 3rd 4th Correct Correct
1 85 - 107 43 4 3 No Yes
2 129 - 150 43 3 - Yes
3 169 - 246 39 3 2, 2, 4 No No
4 265 - 2 85 39 4 - Yes
5 304 - 32 7 43 3 - Yes
6 346 - 363 39 4 - Yes
7 382 - 403 39 4 - Yes
8 422 - 444 39 4 - Yes
9 46 3 - 484 43 3 - Yes
10 503 - 521 43 3 - Yes
11 540 - 559 39 4 - Yes
12 578 - 595 39 4 - Yes
13 614 - 674 43 4 2, 3 No No
14 693 - 744 43 2 end
program
Total Number of Responses: 20
Total Number of Trials: 14
Correct First Time: 10
Total number of Correct
Responses: 13
Reinforcement Rule: Input Pattern 39 - Response No. 4 Reinforced
Input Pattern 43 - Response No. 3 Reinforced
Probabilities
UACT0G6: 17.1.79
Correct first response of Trial: 10 out of 14. Z = 3.047
Probability < 0.002
Total number of correct responses: 13 out of 20. Z = 3.019
Probability < 0.002
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performance of tlie model is illustrated in Table 14.3. In this run 
it will be seen that in the first three Trials the model performs 
little better than chance. If the performance of the model were ent­
irely due to chance, that is, if any of its three Instrumental 
Responses are equally likely to be "correct" on any Trial, then the 
probability of a correct Response is 1/3. The probability, on a 
chance basis, that the First Response of any Trial will be correct is
similarly 1/3. In the next nine Trials, the model produces nine cor­
rect Responses, that is, its FirstResponse on each of these nine 
Trials was correct. The probability of this occurring by chance is 
less than 0 .0 0 2 .
Of course, it is appreciated that statistical procedures can only be 
applied to the results of computer simulations with great caution- 
They must also be properly interpreted. The probability is only men­
tioned to make it clear that the performance shown in this run can
hardly have occurred by chance.
It is not to be thought that, in general, runs of ths model showed 
this level of performance.
In order to detect a progressive learning effect, the beginning of 
runs were compared with the latter portions of the runs. The division 
of Trials in this way was difficult, because the presentation of Cues 
was different from run to run. Some orders of presentation presented 
more difficulty to the model than others. Consequently the number of 
Trials to be allocated to the first portion to display the learning 
effect differed from run to run. Accordingly an arbitrary division 
was made between the first four Trials and the remainder. This gave 
a positive result in every run, but the statistical significance was 
much lower, around 12 per cent. This was not surprising, as in effect 
the model learned quite a lot from a single Trial. One of the troubles 
with the simulation was that to produce an effect within the duration 
of a run, learning had to be speeded up beyond what would be analogi­
cal in animal learning, in which many trials are necessary to modify 
behaviour.
The general level of performance achieved in the average run of the 
model is shown in Table 14.4 in which a number of runs are summarised. 
It will be seen that the number of correct responses achieved varies 
from run to run, and in some cases is not superficially impressive as
TABLE 14.4 
Discriminative Instrumental Performance 
(Results of several experimental runs)
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A. Overall results
Run
Identifier
UACTOIH 
UACTOG1 
UACTOAU 
UACT0G6 
UACTOJ 4
No. of Correct
6
8
7
10
5
36
No. of
First Responses Trials
13
15
13
14 
13
68
Total No. 
Correct
13
15
13
13
13
67
Total No. of 
Responses
24
24
22
20
24
114
B. Runs divided between results of first four Trials and remainder 
of run
Run
Identifier
UACTOIH 
UACTOG1 
UACTOAU 
UACTOG6 
UACTOJ4
First Four Trials
Correct
4
4
4
4
4
20
Total of 
Responses
7
7
9
8
39
Remainder
Corre ct
9
11
9
9
9
47
Total of 
Responses
17
17
13
12
16
75
Probabilities
The probability of a Response being correct by chance is 1/3.
(1) Correct Fist Responses: 36 out of 68 compared with 22 out of 68
by chance
Z = 4.15. Probability less than 0.002 per cent.
(2) Total Correct Responses: 67 out of 114 compared with 38 out of 114
by chance
Z = 5.901. Probability infinitesimal.
(3) Comparison of first four Trials with remainder (progressive learning) 
First part of run : 20 out of 39. Later part of run: 47 out of 75
Z = 1.17. Probability due to chance about 0.12.
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an example of Instrumental Learning. Nevertheless in all these runs 
it could be seen from Internal monitoring that the learning process 
operated. Taken together the overall probability of the number of 
correct Responses occurring by chance (67 out of 113) is infintesi- 
mal (Z > 5.0), even less than that of the individual result shown in 
Table 14.3. There are reasons, which will be mentioned below, why 
the number of correct Responses within the set of First Responses in 
Trials are considerably poorer than would be expected from the overall 
correctness of Responses. Even in this category, the probability of 
the result occurring is only 0 .0 0 2 .
It is perhaps worth examining a run which indicates the problems of 
obtaining the kind of reliable performance sometimes obtained from computer 
simulations of neurological models, from a model which attempts to 
approach more realistically to the neural subject matter. Table 14.5 
illustrates such a run. Actually this version learned a little too 
rapidly. It will be recalled that rapidity of Learning was a function 
of one of the parameters of an Integrating Neuron, the Memory Life.
In conjunction with a counting variable, this controlled both the 
probability of a Neuron becoming a member of a Linked Constellation 
and its being removed from the Linked Constellation (decay). Conse­
quently, if the model learned too rapidly it tended to forget rapidly 
also.
In the run illustrated, the model found the correct result at its 
third attempt. It then emitted in the next two Trials two correct 
Responses first time. In the next Trial, (No. 4) it was presented with 
an Input Pattern which it had not seen before. In the ideal simulation 
it would have responded with an orienting reaction. In the present 
simulation it emitted the Response which had proved successful on 
three previous Trials. However, on this Trial the contingencies were 
different. It had to emit two further Responses to find the one which 
was successful in the revised contingency indicated by the Discrimina­
tive Cue, Input Pattern No. 39.
The next Trial, No. 5, reverted to the earlier contingency, and the 
model was able to produce a successful Response first time. Although 
bn the next Trial the contingency was changed once again to that which 
it had experienced only once, in Trial No. 4, it succeeded in produc­
ing a correct Response upon both this and the next Trial. Then it was
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TABLE 14.5 
Discriminative Instrumental Performance 
A run illustrating some typical errors of performance
Trial Instants 
No.
Input
Pattern
First Resp. 
of Trial
Subsequent 
Responses 
2nd 3rd 4th
First Resp. 
Corre ct
Second
Resp.
Correct
1 86 - 133 43 II 411 "4", "2" No No
2 152 - 184 43 "2" - Yes
3 203 - 218 43 "2" - Yes
4 237 - 289 39 I 2" "3", "4" No No
5 307 - 326 43 * "2" - Yes
6 344 - 363 39 II ^11 - Yes
7 418 - 436 39 II411 - Yes
8 455 - 473 43 II2 " - Yes
9 491 - 525 39 * II 2 I II411 No Yes
10 543 - 578 43 II ^11 II2" No Yes
11 603 - 629 39 * "3" II411 No Yes
12 648 — 681 43 * "3" "2" No Yes
13 699 - 717 39 "411 - Yes
* Responses emitted too early to be attributed to Response Indication
from Cortical Array.
Total Number of Responses: 21
Total Number of correct: 13
Total number of Trials; 13
Total Correct First Time: 7
Total correct First and
second time: 11
Reinforcement Rule: Input Pattern 39 - Response No. "4" Reinforced 
UACTOA: 25:10 78: Input Pattern 43 - Response No. "2" Reinforced
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able to react to a reversion to the earlier contingency when Pattern
No. 43 was the Discriminative Cue. However, Trials 9 - 1 2 ,  show a
deterioration of performance. Nevertheless, its second Response is
the correct one. In that respect the performance of the model 
differs clearly from what would be expected by chance. This 
behaviour is in fact clarified by a Printout monitor at the 
Instant of emission of the incorrect first
Responses of each Trial. Three of the four Responses were emitted 
too early in the Trial to be the result of control by the Discrimina­
tive Cue.
To explain the last statement, it is necessary to remember that 
because of the Uttley-type delay, the Input Pattern reaches the Sub- 
cortical Array some Instants before it reaches the Cortical Array.
The Learned Indication of Motor Response arises in the Cortical Array 
from reactivation of the Learned Linked Constellations, and takes 
several Instants to develop. The correct Anticipatory Response related 
to a Discriminative Cue cannot be expected to be forthcoming until 
the Excitation representing it has been reaching the Cortical Array 
for several Instants. The formal timing of the beginning of a Trial 
was the Instant at which the Discriminative Cue was first presented 
to the model, which was some 14 Instants before it reached the Corti­
cal Array. If it emitted a Response during this interval, the Response 
was related to the Input Pattern representing the Home Nest, and not 
to the Discrimintive Cue presented in the current Trial. Upon inspec­
tion, it was in fact found that in three of the four Trials concerned. 
Nos 9, 11 and 12, the incorrect first Response was emitted only two 
Instants after the Discrminative Cue had reached the Cortical Array.
The analysis of this run illustrl’tes the problems of representing 
behaviour on a time scale which has to be greatly contracted in com­
parison with that of the organisms. Some of this problem should disap­
pear with the expansion of resources of computers.
This run also pointed to an inadequate suppression of Responses by the 
Indifferent Pattern representing the Home Nest location. This inade­
quacy was also partly attributable to the limitations on the time 
scale. The emission of a Response whilst the model was notionally in 
the Home Nest led to the inclusion in the Linked Constellation register­
ing that Response of a Suppression (Not-Do) Pool. Responses emitted in 
the Home Nest occurred only infrequently, because the model was in the
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Home Nest for only a short time. Moreover, since no Response was 
reinforced in the Home Nest, there was no single Response which 
became dominant in the Home Nest situation. The Motor Release mech­
anism tended to try to find a dominant Response, and would often find 
one when in fact there was no Response which had been sufficiently 
reinforced. There were a number of possible remedies for this situa­
tion. For example, it would seem probable that when an animal keeps 
still it is not always because there is no indication of a Learned 
Response. There may well be a Standstill or similar concept of Res­
ponse. The Cortical Array might then indicate a Standstill Response 
and thus not seek a Sub-cortical Response Indication. Some attempts 
were made to simulate an arrangement of this kind, but unfortunately 
time did not permit its development of a successful conclusion.
Before leaving the discussion of runs used to demonstrate Instrumental 
Performance, the reader may wish to be reminded of the actual versions 
of mechanisms incorporated in the run illustrated in Table 14.3. In 
that run, the mechanism of reinforcement was that described in Section 
II (D) of Chapter 12; that is, the registration of an emitted Response 
was delayed to give an opportunity for a Preconsummatory Response to 
be elicited. If such a Response did appear, the Effector aspect was 
registered by an active Afferent to the relevant Neuronal Pool (the 
"Do" Pool). If it did not appear within the allotted time, the active 
Volley was sent to the Not-Do Pool. This was found to be the most 
efficient of all the mechanisms experimented with.
The method of selecting all Sub-cortical Responses was that described 
in Section V (B) of Chapter 10; that is. Sub-cortical Responses were 
driven by Sub-cortical Motivational Pools controlled by notional Clocks, 
giving a "time since last emission" dominance.
The Cortical Motivational mechanism was suspended in its main effect. 
It will be recalled that the main effect of this Array was to feed 
Excitation into Linked Constellations representing previous occasions 
when a goal had been successfully reached. Because of reasons already 
mentioned in relation to earlier runs, these were made inoperative.
Runs investigating their effect are reported in the next Section.
D* Demonstration of Motivational Behaviour
The run illustrated in Table 14.6 demonstrates the influence of the 
notional motivational state of the model on its learned instrumental
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behaviour. For the sake of ease of following the performance, the 
IRP (Innately Recognised Pattern) eliciting Preconsummatory Response 
No. 2 has been labelled "Food"; that eliciting Preconsummatory Res­
ponse No. 3 has been labt1led "Drink". The conditions of the run 
were as follows. Except for the preliminary Session, the Input 
Pattern was always 43 during Trials. During inter-trial periods when 
the model was notionally in the Home Nest, the Input Pattern was 47.
The Food was always in tfie location requiring the emission of Left
(Instrumental Response No. 2) to bring the model into that location.
The Drink was always in the location requiring the emission of Forward 
(Instrumental Response No. 3) to bring the model into that location.
The location which would have been entered by the emission of Right
(Instrumental Response No. 4) was always blocked.
At the beginning of each Trial the model was notionally placed in the 
starting location. From the beginning of the run until Trial No. 5 
the model was both Hungry and Thirsty. This meant that the Afferent 
Fibres to Cortical Motivational Pools Nos. 2 and 3 were active at the 
Lower intensity i.e. at a level which biassed the system but did not 
induce linked Neurons in the Neuronal Pools concerned. It will be 
recalled that the occurrence of an IRP sent the appropriate Motiva­
tional Afferent to the Upper intensity of activity inducing linkage.
Only one of the two maze locations containing the Preconsummatory 
IRPs could be entered. The other was blocked. This ensured that whilst 
the model was notionally both hungry and thirsty it experienced both 
forms of reinforcement and "discovered the whereabouts of the Food and 
Drink". It will be seen that on the First Trial, its first Response 
was to the location which was open, and contained Drink. On the second 
Trial this contingency was changed. It was the Left location, contain­
ing Food, which was now open. The model took eight Instrumental Responses 
to discover this.
On Trial No. 3, the contingencies reverted to those of the first Trial.
The model preferred the correct Response and once again achieved rein­
forcement first time. On the next Trial, No. 4, the contingency was 
changed again. The model could not enter the Forward location. This 
time it took only three Responses to find the open Left compartment.
This part of the run was directed to forcing the model to gain experi­
ence of the "position" of both Food and Drink.
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In Trial No. 5 and all subsequent Trials both locations containing 
IRPs were notionally open. On Trials 5-8 inclusive, the model was 
made only thirsty, i.e. only the Afferent Fibre to Cortical Motiva­
tional Pool No. 3 was Active at the lower intensity level. If the 
model made a Response inappropriate to its motivational state, it 
could enter the compartment containing the reinforcement inappropri­
ate to its motivational state, instead of going to the compartment 
containing appropriate reinforcement. However, as will be seen from 
Table 14.6, it did not do so. For the remainder of the run, the 
model emitted only those Responses which would take it into the com­
partment containing reinforcement appropriate to its Motivational 
State, and when that state was changed it changed its Response accord­
ingly. Its behaviour was almost perfect in this respect.
It may be noted in passing that on two Trials, Nos. 7 and 8 , although 
the model was notionally thirsty and entered the appropriate location 
to drink, it did not actually Drink. It failed to emit the Preconsum­
matory Response. Consequently the Input Pattern was not changed by the 
environmental routines so as to elicit a Consummatory Response either.
An investigation into this failure made it probable that the defect 
in behaviour was partly due to some changes made in this version of the 
model quite unconnected with Motivational Behaviour.
It was also partly due to a satiation mechanism which had been built 
into the model at an early stage. In this early mechanism, when the 
model had eaten or drank several times (emitted Consummatory Responses) 
Excitation was withdrawn directly from Neurons mediating the Preconsum­
matory Response, effectively causing the latter Response to fail. This 
mechanism has not been mentioned previously, because it was considered 
of little theoretical interest. A later implementation was intended 
which conformed to the general motivational concepts developed in later 
versions. In this scheme, the activity in the Motivational Pools 
driving Preconsummatory Responses would be reduced when Consummatory 
Responses occurred (compare Konorski, 1967). However, the simulations 
had to be abandoned before this development was possible.
Table 14.7 illustrates an experimental run in which the model was 
required to discriminate the position of the food according to a Cue 
Pattern. This run differed from earlier runs reported in that one of 
the Motivational Afferent Fibres was active throughout the run, i.e. it
558
TABLE 14.7
Demonstration of discrimination of Input Patterns whilst in notional
Motivational State
Trial Instant Input Number of Responses Actions emitted
No. Pattern in Trial to correct Correct
1st 2nd
1 85 - 129 43 2 F,R X
2 148 - 167 43 1 R X
3 185 - 2 77 39 4 R,R,L,F — —
4 295 - 314 39 1 F X
5 332 - 369 43 2 F,R X
6 387 - 420 39 2 R,F X
7 438 - 470 43 2 F,R X
8 489 - 50 7 39 1 F X
9 528 - 550 39 1 F X
10 570 - 587 39 1 F X
11 60 7 - 640 43 2 F,R X
12 661 - 677 43 1 R X
13 697 - 737 43 2 F,R X
Key : R = Right, Instrumental Action 4
L - Left, Instrumental Action 2
F = Forward, Instrumental Action 3
The Model was notionally hungry, i.e. Drive 2 active, throughout the 
run. The reinforcement was notionally Food.
Summary: Total number of Responses 22
Total number correct 13
Total number of correct to
be expected be chance 7
Run Identifier: UACTOTA 251179
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was notionally Hungry. As has been reported, the presence of an 
Active Motivational Input generally disturbed learning. This dis­
turbance could be reduced by moderating the strength of the Motiva­
tional Fibre Spike Frequency, and with such moderation the model 
could be persuaded to give quite good performance even in a situation 
where it was required to discriminate Pattern under Motivational 
pressure.
E . S ummary of Computer demonstrations
It will be seen from the runs reported that the extended versions of 
the simulations demonstrated Instrumental behaviour analogical with 
tliat of animals in simple conditioning or learning experiments. In 
case tlie reader may have been given the impression from a discussion 
of the details of performance that the demonstration of learning is 
subject to doubt, it is stressed here that this is not the case: the 
demonstration of Instrumental Learning in the model was beyond any 
reasonable doubt. As will be seen from the summary of performances 
of many different versions in different notional environmental situa­
tions, the model performed in a manner so far removed from chance 
probability that its behaviour could only be reasonably attributable 
to the mechansims with which it had been provided. Moreover, the 
operation of these mechanisms was followed by monitor printouts, so 
that it can be unequivocally stated that this was so.
It is true, of course, that the model did not reach in all runs the
level of performance which would be expected of even the most lowly 
animal. Its mechanisms often misled it, causing it to make stupid 
errors. On the other hand, in some runs and in the most recent ver­
sions in which programming errors had been corrected, its performance 
reached a very high level. Its performance must be considered in rela­
tion to the primitive character of the simulated model in comparison 
with the sophistication of any real nervous system, as well as the 
limitations on length of run in a computer compared to the real time
of the animal. The point has been made elsewhere that a higher stan­
dard of performance would have carried with it its own implausibility.
Two main kinds of behaviour were demonstrated: (i) responding with an
appropriate Instrumental Response to a Discriminative Cue which indi- 
ated where the model would be likely to find reinforcement on that 
Trial; and (ii) the cibility to emit dis criminative ly that Instrumental
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Response which would enable it to obtain whichever of two kinds of 
reinforcement was appropriate to its notional motivational state 
at that Trial. That is, in metaphorical terms, the model learned 
where to find food and where to find drink; and to go to the food 
when hungry and the drink when thirsty.
Reinforcement in this context meemt a specific input pattern which 
elicited from the model a Preconsummatory Response. In view of the 
presence in the model of a representation of hunger, thirst and in 
general metabolic or hormonal state, and in view of the simulation 
of the following Consummatory Response, it is felt justified in 
claiming that reinforcement does represent to some extent those sub­
stances which have been termed reinforcers in animal experiments, 
i.e. food and drink.
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CHAPTER 15
SOME PROBLEMS SOLVED BY RHYTHMIC MECHANISMS
Introduction
A number of models possess a rhythmic quality which has been suggested 
to be analogical with the electrical rhythms of the brain. The 
occurrence of rhythms in my model is a different case. In the basic 
concepts of my model, i.e. Linked Constellations, there is no impli­
cation of rhythmic function. The model was developed at the verbal 
level to a considerable complexity without the necessity of rhythmic 
mechanisms appearing. It was only when the model was simulated that 
intractable complications arose which threatened to block the model 
from further development. What was surprising was that once the 
introduction of rhythmic mechanisms had been accepted, most of these 
problems were immediately solved.
Many of the models which have an intrinsic rhythmic quality may have 
been partly inspired by the known fact that there are electrical 
rhythms in the brain, and that there are artefactual devices with 
similar rhythmic qualities. For example, Pringle's (1951) oscillator 
model, Hebb's reverbertory circuit model, Beurle's (1955) propagated 
wave model, Lashley's interference oscillator model, Stanley and 
Kilmer's timed conjunction model (1975), Landauer's frequency induc­
tion model (1964) and Hendrickson's spike interval coding model (1972), 
all explain the EEC by putting forward a rhythmic model of neural 
integration.
The neural hologram models also explain the EEG by an essentially 
rhythmic mechanism. Spinelli's Occam (1970) registers and reproduces 
waveforms. Landfield (1976) proposes specifically that Hippocampal 
Theta is a "reference beam" for the hologram, an approach which con­
trasts with that of Pribram and his group, who favour the idea that a 
neural hologram would not require a reference beam (Pribram, Nuwer and 
Baron, 1974).
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Although these and many other rhythmic models differ substantially 
from each other, they all have in common that rhythms are an essen­
tial feature of the actual coding of information. In contrast my 
model proposes a non rhythmic mode of neural integration - the Linked 
Constellation - and suggests that rhythmic mechanisms serve certain 
quite definite functions in enabling that model of integration to be 
developed to a stage which would be impossible without rhythmic mech­
anisms .
Rliythms appear in my model purely as a form of control. The model 
suggests that rhythms arise in nervous systems as a natural and 
highly effective way of controlling what would otherwise be an un­
stable and confused superposition of different patterns of excitation. 
The model represents neurons not as formal switching units but as 
analogue units handling streams of excitation. In the model, as 
would also seem to occur in the brain, there is at times a super­
abundance of excitation.
In brief, the control was exercised in the model by providing notional 
iniiibitory gates across the afferent pathways to the arrays of neurons. 
These gates opened and shut rhythmically to allow only sufficient input 
of excitation into the array appropriate for its particular current 
function. Moreover, the rhythmic gates sliced up the input to the 
integrating tissue into discrete frames, giving periods of freedom 
from input during which the response of the system can form without 
being confused with the input pattern or being overwhelmed by it. The 
rhythmic mechanism also enabled the amount of excitation entering a 
particular array to be varied and so provided a method of implementing 
attentional weighting alternative to that used earlier, that of vary­
ing the Spike Frequency of Afferent volleys.
As in other aspects of the present project, it is not suggested that 
the following account describes what actually happens in the brain.
To consider the suggested function of the rhythmic mechanisms which 
appear in the model in relation to actual nervous systems, would be 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Accordingly the account will be 
limited to the place of rhythms in the model, with perhaps some sug­
gestions of supporting evidence that the approach adopted is plausible.
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II Brief description of rhythmic mechanism in the simulations
The implementation was extremely simple. Each Neuronal Array was 
provided with an Inhibitory Gate across its set of Afferent Fibres.
The Gate to each Array was under separate control. The Gates were 
notionally situated in the thalamus either as part of the relay or 
as acting upon the post-synaptic element of such relays. In the 
model they could be conveniently regarded as acting on the Afferent 
Fibres between the Control Centre (Thalamus) and the Cortex.
At any Instant the Gate could be in one of two States. When the 
Gate was Shut no volleys were permitted to enter the Array. (In 
some versions the Spike Frequency of the Volleys were reduced rather 
than abolished) . When the Gate was Open, the Volleys were unimpeded, 
and entered the Array just as though the Gate did not exist.
Each Gate had its own characteristic Gate Period or Gate Frequency 
(to be distinguished from Spike Frequency of a Fibre). In terms of 
Instants the Gate Period used throughout the demonstrations reported 
was 14 Instants.
In the simulations only two Gate Conditions were used. The Gate Con­
dition is to be distinguished from the Gate States. In one of these 
Conditions the Gate was Open for seven successive Instants and then 
Shut for seven Instants. In the other Condition, the Gate was always 
Open. These two Conditions were intended to represent two points on 
a graded range of control conditions of the Gate. The Period of the 
Gate did not vary. Control of the Gate consisted of variation of the 
proportion of the Gate Period during which the Gate was Shut.
Two points are to be stressed: (i) Volleys passing when the Gate was
Open had the Spike Frequencies calculated for them by the Control 
Centre as before. When the Gate was Shut, the Spike Frequencies of 
all Fibres was zero (or in some versions, reduced by some simple for­
mula) . (ii) The terms Shut or Open apply to the State of the Gate at 
a given Instant. The Condition of the Gate, which determined its 
function, was a temporal condition, e.g. Shut for half of the Period.
For convenience of reference the Open-all-the-time Condition will be 
referred to as the Uninterrupted Condition, the other as the Interrup­
ted Condition. In further development it would be possible to explore
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different proportions of the Period during which the Gate might be 
Shut, in which case this dichotomous terminology would be inadequate.
The effects of this mechanism and the principles of its control will 
be related in due course.
Ill The nature of problems encountered
The development of the model was severely hampered by a number of
poorly understood difficulties concerned with the levels of Excitation 
and Inhibition. Some indication of these difficulties has already 
been given in context. In a complex system in which many variables 
interact it is not possible to point with certainty to particular 
causes of the overall behaviour. What can be definitely stated is 
that prior to the introduction of rhythmic mechanisms the model per­
formed so badly as to make further progress impracticable. After the
introduction of those mechanisms, virtually no problems of control
were encountered at all.
In the particular form in which they appeared these problems may be 
specific to my model. Some of them undoubtedly are. On the other 
hand it seems probable that similar problems would occur in any 
system with similar characteristics, that is, a system in which inte­
gration is mediated by differences of excitation in distributed sets 
of neurons.
The problems encountered may be summarised as the occurrence of 
variation resulting from the operation of the system which was larger 
than the variation representing the response of the system. To some 
extent these problems were caused by efforts to retain and demonstrate 
certain ideas which were felt to be important implications of the 
basic neurological theory. One of these was the idea that attentional 
weighting could be acheived by varying the amount of Excitation enter­
ing a particular portion of the neural template system. Another idea 
was that in nervous systems Excitation can build up sequentially so 
that even the smallest implications of the processing can acquire 
decisive power.
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IV Arousal problems
A. Feed-back characteristics of original arousal system 
In the initial simulations the Spike Frequency in each of the Afferent 
Fibres was the sum of the Diffuse Volley Value and the Discriminative 
Volley Value. The former applied to all Fibres regardless of their 
signal status. The latter distinguished Fibres designated as Active 
from those designated as Inactive. Arousal was mediated by adjusting 
the values of these variables according to the number of Spikes 
appearing across the Efferent Fibres. A slight variation of output 
in an Efferent Fibre caused an increase of arousal, which in turn 
caused a magnification of the next variation, and so on, so that an 
inflationary loop was entered. Fortunately the loop rarely over­
whelmed the system within the limited duration of a run, so that results 
were still obtainable.
The inconvenience of these effects does not necessarily mean that they 
do not occur in nervous systems. It seems probable that they do
(Chapter 14, ). If they do occur then, as in the model, they
emphasise the need for adequate control so that the system can recover 
from them.
As reported, because of the difficulties encountered, the arousal 
system had to be removed. It was, however, able to be reintroduced 
in a revised form when the Inhibitory Gates had been incorporated. In
this version of Arousal, Spike Frequency in Afferent Fibres was no
longer a function of the output of Efferent Fibres, so the inflationary 
feed-back loop was broken.
As may be remembered, in the new system the whole concept of arousal 
was revised. Two quite different forms of varying the level of activity 
were distinguished.
One way of increasing activity in the system was by sending Active 
Afferent Volleys to one or other of the Motivational Neuronal Pools.
This selectively energised the information stored in specific Neural 
records. The other means of varying activity was to vary, by means 
of the adjustment of the Inhibitory Gates, the amount of Excitation 
able to reach the different Arrays. The Inhibitory Gates enabled the 
weighting given to selective parts or to the whole of the neural tem­
plate to be reduced, or to be at maximum level. In this revised
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concept of an attentional system, weighting could be varied to any 
aspect of the neural template, including the motivational aspect.
B. Gates as attentional mechanisms
When a Gate was Open, sufficient Excitation entered through the Affer­
ent Fibres to cause the Excitation within the Array to rise. If one 
of the Arrays was to be given attentional weighting, i.e. arousal, 
its Gate would be put into the Uninterrupted Condition. Accordingly 
Excitation continued to rise in that Array, much as it had done in 
earlier versions, except perhaps more so. At a certain point a feed­
back control system (described below) checked this rise effectively. 
This feed-back system was able to operate satisfactorily in the new 
version for two reasons. In the first place, Diffuse Volley Value 
and Discriminative Volley Value did not vary as a result of feed-back 
as it had in the earlier arousal system, and the major source of 
instability was thereby removed. Secondly, the Array could always 
be brought under control by putting the Gate into the Interrupted 
Condition.
If one of the Arrays was to receive reduced weighting (low attention) 
the Inhibitory Gate to that Array was put into the Interrupted Con­
dition. In this Condition it was Open for seven Instants and then 
Shut for seven Instants. Whilst the Gate was Open, Excitation within 
the Array rose. When it was Shut, the Excitation began to fall. The 
Excitation within the Array fluctuated regularly when in this Condi­
tion. Its average level was, of course, half that of an Array to
which the Gate was in an Uninterrupted Condition. At the time that
this mechanism was introduced it was thought that the effects would 
only be as selective weighting and as an aid to control. Consequently 
it was thought that an Array, the Gate of which was in an Interrupted 
Condition, could only serve a useful purpose during the Open phase of 
the Gate. It later appeared that the other half of the Gate cycle, 
when it was Shut, was of equal importance.
C . Interpretation of EEG in the model
A few words may be necessary to relate the effects of the rhythmic 
mechanisms to the electrical rhythms seen in the brain.
It is not appropriate to derive a direct correlate of EEG from the
simulations. A waveform was printed out which might seem to represent
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in an approximate form the response of a gross electrode recording.
To try to make this resemble the EEG in principle, the variable 
plotted included a summation over all the Integrating Neurons within 
a single Array of both the Excitation Counts and the Spikes emitted.
These curves were superficially quite like EEG records. For example, 
when the Gate to the Array was in the Uninterrupted Condition the 
waveform showed rapid alternations (i.e. from Instant to Instant) 
of low amplitude. When the Gate was in the Interrupted Condition 
the waveform had high amplitude variations which followed the period 
of the Gate, i.e. 14 Instants. Nevertheless, it is recognised that 
there are many considerations which make an identification between 
any particular aspect of the model and the EEG of doubtful validity.
For example, it is known that in addition to the envelope of emitted 
spikes, the EEG reflects both intra-cellular and extracellular 
potentials at various depths in the tissue. Moreover, it is exceed­
ingly easy to obtain superficially similar waveforms to the EEG with 
many rhythmic mechanisms.
Accordingly the correspondence between the mechanisms of the model 
and possible causes of electrical rhythms in the brain must remain 
at this state purely a matter of the general plausibility of the 
model. As a general interpretation it seems reasonable that when 
Excitation within an Array is allowed to rise, the interneuronal 
exchanges between Integrating Neurons, mediating the Linked Constella­
tion concept, would also increase. Assuming that Neurons differ in 
the rate at which their intracellular potentials grow and in the con­
sequent latency of the Spike, the higher the level of interneurnal 
activity the greater would be the desynchronisation of the firing of 
Neurons. In the initial version of the arousal system, there was a 
considerable implausibility in this assumption. Since the increased 
input to the tissue was in the form of Volleys carrying higher fre­
quencies of Spikes, the higher activity within the system was 
accompanied by a more rapid arrival of afferent excitation. Accordingly 
it was difficult to see how desynchronisation could arise from the 
enhanced Volleys. Moreover, it is known that a sudden or intense sen­
sory stimulus or an artefactual stimulus to the afferent fibres pro­
duces a peak (evoked response) rather than a desynchronisation.
This latter implausibility disappears when Attention is mediated by
the rhythmic gate mechanism. The increased Excitation in the integrating
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tissue arises not because of enhanced afferent volleys but because 
they continue uninterrupted. Consequently as the level of Excita­
tion rises in tlie Array, the balance of interneuronal exchange to 
the direct effects of afferent streams changes.
It seems therefore reasonable to equate an Array, the Gate to which 
has been for some time in the Interrupted Condition, as in a "syn­
chronised state" in tfie following sense. During the Open phase an 
Input Pattern enters and during that phase the Excitation rises 
first in the recipient Neuronal Pools, the interneuronal exchanges 
being relatively small because of the recent increase in Excitation. 
When the Gate moves into the Shut phase, the Excitation falls more 
rapidly from the Unlinked Neurons and Neurons belonging to non­
matching Constellations, because matching Constellations are shutt­
ling their Excitation back and forth. Nevertheless, both interneur­
onal and Excitation within Neuronal Pools falls rapidly. The effect 
therefore is that of a synchronisation of the discharges within the 
Neuronal Pools receiving direct afferent Excitation.
Although we are not concerned with applying the model at this stage 
to an explanation of rhythms as they actually appear in nervous 
systems, it is desirable to avoid a possible misunderstanding.
When an inhibitory gate to a notional projection area is in the 
interrupted condition, it does not necessarily mean that during the 
Shut phase of the gate, no neural processing may proceed in that area. 
The activity would, it is suggested, fall because the levels of Exci­
tation falls within the area. It is also possible that reactive 
inhibition, and in the case of profound slow rhythms, externally 
imposed inhibitory rhythms (see Jacobs, Mosko & Trulson, 1977 and 
Section VIII, B), play a part in subduing interneuronal activity during 
these phases. However, these inhibitory aspects are separate from the 
gating mechanism on the afferent fibres. It is quite conceivable that 
the afferent input could be blocked by the shut gate, but that activity 
continues in the area to which that gate applied because the integrat­
ing tissue is sufficiently activated by other sources of excitation.
In the model these other sources would be the Motivational Pools.
That sources of excitation other than sensory signals support fast 
activity has been suggested by Jouvet (1974) and Dement and Mitier. 
(1974) who refer to "phasic generators".
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In the simulations, during an episode when an Array is in the 
Interrupted Condition, it was not necessary to assume that neuronal 
interchange occurred during the nadir of the shut phase. The 
downward fall of the cycle was, as will be seen, used to derive the 
response of the system independent of the effects of the afferent 
input. This will be discussed further in a subsequent section.
V The control system: feed-back loops
The problem of inflationary feed-back loops did not result solely 
from the feed-back control of arousal. After removal of arousal, 
problems were still encountered. It later appeared that these dif­
ficulties resulted from a fundamental problem in the system which 
may have some theoretical interest. Before discussing that aspect 
of neural processing, a brief account will be given of the control 
system developed in the model and some of the difficulties encountered 
with it.
Excitation entered the system at each Instant through the Afferent 
Fibres. At each Instant both Inhibition and Excitation were destroyed 
through the emission of Spikes. They were also notionally lost as 
dissipation through a leaky system. Unless the total of Excitation 
received at each Instant was destroyed at each Instant then the 
amount of Excitationvithin the Integrating Neurons rose continually 
from Instant to Instant. On the other hand if at the end of each 
Instantall Excitation was destroyed, then the sequential and condi­
tional probability aspects of the processing were also terminated at 
each Instant. The latter did not represent the kind of system I had 
in mind. An Instant was merely a convenient fiction for analysing the 
system in temporal terms. Accordingly the system was purposely 
designed so that some Excitation would remain from Instant to Instant 
to be carried over.
The resulting build up of Excitation was satisfactorily solved in early 
versions by periodically clearing all Neurons of Excitation and Inhib­
ition at arbitrarily chosen times, e.g. immediately after a Preconsum- 
matory or Consummatory Response. This worked well but was considered 
a mere device of convenience. As it later appeared that is exactly 
what the rhythmically operating Gates do; by blocking input periodically, 
they allow both Inhibition and Excitation to return to optimum levels.
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One of the parameters by which the system was adjusted so that some 
Excitation was carried over from Instant to Instant was the value of 
Rate of Discharge. It will be recalled that this was a fractional 
multiplier tlie effect of which was that at each Instant only a pro­
portion of tlie excess of Excitation over Inhibition was emitted as 
Spikes. Obviously the greater this parameter, the more Excitation 
was Discharged at each Instant and the less the problem from the 
build up of Excitation. As reported,this parameter was set at 0.3.
This is now seen to be an unnecessarily low rate, and undoubtedly 
the use of this rate, which was quite purposely set low to increase 
the build-up, added to difficulties. I now think this was fortunate 
as it drew attention to characteristics of the system, which I should 
have otherwise probably ignored.
The problem of replacing the occasional clearing strategy of the 
early versions by a more acceptible physiological mechanism to control 
the build up was, as it now seems, erroneously seen as a problem of 
providing an adequate feed-back control of levels of Excitation and 
Inhibition. A reasonable control system was to have a basically leaky 
system which was replenished from Instant to Instant; the resulting 
level of Excitation could then be adjusted by the quantity of Excita­
tion introduced at each Instant. The most obvious variable for this 
purpose was the Diffuse Volley Value. By feed-back adjustment from 
the average level of Excitation across the Integrating Neurons in an 
Array, a value of Diffuse Volley Value could be calculated which 
returned the system to its optimum level. This use of Diffuse Volley 
Value conflicted with its arousal functions, but since these were by 
that time considered as unsatisfactory in any case. Diffuse Volley Value 
became the control variable, rather than an arousal variable.
At this stage Diffuse Volley Value was interpreted as representing 
all those sources of Excitation within an Array which did not actually 
express the input pattern to the array. These would include intra­
neuronal metabolic processes. Consequently there was no inherent 
implausibility in its use in the system. It seems probable that neural 
tissue possesses homeostatic mechanisms of this kind which serve the 
double purpose of maintaining the tissues at optimum conditions and 
protecting it from extremes induced in special circumstances, e.g. 
high Spike Frequencies. What was implausible was the particular prom­
inence this control factor took in attempts to control the wild 
fluctuations of the system.
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No difficulty was eventually encountered in arranging a simple feed­
back variation of the value of Diffuse Volley Value which corrected 
minor variations of Excitation level and which returned the system 
at each Instant to an optimum level. The difficulty arose from two 
sources. One of these is dealt with in the next Section. The one 
with which we are now concerned was the desirability of carrying 
Excitation forward from Instant to Instant in order to increase the 
strength of the Anticipatory Responses of the model.
In addition to the general increases of Excitation which resulted, 
there were considerable build-ups of Excitation in particular inte­
grating Neurons. In the initial simulations Input Patterns changed 
from Instant to Instant, so these differential build-ups tended to 
average out. In the later versions a single Pattern, say the Cue 
Pattern, might be in the Input for many Instants, Of course, this 
was an unrealistic feature of the simulation which would have been 
obviated by replacing the single Cue Pattern by a sequence, as used 
in earlier versions.
Within limits this build up of Excitation was a necessary and desir­
able prediction of the system. What made it an embarrassment was its 
excessive magnitude, and its continued presence in the system after 
it had served its purpose.
VI Distinguishing the response of the system from the direct effects 
of the input
It is now possible to consider a problem the implications of which may 
have some theoretical interest. It was obviated by the rhythmic Gate 
mechanism. Essentially the problem concerned the difficulty of dis­
cerning the results of neural processing within a location of tissue 
which is subject to continual afferent input. In the simulations the 
problem arose mainly in the Motor Arrays when it was required to detect 
the relevant Motor Response Indications. However, its theoretical 
implications would appear to apply generally to the system.
The model suggests that one function of neural rhythms is to separate 
temporally within an Array the direct effects of the Afferent Input to 
that Array from the effects of interneuronal exchanges across the 
whole template. It does this in two ways. (i) It reduces the level
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of Excitation entering a particular Array. Consequently the Excita­
tion induced in the Neurons of that Array, by activity in some part 
of the most highly reactivated Linked Constellation, stands proud of 
the general levels of Excitation engendered within the Array itself.
(ii) The rhythmic Gate can, when required, slice up the Input to 
that Array into discrete frames, giving the tissue in that Array a 
periodic freedom from the direct effects of Input to enable the res­
ponse of the most highly activated Linked Constellation to be seen.
For convenience of reference one may refer to a primary and a 
secondary response of the tissue. The meaning of the signal input 
is derived in the model from the differences of Excitation induced 
in sub-sets of Integrating Neurons (Linked Constellations) by sec­
ondary exchanges. It was found that this secondary response could 
not be effectively detected against the effects of the direct afferent 
Excitation.
It will be noted that where a Constellation is present in the system 
which matches exactly tlie current Input in all locations, the primary 
and secondary responses of the system will match in one sense: the 
sub-set of Neuronal Pools directly Excited by the Input will be the 
same sub-set which contains the Neurons belonging to the most highly 
reactivated Constellation. In the case of the most closely matching 
Constellation differing from the Input Pattern, the two responses of 
the system will differ, i.e. the sub-set containing the Neurons of 
the most highly reactivated Constellation will not match the sub-set 
of Neuronal Pools directly activated by the Input.
The interesting case is where a mismatch occurs in a particular loca­
tion of the extended neural template, and the model needs to detect 
the implications of the whole input as it relates to that location.
For example, in the simulations the release of a Motor Response required 
the detection of a Motor Response Indication in the Motor Array. This 
Constellation response, induced by the Sensory Input could not be 
detected because of the direct effects of the Afferent Volleys sent 
up to the Motor Arrays when Responses were released.
A. Importance of detecting match and mismatch
Before considering the difficulties in the way of detecting the Constel­
lation response in an Array, a short digression may be justified to 
establish the necessity of doing so in a more general theoretical sense.
'I'tie inability of Llie system Lo distinguish the secondary frojii the 
primary response will not matter if the aim of ttie system is simply 
that of es tabl ish i luj d L imu J us-Response L’onne of i ons ; at least it will 
not maffer on Liie Sensory side of Liie apparatus. The near match, 
even if not comp le te match, between Const t! J bit ioJis present in the 
system and tlie current Input will ensure the rapid reactivation of 
the Constellations. In some circumstances j t is important that the 
system should respond to the input as if it were tlie same stimulus 
as that on previous occasions and ignore minor discrepancies. This 
would assist a clear and prompt response. It would represent one 
mode of operation of the model, which may be termed the Stimulus- 
Kesponse mode.
Ignoring for the moment the possible difficulties of detecting the 
Motor Response, one can envisage a well learned sequence of sensori­
motor behaviour running off without trouble in a mode in which, on 
the sensory side at least, no attempt is made to distinguish between 
the primary and secondary response of the system. An equivalence is 
assumed between the most highly reactivated Constellation and the 
current Input. Each successive input would reactivate a relevant 
set of Linked Constellations. The resulting Motor Action interacts 
with the environment to modify input at the next Instant. The mod- 
itied Input reactivates the next step of the sequence of Linked 
Constellations laid down on an earlier occasion. In this mode the 
system exemplifies the Stimulus-Response view of behaviour as a sen- 
sori-motor chain.
There are however circumstances where such a model of operation fails 
to take advantage of the information stored in the system. Such a 
model cannot "take care" and avoid some of the disasters which might 
result from faulty equivalences of slightly differing situations.
The interesting aspect of the model is where some part of the informa­
tion represented in a Linked Constellation already present in the 
system is different from or absent from the current input, or conversely 
where information in the current input is different from that stored in 
Constellations. In the Stimulus Response mode, the most closely match­
ing Constellation is simply identified with the currently arriving 
pattern of Excitation. In a purely discriminative model, as defined 
by the Gibsons (1955) (see Chapter 2) such faulty equivalences will be 
challenged only by the eventual environmental failure of the responses
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released by tlie equivalenced neural records; the mismatch can only 
be detected by tiie subsequent (and possibly fatal) environmental 
consequences of an unjustified identification of stimuli. An alter­
native consequence of a faulty equivalence is that a valuable 
opportunity for the animal may be lost. A dog which goes out of a 
room to find food when a buzzer of the wrong frequency is sounded 
will not be in the room to hear the correct cue when it occurs.
Two rather different cases of mismatch may be considered. The first 
occurs wiien the system is already on its guard and the suspected input 
is to be examined. This may be because of the failure of the well 
known sensori-motor chain to be activated; it may be because some 
significant aspect of the environment has already differed from what 
is familiar, e.g. a new keeper arrives with food. In such circum­
stances it will be desirable that any sensory stimulation which differs 
even slightly from what has been previously encountered should be 
carefully examined for mismatch. When a mismatch is detected, it is 
desirable to proceed very cautiously with motor action, so as to be 
able to withdraw or proceed to the next step, and to label each Input 
Pattern as safe or otherwise. To detect the mismatch it is necessary 
in my model to discern the response of the reactivated Constellations 
in comparison with the direct effects of tiie Input Pattern somewhere in 
the system.
That the sophisticated nervous system is able to operate in this way, 
at least in critical situations, may be seen in the experiments of 
Sokolov (1960) , Anokhin (1961) and Walter (1969) , and their schools.
These experiments show tiiat a novel stimulus produces an orienting 
reaction (having distinct EEC parameters). The orienting reaction 
becomes habituated after familiarity with the stimulus. The reaction 
appears again if the stimulus is changed, even in a minor way.
A second case in which it would appear to be valuable to the animal 
to be able to detect the secondary response of the system is where 
some current stimulation signals that something else is likely to occur.
A familiar example is the classical conditioning situation. Say that 
a buzzer signals food. There is no food present when the buzzer is 
sounded. Nevertheless the animal looks attentively at a place where 
food is customarily placed. According to the model, the meaning of 
the acoustic stimulus is seen in the reactivation of the matching 
Constellations. These Constellations, or those closely associated with
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theui by temporal sequence, will contain representations of the visual 
appearance of food, registered upon former occasions. It seems reason­
able that the animal has a visual expectation of food. The representa­
tions of food laid down on former occasions will be in the visual 
location of the neural template (or some location receiving a conjunc­
tion of visual and accoustic inputs). The reactivation of the portion 
of ttie Constellation falling within the visual location, must be 
detected against the pattern induced in the same location by the current 
input, an input which signals that no food is present.
Such an interpretation is not of course essential to an explanation of 
Conditioned Responding. The interpretation may be distinguished from 
the substitution theory in which the CR, say, salivation, is simply 
attached to tlie CS, say, a buzz in substitution for the original stimu­
lus capable of eliciting salivation, say, food.
Having argued for the necessity of distinguishing the response of the 
reactivated Constellations, we may now consider how the rhythmic Gate 
mechanism enabled it to be detected.
VII Difficulties in detecting Response of Constellations
A. Magnitude of Response of Constellations
The response of Constellations is induced in the system as the result of 
interneuronal exchanges between Neurons of a Linked Constellation. In 
the conservative Excitation system used in the main simulations, the 
differences of Excitation between Constellations were small as compared 
with the effects of Afferent Volleys on the Integrating Neurons situated 
in the Pools whose Fibres were Active.
The magnitude of the response of Constellations could be increased by 
departing from the conservation concept and assuming that Excitation is 
amplified by interneuronal exchange. In the separate simulation which 
investigated the mediation of Linked Constellations by orthodox synapses 
it was found that the system could be made amplificatory, conservative 
or attenuative simply by adjusting the threshold at which Integrating 
Neurons underwent a notional action potential in relation to the average 
number of synapses which Integrating Neurons made upon each other. In 
the amplificatory system, the problem was the converse of that experienced
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in the main simulations. Instead of Excitation building up in the 
Neuronal Pools receiving direct afferent input, it built up in the 
Linked Constellations- Once a Constellation had exceeded a critical 
state it continued to rise in Excitation until it exploded at an 
impossible level. At subsequent Instants further Constellations 
readied the critical level and the whole model ran out of control.
This control could only be regained by introducing a rhythmic Inhibi­
tory Gate, and in addition a profound Inhibition, which by cancella­
tion of Excitation, brought the Constellation back below the critical 
level.
To return to tlie simpler case of the conservation system in the main 
simulations, the response of the Linked Constellation was small in 
comparison with that of the Neuronal Pools. This seemed to be the 
required state of the apparatus for most purposes. The direct effect 
of inputs must be relatively large at least at the times when it is 
necessary to ensure accurate registration of sensory events.
B. Overlapping of directly excited and Constellation responses 
In locations to which afferent excitation is continually arriving, 
the reactivated pattern is overlaid by the signal pattern. With 
rhythmically spaced Input Volleys, the two patterns are separated 
temporally. During the Open phase of the Gate, Excitation enters the 
selected Neuronal Pools and the afferent Excitation to that Array 
becomes dominant. At the peak of the response of the directly driven 
Neuronal Pools registration may take place. Interneuronal exchanges 
take place, but they cannot be distinguished from the direct affects 
of the afferent volleys. When the Gate Shuts, the Input Volleys are 
cut off. The Excitation in the system begins to fall. Where a Linked 
Constellation is at a high level because of Excitation reaching it 
across the whole Neural template, it will now stand proud.
The foregoing description is not the only way in which the rhythmic 
system might operate in the model. It was, however, the way in which 
they were used in the simulations, and which were accordingly shown to 
be effective. To consider further possibilities of the effects of the 
rhythmic Gates would be to go beyond the aims of the present discussion. 
However, some possibilities are mentioned in a later section.
It may be important to stress that the above account does not need to 
assume that interneuronal activity can take place when the Neurons
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concerned are inhibited. Although that might be so (see Section IV, D 
of Chapter 5), the above account does not require it. This would 
remain true even if there is a profound externally induced Inhibition 
during slow waves, as was conveniently introduced to control the 
amplificatory aspects of the separate simulations utilising notional 
orthodox synapses. The Constellation response could be detected 
during the downward phase rather than at the nadir of activity within 
the Array.
It would seem probable that if rhythmic Gates perform the roles 
attributed to them in the model, there would be room for considerable 
variation of their mode of activity, both from location to location 
and also from moment to moment. For example, it may be that a profound 
externally imposed inhibition only occurs in cortical tissue under 
special circumstances (Jacobs, Mosko and Trulson, 1977).
Verzeano (19 70) interprets his results as follows; " . . .  different 
neurons behave in different ways in relation to the (gross) slow waves.
. . . the largest majority of neurons, which produce spikes of low
amplitudes, discharge in consistent relation to the negative slopes of 
the gross response. A small minority of neurons, which produce spikes 
of high amplitude, discharge in a more variable fashion; in some instances 
in relation to the negative, in other instances in relation to the posi­
tive slopes of the gross response".
C. Inhibition
Inhibition problems in the model could not be satisfactorily solved until 
the rhythmic Gates were provided.
Within an Array the average level of Inhibition Count rose so as to 
silence all but the most highly Excited Integrated Neurons. A feed-back 
criterion had to be found for this system. This raised the question 
of the distinction between the response of the system, that is, the 
permitted discharge, and the "noise" which was to be rejected.
The external intelligence of the programmer was obviously not to be 
utilised in recognising when a discharge "pattern" had been optimised. 
The model offered its own criterion of pattern. A principle of the 
model, already discussed, is that all valid signal patterns involve 
approximately the same proportion of Active to Inactive Fibres (both in 
Motor and Sensory Arrays). Accordingly, the system aimed at that level
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of Inhibition at whioh the sub—set of Neuronal Pools containing Dis­
charging Neurons conformed to a balanced pattern.
Inhibition was easily cun trolled to give this effect. The Discharge 
from tiie Pools representing the balanced pattern could be maximised 
by seeking tlie lowest level of Inhibition at which tlie required num­
ber of Neuronal Pools showed no Discharge.
During admission of signal volleys, the system naturally maximised 
the response of the Pools receiving direct Excitation and Inhibited 
the others, i.e. it isolated the directly excited response of the 
system. In tlie Uninterrupted Condition of the Gate (and, of course, 
in earlier versions of the model without Gates) this was the only 
response which could be isolated by the Inhibition system. In the 
Interrupted Condition of the Gate, during the Open period of the Gate 
the system homed in to the directly excited response, and during the 
early part of the Shut Condition it was able to home in to the Constel­
lation response.
The system was able to distinguish the most highly Excited "relevant" 
reactivated Constellation from less Excited "irrelevant" Constellations 
because at the appropriate level of Inhibition, the most highly Excited 
could be isolated by the requirement that the sub-set of Pools in Dis­
charge conformed to a balanced Pattern. If the Inhibiton were lowered 
further, the balanced pattern was broken up by the intrusion of Discharge 
in further Neuronal Pools, due to the inclusion of less highly Excited 
Constellations.
The precise setting of the system could be used to determine the degree 
of generalisation permitted. If the Criterion used for the feed-back 
control of Inhibition were satisfied when a greater number of Pools were 
allowed to contain Discharging Neurons, say, two or three more than 
those required for a balanced pattern, then the Constellations permitted 
to contribute to the Constellation response might include Linked Constel­
lations which did not completely match the most highly reactivated 
Constellation. If the feed-back loop homed in to precisely the condition 
that just half the Neuronal Pools might contain Discharging Neurons, then 
only the Constellations reactivated to the highest levels which exactly 
matched each other, could contribute.
The important feature of the temporal separation of directly excited and 
Constellation response, by the action of the Gate in the Interrupted
Condition, was that the Inhibition system could then optimise each of
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the two responses of the system separately.
Before the foregoing features of the system had been understood, much 
time had been spent in searching for a criterion which would enable 
both the directly excited and Constellation response to be seen 
together. Even if it had been found, the difficulties associated 
with the simultaneous appearance of both the signal and the secondarily- 
reactivated pattern would have remained. Accordingly the Inhibition 
problem converged upon the other problems which were solved by the 
rhythmic mechanism.
D. Detection of Motor Response Indications
It might perhaps be thought possible to avoid the foregoing problems 
by looking at some location where Afferent Volleys are not present at 
that time. For example, as may be seen in Figure 5.7, in principle 
the meaning of the sensory input can be discovered by looking at the 
Discharge of the Efferent Fibres, i.e. the Motor Location. It was, 
however, pointed out that the freedom from Afferent Input of the Motor 
Neuronal Pools was a simplification used for exposition only. These 
pools were provided with Afferent Fibres and received Volleys which 
registered emitted Responses. Such Volleys occurred whenever a Res­
ponse was initiated either by a Cortical Motor Response Indication or 
by a Sub-cortical initiation. There was also Diffuse Volley Value, 
the control variable which entered all Fibres at each Instant.
Although the present discussion concerns rhythmic mechanisms in the 
model rather than the brain, in reality motor cortex is subject to 
considerable direct excitation, some of it sensory, but much of it 
motor, e.g. from the ventral lateral nucleus of the thalamus. As already 
mentioned, Diffuse Volley Value is rather specific to my model and may 
be difficult to relate to specific aspects of neurophysiology. Never­
theless there are profuse sources of excitation to motor locations. It 
seems implausible to consider that any location of the cortex would be 
sufficiently free from afferent volleys for the purposes suggested by 
the model, unless special arrangements were made for that purpose, e.g. 
an inhibitory gate (see below).
However that may be, in the model it was found impossible to obtain 
the Motor Response Indication (i.e. the Reactivated Constellation res­
ponse of the Motor Array) with accuracy. The main source of trouble was 
the effect of Volleys in the Motor Efferent Fibres sent from the Control
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Centre to register Motor emissions. Although these did not occur 
all the time, the effect was that the Motor Response Indication was 
likely to reflect the Excitation left behind by a recently emitted 
Response registration, rather than reflecting the Constellation res­
ponse to the current Input.
Tills difficulty was Immediately cured wiien the rhythmic Gate to 
the Motor Array was put into the Interrupted Condition. The Motor 
Response could be taken at just the point when, after the Gate had 
Shut, the average Excitation in the Array had fallen to a level which 
maximised the response of Reactivated Constellation. The Motor Res­
ponse was then found to be almost without exception a reliable pro­
duct of the Sensori-Motor Constellation laid down at an earlier 
occasion. Even when the model made behavioural errors, which it 
frequently did, these were rarely found to be caused by an unreliable 
Motor Response Indication, but rather to the dominance of a "wrong" 
Indication.
VIII Attentional aspects 
A . Economy of storage
In tlie initial simulations it was demonstrated that the amount of 
information stored at each Instant was adjusted according to the sig­
nificance of events as assessed by the model. Linked Constellations 
which registered the occurrence of Innately Recognised Patterns (IRPs) 
contained a greater number of Integrating Neurons than those formed 
at other Instants. In the "conditioned arousal" versions, this dif­
ferential storage could be applied to the registration of Patterns 
of the Cue Sequence, although these latter patterns were indifferent 
patterns before being repeatedly presented as a Cue.
As reported, the arousal system based upon variation of Spike Frequency 
had to be withdrawn for many reasons. In relation to economy of stor­
age it had several inadequacies. These related chiefly to what happened 
when the arousal level was low. The reduced Spike frequencies produced 
smaller differences of Excitation between Active and Inactive Pools. 
Accordingly the signal to noise ratio was severely reduced and the 
number of errors increased. Secondly, the level of Excitation intro­
duced being low at each Instant, only a few Neurons were linked into
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each of the Constellations formed. This number was rapidly reduced 
by decay. The overall effect was that, if a substantial economy was 
made in information storage, no adequate record was maintained of the 
period during which the arousal level was low.
It would seem that in tlie initial arousal system, the only effective 
alternative to tuiking a full record was to take none at all. Theoreti­
cally this might be a considerable disadvantage if it were later found 
that events to which "no attention had been paid" were in fact impor­
tant. This was one of the difficulties in implementing the "conditioned 
arousal" scheme. An indifferent pattern in a Cue Sequence could never 
give rise to "conditioned arousal" unless it had been adequately 
registered in the first place.
In the new system these drawbacks were largely remedied. To acheive 
Attention to an Array, the relevant Gate was put into the Uninterrupted 
Condition. As described. Excitation rose within the Array. In this 
Condition the new system behaved very much like the original system 
in the number of Neurons Linked, although of course without the con­
trol problems.
A difference regarding registration was seen when the Array was put 
into the Interrupted Condition (i.e. low arousal or Inattention). In 
this Condition, at the peak of the Open phase of the Gate cycle, the 
linked Constellations formed had approximately the same number of 
Neurons as did those formed when the Gate was in the Uninterrupted Con­
dition. For the remainder of the Gate period, the Constellations 
consisted of relatively few or no Neurons, which decayed rapidly.
Unlike the record of events taken when the original arousal system was 
at a low level, the Constellation record now consisted of a few pop­
ulous Constellations separated temporally by gaps in which there was 
virtually no record. Whereas the original system had produced a con­
tinuous but inadequate record, the new system produced a periodic but 
adequate sample of the Input events.
B . Arousal and attention: monitoring sensory input
In the simulations as reported, the main purpose of the rhythmic mech­
anisms was the maintenance of control over the system and the deriva­
tion of the Motor Response Indication in spite of the effects of 
Afferent Excitation on the Motor Array. In the theoretical model there 
are some further implications which may be mentioned briefly.
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It has been pointed out that the Reactivated Constellation response 
of the system could be derived in the absence of afferent input. 
Accordingly it should be possible to derive the sensory implications 
of signals to one cortical location, say, auditory, by blocking the 
input to another location, say, visual, as in the example mentioned 
earlier of a buzzer signalling food.
Ass tuning that the general proposals of the theoretical model are accep­
ted, there is still no reason to consider that the required blocking 
of Afferent Input need take the form of a rhythmic inhibitory gate.
The reduction of signals by habituation would achieve the required 
effect.
There would however appear to be a considerable advantage in interpos­
ing a rhythmic inhibitory gate between the source of signals and the 
central integrating tissue. Such a Gate might form an intermediate 
step in excluding unwanted signals from the cortex, with this differ­
ence , that the signals excluded by the Gate might be blocked by reason 
of their meaning rather than their sensory quality. This form of con­
trol might be especially useful in excluding those signals which do 
not in themselves lack variety or information content, and which would 
not easily be habituated at the peripheral stations, even when the 
animal had learned that they had little consequence.
The advantage of the exclusion by the Gate in the Interrupted Condition 
would be (a) an adequate although greatly economised record could be 
taken of them • (b) when habituated at the periphery the signals passing 
through the Open phase of the Gate would have no effect, so nothing 
would be lost by interposing the Gate (c) the signals reaching the 
integrating tissue would be able to interact to some extent with the 
information stored there. At each cycle of the Gate some Excitation 
enters to be able to confirm the reactivation of Constellations indica­
ting "safe" or "of no interest". In the event of the afferent signals 
changing character or becoming dishabituated, other Constellations 
become activated, and the Condition of the Gate could be changed.
In brief, rhythmic inhibitory Gates might be used to monitor input in 
locations to which Attention had been reduced, and the effects of mon­
itoring used to control, the Condition of the Gate itself.
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Figure 15.1 (Reproduced from Purpura and Shofer, 1963) Patterns of 
intracellularly recorded activities of thalamic neurons during cortical 
recruiting responses evoked by 7/sec. medial thalamic stimulation.
A. surface negative recruiting response from Motor Cortex. B. Neuron 
in ventral anterior region of thalamus. C. Relatively quiescent ventro­
lateral neuron develops discharge. D. similar to B. E. Neuron in intra- 
laminar region. Stimulus interrupts a spontaneous discharge. Successive 
stimuli evoked IPSP's and evoked EPSP's.
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IX Some neurological considerations
As stated, the rhythmic mechanisms have been presented as part of the 
model, not as a theory of electrical rhythms in nervous systems. 
Nevertheless, it is reasonable for the reader to expect some mention 
of tlie neurological data relating to the mechanisms which have been 
incorporated into the model.
The essential mechanism used in the model to implement the various 
matters which have been discussed is the Inhibitory Gate. In the model 
this consists of notional neural mechanisms capable of blocking the 
transmission of afferent volleys from the Control Centre (Thalamus) to 
the Cortex.
In brief, there is ample neurological evidence that inhibitory arrange­
ments, of just the kind required for the Inhibitory Gates of the model, 
exist in the mammalian nervous system. The subject, which has a vast 
literature, will not be fully reviewed, but a resume given.
Dempsey and Morison (1942), Bremer and Adrian carried out pioneer work 
which led to the recognition that certain rhythms originate in the 
thalamus. A number of neuro-anatomical hypotheses, backed by the 
research of certain well-known groups, involve inhibitory gating of 
afferent pathways in the thalamus. Three will be described.
(i) Recurrent axon collaterals, acting through Renshaw-like interneurons 
inhibit discharges flowing through specific thalamic nuclei (Andersen 
and Eccles, 1962; Andersen and Andersson, 1968; Andersen, 1974). Since 
rhythmic activity persists in the thalamus after complete decortication, 
such activity cannot be dependent completely upon cortical feed-back 
(Morison and Basset, 1945). The pacemaker effect proposed by Dempson 
and Morison (1942) is explained by Andersen as an intrinsic rhythmic 
excitability of neurons "responding in inhibitory rebound" (Andersen, 
1974)
(ii) Purpura and his group demonstrated that stimulation of medial 
thalamic nuclei produce frequency-specific EPSP-IPSP sequences in 
neurons of both specific and non-specific thalamic nuclei. He favours 
a synaptic theory implicating "complex organisations of excitatory and 
inhibitory interneurons" (Purpura, 19 70). A reciprocal relationship 
between specific and non specific nuclei was reported (Desiraju, Santini 
and Purpura). Purpura (19 74) reviews the work of the group, disclosing 
rhythmic inhibition of specific, non-specific, motor and sensory nuclei,
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both spontaneously and under medial thalamic artefactual stimulation.
An example of the inhibitory gating demonstrated by Purpura and his 
associates is illustrated in Figure 15.1.
(iii) In an anatomical study, Scheibel and Scheibel suggest that the 
reticularis nucleus acts as a frequency specific gate. This work 
would appear to follow the early discoveries of Schlag-Chaillet, (1963)
who observed that when the mesencephalic tegmentum was destroyed, 
i.e. caudal to the thalamus, cortical desynchronisation could no longer 
be obtained by high frequency stimulation of the medial thalamus. In 
Purpura's experiments, high frequency stimulation of the medial thala­
mus produced desynchronisation at the cortex, low frequency stimula­
tion, synchronisation and thalamic inhibitory gating.
Scheibel and Scheibel describe a major projection of the thalamic 
non-specific system rostrally through the reticularis nucleus, and a 
caudal projection to the tegmentum. They summarise; "Low frequency 
stimulation of the medial thalamus is immediately effective in syn­
chronising activity over huge areas of the thalamus and cortex because 
this roughly matches the frequency ranges established by the reticu­
laris gate".
More recent reviews of the subject are in Landfield (1976), Brazier 
(1977) and Verzeano (1977). Essentially, however, the concepts of 
thalamic inhibitory gating in the field, as relevant to my model, 
remain as indicated above.
X Application of Inhibitory Gates in the simulations
To assist in clarifying the practical use of the Gates in the simula­
tions, the control of the Gates at various points in the experimental 
runs reported in Chapter 14 will be given. Further, rather more infor­
mal, explorations of the possible implications of the use of inhibitory 
gates were carried out, but as they fall beyond the scope of this 
project, they will not be pursued here.
At the commencement of a Trial in a typical run, the model would be 
seeking an appropriate Instrumental Response. This "seeking" mode 
was the basic one in the simulations, and the model was set in this 
way unless some other indication occurred to indicate a resetting.
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In the seeking mode, the system was awaiting a Motor Response Indica­
tion from the Instrumental Cortical Array. It may be recalled that 
tills Motor Response Indication was to be obtained from tlie reactiva­
tion of a Seiisori-Motor Constellation laid down on a former occasion 
of emission of a successful Instrumental Response in that situation 
(i.e. location of tlie maze bearing the same Input Pattern) . That 
Cons te Llation liad been formed some 13 Instants after the release of 
the Instrumental Response. It contained in different Cortical Ses- 
sory Arrays representations of two Input Patterns. One of these was 
the Input Pattern present before the release of the Instrumental 
Response (delayed pathway) , the other was the Input Pattern which 
appeared as the result of the Instrumental Response (more immediate 
pathway). To obtain the Motor Response Indication when the model 
was once again receiving the pre-response Input Pattern, only the 
Cortical Sensory Array containing the representation of that projec­
tion was relevant. A mismatch would have occurred if the pathway to 
the other Cortical Sensory Array had been unimpeded. Accordingly 
the Inhibitory Gate to the latter Array was in the Interrupted Con­
dition during the seeking mode; the Cortical Sensory Array containing 
the pre-response Input Pattern in the relevant Constellation, was in 
the Uninterrupted Condition.
In tlie seeking mode, the reactivation of the Constellations was being 
driven mainly by the Input to the Cortical Sensory Array receiving 
the delayed signals. Since these energised the part of a Constella­
tion containing an event which had occurred later (i.e. the Response) 
this was the anticipatory pathway. It was required to detect that 
anticipatory Constellation response in the Cortical Instrumental 
Motor Array. This Constellation response was the Motor Response Indi­
cation. To do this effectively, as discussed earlier, the Inhibitory 
Gate to that Array was put into the Interrupted Condition. This 
illustrates a case where it might be said that "attention" was paid 
to an aspect of the neural process by reducing the Excitation to an 
Array (Figure 15.2).
In this mode, at each cycle of the Gate to the Cortical Instrumental 
Array at a particular phase, i.e. when Excitation within the Array had 
fallen below a criterion, the Motor Response Indication was taken. 
Notionally this meant opening another inhibitory gate (not formally 
simulated) across the Efferent Fibres of the Array, timed to coincide
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with the main Inhibitory Gate to the Array.
As soon as an adequate Cortical Motor Response Indication had been 
obtained, or alternatively, a Response emission accepted for release 
by the Motor Release Mechanism (Thalamus), the seeking mode was 
brought to an end. In tlie typical runs referred to, the model was 
put for a short time into a "recuperative" mode. (In some exploratory 
runs still in progress, this time was used to obtain another secondary 
response of the system, see below). In this recuperative mode, all 
Gates were put into the Interrupted mode for about eight Instants.
This was found to be important as ensuring that a sufficient number 
of Unlinked Neurons were available for the crucial registration of 
the Sensori-Motor Constellation some 13 Instants later.
At the end of the "recuperative mode", the Gates to all the Arrays 
whose activity was to be registered in the critical Sensori-Motor Con­
stellation were put into the Uninterrupted Condition to ensure ade­
quate registration, i.e. both of the Sensory Arrays, the Consummatory,
Preconsummatory and Motivational Arrays.
In experiments still in progress, the Consummatory (Final) Response 
pathway was delayed. At the point under consideration, i.e. registra­
tion of the Instrumental Response, the Gate to the Consummatory Array 
was put into the Interrupted Condition and only put into the Uninter­
rupted Condition somewhat later. This was to give effect to the function 
of the Consummatory Response as being the event which caused the reduc­
tion of Motivational Excitation (see Chapter 19).
Whenever an Instrumental Response had been registered, and in the 
absence of a Preconsummatory or Consummatory Response, the model was 
put into the recuperative mode (all Gates in Interrupted Condition) for 
some time. In the case of the emission of a Preconsummatozy Response, 
the Gates continued in the Uninterrupted Condition, (full arousal) for 
a further interval to allow for the reception and registration of the 
Consummatory (Final Response) and then the recuperative mode intervened, 
and was made to last for longer than after an unsuccessful Instrumental 
Response. At the end of the recuperative phase, the model was put once 
again into the seeking mode.
The modes represented are not intended to indicate the mode of action 
of the apparatus in a Stimulus-Response mode. The simulations aimed at
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optimising learning, rather than representing what might happen when 
a we 11-learned behaviour was being performed. It seems possible that 
a recognition of a well learned stimulus could be devised which would 
put the model into the Stimulus Response Mode. The Gates would then 
be operated as described to obtain each Motor Response Indication, 
but iimriediately afterwards a further Motor Response Indication would 
be obtained without the more elaborate arrangements for registering 
and adjusting the system.
In some exploratory programs still under investigation, the Inhibitory 
Gates became of primary importance. In these runs, the critical 
Sensori-Motor Constellations registering the Instrumental Responses 
were labelled with the Preconsummatory Response which had become 
associated successfully with the emission of the Instrumental Response 
concerned. Opportunity was taken of the interval immediately after 
the release of an Instrumental Response, and before its registration, 
to obtain the Motor Response Indication of the Preconsummatory Array 
as driven by the post-instrumental-response Input Pattern. This pro­
vided a TOTE like test as towhether the Instrumental Response which 
had just been emitted was in fact a "correct" one. If it had been 
correct, then it would have had the effect on the environmental 
routines of producing from the Input the identical post-emission Pattern 
as had occurred on previous occasions. For this purpose, the Inhibi­
tory Gate to the Cortical Sensory Array with the delayed pathway was 
put into the Interrupted Condition and the Gate to the Sensory Array 
with the more immediate pathway was put into the Uninterrupted Condi­
tion. The Gate to the Preconsummatory Motor Array was put into the 
Interrupted Condition in order to detect the secondary Response in 
that Array. The detection of an appropriate Response Indication in 
the Preconsummatory Array confirmed that the Instrumental Response had 
achieved its environmental effect. This Motor Indication was driven 
by the Input Pattern which had appeared in the Input after the release 
of the Instrumental Response. (Figure 15.3).
In summary, the Inhibitory Gates were used in the simulations not only 
to acheive a solution to the problem of control, but also as a selec­
tive attentional mechanism. They were also used to enable the Reacti­
vated Constellation responses to be detected without disturbance by 
direct Inputs.
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XI Rhythmic mechanisms and brain function
The literature relating electrical rhythias observed in the brain to 
behaviour, both animal and human, is considerable and complex. As 
already stated, it is considered that such matters go beyond the 
reasonable terms of reference of this project. The author has natu­
rally given the matter some thought and is of the opinion that it is 
possible to reconcile much of the evidence with an hypothesis of 
rhythmic interruption of afferent pathways in combination with the 
intrinsic properties of neural tissue. However, to pursue such a 
theory would require considerable research. It would probably also 
require more knowledge than is at present available in respect of 
the structure and function of nervous systems. The approach in this 
project has been to find mechanisms which will enable the basic theor­
etical model to be taken a stage further in the representation of the 
brain. At the same time some of the implications of the mechanisms 
used are explored.
Accordingly, it is not proposed here to consider the behavioural 
correlates of electrical rhythms. Some idea of the relationship 
between behaviour and rhythms will be implicit in the aspects of the 
model which have been discussed.
In the most general sense one may say that the use of rhythmic Inhibi­
tory Gates in the model implies some general relationships. Uninter­
rupted Conditions of Sensory Gates with Interrupted Conditions of 
Motor Gates suggest a sensory driving of Motor decisions. Interrupted 
Conditions of Sensory Gates imply either a state of relaxation or that 
some implication of meaning of the sensory input to some other sensory 
location, in which the Gate is in an Uninterrupted Condition, is being 
derived. A variety of Interrupted and Uninterrupted Conditions suggests 
selective attention.
To avoid misunderstanding, one or two points may be mentioned. The 
Interrupted Condition of the Gates, as discussed, need not be identi­
fied with the very slow waves which, for example, appear in Slow Wave 
sleep. Nor need the Uninterrupted Condition be identified with the 
fast episodes of Paradoxical or Fast Wave sleep. It is probable that 
special uses of inhibitory gates would intervene during sleep. As 
mentioned earlier, an Interrupted Condition of a Gate still permits the
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relevant Array to be in a highly Excited ("desynchronised") state.
Such a state might be driven by Excitation which reaches that Array 
through the interneuronal exchanges of the Linked Constellation 
system, or by means of special sources of Excitation, e.g. motivational 
or perhaps P.G.O. spikes.
In addition to the special attentional and detection functions used 
in the simulations, there is also the overall control function achieved 
by adjusting the Gates.
XII Concluding remarks
A number of difficulties encountered in the development of the model 
have been described in some detail. These difficulties threatened to 
bring the further development of the model to an end. The introduc­
tion of motional rhythmic Inhibitory Gates effectively remedied 
these problems.
In addition to their practical effect, the rhythmic mechanisms drew 
attention to a number of aspects of Neural function, as represented in 
the model. If the problems encountered in the present effort are taken 
to be indicative of the kind of problems which should be faced 
generally in endeavouring to provide a realistic simulation of nervous 
tissue, then these effects of rhythmic mechanisms might have further 
significance.
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CHAPTER 16
SEPARATE SIMULATION INVESTIGATING NOTIONAL SYNAPTIC MEDIATION
The main simulations have been developed upon the basis that the 
concept of Linked Constellations is independent of the neuronal 
mechanisms by which they might be mediated. Nevertheless, it has 
also been proposed that the Linked Constellation concept did not 
necessarily require an unorthodox form of communication between 
neurons. Orthodox Gray-type synapses would suffice, provided that 
profuse interconnections are assumed, and subject to some simple 
rules for the formation of effective connections from potential 
connections.
It was considered necessary to test this supposition. Accordingly 
a separate series of simulations was run. This did not attempt 
behavioural implementation in the same way as the main set of simula­
tions. They were designed to test that the main properties attributed 
to Linked Constellations in the main simulations, and represented in 
those by simple arithmetical procedures, would arise in a system of 
diffuse synaptic connections obeying simple rules.
I Design of model
The model followed the general layout of Figure 5.7 and 5,12. The 
number of Neuronal Pools was restricted to a minimum, in order that 
the number of synaptic connections per Neuron might be maximised within 
the computer resources available. Six Sensory Neuronal Pools were 
provided. The Input Patterns were designed so that each Active Fibre 
('1 ') was always accompanied by its complementary ('0 '), so that the 
set of Fibres represented a balanced receptor system.
Two Motor Neuronal Pools were provided, and initially these did not 
represent a balanced effector system. It was later discovered that 
some balancing was essential to maximise performance, and accordingly 
additional Neuronal Pools were added to the Motor representation (see 
below).
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Separate Sub-cortical and Cortical Arrays were not provided in this 
model. The general idea was to present a succession of Input Patterns, 
then re-present them and see if Linked Constellations laid down on 
the first presentation were appropriately reactivated upon subsequent 
presentations.
It was desirable to include some Motor representation so as to be able 
to confirm the sensori-motor implications of the Linked Constellation 
idea. The equivalent of Preset Constellations were induced in the 
model by reserving tlie first ten Instants of an experimental run to 
the presentation of special Input Patterns. These Input Patterns were 
the same as the Input Patterns presented later in the program to test 
the model, except that they possessed extra digits corresponding to the 
Motor Neuronal Pools.
Consequently a number of Sensori-Motor Constellations were formed dur­
ing the first ten Instants of the run. Following the initial ten 
Instants, Input Patterns were presented which matched Patterns presented 
during the first ten Instants on the Sensory side, but always had zeros 
in the locations corresponding to the Motor Neuronal Pools.
II Excitation arrangements
As in the main simulations, each Afferent Fibre which was Active deli­
vered an equal amount of Excitation to each Integrating Neuron in its 
Pool. The other assumptions of the simulation now under discussion 
were relatively simple. An Afferent Fibre whose corresponding Input 
Pattern digit was a 'O' delivered no Excitation to the Neurons within 
its Neuronal Pool.
In order to examine more closely the assumptions concerning inter­
neuronal exchange of Excitation, in later versions of this simulation, 
the Excitation delivered at each cycle of the program was reduced.
The number of cycles constituting an Instant was increased (usually to 
about ten cycles). Consequently there was a finer temporal analysis. 
All Neurons obeying the rules for forming Integrative Connections 
within an Instant, i.e. ten cycles, were still labelled as members of 
the same Linked Constellations.
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These variations were introduced into this set of simulations to test 
that the preliminary results obtained with a somewhat cruder system, 
would still hold up under this more realistic representation. In the 
first versions of this simulation, an Active Fibre would deliver 1000 
Spikes to each of the Neurons in its Pool. The thresholds of all 
Integrating Neurons in the system were set at 75 Spikes. With these 
figures, at Each Instant each Neuron in an Active Pool discharged a 
very large number of Spikes. These were exchanged through Synaptic 
Connections by a sub-cycle within the Instant. In the revised version, 
the amount of Excitation delivered to each Integrating Neuron at each 
sub-cycle was in the region of 100 Spikes, i.e. just enough to cause 
the recipient Neuron to fire once.
An attempt was also made to simplify the physiological assumptions con­
cerning Excitation. All Excitation which did not result in Spikes 
within a sub-cycle was notionally destroyed (i.e. Excitation Count 
was set to zero). However, Excitation resulting in a Spike was pre­
served until the next sub-cycle upon the assumption that the Spike 
leaving the axon hillock of that Neuron would take some finite time to 
travel to the Neuron which was to receive it. Accordingly, at the next 
Sub-cycle, Neurons received not only the Excitation receivable from their 
Afferent Fibre but also 1 Spike of Excitation in respect of every Neuron 
which possessed a synaptic foot upon it and which had emitted a Spike 
at the previous Sub-cycle.
Inhibition assumptions were also simplified in a physiological sense. 
Inhibition was calculated by the system on a basis comparable to that 
in the main simulations. However, the action of the Inhibition was 
significantly different from that of the main simulations. In this 
version. Inhibition cancelled out Excitation. At the beginning of each 
Sub-cycle, the Excitation Count of each Integrating Neuron in the system 
was adjusted as follows:
(i) it was reset to zero
(ii) its value was put equal to the sum of the Afferent Excitation 
delivered by its relevant Afferent Fibre and the Interneuronal Excita­
tion received from other Neurons in the system which possessed notional 
synaptic connections upon it
(iii) this sum was reduced by the Inhibition Count of the Neuron 
concerned
(iv) Inhibition Count was reset to zero
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(v) the 11 umber of Spikes emitted was then calculated as the nett 
Excitation Count divided by the Threshold.
An important fetiture of ttiis representation concerned the quantitative 
effect on an Integrating Neuron emitting an impulse. If the Neuron 
possessed N effective synaptic feet upon other Neurons in the system, 
then when it emitted a Spike, N Spikes were delivered into the system.
On the other hand, a Neuron required to receive more than a single 
impulse to be able to pass on a Spike. It will be readily seen that 
if the Threshold is set equal to the average number of synaptic feet 
which each Neuron possesses upon other Neurons, then in principle the 
system is neither amplificatory nor attentuating. Actually this rule, 
although approximately indicating the properties of the system does 
not adequately reflect its operation. The destruction of Excitation 
which does not reach the required Threshold level without the crea­
tion of a Spike, introduces some distortion.
Ill Simulation of synaptic connections
Each Integrating Neuron in the system was assumed to possess profuse 
potential synaptic connections upon randomly distributed other Neurons 
in the system.
The actual method was briefly as follows:
At each Sub-cycle the Excitation Counts of all the Neurons were first 
adjusted as described above. Then each Neuron was considered in turn.
If its Excitation was below Threshold it was rejected. If it was above 
Threshold, then notionally it could form effective synaptic feet upon 
other Neurons upon which it had potential connections provided that 
the postsynaptic Neuron was in a similar condition. Random numbers 
selected another Integrating Neuron in the system, and if, and only if, 
that Neuron also fulfilled the linkage condition, the synaptic foot upon 
that Neuron was notionally made effective. This was done by entering the 
address of the post-synaptic Neuron. The number of such synaptic feet 
that a Neuron could make effective was limited to a certain number. In 
most runs this was 175 for each Neuron. This number exhausted the core 
store of the computer.
Accordingly when the foregoing process had been completed, each Integra­
ting Neuron which was Unlinked at the beginning of the Instant and 
which had exceeded threshold, now possessed a list of addresses of other
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Neurons upon which it possessed synaptic feet. It only remained at 
the end of each Instant to check through all the Neurons, and select 
tliose Neurons which had been Unlinked at the commencement of the 
Instant, and which now possessed synaptic feet. The relevant Constel­
lation Label was then entered into the Linkage Label location of the
Neuron concerned. Thereafter it could not form Integrative Connections. 
,not
Decay was/represented in this set of simulations.
IV Interneuronal exchanges
At the commencement of each Sub-cycle, the Excitation Counts of all 
the Neurons in the system were, as described above, set to zero. To 
perform the next step, that is to enter the Excitation received from 
both Afferent Excitation and Interneuronal exchanges, it was necessary 
to calculate the latter figure for each Neuron in the system. This 
was done in the following manner. Each Neuron was considered in turn.
The number of Spikes which it had emitted during the previous Sub-cycle 
had been recorded in a special location within the Neuron. This number 
was then added into the Excitation Counts of each of the Integrating 
Neurons whose addresses appeared in the list of Neurons upon which the 
reference Neuron possessed a notional synaptic foot (or feet). In 
this way the Interneuronal exchanges mediated by synaptic connections 
of an orthodox one-way axonal-dendritic type were roughly simulated. 
Obviously the simulation was limited by failing to repeat this inter­
change sufficiently frequently to mimic a continuous analog system.
However, within the limits of the simulation, it was considered to rep­
resent the Linked Constellation idea mediated by orthodox connections.
It will be noted that the Constellation Label played no part in the 
implementation of this system. It was purely the result of the exchanges 
recorded between the synaptic feet. The only minor purpose served by 
the Constellation Label was to indicate that the Neuron concerned had 
its full complement of effective synaptic feet. The actual purpose of
writing in the Constellation Label was to enable the programmer to
analyse the performance of the system. These Labels enabled the Instant 
at which particular Neurons had been linked to be identified, and so 
the theoretical attributes of the proposed Linked Constellations could 
be checked out.
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There is one minor variation which should be mentioned. With the 
system as just described, and lacking a "ripeness" or decay system, 
all the Neurons of an Active Pool would have been Linked at the first 
occurrence of the Active Volley. To prevent this a probability con­
trol was introduced. Only if a random number chance system indicated 
accordingly, was the Neuron regarded as being in the condition to 
form Integrative Connections.
V Performance of the system
A Confirmation of formation of Linked Constellations and their 
attributes
As was predicted, at each Instant of the program the sub-set of Inte­
grating Neuons excited by the Afferent Input Pattern formed an 
interconnected sub-set. In all the versions of the program, the basic 
attributes of Linked Constellations were confirmed. In particular, 
when an Input Pattern which had been presented earlier in the program, 
say at Instant I, was re-presented at a later Instant, the Integrating 
Neurons bearing the Constellation Label I, that is, those Integrating 
Neurons which had formed interconnections at the earlier presentation 
of the particular Input Pattern, were found to be the most highly 
Excited in the system.
Secondly, if at Instant I, the Input Pattern had possessed an Active 
Motor digit, then Integrating Neurons were naturally found Linked 
into Constellation I situated in Motor Pools. Similarly at Instant J, 
when another Input Pattern had appeared with an Active Motor digit. 
Neurons were linked in another of the Motor Pools. It was confirmed 
that when the Input Pattern presented originally at Instant I was sub­
sequently repeated, but this time lacking the Active Motor digit, 
nevertheless, the Neurons in the relevant Motor Neuronal Pool rose to 
maximum Excitation. This could be compared with the Neurons belonging 
to Constellation J, and situated in the other of the two Motor Neuronal 
Pools. The latter Neurons were found to be at lower Excitation levels 
and to Discharge fewer Spikes than the Neurons situated in the Motor 
Neuronal Pool which was Active at the first presentation of the same 
Sensory Input Pattern and which was once again in the Input.
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These results are illustrated in Figures 16.1 and 16.2 which re­
produce tables printed out by the computer during the runs. The 
numbers displayed under Column headings consist of (a) the Constel­
lation Label, and (b) the Spikes emitted, in respect of sample 
Integrating Neruons located within the Neuronal Pool named at the 
head of the column.
Figure 16.1 represents the state of the model at the third sub-cycle 
of Instant No. 12. At this Instant the Input Pattern was Pattern 
No. 42. This Input Pattern had been previously presented at Instant 
No. 4, with an Active digit (a *1') in Motor Column 1. It may be 
noted that in general the Integrating Neurons bearing the Constella­
tion Label '4' emitted more Spikes than others in the system. There 
were exceptions, some of the Neurons did not make adequate synaptic 
connections with other members of the Linked Constellation to which 
they were supposed to belong.
It may also be noted that the Neurons in Motor Column 1, bearing the 
Constellation Label *4', emitted considerably more Spikes than those 
in Motor Column No. 2, bearing Constellation Label '6 '.
Figure 16.2 shows the state of the model in the same computer run, 
but at Instant No. 15. Input Pattern No. 28 is now in the Input. This 
is the Pattern which formed the Sensory part of the Input at Instant 
No. 6 , there being at that time an Active digit in Motor Column 2.
The Integrating Neurons which now generally show the highest Excita­
tion are those bearing the Constellation Label '6 ', as predicted by 
the Linked Constellation concept. Moreover, it is now Motor Column 2 
which contains Neurons at the highest Excitation Levels, the Neurons 
in that Column bearing Constellation Label '6 '.
It may be noted that the system is not without irregularities. These 
support the observations already made earlier in respect of the main 
Constellations. For example, the Integrating Neurons in Column No. 6 , 
bearing Constellation Label '10' are at the highest in the system.
It will however be noted that all the Neurons bearing this Label are 
situated within Column 6 . This can be explained on the hypothesis, 
argued in Chapter 6 , Section I, in connection with balanced receptor 
systems, that a Linked Constellation resulting from a small number 
of Active Fibres would be reactivated maximally by a large number of
381
OJ » — Q 0 S K S C S C 3 O
u Q c a i s i s t i t s r - -  
X  O'
Z  UJ
•  t S S G . Q G . G ' O
C£ (S
G  Gi c : G  G  2D P3 «  C  G  CO C3 
CJGGii'IiCicaGCCGCDSJca
g c £ « s : g ; 5 : ( S ( £ ( s s s s g d  
* ^ « .  • .  « • « . • < *  •  # # #
'OQ'OSGGO'OsOcaQcaGi.oQQcacaQûiaOsO
c ü e a c ü i s a i w s ^
- 4  r u  fvj rvj
';ea?aQsca<T?c5Giaa<ras)cacaacao;T
C S > O C a S s O E ) H Û S i v O l S Q C 3 C 3 [ S î 3 v O r S 3 Q ' O s Û Q Q
•  m •  m. m # # # # # # . # # # # « # # # » # #
QXicar~oQscaGjOiAoamh~5)aI ( 9  C3 Cm S3
• D
' Ï  a .
31
! . «  I CO
o
u
o
(SQKJKiraoQcaraQscafnQ^afiieaEiQcacafQ
t # # * * # # # # a # » # # m m # # # # * e #
QQCDv£)QCaGlS)ïSi'OQ>QSi(9E)G»CaiSK>CaC319 
■ • • • « • • • « • • • • • • • • • • • a *
QSQrUCaQKiQ<9rvJC3r^CDGJG3CaOG3SCiQCa^
iI :i
■QQCa(SSGJ(9G3GiKiQQrDe?CSaCi3Q<SQQS>53 
• • • « • « • • • a  « . • ■ • • • ■ ,  « • • • • •
'Q^^mh-.ejQr^Q^r^mtrcDr—ca^ TcacTcar^ o
=T &— a  o  o
u  Q  n j  c*
H- Z) Z —» 
UJ o  
CL U  
UJ a  «OilT» LA -o
CD 'O wO O  G3 'O '
ra  O  O  O  ^  CO ^  
ra o  ta Q  ca m  m
K  l-H •
o  o  rvj
CO X  O'
z  Z  UJ 
w  X
>0 vO ^ sO o <o s
nj sO ^  ui ^  ?  a  ?rlHi
o  #-4 V #  rvi A j «—#1 f\j
raorDTaraca'3a|5
-Û  -O 'O  >0 >£
c .  o  c  ra  o  
rvj in 3^- ui o
'O  >0 ^  '>0
ruv— o o  S i Gi o  -Û
o  p'' ro  Q  ra  (T3 CO 
z  w
1 es C3 ra ca r j  
, Ki ta S i m  o
o  a  G l C3 sO D  sO
ra  Q  53 13 O  53 EJ 
ca Cm  G3 ca C i o
o  'O 53 ca ^  o  
.0 ca G* O' fvj
ca <53 Ga Q  C9 Q  
rO St —« O
?  M  ru ; I
^ o o 
=r Ki
t: UJ 
X
n
J—^ra.aEto-ouDo.oo.ood.c.ouaa'Oooo.o
►H • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I i .  • • • • ,  • •
o c o i a —*t r j tOvOinr - ( \ j rv j ruLAr3!T3K)0'a . . . ^^O'o:>^  
X  —i —. .-• rvj rvj --I fvi ru — ' rviru— *»-»»-*
_Jc «css S K K - c s s s s c s s c c :  s s c c c s g : 
O  ._ ! .  • . • • • ■  • .  • .  •  •  •■ • .  •■ • -  •  • .  • .  » .  • .  •  •  • -  • -  •• Kv?^ »oruKif\imrr»(\|çrro.-ii^ '-ti^ :jruru^ ’-»*-*.sr
0 <D
00
G n
0
•H OJ
■P Cn
fd (d
u 04
-H
1-1 G
A 0
G
b W
0
(d (d
(U
U) A
•H Oj
(d
QJ
iG
G u
tJi •H
•H
m
cn P
•iH fd
b rG
Eh G
CsJ
(d
r-
Q)
k .
3
O)
502
Patterns. Of course, in the simulation now being described the Linked 
Constellation concerned (LC (6 )) was not formed from an Input Pattern 
activating a smaller number of Fibres. All Input Patterns activated 
three Sensory Fibres together with a Motor Fibre on special occasions 
(Instant 4 and 6 ). However, by the time the run had reached Instant 
No. 10, most of the stock of Unlinked Integrating Neurons had already 
been exhausted, so it is not surprising that the only Neurons linked 
at that Instant were drawn from that Pool which had been least fequently 
called upon up to that time. The efect was, however, just the same as 
if the Constellation had been formed by a Pattern having a single Active 
Fibre.
In summary, the simulations confirmed that subsets of Neurons formed 
by diffuse random connections obeying the rules laid down for the 
model behaved in the same way, as far as could be seen, as the Linked 
Constellations of the main simulations. The latter were simulated by 
computing the values of Excitation Counts according to the hypothesised 
attributes of the Linked Constellation hypothesis, as defined in 
Chapter 5. Accordingly the currently described simulation served as 
an effective demonstration that the proposed attributes of Linked 
Constellations would be possessed by sub-sets of Neurons which form 
mutual orthodox synaptic connections of the kind represented in the 
currently described simulation.
As has been mentioned, it is further suggested that subsets of Neurons 
categorised by interconnections of any kind which transmitted Excita­
tion between Neurons, would serve the same purpose.
VI Inhibiton, Excitation, rhythmic mechanisms and other aspects of the 
separate simulation
A few points may be noted concerning the behaviour of the system in 
this separate set of models, since they are relevant to matters raised 
in relation to the main set of simulations.
(i) Inhibition In this set of models. Inhibition cancelled out Excita­
tion in the manner customarily used in neurological models at a 
symbolic level. Nevertheless, as will appear below, similar problems 
arose in regard to Excitation as in the main set of simulations.
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Inhibition could be used to control Excitation, and was in fact used. 
However, the mechanism by which Inhibition was able to control the 
build-up o£ Excitation was entirely analogical, except that it related 
to Inhibition rather than Excitation, to he rhythmic mechanisms used 
in the main simulations to control Excitation. That is, if the 
system were flooded witli Inhibition at periodic intervals, then since 
the Inhibition cancelled out Excitation within Neurons, the system 
periodically cleared the Neurons of their built up Excitation.
Necessarily however, this Inhibitory rhythm, if it were to be effec­
tive in controlling the build up of Excitation, would prevent the 
temporal sequential aspects of the system from acting in the sense of 
a priming Excitation.
(ii) The Excitation introduced into the system through the Afferent 
Fibres could be amplified, conserved or attenuated by adjusting the 
parameters of the system in a simple manner. This aspect depended 
upon the average number of synaptic connections. If an Integrating 
Neuron had a threshold of 50 Spikes and made 150 synaptic connections, 
then each time it emitted a Spike, the number of travelling Spikes in 
the system was increased threefold. Actually, as earlier mentioned, 
the system was considerably more complex than is indicated by such 
arithmetic, but the basic relationship was confirmed.
If the system were made conservative or attenuative, then it behaved 
approximately as the main set of simulations. The build up of Excita­
tion could be controlled by introducing rhythmic Inhibitory Gates 
across the Afferent Fibres. In these cases it was unecessary to depart
from the reactive Inhibition assumptions of the main simulations, i.e.
it was not necessary for Inhibition to clear the system, the lack of 
Excitation did that effectively during the time the Gate was Shut.
If, however, the system were made amplificatory the Linked Constella­
tion system only worked in a very limited sense. What happened was 
that the first Constellation formed in the system, since its Excitation 
was amplified as it was shuttled between member Neurons, grew continually 
in Excitation from Instant to Instant. The next Constelltion formed 
in the system did the same. Since it started one Instant behind the
first, it never quite caught up. The third Constellation formed
performed in a similar manner. Consequently, the Constellation whose 
Neurons stood at the highest Excitation level was always the first one
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formed in the system, the next highest the second formed, and so forth. 
Changes in Input Pattern were unable to influence this situation sig­
nificantly. Of course, eventually the system ran completely out of 
control.
This behaviour in the amplificatory version, could not be controlled 
by rhytlimic Inhibitory Gate across the Afferent Fibres. It could how­
ever be controlled by periodically flooding the system with Inhibition.
Whilst one must, as already mentioned, be cautious about applying the 
behaviour of these simulations to the brain, it is an intriguing idea 
that both Inhibition and Excitation might be subject to rhythmic 
mechanisms. First, one may note that in nervous tissue, upon the 
assumption of the model, the system need not be amplificatory, conser­
vative or attenuative in an absolute sense. This might be adjusted by 
a system of thresholds which changed the relationship of operationally 
effective synaptic feet to average Spike threshold. In a conservative 
or attentuative mode, inhibitory flooding might not be needed, but in 
an amplificatory mode an imposed external source of Inhibition might 
be essential to maintain stability. At the same time the sequential 
aspects of the system would disappear. The advantage of this would be 
that the maximum analysis of the single input pattern permitted to 
enter could be obtained through the continuing growth of Excitation in 
the matching Constellation. It would be curtailed by a profound 
Inhibition.
Whatever may be the relevance of these speculations to brain functions, 
it must be reported that these implications could be seen in the 
simulation under discussion.
VII Conclusion
A separate simulation investigated the feasibility of mediating Linked 
Constellations by orthodox formal synaptic connections. The simulations 
confirmed, within the limits attempted, that this was in fact the case.
The utilisation of rather different physiological assumptions concern­
ing neuronal Excitation and Inhibition in this set of simulations, 
served to demonstrate that the characteristics of the main set of
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simulations were not the product of the particular notional physiology 
incorporated.
The model also enabled the implications of amplificatory, conservative 
or attentuating systems of Excitation to be explored. The effects of 
rhythmic mechanisms applied to both Inhibition and Excitation were 
also investigated-
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CHAPTER 17
SOME MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS
I Introduction
This chapter considers some miscellaneous topics which require some 
mention.
II Some notes on the computer programming
A. Languages
The initial set of simulations were run on the ULCC Atlas computer 
and written in Atlas Basic Language. That language approximated to 
a machine instruction code with supplementary facilities. Itera­
tive loops, return addresses, conditional jumps and other structural 
facilities had to be constructed by the programmer.
The extended version of the model (Aries) were written in Fortran, 
supplemented by machine code. They were run on the ULCC CDC 6,500.
A version written in Algol was not actually used.
B. Special facilities and techniques
The main difficulty in programming stemmed from the limitations inherent 
in the computer resources available. These resources were considerably 
greater than those generally in existence at the time but were still 
not adequate for an effective demonstration of the model without re­
source to special techniques. These techniques in themselves necessar­
ily complicated the programming. Only a brief indication of these 
matters will be given.
The limitations were closely connected with the theoretical basis of 
the model. Effective memory duration in the model is determined by the 
number of neurons represented in each neuronal pool of the model. Con­
sequently to run the model long enough to demonstrate its principles 
demanded large numbers of represented neurons.
Wi til tlie number of neurons which would fit into the computer core 
store, a further compiication arose. Even when the number of neurons 
permitted a reasonable demons tra t ion run of the model from tlie point 
of view of médiatiruj ietuntion of learning, the actual computer time 
necessary to process the mode,*! was greater tfian that permitted to the 
student, given a reasonaljle turn-around.
The solution was to run tlie program for as long as permitted at one 
time. Then the entire core store was copied onto magnetic tape.
The next computer job began with copying the magnetic tape into core 
store, and so- on. So the notional lifetime of the model organism 
took a number of computer runs to complete. However, in the thesis, 
an "experimental run" of the model means the succession of these 
individual runs.
To accommodate this strategy a number of special techniques were 
necessary. A single example will be given. During the relatively 
slow peripheral operations, the program would have monopolised the 
central processor. A pseudo-parallel processing was used. By means 
of special instruction "XRCL" the central processor could be held up.
Tlie program was split into two halves, AM and BMj whilst one was being
processed the other was being read in and out of core.
Although in some respects, the change to the CDC computer made some 
of these difficulties obsolete, others appeared. With the extension 
of tlie model, the whole of the notional system could not be held in 
store at one time. Fortunately disc storage had by now been intro­
duced. The model was split into 24 parts and these were buffered 
in and out onto disc, by much the same technique as had earlier been 
used to extend the duration of the run on the Atlas.
Most of the experimental exercises on the model required some 750
Instants. Each computer run could only handle 45 Instants within the 
time allotted to the student. Consequently an "experimental run" 
took over 15 runs on the computer. In the early days, the turn-round 
took several days. Later this improved to an overnight service. Even 
so an effective experimental run took a minimum of 15 days to complete. 
Even a minor error, a misplaced comma, took a day to discover and 
rectify.
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These constraints brought many difficulties in their wake. Only one 
will be mentioned. Nurmaiiy, in a program a variable can be relied 
upon during tlie program. However, the shuttling in and out of core 
memory did not. permit tlie pn;servation of all the subsidiary vari­
ables. Consequently the programmer himself had to set up a system 
to presoive the values ot the main variables.
Typical of the mysterious difficulties which arise when attempting 
to overcome Üie natural limitations of a machine, was the appearance 
of tlie number "32" in various key places within Integrating Neurons. 
They often appeared in the locations of Constellation Labels, so 
before the error was discovered, the model seemed to suffer from 
some strange disease, that of "proliferating 32's". This baffled all 
the computer advisory service personnel, until it was discovered that 
tlie re was a conflict of coding during the tape copy operation which 
corrupted the information.
In leaving this merest hint of computer difficulties, it may be men­
tioned that recent developments in the architecture of computers may 
make the task of programming immeasur/dily simpler. The current dev­
elopment of disc storage which may be directly addressed without the 
involvement of the prograiimier, would mean that the whole of a very 
large model, could be designed and written in a simple direct manner. 
Such facilities are not however yet available.
C. Some brief statistics
The Aries program consisted of some 5000 Fortran Instructions. Each 
computer run took between 600 and 900 seconds on the computer, so 
the total time of an experimental "run" was about 10,000 seconds. 
Monitoring output was on Microfiche, and over 600 pages of notional 
printout, i.e. micro-photo output, was printed for each run. Accord­
ingly there were approximately 9000 pages of printout monitoring a 
single experimental try-out of the model.
It was thus possible to say with some certainty exactly how the model 
operated in many respects. An example of such monitoring output may 
be seen in Appendix A, consisting of the microfiche of one computer 
run only. An extensive monitoring process of this kind is, in my 
opinion, an essential point in modelling a subject which is extremely 
complex and little understood, by means of a system which is also 
complex unless one has some means of understanding with certainty what 
is going on the model.
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D. Processing time and real time
This brief mention of computing mutters should not ignore a special 
difficulty related to neurological models.
In the nervous system a large number of neurons do not necessarily 
take lorujer to perform their function tiian a smaller number. In 
the computer, the processing time is directly related to the number 
of neurons to be represented. This is so even where the system being 
modelled, as in the present case, is an analogue parallel processing 
system. This is because the computer is essentially a serial pro­
cessor, each neuron involving an additional iteration of those opera­
tions, which, taken together, comprise its simulation.
This difficulty offers a very substantial difficulty to the adequate 
representation of neuronal systems. It was also responsible for 
characteristics in tlie models which were not really attributable to 
their theoretical basis. For example, to produce some kind of per­
formance within a reasonable length of computing, learning had to be 
greatly "speeded up".
In suirmiary, the computing aspects have in the past, and at the present 
time, present a considerable obstacle to simulating a brain model 
of the kind pursued in this thesis. There are however, in the rapid 
developments of computer technology, hopes that these will be greatly 
reduced in the near future. The present exercise has shown some 
progress is possible even with the limitations of current technology 
and resources.
Ill Some simulations in the course of development
A . Background remarks
At the time of writing, some further simulations were being developed 
but had not progressed sufficiently to say whether they would be 
successful. They are briefly reported here, not to suggest that they 
might or would work, but because the principles developed in their 
design may have some bearing upon the theoretical model as a whole, 
particularly in regard to the difficulties encountered.
The next stage in the development of the models would have been to try 
to enable the performance of a sequence of Instrumental Actions to
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reach a goal, in place of the single Instrumental Action used in the 
simulations reported. Tliis would be an important step in the effec­
tive simulation of brain function in neural terms. With such a model 
one could go on to simulate co-ordinated perceptual and motor activi­
ties. Moreover, the restriction of the previous models to a single 
Instrumental Response begs one of tiie major theoretical questions 
concerning the organisation of behaviour. It avoids the problem of 
how tJie effect of tiie reinforcing event is able to get from the neural 
records of a formerly reached goal to the initial steps which must 
be taken to reach that goal.
Although the latter question has been subject to much research and 
many theories, the mechanism is still not understood, nor its funda­
mental attributes agreed upon. The modeller may therefore feel fairly 
free to use what suggests itself.
In tlie models so far simulated the effect of the reinforcing event, 
the elicitation of the Preconsummatory Response, was applied to the 
representation of the Input Pattern which immediately preceded that 
event by introducing a delay into the sensory pathway. This introduced 
a basic implausibility, discussed earlier. The reinforcing event 
must follow sufficiently closely upon the Instrumental Response for the 
delayed pathway to be successful in integrating them. Of course, the 
unit of time represented in the models is a notionally short one, so 
one is really looking at a temporally continuous process in which the 
sensory pattern preceding an Instrumental Resonse overlaps the emer­
gence of the Preconsummatory Response.
The implausibility of this time scale can be readily avoided by intro­
ducing a delayed consolidation concept. Such a concept is extraneous 
to the principles laid down for the theory of neural integration. It 
was accordingly desirable to demonstrate the main attributes of the 
theory without resort to such a mechanism. Having done so, it seems 
justifiable to utilise biochemical reactions to extend the power of 
the mode 1.
This is especially the case because consolidation mechanisms seem to 
have been substantially confirmed by contemporary research. It is 
not proposed to review the field here, but two sources may be referred 
to in support of this statement. Landfield (1976) reviews those 
hypotheses closely connected with the electrical rhythms. Brazier's
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(1979) aiitiiülocjy contains many papers devoted to this subject.
Routtenborg \ irJuing-Ja have sliown tJie interaction of two transmitters (1978) .
In tlie model, the median ism was simple to incorporate. The model 
remained essentially as before. A difference was introduced into 
the represen tation of Integrative Connections. Instead of the Con­
stellation Label being inserted at the time that the Integrating 
Neuron fulfilled the linking conditions, a provisional marker was 
entered into the Neuron location. If within a certain nurrber of 
Instants an event had occurred which it was considered enabled the 
consolidation to be confirmed, then the marker was replaced by the 
Constellation Label which would have been entered at the time of 
the Provisional Linking.
The mechanism worked satisfactorily from a practical point of view.
Of course, all Integrative Connections in the model were not made 
subject to consolidation. In the short time that the mechanism has 
been experimented with, consolidation was restricted to the Connec­
tions in the Motor Neuronal Pools, in particular to those of the 
Instrumental Pools. In particular, the event which would confirm the 
consolidation of the provisional connections was the occurrence of a 
Preconsummatory Response within a given nunber of Instants.
The system was run sufficiently to demonstrate that in this way the 
temporal proximity between reinforcing event and Instrumental Response 
could be overcome. It v/as not run sufficiently to explore the 
behavioral implications of introducing long delays between provisional 
formation of Linked Constellations and their consolidation. Insofar 
as experiments were run, it seemed that if the delay were made longer 
than the average time taken to emit an Instrumental Response, compli­
cations of learning followed. The model would fail to learn the cor­
rect order of a sequence of responses. Although nothing definite can 
be claimed from the simulations run, it appeared that a notional bio­
chemical consolidation process in itself would not enable the model 
to learn a sequence of successive Instrumental Responses.
There is however one theoretical aspect of the model which would appear 
to be broadened by the consolidation hypothesis.
A continuous sensori-motor chain cannot be the only mechanism of 
motivated behaviour. The type of learning where associations are made 
only if events occur within a few seconds of each other may be contrasted
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with that whicli occurs between events which are separated by hours 
(Üatley, 197Ü) as when an animal suffers illness after eating a 
specific dis crimi iicJj le food and afterwards avoids it. Some theor­
ists consider that pmrposive behaviour reflects tlie animal's 
concepts of causation derived from his general associations 
(Mackintosh, 1974).
A biochemical hypothesis of consolidation, especially one in which 
specific labelled biochemical processes interact selectively, enables 
the model to be extended to explain such time gaps. One may assume 
that the consolidation of actions concerned with the alimentary pro­
cesses are bound together because their consolidations are mediated 
by a single sub-set of biochemical consolidators. In the hypothesised 
model, the Constellations indicating the acts of eating would be 
registered provisionally in both the Activator (Do) and Suppression 
Pools (Not-Do). In normal circumstances the Activator aspect would 
be consolidated, but iti the case of some trouble in the alimentary 
system (mediated by a Preset Constellation which would recognise 
such a trouble) then the Suppression representation would be consoli­
dated. Ill view of the biochemical specificity assumed to be specific 
to alimentary processes, this widely spaced temporal integration 
would be independent of intervening events provided they were not also 
alimentary events.
As to the biochemical plausibility of such mechanisms, Iversen (1979) 
remarks in reference to the neuro-peptides as neural transmitters,
"It therefore seems that the neuro-peptides may be chemical messengers 
of a character different from that of previously identified transmitters 
they appear to represent a global means of coding for patterns of brain 
activity associated with a particular function, such as body fluid 
balance, sexual behaviour, pain or pleasure".
The biochemical consolidation hypothesis as a corollary to the model 
would appear to broaden its scope considerably. Except for the theor­
etical implications just discussed, the inclusion of the mechanism does 
not seem to modify the model which is the subject of this thesis very 
greatly. However, it seemed of some importance because it greatly 
assisted another development of programming in hand. This was the 
mediation of extended sequences of instrumental actions leading to a 
goal. This is discussed further below.
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B. 'l'uiiiporal sequences: _ motivational link s
One means whicli has been suggested by many theorists (e.g. Hull, 
Sheffield) as the basis of organisation of successive Instrumental 
actions, is that the cT'fects of reinforcement become attached pro­
gressively tu objects and situations whicti occur earlier in tiie 
sequence on eacii subsequent experience with the situation. It is 
not proposed to discuss the question here except to note that ani­
mals do learn sequences of instrumental behaviour with some ease 
(for review see Hinde, 1970, p.609). The approach here follows 
the general line already indicated, that special mechanisms exploit 
tiie basic attributes of the system.
Two forms of the hypothesis suggest themselves. In one, successive 
labelling of sensory input would enable the system to ascertain 
whether an Instrumental Action taken in the presence of that Input 
would be likely to lead to a goal situation (a Preconsummatory IRP). 
The second form of tiie hypothesis concerns the attachment of Moti­
vational Links to progressively earlier steps in the sensori-motor 
chain, enabling the behaviour to be "driven" towards the goal, as 
in, for example, Deulsch's (1960) hypothesis. Both these forms are 
the subject of models in development, and both seemed to be subject 
to similar difficulties. It is in fact these difficulties, rather 
than the ideas themselves, which are the subject of the present sec­
tion, as they are relevant to the models already reported.
In tlie simulations reported earlier, the emission of a Preconsumma­
tory Response caused the Instrumental Action immediately preceding 
it to be registered in a Positive (Do) Neuronal Pool. The Precon­
summatory Response in those models had to be a full one, that is, it 
had to arise from a direct reactivation of a Preset Constellation in 
the Sub-cortical Array, and the Sub-cortical Preconsummatory Response 
was then transmitted to the Cortex for registration. In the versions 
now being described, the reinforcement control of registration of 
Instrumental actions was not restricted only to the direct full elici­
tation of a Preconsummatory Response in this manner. A sufficiently 
strong Cortical Motor Response Indication from the Preconsummatory 
Array (i.e. the Anticipatory Response detected in that Array) served 
as a reinforcing event, just as had the direct elicitation of the 
Response served as a reinforcing event in earlier versions.
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Tlie question was; how was such an Anticipatory Response to be forth­
coming? In essence, that Anticipatory Response was obtained only 
"one jiuiip" ahead, by exactly the same principles as tlie Instrumental 
Response Indication had been obtained "one jump ahead" in the simu­
lations already reported. However, in addition, at each repetition 
of the situation, the registratiun of the Anticipatory equivalent 
of the Preconsummatory Response was moved one step temporally backwards.
In brief, the idea was as follows: After each emission of an Instru­
mental Response, and at the time of registration of that Response, 
a provisional registration was also included in the Linked Constellation 
in the appropriate Preconsummatory Response Pool. The particular Pre­
consummatory Pool chosen for this provisional registration could not 
of course, be determined by an actual elicited Preconsummatory Response, 
because none would have yet occurred in the current trial. Accordingly, 
the Pool chosen was the one relating to the Cortical Motivational Pool 
which was active at the biassing level at that time. In simple terms, 
if the animal was hungry, then the Preconsummatory Pool which would 
be provisionally registered was that relating to the consumption of 
food. After each Instrumental Response, then, there was present in the 
Linked Constellation recording that Response, a provisional registration 
of a Preconsummatory Response.
The determination of whether that response was to be consolidated (in 
a positive or suppressive aspect) was taken at the emission of the 
next Instrumental Response. Suppose, in the simplest case, that this 
next Response was the one which had led directly to the direct elicita­
tion of a Preconsummatory Response, as in the successful Instrumental 
Responses of the models already reported (call this Instrumental Res­
ponse A). Then immediately after the Instrumental Response had been 
taken a Preconsummatory Response would be elicited. This was the 
primary reinforcing event which confirmed the consolidation of the Pre­
consummatory 'label' in the Constellation recording the preceding 
Instrumental Response (i.e. Instrumental Response B) .
So far so good, as regards an Instrumental Response (B) which immedi­
ately preceded the one which elicited the Preconsummatory IRP. What 
about an earlier Instrumental Response, say the one which preceded 
that just discussed? It will be seen that upon emission of this earlier 
Instrumental Response (call it Instrumental Response C) it would be
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given a provisionaI registration of the relevant Preconsummatory 
Label. When the model emitted its next Resonse (B) , i.e. tlie one 
preceding the final Instrumental Response of the sequence, it would 
not elicit a direct Preconsummatory IRP from the notional environ­
ment. That IRP was only elicited later by Instrumental Response A. 
However, it will be recalled from the above,that the earlier regi­
stration of Instrumental Response B did include a representation of 
the P re cons umma to ry Response elicited by Instrumental Response A, 
termed a Preconsummatory marker or label. Accordingly, immediately 
after the emission of Instrumental Response B, on this second 
occasion, one could ascertain whether Instrumental Response C had 
been a successful one by referring to the Linked Constellation 
registering B on the earlier occasion.
The reference to the Linked Constellation registering B was made by 
obtaining the Anticipatory Response from that Constellation. Immedi­
ately after the emission of Instrumental Response B, the most highly 
reactivated Constellation in the system was that registering a former 
occurrence of Instrumental Response B. Accordingly, at this time 
the Inhibitory Gates of the model were put into the appropriate Con­
ditions to maximise the Response Indication to be derived from the 
Preconsummatory Cortical Array; if Response B had led to Resonse A on 
a former occasion, a Motor Response Indication would be forthcoming 
from the relevant Pool of the Preconsummatory Array. This could then 
be used as the signal to consolidate the Preconsummatory Label 
provisionally attached to Instrumental Response C, and so on indefinitely,
The model reached the stage of being run, but failed to work for the 
following reason. As soon as a Preconsummatory Response had been 
registered by the occurrence of a primary reinforcing event, i.e. a 
directly elicited Preconsummatory Response, then a reference to the 
Preconsummatory Array to try to detect a Preconsummatory Motor Response 
Indication, as described above, was always successful. Consequently, 
all Instrumental Responses emitted were consolidated as though they 
were successful in leading to the goal, regardless of their actual effect,
The reason that the detection of the Anticipatory Response of the 
Preconsummatory Array was always "positive" once a Preconsummatory Res­
ponse had been registered, seemed obvious once it had been seen in the 
computer simulation. Initially the only registration in that Array was
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the resuit of an actual occurrence of an IRP. Consequently, at this 
stage of the developiaent of behaviour, the only linked neurons located 
in a Preconsuiuniatory Cortical Pool were those representing this 
actual reinforcing t-'vent. Accordingly a reference to this Array 
produced a maximum Response Indication from the Pool concerned simply 
because there was no competition.
The solution to this problem seemed clear, but unfortunately it was 
at tills time that computing had to cease. Nevertheless, the solution 
seems to be of some theoretical interest, especially in relation to 
the motivational problem discussed below. Briefly, it was the registra­
tion on every occasion categorised as successful, of both the positive 
and negative (Activator and Suppression) aspects of the Preconsummatory 
Response and its Label equivalent. However, the Negative (Not-do) 
aspect was to be registered later than the Activator (Do) aspect. The 
rationale for this was as follows.
The Positive and Negative aspects of the labelling, being in Constel­
lations close together in proximity, normally balanced each other out. 
Consequently, on reference to the Preconsummatory Array for an Antici­
patory Response Indication, no positive Indication would be obtained.
The only case where that balance would not be maintained was when the 
Input Patterns in both Cortical Projections matched the Linked Con­
stellation recording a Positive Preconsummatory Label, and did not 
match the Constellation recording the negative Preconsummatory Label.
Such a combined match and mismatch only occurred in respect of those 
Linked Constellations which had been registered upon former emissions 
of the Instrumental Response currently emitted in identical Sensory 
circumstances. Only a combined match and mismatch of the Constella­
tions containing Positive and Negative representations of the Precon­
summatory Label disturbed the balance of Positive and Negative and 
produced a Preconsummatory Response Indication (Anticipatory Response).
To make this clearer, the Linked Constellation registering a former 
Instrumental emission and containing the Positive Preconsummatory Label 
contained also a representation of both the pre-emission and post-emission
Sensory Input Patterns, that containing a representation of the Negative 
Preconsummatory Response Label contained only the Post—emission Input 
Pattern.
Consider tiu; uiui sü 1 wii of an Ins L r union La 1 Response which on a former 
occasion hud been yiven a PreconsniiiiiiuLory Response Label in the Linked 
Cons Le 1 I a t. i ell by which it was trajistered; correspondingly, the Linked 
iJons tel I a L1 on laid down just at let the one containing the Positive 
L.iije 1, had been g i ven t he Negat ive l,,ibe 1. Ujjon the current, occasion, 
i iiimedi a t e iy alter emission ot the I ns tr uiiien ta 1 Response, the Precon- 
suiiuiiatory Response 1 nd i cat ion was sought. Since this Indication was 
looked for just after emission, the Input Patterns in Projections 1 
and 2 consist e<l n.'spect Ively of the Input Pattern just before emis­
sion and that arriving just after. This matched precisely the Linked 
Cons teL lation laid down of the Instrumental Response emission on the 
former occasion, and containing the Positive Preconsummatory Label. 
At.’ciirdl iKjly the Input at this time reactivated the Positive Label.
The pos i t ion in relation to tlie Negative registration of the Preconsum- 
ma tor y Label was different. Since this Constellation had been laid down 
somewtrit later, the temporal delay which preserved the pre-instru­
mental -emiss ion Input Pattern to Projection 2, would have expired.
Both Projections would have received the identical Input Pattern, 
i.e. the pos t-emiss i on Input Pattern. At the time the Motor Response 
Indicatb.n was taken, on the current occasion, these Patterns were 
not in thi' Input in both Projections. At this time, (just after 
emission) tdie Input Pattern to Projection 1 contained the post emission 
Pattern, but that to Projection 2 contained the earlier, pre-emission 
Pattern due to the Uttley-type delay. Accordingly at this time the Con­
stellation containing the Negative Label was mismatched.
Accordingly, provided the Anticipatory Response of the Preconsummatory 
Array (Preconsummatory Response Indication) were taken at the right 
moment, there was a combined match of the Constellation containing the 
Positive Label, and a mismatch of that containing the Negative Label.
The idea, then, was that after every emission of an Instrumental Res­
ponse, Preconsummatory Labels, Positive and Negative were provisionally 
registered. These were consolidated if the next Instrumental Response 
were "confirmed" by a Positive Preconsummatory Response Indication.
With each subsequent repetition of a familiar sequence, the Preconsum­
matory Label would be transferred to successively earlier steps in the 
sequence.
The advantage of this scheme was that, other than the use of the
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consolidation cio lay, nu new rnechanisiii or concept had been introduced.
C . M u L i v atiuiiaL b i as: F r e u d  a n d  D e u t s c h  
( i ) S o m e  e a r l y  aljo 1 1 i ve a L L e m p L s
In tiie verbal, pre-s LmulaLion, formuLation of the model, the organis­
ation of extendt?d behavioural sequences was visualised as resulting 
from motivational bias introduced selectively into the sensori-motor 
pathway leading to a goal. Essentially the idea was that shown in 
Figure 12.5 (Chapter 12) but extended over several successive instru­
menta 1ly conditional responses. The idea was essentially the same as 
that used later in connection with the motivational mechanisms in 
relation to a single Instrumental Response. When an action was success­
ful in reaching a primary goal, motivational links were entered into 
the Constellation registering the goal event. On subsequent occasions. 
Motivational Excitation entering through these links spread back­
wards (temporally speaking) through the sequence of Constellations and 
reinforced the Excitation feeding forwards from the current sensory 
input.
This was tried out in quite early versions of the simulations. It was 
however found to be impracticable. There were two difficulties.
First, the Excitation had to build up massively in order to reach back 
as far as the Constellations registering the early steps of the sequence 
on Instrumental Responses. This difficulty may have been solved by 
rhythmic gating, had it been envisaged at the time. Before the intro­
duction of rhythmic mechanisms, the build up continued from Instant 
to Instant and so overwhelmed the discriminative function of the system. 
With rhythms it would have been possible to allow the build up to occur 
just prior to the detection of the Instrumental Response Indication, 
its meaning ascertained, and then system cleared by the operation of 
the Gate, ready for the next Instrumental Response.
The second difficulty was more fundamental. The Motivational Excita­
tion was in fact found to be effective in biassing the sensori-motor 
pathway, but not evenly. Since the Excitation entered the system 
through the goal Record, and spread temperallyjbackwards, it naturally 
biassed the Responses nearer the goal more than those appearing earlier 
in the sequence. Consequently the Instrumental Responses for the early 
steps were not emitted. The model could only emit abortive Instrumental 
Responses which would have been effective had they been emitted later.
599
This uneven operation of the Motivational bias had, of course, been 
anticipated, but it had not been thought to be important. The required 
Instrumental Response in an early step of the sequence, would, it 
was tliought, be triggered because it received double Excitation, that 
from the current Sensory Input, and that from the Motivational Excita­
tion. The trouble actually experienced was that in order for the 
Motivational Excitation to penetrate far back enough from the goal to 
affect the initial steps, it had to be more powerful than the Excita­
tion from the current Sensory Input.
At the tiirie, the difficulty was not fully understood, and was abandoned 
because of troubles attributed to the general inefficiency of the 
system rather than to a difficulty of principle. With the introduction 
of rhythmic mechanisms and consequent control of the system, the diffi­
culty is seen as more fundamental.
(ii) Solutions under investigation
One way out of the difficulty, whilst preserving the overall rationale 
of motivational bias spreading from former goal attainment, was to 
have the Motivational Excitation move backwards by steps. That is, on 
the first trial the Motivational Excitation only needs to influence 
the Instrumental Response taken just previously: on the next trial it 
moves backwards one step. The mechanism than resembles that described 
for the attachment of Preconsummatory Labels. The latter mechanism 
can readily be extended to include Motivational Links.
Whenever an Instrumental Response was emitted than, in addition to the 
provisional registration of the Preconsummatory Label, there were 
also included provisional Motivational Links. These Motivational Links 
were in the Motivational Neuronal Pool relevant to the current state 
of Motivation. Whenever the Preconsummatory Label was consolidated, 
then the Motivational Links were consolidated as well. Consequently, 
at successive repititions of the sequence, Motivational Links were 
attached to progressively earlier and earlier steps of the sequence.
(The reader may wish to be reminded that to register Motivational Links 
all that was required was for an Afferent Volley at the Linking Value 
of Spike Frequency to be sent along the relevant Afferent Fibre).
The advantage of this scheme over earlier formulations was that 
Motivational Excitation would be distributed evenly throughout the 
steps of the sequence. Motivational bias could be kept within bounds
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and need only enter for a few Instants at a time. The next step to 
be released would be that triggered by the current Sensory Input.
Actually, the two aspects discussed, i.e. Preconsuimnatory Labelling 
and Motivational bias, were developed together. Accordingly, the 
implementation was extended slightly to include both a Positive and 
a Negative (Drive and Anti-Drive) representation of the Motivational 
Links also. It won Id however be going to far into programs which did 
not produce reportable results to discuss this further. In general 
it may be taken that the use of Drive and Anti-Drive follows the use 
of Positive and Negative representations of Labels.
The rationale behind the scheme was roughly as follows. When a Moti­
vational State occurred (e.g. hunger) both Drive (Activator Motivational 
Pool) and Anti-Drive (Suppression Motivational Pool) received Afferent 
Input at the bias-only Spike Frequency. Consequently Constellations 
containing representation of Drive were equally biassed as those con­
taining Anti-Drive representation. The Constellations containing 
Anti-Drive Links also included registration of the Suppression of the 
Instrumental Response(i.e. links in the Not-Do Instrumental Pool) and 
of the Suppression of the Preconsummatory Label. Consequently both 
the Instrumental Response Indication and the Preconsummatory Label 
Indication were always balanced except at the critical times when 
one particular Constellation (i.e. the one containing the Activator) 
was more highly reactivated by the current Input Patterns than the 
other one containing the Suppression.
In this particular scheme, the Motivational Excitation did not con­
tribute towards the selection of a particular Instrumental Response 
in the sequence leading to the goal. It was the whole of the sequence 
which was biassed above the general levels by the selective Motivational 
Inputs. The selection of particular successive Responses required 
to be emitted in sequential order was entirely due to the imbalances 
created by the Input Patterns.
The general resemblance of the scenarios described above to that of 
Deutsch (1960) may have been noted. There is however a significant 
difference. In Deutsch's scheme, the Motivational Link to each 
successive Instrumental Response is turned on by the operation of the 
Sensory Analyser whioh it elicits from the environment. This switching 
action may perhaps be seen as realised in the above scheme relating
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to t.he use of Precorisuimiiatory Labels to control "reinforcement".
The Pre cons unuiid tory Motor Response Indication would, in the scheme 
described, be turned on by the Input Pattern occurring just before 
and turned off by the 1n[)ut Pattern occurring just after, the 
Motor Response Indication is detected.
Tliat swi telling action would not apply to the scheme sketched out 
tor t tie Motivational bias. In fact, the individual Instrumental Action 
is not selected at all in the scheme. Motivation simply acts to pick 
out the whole of a sequence. A switching action could be seen in the 
version of Motivation in which Suppression (Anti-Drive) was not repre­
sented, but here again the switching was merely the effect of Input 
Pattern on reactivation rather than an actual switching in and out of 
Motivational Excitation.
These differences from Deutsch's formulation are not reported as being 
in any way superior. On the contrary, Deutsch's account was sufficiently 
persuasive to lead the author to compose a considerably more complicated 
scheme in wliich the Efferent Fibres of Suppression Pools actively inhibit 
the Afferent Fibres of Activatory Motivational Pools. To discuss that 
scheme would however take us too far from programs actually devised.
What seems of interest are the empirical questions raised. Insofar as 
Deutsch's formulation impresses as fitting the behavioural evidence, 
it begs a neuronal means of implementation. The difficulty in devising 
such a means may lead to a re-examination of whether in fact individual 
instrumental responses are facilitated by motivational conditions, or 
whether it is not rather the whole sequence of behaviour which is 
facilitated.
D. Summary of Programs not completed
The above programs cannot be cited in support of the theory of neural 
integration nor of the mechanisms of behaviour incorporated in them.
Since they were not run sufficiently to determine their effects on the 
operation of the model, they remain merely possible versions of the 
model which might work. However, unlike verbal theories, they do have 
the character of being in the form of actual algorithms written into 
computer programs. Also they fit into the general scheme of the model, 
and can therefore be seen as implementations of definitely described 
neural structures.
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They have been reported for several reasons. First, they give some 
indication of how the iriodel would progress in the future. Second, 
they exemplify how the model may be used to build quite complex 
neural theories implemen t ing ideas current in the literature, in 
this case, Deutsch's Motivational hypothesis. Thirdly, they indi­
cate that difficulties encountered in first attempts to implement a 
model may in fact be overcome by perseverance, provided that it is 
logically acceptible to adopt tlie course of trying to adapt the 
system to the known facts (see discussion in final chapter). Finally, 
the mechanisms give some indiction of how mechanisms which at first 
seem limited to exceedingly simple acts may be broadened to explain 
behaviour of a more complex kind.
IV Cognitive Confirmation
The suggestion was made in Chapters 2,3 & 10 that behaviour might be 
confirmed by a kind of TOTE test of the kind proposed by Miller, Galanter 
and Pribram (1960). The idea was that the understanding of the world 
need not be interpreted as deriving only from the satisfaction of Needs, 
whether physiological or psychological. There is also the capacity 
to understand that things are as they are expected to be.
Having burdened the reader with an account of programs in progress 
intended to label events with indications of their implication (i.e. 
Preconsummatory Labels, discussed in the preceding Section) it is now 
easy to suggest how such labelling could be extended to provide a con­
firmation of the fulfilment of expectancy (cognitive confirmation).
All that is required is to assume that some Preset Constellations have 
evolved, entirely analogous in the function to the Preconsummatory 
Preset Constellations discussed, except that they function internally 
by signalling to the remainder of the system that some state of affairs 
exists. Such a Preset Constellation might, for example, be activated 
by the absence of any internal event of significance. Any event of 
significance in this context would be the reactivation of any other 
Preconsummatory Preset Constellation or its Label, whether appettive 
or Protective. Such a Neutral Preset Constellation would act entirely 
in conformity with the labelling principle laid down for the usual 
Preconsummatory Responses. That is, after every emission of an
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Instrumentai Response, if no other Preconsummatory Response (primary 
reinforcement) or Preconsummatory Response Label (secondary reinforce­
ment) were forthcoming, provisional registration of this General 
confirming Preset Cons Le 1 lotion woulci follow, and this would be con­
solidated if nottiing happened on the next Instrumental Response.
The effect of such a Neutral Preset Constellation in tlie system 
(what might term a Non-Preconsummatory Constellation) would be to 
label all Input which had no consequence for the system. Of course 
it is unnecessary to assume such a strict Neutrality. It seems plaus­
ible tliat, given the system developed so far, there would be Preset 
Constellations able to recognise all kinds of internal and external 
conditions, e.g. abdominal discomfort, unduly low temperature.
Generally the idea is that all Input would be labelled in some way or 
other. At every Response emission some confirmation would be obtained 
from the Preconsummatory Response Indication mechanism described in 
the preceding Section.
Of course such an Indication would not be forthcoming in the case of 
novel stimuli. The complete absence of a confirming Preconsummatory 
Response Indication of any kind could therefore be the occasion of 
an Orienting Response.
That tliese speculations are not entirely divorced from the world of 
the laboratory may be seen by considering the well known experiments 
of Sokolov (1960), Anokhin (1961) and more recently Walter (1969).
These experiments show that an Orienting reaction, defined neurologi- 
cally and behaviourally, is obtained when a novel stimulus is 
encountered. Subsequent familiarity with the stimulus, especially 
in association with motor decision, reduces the neurological signs 
of orienting, and habituates the reaction. It reappears immediately 
novelty is introduced into the stimulus configuration.
V Conclusion
Opportunity has been taken to acquaint the reader with aspects of the 
work not reflected in actual computer demonstrations- The intention was 
to indicate some characteristics of the models which may assist in their 
general interpretation as early examples of applying the theory to the 
representation of brain functions.
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CHAPTER 18
AN EXPERIMENT IN PERCEPTION: LEARNING AND THE SPIRAL ILLUSION
Introduction
The generally accepted explanation of the after-effect of observed 
movement, as seen for example in the Spiral Illusion, ascribes the 
phenomenon to the fatigue or inhibition of receptors sensitive to 
specific directions of motion. However, the theory of neural inte­
gration which has been presented in this thesis, qualifies this 
explanation substantially and proposes a new contribution to the 
explanation of the illusion. The modified theory suggests a pre­
diction upon which the accepted theory is silent, namely that the 
duration of the illusion can be extended by learning.
An experiment was carried out to test this prediction. The experiment 
is reported in a published paper (Houtman, 1974) which is bound into 
this thesis. The experiment is described in the paper, and accordingly 
only a limited account will be given here with a view to relating the 
experiment to the general concerns of the thesis.
II Background
The account of perception and cognition offered by the model presented 
in this thesis is an "enrichment theory", in the sense discussed in 
Chapter 2. According to the theory, what is perceived at any instant 
will depend not only upon the sensory signals sent to the brain from 
the periphery. Perception in the model is determined by the pattern 
of excitation induced in the integrative tissue. That pattern will 
depend upon the ongoing activity before the signals arrive, upon the 
immediate effects of the signals on the neuronal pools to which they 
deliver their excitation, and upon the patterns of activity induced 
by these two sources of excitation in the Linked Constellations 
already present in the tissue.
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If this account is correct, then what is perceived is correlated 
with the Linked Constellations being formed at the current instant, 
rather than with current sensory event. Of course, as described in 
an earlier chapter, in a waking state the signal effects will domi­
nate. Nevertheless, according to the model the meaning of events 
derives from tlie reactivation of the stored neural records. Sensa­
tion, in tlie pure sense of the term, is foreign to the ideas of 
the model. Perception is what occurs when afferent volleys interact 
witil Integrating Neurons. "Bare" sensations could only occur if 
no til ing were added to the afferent signals by the reactivated Constel­
lations. Even at birth it may be assumed that sensory signals meet 
a tissue which already has ongoing activity and which already contains 
Linked Constellations, both those which are genetically determined 
and those laid down during intra-uterine development.
The question which presented itself was whether such an account of 
perception can be applied to the explanation of actually observed 
peculiarities of perception. A suitable candidate was the Spiral 
Illusion.
Ill The Spiral Illusion: a prediction from enrichment theory
The Spiral Illusion goes back to antiquity and undoubtedly contrib­
uted to the magic properties attributed to spirals. After a prolonged 
inspection of a rotating spiral, there is a disturbance of perception. 
The illusion is now seen as an instance of the after effects of 
observed motion. When a contoured pattern passes across the visual 
field for some time and one then observes a stationary figure, there 
is an illusion of movement in the opposite direction.
Wohlegemuth (1911) reviewed the early history of the illusion in con­
siderable detail. According to him, Purkinje suggested the first 
sceintific explanation in 1825. "After having looked for more than 
an hour at a cavalry procession, the houses appeared to Purkinje to 
move in the opposite direction to that of the procession. In attempt­
ing to explain the phenomenon, Purkinje states that the eye, in 
endeavouring to fixate each individual soldier, moves unconsciously 
in the same direction. " This often repeated movement becomes for 
the time being habitual and continues even after the procession has
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LEARNING AND THE SPIRAL ILLUSION
By s . D. HOUTKIAN
Department of Psychology, Bedford College, University of London
A generally accepted explanation of the spiral illusion is tha t the receptor cells sensitive to 
the specific motions being observed become ‘ suppressed’ by inhib ition consequent upon tha t 
stimulation. However, an original neurological model suggests tha t inhib ition is a short-term 
process, whereas perception is also dependent upon longer-term ‘ learning’. The model predicts 
that the duration of the illusion w ill be increased by the accumulation of ‘ learned records ’ of the 
moving spiral.
In the experiment, ‘ learning sessions ’ followed daily tests of duration, and an increase was 
demonstrated on the next day, more than 22 hours after such a session. No increase was detected 
where the ‘ learning session ’ was om itted or replaced by a ‘ fatigue session ’ employing an 
oppositely drawn spiral. In  this way the ‘ learning effect’ was distinguished from ‘ suppression’, 
or a possible improved ‘ discrimination ’ due to practice. The results confirm the predictions of 
the new" model and are difficu lt to reconcile w ith  the ‘ suppression ’ hypothesis.
The after-effect of observed movement (e.g. the spiral illusion) has attracted an 
extensive literature because of its challenge to theories of perception. However, 
following the demonstration of stimulation in the frog’s eye (Lettvin et al., 1966) and 
in the cat’s eye (Hubei & Weisel, 1959, 1962), the explanation which ascribes the 
illusion to the ‘ suppression ’ by fatigue or inhibition of receptors sensitive to specific 
dhections of motion was suggested by Sutherland (1961). Further work which led 
to the general acceptance of the ‘suppression’ hypothesis included the demonstration 
of the existence of receptors in the rabbit’s retinal field sensitive to particular direc­
tions of motion and of their suppression following stimulation (Barlow & H ill, 1963). 
Sekuler & Ganz (1963) showed that in human beings an increased threshold to motion 
followed prolonged inspection of moving contours. In  short, the hypothesis is that 
after continued inspection of any particular motion, the population of receptors 
will have a skew distribution and so the perceived motion is displaced in the opposite 
direction.
However, this explanation would appear to have weaknesses. For example, if 
darkness or a field lacking contours is interposed during the ‘post-exposure’ period, 
then the illusion is prolonged. That is, its duration extends beyond the time after 
which it would otherwise have ceased (Spigel, 1962; PickersgiU & Jeeves, 1964). 
This is difficult to understand in terms of the ‘suppression’ hypothesis. I t  would 
appear that ‘suppressed’ cells would have at least an equal opportunity to recover 
whether stationary contours, a dark field, or a field lacking contours intervened, just 
so long as the interposed field did not repeat the particular motion which had hypo­
thetically caused the suppression. I f  anything, it would seem that an absenee of 
contour would aid recovery and therefore shorten rather than prolong the illusion.
A neurological model upon which the author is engaged suggests that the role of 
neural inhibition in perception is principally in the control of attention to the stimulus. 
Levels of inhibition may be determined by longer-term learning processes, but 
inhibition itself rapidly disperses. The suppression due to inhibition is a short-term 
adaptive process which should be distinguished from more permanent ‘learning’. In
(.If0
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the model this more permanent learning takes place by the formation of neural 
‘linlvage structures’ which record and represent the pattern of discharge in nervous 
tissue from moment to moment, a pattern which in turn is a function of both the 
current stimulation and the learned records. Perception whieh continues for aiiy 
length of time or has been previously experienced is therefore partially a function of 
these memory records, whether of previous occasions or of the learning just laid 
doxvn. The model suggests that the principal factor in the production of the after­
effect is the interaction of activity in the Teamed records’ of the moving spiraloj 
the one hand, with the Teamed records’ of the stationary contours on the other 
This interaction is interpreted by the brain as a paradoxieal reverse motion.
I f  the h)/pothesis is correct then it should be possible to detect longer-term effects 
than can be explamed within the ‘suppression’ hypothesis. Inliibition or fatigue of 
receptors can only explain a ‘shift’ in the perceived motion for the very short 
durations during which inhibition can be considered effective.
M e t h o d
The purpose o f the experim ent was to  ascertain w hether the  du ra tio n  o f the spiral illusion 
could be extended b y  a ‘ learn ing procedure ’ w h ich  w ou ld  d is tingu ish  a longer-term learning 
effect from  short-te rm  adaptive changes due to  in liib it io n . I t  was also desirable to  distinguish a 
‘ learned effect ’ in  the  sense o f the model from  a ‘ practice ’ effect due to  an im proved discrimina­
tio n  resu lting  from  acquaintance w ith  the  after-effect.
The 21 subjects, college students and staff, were d iv ided  random ly  in to  three groups. A 10 in, 
Archimedes sp ira l was in  a ll cases ro ta ted  clockwise a t 35 r.p .m . E v e ry  subject was given a set 
o f ‘ test t r ia ls ’ a t about the  same tim e  on each o f three consecutive days, the  purpose of which 
was to  ob ta in  a measure fo r each subject on each o f the  three days o f the average duration of 
illus ion  experienced a fte r a standard s tim u la tio n  o f 6 sec. ro ta tio n .
The con tro l group were s im p ly  given the  measurement tr ia ls  on each o f the three consecutive 
days and then released. The second group were required to  undergo a ‘ learning session’ after 
the  test tr ia ls  on each o f the  f irs t tw o  days, so th a t the  tes t tr ia ls  on the  fo llow ing day should 
reflect the  effect, i f  any, o f the  previous ‘ learn ing session ’ a fte r a de lay o f approxim ately one day.
The ‘ learn ing session ’ consisted o f fix a tin g  the  ro ta tin g  sp ira l fo r  25 sec. w ith  one eye, closing 
the  eyes, resting fo r  25 sec., then  fix a tin g  w ith  the  o ther eye fo r 25 sec., and so on until five 
fixa tions w ith  each eye had been accomplished. Then a resting period o f 7 m in. was allowed, 
w ith  eyes open and conversation pe rm itted . Then the  procedure was repeated u n til a total of 
15 fixa tions had been fin ished on th a t day. Th is  group were g iven the  iden tica l spiral used for 
a ll subjects in  the  test tria ls . (See F ig . 1.)
The ‘ learn ing session ’ was given th is  fo rm  fo r tw o  reasons. F irs t, the  theoretica l model sug­
gested th a t the after-effect is a fun c tion  o f the  records la id  down n o t on ly  o f the moving contours 
b u t also o f the  s ta tiona ry  contours. I n  the  norm al experience o f the  illus ion  bo th  o f these would 
be equa lly learned and to  produce the predicted p ro longa tion  a technique was necessary which 
w ou ld  increase the  streng th  o f the  records o f the  m oving figu re w ith o u t g iv ing  the opportunity 
fo r  strengthening the  records o f the  s ta tiona ry  figure. Secondly, i t  was necessary to  show that 
any increase o f s treng th  o f the  illu s ion  fo llow ing  the  learn ing procedure was no t an improved 
d iscrim ination  due to  greater experience o f the  after-e ffect. W ith  the  procedure followed aU three 
groups had equal practice w ith  the  actua l illus ion , since the  learn ing procedure involved no 
d iscrim ination  no r even an experience o f the  after-effect.
The th ird  (or ‘ fa tig u e ’ ) group fo llowed exactly  the  same procedure as the  second, except only 
th a t the  spira l used in  the  repeated fixa tions  was draw n in  the  opposite d irection to that used 
in  the  test tria ls , a lthough ro ta ted  in  the  same direction.
The general design o f the  experim ent is d iag ram m atica lly  ind ica ted in  F ig. 2.
The predictions o f the  ‘ suppression ’ hypothesis and o f the  new m odel were clearly opposed. 
Accord ing to  the suppression hypothesis one w ou ld  expect no change in  dura tion  in  any of the
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Pig. 1. (®) Reduced reproduction o f the 10 in. diameter spiral used in  the measurement of 
duration of the illusion for all groups. I t  was also used in the ‘ learning ’ sessions for experimental 
group 1. (V) Oppositely drawn spiral used in  ‘ fatigue’ sessions for experimental group 2. A ll 
spirals were rotated clockwise.
Daily routine, repeated for each subject on each of three consecutive days
2,00 p.m.
Time Group 1
(control)
Measurement trials : six 
readings o f duration of 
illusion after 6 sec. rotation 
of
Spiral A  
rotating clockwise
2.30 p,m. to No action : sub j ects
3.30 p,m. released
Group 2 
(learning)
Measurement trials : 
exactly as in  Group 1
Group 3 
(fatigue)
Measurement trials : 
exactly as in  Group 1
Spiral A  
rotating clockwise
‘ Learning session ’ w ith  
Spiral A  
rotating clockwise
(i) Fixate rotating spiral 
w ith  righ t eye for 25 sec,, 
close both eyes, resting, for 
25 sec., fixate spiral w ith  
le ft eye for 25 sec., close 
both eyes for 25 sec., fixate
w ith  r igh t eye for 25 sec__
continue u n til five fixations 
w ith  each eye are completed
(ii) 7 min. rest, eyes open, 
conversation permitted.
(iii) Repeat procedure (i) 
as above, i.e. w ith
Spiral A
(iv) 7 min. rest, eyes open, 
conversation permitted
(v) Repeat procedure (i) 
as above.
Spiral A  
rotating clockwise
‘Fatigue session’ w ith  
Spiral B 
rotating clockwise
Procedure as in  (i) to (v) 
of Group 2 but using Spiral 
B instead of Spiral A
Fig. 2. General design o f the spiral illusion experiment.
i over the three days, since any fa tigue or suppression w ou ld  have dissipated in  the  22 hours 
which elapsed between the  subjects’ las t experience o f the  sp ira l and the  ne x t test measurement. 
The neurological evidence is clear th a t  the  threshold re tu rns to  base level a lm ost im m edia te ly  
after the illusion has ceased (Sekuler &  Ganz, 1963) b u t in  any case to  c la im  th a t the  in h ib it io n
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Table 1. Group means {in sec.) of duratio7i of spiral illusion as measured 
on each of thi'ee successive days
(Each entry represents the rounded mean of 42 readings, i.e. six trials for each of seven subjects 
in each group.)
Group Day 1 Day 2 Day 3
Control 7-5 6-4 6 4
Learning 5-0 7-9 110
Fatigue 9-4 10 8 7-5
Table 2. Prolongation or curtailment of duration of after-effect after 
various experimental treatments
(In seconds for each subject. Each entry is derived by subtracting subject mean for Day 1 
from subject mean for Day 3.)
Control group Learning group Fatigue group
— 6 0 6-9 0-9
— 0 8 2 2 — 6 0
0 5 4 1 —49
0 4 5 2 - 0 9
-0 -6  80  - 0 0
- 0  0 14 8 -2-3
- 0  9 14 - 0  0
Means of duration changes — I T  5 9 —19
lasted, fo r 22 hours w ou ld  m ake the  fun c tion  o f neura l in h ib it io n  so d iffe ren t from  tha t normally 
accorded to  i t  as to  render the  ‘ suppression’ the o ry  on th is  basis a d iffe ren t hypothesis from 
th a t im phed in  th a t theory. I t  is to  be noted th a t an increase o f du ra tio n  does no t occur upon 
mere acquaintance on subsequent days w ith  the  illus ion  (PickersgiU &  Jeeves) and tha t it  is only 
the  present technique w h ich  predicts such an extension in  accordance w ith  the  theoretical model 
proposed. I t  is d iff ic u lt therefore under the  suppression hypothesis fo r any prolongation to be 
accounted fo r  in  any o f the  groups.
However, i f  i t  should be argued th a t perhaps some effect o f in h ib it io n  m ig h t remain even after 
the  deferm ent, i t  should in  any case be equalized, o r nearly  equalized, in  the  case o f the groups 
w h ich  were exposed to  repeated ro ta tions o f the  tw o  d iffe ren t spirals. The tw o  spirals contained 
the  same am ount o f con tour and m oved in  the same d irection . E ven  assuming th a t the ‘ e 
sion ’ effect was d iffe rent in  them  as a resu lt o f the  illus ion  o f con trac tion  in  one and 
in  the  other, the y  bo th  share the  same m a in  m otion , a m o tio n  w h ich  is c learly perceived, the 
c ircum feren tia l ro ta tio n . I f  any  in h ib ito ry  effects rem ained a fte r the  22 h r. delay they would 
be expected to  app ly  to  bo th  o f these groups, i f  no t equa lly  then nearly  so.
I n  contrast the  new m odel predicts th a t  the  con tro l group w il l  show no change of duration, 
and the ‘ fa tigue group ’ w h ich  watched the  reverse-drawn sp ira l w i l l be clearly differentiated 
fro m  the ‘ learn ing g ro up ’ , since the  reverse -drawn sp ira l m ay be expected to  interfere with the 
‘ learned records’ o f the  ro ta tin g  ‘ fo rw a rd -d ra w n ’ sp ira l in  the  test tr ia ls .
R e s u l t s
Each subject provided a set of six scores each day. Table 1 shows the means of 
the three groups on each successive day. I t  will be seen that the Teaming group 
shows an increase from 5 to 11 sec., whilst both the other groups show reductions. 
Table 2 gives the prolongment or curtailment of the illusion between the first and 
third day for each individual. No subject in the Teaming group’ failed to show an 
increase of duration. In  the ‘fatigue group’ three subjects showed substantial decre­
ments, and the remainder registered changes of less than 1 sec., mostly negative. In
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Table 3. Summary of analysis of variance according to model hy Winer
(Differing treatments applied to separate groups of subjects.)
(1962)
Source of variation
between su b jects;
A (treatment groups)
Subjects w ith in  groups
W ith in  subjects :
B (days)
AB (groups X days)
B X subjects w ith in  groups ; 
error B
C (trial scores)
AC (groups X scores)
Cxsubjects w ith in  groups; 
error C
BO (days x scores)
ABC (groups X days x  
scores)
BC X subjects w ith in  groups ; 
groups; error BC
Contrast of linear trends
Partitioned into :
Contrast of A (control) against B 
(learning)
Contrast of C (fatigue) against 
(A+B)
Contrast of quadratic trends 
Partitioned into :
Contrast of A (control) against B 
(learning)
Contrast of C (fatigue) against 
A+B 
Total s.s.
Total D.F.
6023-3
3803-0
778
145
.s. D.F. M.S. F
20
391-2 2 195-6 0-63
5632-1 18 312-9 0-63
357
85-5 2 42-7 1-57
923-1 4 230-8 8-47
980-8 36 27-2 —
4-1 5 0-8 0-13
52-6 10 6-3 0-84
560-7 90 6-2 —
16-2 10 1-6 0-28
155-9 20 7-8 1-37
1024-1 180 5-7 —
m of squares fo r A B  {groups x  days)
s.s. D.F. M.S.
F  (using 
error B)
; 2 389 14-5*
517 1 517 19-0*
261 1 261 9-6**
2 72-5 2-7
8 1 8 0-3
137 1 137 5-0
923 923
* Significant : P  < 0-001.
4 4
**  Significant : P  <  0-01.
the control group six subjects changed less than 1 sec., and the seventh showed a 
reduction of 6 sec.
An analysis of variance for differing treatments applied to separate groups dis­
closed that the only significant interaction was that for groups x days, as predicted 
hy the new model [F =  8-47; d.f. =  4, 36; P  < 0-001). A partition of trends 
showed that the contrast of linear trends was significant beyond the 0-001 level. 
The contrast of the learning group against the control group was significant beyond 
the 0-001 level, and the fatigue group against the other two, beyond the 0-01 level.
14-2
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D i s c u s s i o n
The results confirm the prediction of the Teaming’ model, and support the hypo- 
thesis (Spigel, 1965) that the illusion is subject to complex determination, one factor 
of which is now shown to be learning in a sense not covered by short-term adaptive 
changes ascribable to inhibition or fatigue, nor to improved discrimination. The 
augmenting of the illusion remaining after 22 hr. cannot be explained within the 
ordinary concepts of neural mhibition, and furthermore the fact that exposure to the 
reverse-drawn spiral produces no increase, but if anything a reduction, cannot be 
explained by ‘suppression’, since at the very least the rotation of the two spiral 
must share a common ‘suppressive’ factor.
Although the new model does not, as presented, give a detailed explanation of the 
illusion, a fuller exposition suggests some possibilities.
One possibility is that the ‘ suppressive ’ hypothesis is right in its description of 
the actual mechanism giving rise to the perception of the ‘reverse’ movement, but 
that the level of inliibition is controlled by higher-order ‘learning’. I f  inhibition is 
primarily an instrument of attention, as it is in the present neurological model, then 
it  would be understandable for it to be subject to such control. Douglas & Pribram 
(1966) have suggested the central control of inhibition as an instrument of learning, 
However, this explanation would still not explain why the ‘suppression’ does not 
produce an apparent slowing down of perceived motion whenever motion is con­
tinuously observed.
Another possibihty is that the illusion results from an after-discharge of the neurones 
involved in the perception of the stimulating motion (perseveration), giving a faint 
continuing perception of ‘forward’ motion which acts as a ground against which the 
now stationary ‘figure’ is seen as ‘moving backwards’. Wallach (1959) showed that 
whichever really moves, it  is the figure which is perceived as moving. The autokinetio 
illusion which occurs when a stationary light is observed in an otherwise dark room 
demonstrates the difficulty of discriminating motion without a frame of reference, 
The after-effect may not be due to a direct response of cells reporting ‘reverse’ motion, 
but rather a figure-ground effect resulting from a subliminal ‘forward-moving’ 
image.
I t  would seem desirable to ascertain experimentally whether there is in fact a 
‘ forward-moving ’ image during the perception of the after-effect, or whether the 
perception is a simple perception of ‘reverse’ motion of both figure and ground, 
Various attempts have been made over the history of the illusion to discover the 
precise nature of the images accompanying the illusory movement : the results are 
contradictory and uncertain. The reason for this inconsistency is suggested by some 
pilot experiments by the present author. Any image is very difficult to obtain and 
the after-image of the rotation is confused with after-images of the stationary aspects 
of the situation, for example the retinal negative after-images of the boundary o f the 
moving figure (the disc), and even of the pupil itself. A considerable methodological 
difficulty results from the necessity of a frame of reference to judge the movement 
of any image which may occur. Attempting to fix such an image as ‘figure’ in itself 
makes other images move in the opposite direction. Attempts to judge introspec- 
tively whether a ‘forward’ or ‘reverse’ moving image is present are therefore confused
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by f ig u re —ground effects inherent in the judgement itself. However, further attempts 
to investigate this question continue.
The now proposed model would appear to be effective in generating further 
questions for investigation and to make one think anew about an old problem.
The author is g ra te fu l to  D r  R . Meddis fo r  his valuable suggestions and criticism s.
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passed. The eye then wants to fixate the stationary objects in a 
similar manner to which it has learned to fixate the moving one; it 
unconsciously slides in the accustomed direction, which makes the 
objects appear to slip away in the opposite direction".
This explanation sounds ratiier quaint today. Reference of the illu­
sion to eye-movements was dismissed many years ago. For example,
Sekuler and Ganz (1903) studied the after-effect with a stabilised 
retinal image in order to avoid contamination with eye movement effects 
however small.
Nevertheless there are two features which Purkinje's explanation has 
in common with that suggested by my model. It suggests that learning 
is implicated in the illusion, and it suggests that there is a persevera­
tion of the physiological correlates of movement in the same direction 
as the observed movement.
One may consider the explanation of the illusion offered by my model 
at two levels. First there are the general implications of the model 
as a particular form of enrichment theory. Secondly, there is a more 
detailed, and naturally more problematical^ suggestion of neural 
mechanisms which may contribute to the illusion.
At the general level, the model suggests a consequence of fixating a 
visual field which contains moving contours. Whatever the underlying 
explanation of the after-effect may be, according to enrichment theories 
in general, and mine in particular, subsequent perception should be 
added to by neural records of earlier experiences. Since the immediate 
effect of inspecting a moving field is the customarily perceived 
illusory after effect, it is reasonable to suppose that whatever it 
may be in the first experience which gives rise to the illusion would 
be augmented by subsequent experience.
It may be noted that, at first sight, this predicts that the duration 
of the illusion would be increased with familiarity. It would also 
appear at first sight that this prediction is the opposite of that 
implied by discrimination or differentiation theories. According to 
differentiation theory, the effect of experience is to facilitate 
the recognition of those features of the stimulus which differentiate 
it from other stimuli, and so enable a more veridical perception of 
the object, as signalled by the sensory information. Acquaintance 
with the illusion should enable the subject to identify the sensory
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realities more promptly, i.e. that the spiral has ceased to rotate, 
and so shorten the duration of the illusion.
However, such a theoretical opposition oversimplifies the issues. 
Although tlie model presented here opposes the differentiation theorist 
approach, it does so because that approach excludes enrichment rather 
than because the model suggests that differentiation is not an impor­
tant aspect of the perceptual process. Accordingly what enrichment 
tlieory would predict is that whatever produces the illusion is 
strengthened by repetition. On the other hand, familiarity with the 
after-effect does enable the subject to identify the realities more 
promptly.
With this more sophisticated analysis, one might predict that with 
repetition of the illusion, the factor which causes the illusion is 
strengthened but also the ability to discriminate the stationary 
contours when the spiral stops moving, is also strengthened. If one 
may be permitted to apply the term "learning" to the effects of lay­
ing down records in the system, then the actually observed movement 
is learned and the stationary contours which occur when the movement 
stops is also learned.
Accordingly, as may be noted from the attached paper, in designing 
the experiment it was necessary to separate these two aspects. A 
procedure was introduced which, on the basis of the above analysis, 
would increase the learning of the actually observed movement whilst 
impeding the learning of the stationary contours which bring the 
illusion to an end. This procedure was to introduce "learning ses­
sions" during which the subject fixated the moving spiral but after 
which, instead of seeing the contours of the stopped spiral he 
simply closed his eyes.
IV Two hypotheses of the illusion
As sketched out in the paper, following the discovery of receptors 
sensitive to particular directions of motion (Lettvin, Maturana, 
McCulloch and Pitts, 1966; Hubei and Wiesel, 1959, 1962; and Barlow 
and Hill, 1963) an explanation proposed by Sutherland (1961) gained 
general acceptance, and remains the generally accepted hypothesis 
(Sekular, Pantle and Levison, 19 78). The hypothesis assumes that
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perceived motion depends upon the proportion which receptors sensi­
tive to motion in a particular direction and stimulated by sensory 
stimulation bears to the total population of motion receptors.
During observation of actual motion, receptors sensitive to that 
motion become fatigued, adapted or otherwise "suppressed". The 
effective removal of a proportion of receptor elements sensitive 
to motion in a particular direction leaves the distribution of the 
remainder of the population biassed towards the perception of move­
ment in the opposite direction. The inspection of stationary con­
tours in this condition accordingly gives rise to a perception of 
movement in the opposite direction to that viewed during the 
adaptation period.
My model offers an alternative, or possibley supplementary, explana­
tion. During inspection of a moving field. Linked Constellations 
are laid down which record what is seen. According to the model, 
excitation builds up in learned records when matching sensory input 
continues for some time. After prolonged inspection of a moving 
field the learned records of the motion are in an excited condition. 
When the direct sensory signals from the moving contours cease, 
these records continue to discharge. This after-discharge gives a 
pattern of excitation similar to that caused when motion continues 
in the same direction as that occurring when the Linked Constella­
tions were laid down. The new input, that is the signals arising 
from the stationary contours, now enter the neural tissue, and as 
emphasised in the exposition of the model, dominate the reaction of 
the tissue. Nevertheless the pattern of excitation includes the 
perseveration of the after-discharge representing a subliminal back­
ground which is moving in the same direction as the observed motion. 
This combined pattern of excitation is matched in the neural template 
system. The matching of a dominant excitation (Figure) against a 
fainter excitation (Ground) representing moving contours, is inter­
preted as a movement of the Figure in a direction opposite to that of 
the Ground, i.e. opposite to that of the observed movement.
The further discussion of these two hypotheses will be left until 
after the results of the experiment have been considered. It may be 
mentioned here that they are not necessarily as much in opposition 
as may at first appear. The explanation proposed by my model does not 
refute that elements sensitive to specific directions of motion may
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be suppressed following observation of a moving field. It does 
not even need to argue that such elements are not involved in the 
after-effect. The important element in the explanation offered 
by my model is that learned records are laid down during inspection 
of motion and that tliey contribute to the after-effect.
V The experiment
As the experiment is fully described in the paper, only the general 
idea will be given here.
There were three groups of subjects, a Control Group, a so-called 
Learning Group and a so-called Fatigue Group. The Control Group 
were exposed to a standard "control" opportunity to experience the 
Spiral Illusion at approximately the same time on each of three 
successive days. The duration of after-effect reported on these Tests, 
formed a basis of comparison for the two other Groups. The Learning 
Group and the Fatigue Group were also exposed to exactly the same 
procedure as the Control Group, that is, on each of three successive 
days they were exposed to tlie standard "control" illusion and the 
duration of after-effects recorded. Their scores on these Tests pro­
vided the scores of the Learning Group and Fatigue Group respectively. 
Accordingly all three Groups underwent precisely the same test of 
duration of the illusion on three successive days.
The Learning Group and the Fatigue Group differed from the Control 
Group and from each other by the Treatment they received each day 
after the measurements of duration for that day had been taken.
The Control Group was dismissed. The Learning Group was asked to 
undertake repeated sessions of fixation of the rotating spiral. During 
these sessions they did not have the opportunity to experience the 
illusion, at least in its normal form, because after each period of 
fixation they were asked to close their eyes. The Spiral which was 
used in the sessions of the Learning Group was the same Spiral as 
was used for all three Groups for the standard Test Sessions.
The Fatigue Group followed exactly the same routine as the Learning 
Group, except that the Spiral which they fixated during their Treatment 
sessions was drawn in the opposite direction to that used in the
411
standard Test Sessions. Consequently the Spiral used in the Treat­
ment sessions of the Fatigue Group was different from that used to 
obtain the measurement of durations of subjects in that Group.
The scores of the three groups were compared from day to day. The 
Control Group did not differ greatly in their scores on any day. The 
Fatigue Group showed a shortening of the duration of the after-effect 
from a mean of 9.4 seconds to 7.5 seconds. The learning Group showed 
an increase over the three days from a mean of 5.0 seconds to 11 
seconds. The significance of the result for the partition of vari­
ance for the Contrast of the Control Group against the Learning 
Group was at the 0.001 level.
VI Discussion
The results of the experiment clearly confirm the main prediction of 
the model. When the opportunity for improving discrimination of the 
stationary stimulus (or of the circumstances in which it appears) is 
restricted, then familiarity with the moving stimulus extends the 
duration of the after effect. Rephrased in terms of the model, if 
the opportunity to lay down neural records of the stationary stimulus 
is restricted, then the neural records of the moving stimulus dominate 
more strongly and the after effect is augmented.
Although the results confirm the prediction of my model, they do not 
refute the positive contention of differentiation theory, that with 
experience perception approaches more closely to veridical perception. 
The Control Group did show a slight shortening of the duration 
of the after-effect over the three days. However, this result is 
also concordant with the predictions of the model. The model suggests 
that an opportunity was taken to lay down more records of the circum­
stances in which the stationary stimulus appear, i.e. that enrichment 
is the basis of discrimination.
The implications of the experiment concerning the causes of the after­
effect are less clear. Upon fuller consideration, the arguments in 
the paper concerning the interpretation of the results of the Fatigue 
Group seem less strong than they did at the time.
The shortening of the duration of the after-effect in the Fatigue Group
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is explicable in terms of the suppression hypothesis. Although the 
oppositely drawn spiral moved in tlie same direction as tlie standard 
spiral, effectively the contours moved in tlie opposite direction.
Pantle (reported as in preparation in Sekuler, Pan tie and Levison,
19 78) devised a cancellation technique. After establishment of an 
after-effect, a super-1mposed second stimulus moving in the opposite 
direction simultaneously with tlie first adapting stimulus, could be 
adjusted so as to cancel out the after-effect. The conditions of 
the Fatigue Group in my experiment bear some resemblance to these 
conditions. If the sessions with the oppositely drawn spiral is 
regarded as simply exposure to contours moving in the opposite direc­
tion, then the shortening of the after-effect resulting from the 
sessions with the standard spiral is comparable to the subtraction or 
cancellation effect seen in Pantle's experiment. Of course Pantle's 
experiment provides no evidence that the illusion is due to the 
suppression hypothesis. It is equally explicable by the perservera- 
tion hypothesis suggested here.
What does appear somewhat weaker now is the argument that exposure 
to an oppositely drawn spiral would provide an equivalent suppression 
effect to the standard spiral, since it contains the same amount of 
contour and moves in the same direction. It remains true that there 
would be a residual effect, as mentioned in my paper. Insofar as 
the two spirals are perceived to move in the same direction, there 
would be an equivalence of suppression effect. However, insofar as 
one spiral is perceived to expand and the other to contract, the 
suppression effect is not equivalenced. The argument that the results 
of the Fatigue Group bear against the suppression theory is thereby 
weakened.
It may be noted however, that whatever the interpretation of the cause 
of the after effect, the results from the Fatigue Group confirm the 
main prediction of the model. The effect is enhanced considerably by 
the th i rd day .
In general the acceptance of the suppression theory has resulted from 
the overwhelming evidence that receptor units specific to particular 
directions of motion do exist in nervous systems, together with the 
plausibility in the light of the neurological evidence, that such units 
would be inhibited or otherwise adapted by prolonged use. However, 
these facts are equally acceptible to the perseveration theory.
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The suppression theory requires in addition a theory of the percep­
tion of motion-direction as a function of the proportion of receptor 
units able to respond to stimulation of movement in a particular 
direction. Moreover, even if such an explanation of motion-direction 
perception were established, it would still not exclude the persever­
ation hypo tiles is (see below) .
In Uie literature considerable emphasis is placed upon two pieces of 
research, Sekuler and Ganz (196 3) and Barlow and Hill (1963) . From 
subsequent reported work, there is certainly no need to doubt the 
validity of their findings. However, the interpretation as support­
ing exclusively a supression hypothesis is less certain.
Sekuler and Ganz showed that the threshold for the perception of 
motion after prolonged inspection of a moving field is raised for 
the direction of movement of the stimulus. Whether this evidence 
can be taken as critically rejecting the perseveration theory depends 
considerably upon tlie approach taken to the action of inhibition or 
excitation in tlie nervous system. If one is prepared to accept that 
neurons may be simultaneously excited and inhibited, as discussed 
earlier in the thesis, then the perseveration hypothesis is reconcilable 
with the observed raised thresholds. After prolonged inspection of 
a moving stimulus field, then excitation will be high in the neurons 
stimulated by and recording the movement. Inhibition due to recurrent 
processes would also be high. Upon cessation of the real movement, 
the excitation and inhibition would decline in step yielding both 
suppression and a perseveration of discharges.
Barlow and Hill (196 3) recorded directly from units in the retinal 
ganglion of rabbit. During initial viewing of the stationary 
presentation, there was a maintained discharge. When motion of the 
stimulus started, the impulse frequency immediately rose to about 
60/sec. but declined to about 25/sec- during the first 15-20 seconds. 
During the next 40 seconds of viewing the moving stimulus, it fell 
only slightly further. Motion was stopped 57 seconds after it had 
started and the impulse frequency dropped abruptly to zero - "below 
the maintained level preceding the stimulus". "During the following 
0.5 seconds it climbed slowly back to the level of the maintained 
dis charge".
This evidence argues strongly for the suppression of active units
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following stimulation. However, it gives no evidence with regard to 
the theory of motion perception required in order to establish the 
suppression of units as the explanation of the after-effect of seen 
motion. On tlie contrary, it would seem to have some slight counter 
indi cation.
As pointed out by Barlow and Hill, tlie evidence relates to the rab­
bit's retina and it "seems unlikely that similar effects occur at a 
retinal level in man". Perhaps more significant is the lack of verbal 
corroboration from the rabbit thac it perceived a motion after-effect.
The point is not whether the rabbit's nervous system resembles that 
of man, nor whether perception in man resembles perception in rabbit, 
nor even whether the rabbit did or not perceive an after-effect.
Most workers would be content to assume resemblance but not identity 
in these respects. The point is rather that the "suppression" theor­
ists cannot have it both ways. If the reported results are to be 
used to support the suppression hypothesis, then the counter indica­
tions of these results must also be taken into account.
There is good evidence that although the after-effect requires an 
active retina, in order to provide contours against which to per­
ceive it, the phenomenon itself is a central not a retinal phenom­
enon. (Barlow and Brindley, 1963; PickersgiU and Jeeves, 1964).
Taking this into account, it would have supported the suppression 
hypothesis if Barlow and Hill had not found units which are suppressed 
in the retina'. Barlow and Hill suggest that similar units to those 
which they found in the retina of the rabbit occur at a higher level 
in man. It seems more likely that units serving analogous func­
tions to those found in the retina of rabbit would be situated in 
the retina of man. However, even this is not the critical point. The 
point is that to find units which are suppressed in the retina rather 
than at a higher level argues against the suppression as the explana­
tion of the illusion, because the latter is a higher level function.
Barlow and Hill's evidence may be used against the perseveration theory 
upon the argument that no rebound occurred, such as is implied in a 
perseveration theory. Here again however, the fact that the units 
were found in the retina stops it being used to support that argument.
The rebound or perseveration results in my model from the excitation 
built up in learned records. These would only occur at the higher 
levels responsible for the after-effect. There is no need to argue that
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neurons at higher levels do not operate upon entirely similar princi­
ples to those found by Barlow and Hill, except that tliey do not form 
Integrative Connections.
Perhaps the main evidence throwing doubt upon the suppression 
theory is the demonstration that the after-effect is extended in 
duration by the interpolation of contour free periods (Spigel, 1962) 
or by blocking tlie signals from the eye by anoxia (PickersgiU and 
Jeeves, 1964). It is difficult to see how this would arise in the 
suppression model. It is concordant with the perseveration model.
Since discrimination results from the learning of the conditions 
when stationary contours appear, and improved discrimination counter 
balancing the augmented perseveration effect is the function of 
reactivation of the stationary contours, absence of stationary con­
tours impedes the discrimination of the veridical conditions.
The experiment reported here adds further evidence. The suppression 
theory is silent in respect of a long term enhancement. Although 
it could be suggested that this long term enhancement is due to long 
term suppression effects, as pointed out in the attached paper, 
this would make the suppression theory a different one from that 
customarily put forward. Moreover, long term suppression effects 
would be expected to affect perception generally. Perception appeared 
to be quite normal in all subjects when inspecting contours gen­
erally. It was only in relation to the particular stimulus that the 
effect was demonstrated. The author can confirm that during the 
time that the experiment was conducted his perception of motion was 
quite normal except when he happened to glance at the spiral. He 
then immediately experienced a strong disturbance of perception not­
withstanding that the spiral was stationary.
When all is said and done, my experiment does not produce conclusive 
results as to the explanation of the illusion. It may serve to throw 
some doubts upon the unqualified acceptance of the suppression theory.
Probably the most powerful evidence that there is a perseveration of 
image moving the same direction as the observed motion would be a 
report to that effect in the absence of contour. Such images moving 
in the same direction as the motion are frequently reported in the 
anecdotal literature. With a view to supporting his, I conducted a 
number of pilot experiments. I found a methodological difficulty.
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It was almost impossible to establish a positive after image of the 
movement without also establishing an after image of some station­
ary contour against wliich the positive image of the movement could 
be seen as moving.
This difficulty echoes the general difficulty in distinguishing the 
two explanations of the after-effect. Looking at the literature 
since the date of the experiment, there seems to be no change in 
this ambiguity. Almost every experiment which has been carried out 
can be explained equally in terms of either of the two explanations.
For example, complex temporal and spatial frequency effects, cancel­
lations and superimposed effects, reviewed by Sekuler, Pantle and 
Levison, (1978) can be explained equally by perseveration of an image 
moving in the same direction and forming a ground, or by a suppres­
sion of selective receptors. Other peculiar effects, e.g. the vec­
torial effects of head tilting (Carpenter, 1977, p.275) or some 
rather strange effects of apparent movement (Anstis, 1978) are equally 
explicable, or perhaps inexplicable, according to the two theories.
Of course it may be that both explanations describe processes which 
contribute to the illusion. This may not be as far-fetched as it at 
at first seems. Accepting for this purpose, the suppression hypothesis 
of the perception of motion direction, then immediately upon cessation 
of stimulation, one might expect a suppression of the stimulated units, 
giving rise to a suppression induced illusion of motion in the 
opposite direction. Upon the assumptions of the perseveration theory, 
this would be followed by an after discharge in the neurons concerned, 
giving a representation of motion in the direction of the adapting 
motion. These periodic suppressions and after-discharges might alter­
nate, as has been shown to occur in the cortical neurons receptive to 
brightness and darkness following a flash of light (Jung, 19 72) . In 
the case of alternate suppression and after-discharge of direction 
sensitive neruons, the perceptual effect, on the combined template 
theory and suppression theory, would be additive, since both hypotheses 
predict a perceived movement in the direction opposite to that of the 
adapting stimulation. This explanation supports Spigel's conclusion 
that the illusion is subject to complex determination.
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VII Conclusion
An experiment was carried out to test predictions suggested by a 
perseveration theory of the after-effect of observed motion, upon 
which the generally accepted suppression theory is silent. The 
perseveration tlieory predicted a prolongation of the illusion under 
specific conditions, and tfiis prolongation was confirmed.
An opportunity was taken to discuss the theoretical issues involved. 
From this discussion it was concluded that the causation of the 
illusion has not been established with certainty. Although the 
experimental results may not constitute a challenge to suppression 
theory, they should cause a reassessment as to the general acceptance 
of the suppression theory without qualification.
The experimental results support in a general way an enrichment 
interpretation of perception.
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CHAPTER 19
CONCLUSION
I Recapitulation
A theory of neural integration has been presented, and attempts to 
simulate progressive versions of the theory in a computer described.
In the early chapters of this thesis an attempt was made to isolate 
the main problems, both psychological and neurological, which an 
explanation of brain function must eventually deal with. Against 
this background and against the background of contemporary research 
on the structure of nervous tissue, the theory of neural integration 
was presented. It was then proposed, using the computer as a tool 
of theory building, to construct brain models which might progres­
sively be able to deal with these problems. Naturally it was not to 
be expected that the eventual goal would be reached, in the sense 
that all problems would be overcome. On the contrary, the aim was 
to see how far and with what difficulty a particular theory of 
neural integration could be applied to that end.
The endeavour was to be regarded as a step towards constructing more 
comprehensive brain models, that is, to combine a theoretical assess­
ment of contemporary data and opinion with computer simulation to 
provide effective neurological models. As argued by George (1965), 
the computer offers a unique opportunity to provide models which are 
effective in the sense that the implications are demonstrated 
unequivocally.
An initial set of simulations aimed to demonstrate the main implica­
tions of theneural theory. They were comparable in that respect with 
the simulations which have been presented in the literature in support 
of other models, (e.g. those of Kilmer and his associates, Spinelli, 
Walley and Weiden).
Unlike most other simulations of neurological models, the computer 
models reported here were extended progressively to try to encompass a
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broader representation of behaviour and a more realistic brian model 
in terms of anatomical structure and function.
The models progressed to the stage where a simple sequence of appeti­
tive consummatory behaviour was represented. A number of mechanisms 
were explored by which successful behaviour, as assessed by the model, 
would take precedence over unsuccessful behaviour. Within the limi­
tations imposed by the capacities of the model at the stage to which 
it had been developed, an examination was made of arrangements by 
which motor behaviour might be initiated, and also the possible 
relationship between mechanisms which originate behaviour as the 
result of innate programming and those which adapt that behaviour as 
the result of experience.
In attempting to draw some tentative conclusions from the work which 
has been presented, one may consider it from three aspects:
(a) in relation to the particular theory of neural integration proposed;
(b) as a step towards developing a more realistic brain model;
(c) in relation to the use of the computer as a tool of theory building.
These aspects are closely involved with each other, and accordingly 
it is not possible to separate them entirely in the following discussions
II General discussion: in relation to the particular theory
At a formal level the simulations have shown that the logical implica­
tions of the theory fulfil the predictions made. It was demonstrated 
that sub-sets of neurons obeying quite simple rules could form 
neural templates. Linked Constellations. These templates could repre­
sent events which occurred from instant to instant. A small number 
of written-in sub-sets (Preset Constellations) could effectively shape 
the further development of the system in conjunction with the inputs 
which occurred from instant to instant. It was also demonstrated that 
the inbuilt patterns could act as criteria of success and failure and 
enable the model to assessthe significance of the inputs in relation 
to those criteria. Storage space could be allocated and retreival 
activity adjusted accordingly. The system could operate effectively 
when, after learning, substantial portions of the system were removed.
It was demonstrated that the system of neural integration was capable of
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controlling the emission of a notional instrumental response and 
learn to make the response which had on former occasions led to 
notional consuimnatory behaviour. In making a decision as to which 
response to emit, the model was influenced by its supposed motiva­
tional state.
In addition to these formal demonstrations, there were a number of 
characteristics of the simulations which appeared to be analogous to 
the behaviour and neurology of animals. It was shown , for example, 
that when a classical conditioning situation was simulated, a 
response was obtained from the model which was analogous to the 
Conditioned Response of animals. These similarities are naturally 
to be treated with caution as supporting the theory of neural inte­
gration. It seems probable that almost any reasonable system of 
neural integration can be applied to produce a notional conditioning. 
What seems to be of more importance than a demonstration of a con­
ditioned response is the manner of its production and its particular 
characteristics. A number of features of the response of the model 
were found to be similar to that occurring in animals in classical 
conditioning situation. For example, the equivalent of stimulus 
generalisation and stimulus discrimination was expressed in the model 
as a modulation of the strength of the conditioned response much as 
the degree of salivation varies in the animal in analogous circum­
stances. Nevertheless, these similarities would no doubt extend to 
many models.
These less formal aspects of the demonstrations are perhaps best seen 
as particular hypotheses of the aspects of behaviour which they repre­
sent. Clearly when differing theoretical models of neural integration 
produce analogous CRs, the explanations which they offer will differ 
from model to model. The present model develops a rather special 
explanation of classical conditioning. The CR reflects a discharge 
from memory records about to be activated by a familiar sequence of 
events. It is clearly distinguishable analytically from the UCR, 
which acts directly through the inbuilt system. To ascertain whether 
this is a better theory of classical conditioning than other explana­
tions is an empirical question which falls beyond the scope of this 
project. What the simulation is able to do is to show a way in which 
a CR may occur.
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The extended set of simulations may be considered as taking the same 
kind of demonstration further. The aim is to explore the possibilities 
of the theory. The simulations obviously do not demonstrate that the 
mechanisms employed are those which occur in actual nervous systems.
What they show is that the system is capable of handling behaviour 
at the level represented.
It may be objected that it is almost certain that a similar attempt to 
model the same behaviour by some other system would be equally if not 
more, successful. This is the trouble with theories of neural inte­
gration. There are so many contenders. This is true, but there are 
two answers to the objection.
The first is that although the same behaviour might be modelled in 
another theory, that result might only be accomplished, as it has in 
the present effort, after encountering many troubles and difficulties. 
Those troubles and difficulties exhibit the characteristics of the 
theory and so enable one to judge better the plausibility of the 
solution. They also enable one to find out some of the difficulties 
which are to be faced in constructing a model nervous system. The 
second answer follows closely upon the first. The important question 
is not the behavioural performance achieved, but to what extent the 
resulting models are life-like in important senses.
To answer the latter question is bound to be partly subjective. That 
is not because it is not a strictly empirical question, but rather 
because the answer involves such a large body of evidence. Moreover,
the total evidence available may be inadequate. The observer is, in
such circumstances, bound to be influenced by the weight he attaches 
to certain aspects of the evidence. In this lack of certainty there 
is scope for the philosophical predelictions of the individual. In 
the case of the present author, an endeavour was made to outline the 
aspects of brain function which were considered relevant to a theory 
of neural integration. Of course, the simulations did not solve these 
problems, but one may perhaps judge the life-like quality of the models 
in terms of steps on the way to attempting to solve them. These
aspects are discussed further in the next section.
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III Some aspects of the models 
A , Overall co-ordination
One of the functions of neural integration which was considered to 
be important in the earlier discussions in this thesis was the over­
all co-ordinating and unifying characteristics of the process. It 
was this impressive characteristic of brain function which led to 
the concept of a Linked Constellation. It was argued that an exten­
ded neural template incorporating all aspects, sensory and motor, 
of the events would provide an inherent and automatic co-ordination 
of the separate systems.
Within the limits to which the simulations were developed, this 
unifying capacity of the system was demonstrated. A number of dif­
ferent aspects of behavioural organisation were represented in the 
models, including genetically-determined factors, sensory stimula­
tion, temporal relationship, hormonal and metabolic states, different 
categories of motor action in relation to their interactions with 
the environment, the frequency of exercise of actions, and the rela­
tionship of action taken in the past to the consequences of those 
actions.
No special mechanisms had to be incorporated to obtain the overall 
co-ordination and unity of behaviour displayed in the models. Of 
course, it is true that care had to be taken to ensure the right 
temporal conjunctions within the model, and that inhibitory and other 
switches focussed attention on one part of the model rather than another 
at the right time. These adjustments and developments were however 
all simply variations of the general parameters and characteristics of 
the Linked Constellation model.
One must be careful not to overstate the case for the particular theory 
of neural integration. Konorski (1957) undoubtedly had a similar 
overall co-ordination in mind when he reviewed the neurological evi­
dence for transcortical connections between different modalities.
His system of Gnostic Units solves the problem of overall co-ordination 
upon the assumption that there is a comprehensive assessment of the 
entire configuration of sensory, motor and humoral events, similar to 
that mediated in my model by an extended template. In his system it 
is mediated by an overall convergence of all inputs to.a single apex.
A point made earlier may be repeated here. It does not seem clear how
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an hierarchical system of this kind could operate unless complete 
matchings were obtained. A part matching would leave fragmented por­
tions of the system in which matching occurred isolated at a lower 
leve1 in the hierarchy, and the unity would be lost. That argument 
relates to his model rather than mine, and undoubtedly the last word 
has not been said in the debate which will undoubtedly continue 
between hierarchical and distributed models.
B . Differentiation of Response classes
Another aspect of neural function which characterises the behaviour 
of living systems in comparison with artefacts, is the differentiation 
of action in relation to functions which seem to be peculiar to organ­
isms. Actions are mainly organised around acts of consummation, i.e. 
food gathering and mating, and protection, i.e. withdrawal. There 
are more than superficial differences between acts which lead to the 
situations in which these functions can be accomplished and the 
acts by which the functions are themselves executed. These differences 
were represented in the model by Consummatory, Preconsummatory, 
Instrumental and Protective Actions. Although, as was emphasised 
earlier, these were not to be regarded as theoretical categories, it 
is reasonable to maintain that their realisation in a computer model 
gives a life-like character.
Here again, one must be careful not to be misunderstood. The mere 
fitting out of a model with a variety of responses would not make 
it more life-like for present purposes. A clever toy might be equipped 
with teeth and jaws and swallow food. It might possess claws for 
fighting. Equipped with a sufficiently powerful digital computer and 
artificial intelligence programs, it might be able to emit appropriate 
instrumental and protective responses. In fact it is not difficult to 
imagine that such a robot might perform far more powerfully in life­
like behaviour than the excessively limited simulations reported here.
The important point is the theoretical basis of the differentiation 
displayed. In the present project the initial simulations developed 
a basic paradigm of motor action and developed differentiated kinds of 
action from it. A Preset Constellation, when activated by specific 
input, released a Response. Such innately provided mechanisms are a 
central feature of nearly all behavioural and neural theories, e.g. 
key trigger patterns. Innate Releasing Mechanisms, Unconditioned Responses
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In the computer models, this idea was taken further and an attempt 
made to develop responses required for behaviour as a set of varia­
tions on the main theme.
In one respect the basic mechanism of my model, that is, the 
equivalent to the key trigger pattern of Pringle (1951) differs from 
other neural formulations of the innately provided mechanism. In my 
model, the innate mechanism remains unaffected by experience. The 
effect of experience is to lay down a separate neural record of events, 
independent of the innate mechanism. The occurrence of an activation 
of the innate mechanism is simply part of the overall record of events 
taken from instant to instant.
By a kind of speculative evolutionary process, this basic paradigm 
was varied so as to meet the requirements of the behaviour to be 
generated. Consummatory, Preconsummatory and Protective Responses 
had in common that they all symbolised actions which would be released 
by specific stimulation, so no variation was required of the basic 
relase mechanism. Their separation enabled their different relation­
ship to behaviour to be represented. For example, Preconsummatory 
Responses could be used as an indicator that motivational inputs were 
to be stepped up, whereas Consummatory Responses indicated that the 
behavioural sequence had reached its climax, and motivational inputs 
could be reduced.
This distinction between the Preconsummatory Response and Consummatory 
Responses of the model was, of course, intended only to represent a 
wide range of organisational differentiation. Although in the models, 
each kind of behavioural sequence, say, eating or drinking, was repre­
sented by a single Preconsummatory Response and a single Consummatory 
Response, this was intended to be an abbreviation of sets of Preset 
Constellations. Each would have the relationship of a Preconsummatory 
Response to the Preset Constellation which followed in the sequence, 
and a Consummatory Response to the one which it followed.
In addition the extended template concept enables the Preset Constel­
lation, as a releasing mechanism, to be applied interpretatively to the 
initiation of action by signals other than sensory. Hormonal, metabolic 
and other internal signals could contribute or provide the IRP 
(Innately Recognised Pattern) which induces action. The relationship 
of Preconsummatory to Consummatory behaviour symbolises in simple form
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the kind of hierarchical organisation of specifically elicited 
behaviours described by Tinbergen (1951).
In the case of Instrumental Responses, the basic Preset Constella­
tion mechanism required further modification. That class of beha­
viour wiiich is exhibited in instrumental conditioning situations 
differs from behaviour which is reliably elicited by specific sen­
sory stimulation. The validity of the distinction between "operants" 
and "respondents" was touched upon in an earlier chapter. It has 
been argued that the distinction is subject to considerable confusions 
(e.g. Moore, 1973; Jenkins, 1973). The approach adopted for the 
purposes of taking the present models further was to assume that all 
motor organisation is derived from fundamentally similar neural 
arrangements. There are however differences of emphasis. The idea 
of isolating a separate class of Instrumental Responses was to be 
able to concentrate on arrangements which might be notionally present 
in all responses but which come into prominence in instrumental learn­
ing situations.
Like Consummatory, Preconsummatory and Protective Responses, Instru­
mental action was produced in the model initially by the reactivation 
of innate templates, i.e. Preset Constellations. In all types of 
Response, initiation is primarily from the Preset Constellation, but 
their effect can be mimicked by reactivation of Learned Records. 
Instrumental Responses were made to differ from the more definitely 
stimulus-bound responses by variations of degree. A number of the 
arrangements explored have been described in detail. Essentially they 
were adaptations of the Preset Constellation designed to permit the 
primary (genetically-determined) initiation of the response to be less 
tied to specific sensory input and to be influenced by other more 
intrinsic factors. A prominent change of emphasis was towards the 
precedence of the Learned Indication over the Innate Indication in 
initiating responses. Although developed separately it may be seen 
that Instrumental Responses do not involve concepts absent from the 
other kinds of responses. Whereas as displayed in the model, Precon­
summatory Responses were only effectively emitted as the result of 
a Sub-cortical initiation, elicited by specific stimulation. Instru­
mental Responses gave precedence to the Cortical Motor Response 
Indication. The differences between appetitive response types may 
therefore be seen as differences of threshold.
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It does not matter in the present context whether these ideas are 
right or wrong. What is claimed for them is that they arise in the 
model as developments of basic concepts, and that they generate 
behaviour.
C. Reinforcemen t
In the simulations a number of specific mechanisms of reinforcement 
were explored. In some versions "reinforcement" consisted of selec­
tive registration of either the positive (activation) or negative 
(suppression) expression of the Response (Do and Not-Do Pools). In 
some versions both were registered. In some versions motivational 
links fed Excitation into the representations of successful events. 
Perhaps more than any other aspect of the simulations, these mech­
anisms of reinforcement are to be regarded merely as useful 
abbreviations enabling the model to achieve some kind of successful 
performance. They show possible ways in which the inherent meaning 
of events can be pointed up into specialised neural mechanisms by 
exploitation of the extended template idea. Although it is to be 
hoped that they may have something in common with the kind of specific 
neural mechanism developed in actual nervous systems, it is doubtful 
that they closely reflect such mechanisms.
The particular mechanisms of reinforcement represented in the models 
may be distinguished from the overall concept offered by the theor­
etical model. Reinforcement and motivation are important questions 
in the general interpretation of brain function. Pribram (1971) 
cites an old adage that all of the problems of psychology ultimately 
reduce to two: the nature of similarity and the nature of reinforce­
ment. He then proposes that these two are in fact one, that of 
discerning meaning. At this general level, the model presented here 
points in the same direction. Essentially the concepts of motivation, 
reinforcement, and recognition of similarity are merely aspects of 
the overall organisation of the model. That organisation is directed 
towards matching the signals of the external world with the desirable 
state of affairs represented by innate templates, and towards avoiding 
matchings with undesirable states of affairs represented by other 
templates.
Accordingly, the model does offer a specific concept of motivation 
and reinforcement. Motivation refers to the influence of metabolic
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and hormonal inputs to the system as compared with sensory stimulation. 
This does not mean tliat the two do not interact. A template which 
records a particular environmental object at a time when motivational 
inputs are high, may be reactivated by tlie sensory stimulation from 
the object as well as by the recurrence of activity in the motivational 
inputs. Reinforcement in the model is the reactivation of particular 
Linked Constellations. Such Linked Constellations are either themselves 
Preset Constellations, and so mediate an innately prescribed recognition 
of desirable or undesirable circumstances: or else they derive from 
Preset Constellations through the system of Learned Records.
Such a statement of reinforcement may appear to tie the model down 
to a rather narrow concept similar to that of earlier Needs satisfac­
tion models. That is not actually the case. There is no reason why 
the desirable state of affairs towards which the model moves, and the 
undesirable state of affairs, away from which it moves, should be 
defined in Preset Constellations representing direct physiological 
requirements, such as deficits in food,drink, and copulation. With 
the evolutionary development of systems. Preset Constellations may 
have developed which monitor the state of the system itself rather 
than the external inputs to it. The desirable states of the system 
might be defined in terms of optimum states of variables of the sys­
tem, for example, when Excitation is temporally randomised across the 
Pools of Arrays, thus ensuring variety of stimulation. Another manner 
in which the definition of desirable states may have broadened is by 
the change of emphasis of Preset Constellations which originally may 
have acted as signposts to major physiological goals, becoming them­
selves the goals of behavioural sequences, and becoming "reinforcing 
events".
Aside from the development of systems mediating the innate propensities 
of animals, there are possibilities of the broadening of goals through 
the Learned Records. Such secondary reinforcement comes about in the 
model in two ways. First, there are the general associative proper­
ties of the system, as for example, the transmission of excitation 
from a Cue Pattern to a Learned Record of a Preconsummatory event. 
Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, there are the possibilities 
of labelling Constellations which register events which were originally 
neutral. Such labelling is illustrated in the reported simulations by 
the registration of a Preconsummatory Response in a Constellation which
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records an input pattern preceding rather than accompanying the rein­
forcing event.
One of (die next steps whicdi would be attempted if one were to attempt 
to develop the model further would be to see if the Preconsummatory 
and Motivational labels could be transferred to Linked Constellations 
registering progressively earlier steps in the behavioural sequence.
It was also hoped by utilising a delayed consolidation hypothesis to 
show tliat labelling could be made relatively independent of temporal 
contiguity. These demonstrations remain in the future, and may, of 
course, be beyond the scope of the neural theory to mediate. Their 
mention serves to show the general rationale of the models.
D. Notional Neuro-anatomy
The life-like nature of a model does not depend only upon its prin­
ciples of operation. It also depends upon its "flesh and blood".
We may be reminded of Olympia, the doll in the Tales of Hoffman. Her 
behaviour has made her indistinguishable from a human being. When 
she falls to (die floor and the trapdoor in her back is opened to ex­
pose the works, we all know (diat she is not a girl but a machine.
This is not an idea which has lost its validity since the eighteenth 
century. We still know the difference between an "android" and a 
man, when we expose the works of the former. At the level with which 
we are now concerned, the choice between two models of the nervous 
system may well depend not on the overt behaviour of the systems, but 
the extent to which the notional neuro-anatomies resemble that of 
nervous tissue itself.
Here again resemblances between what is known of neural structure and 
the representation in a model must be treated with caution. Most 
models, including the present one, are designed with an eye on the 
results of contemporary research. The question is not whether there 
are superficial resemblances, but to what extent the resemblance of 
structure arises from the basic implications of the model itself.
Contemporary research on the histology, neuro-anatomical and general 
structural arrangements in the nervous system has been cited in context. 
There appear to be certain resemblances which arise in the model from 
its basic propositions. First, there is the Neuronal Pool or columnar 
structure. This is fundamental to the model. It also appears to be 
fundamental to the mammalian nervous system. Second, there is the
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modality layout and the topographical representation as a series of 
elements, which seems ideally suited to an extended template layout.
These resemblances are those which arise from the basic propositions 
of the neural theory. In the case of the models developed in the 
simulations, these structural resenhlances seem to progress further, 
not as an ad hoc imitation of what is known of actual neural arrange­
ments , but as tlie necessary realisation of the model. For example, 
the presence of corresponding Neuronal Pools in sub-cortical, cortical 
and control arrays bears some resemblance to the topographical organi­
sation of the regions of the central nervous system, thalamus, striatum, 
Superior Colliculus and Cortex. The simple system of afferent and 
efferent fibres between these Arrays of the model seems not unlike the 
tracts and pathways seen in the nervous system.
Once again, it must be remarked that such resemblances might arise in 
other models. What can be said of the present model is that the neural 
arrangements seem to be concordant with the data. It may be remarked 
in passing that such an arrangement is not at first sight what one 
might expect from the feed-back type of model nor from the hierarchical 
convergence kind of model. It may perhaps be claimed in this context 
that the structural and histological resemblances between the model 
and the nervous system goes beyond that achieved by the great majority 
of simulations at the neurological level, and equals that of systems 
which have been specifically designed to resemble neural structures, 
e.g. Kilmer and Olinski's (19 74) model of the Hippocampus.
IV Some weaknesses and problems referable to the theory of neural 
integration
Certain difficulties in the theory were exposed by the simulations. 
Others were more or less obvious from the start, and will be mentioned 
only briefly.
The first point to be made was that the development of the model was 
so slow, and what was achieved, was very modest in relation to the
problems which must eventually be overcome by a neurological theory. 
This limited progress may be interpreted in a number of ways.
One may argue that if the Linked Constellation concept is as powerful
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an explanatory concept as was claimed for it, then no difficulty 
should have been experienced in using it to develop systems of far 
greater behavioural sophistication than were in fact achieved.
Against this two argiuiients may be brought. The first of these in 
itself involves more than one consideration.
(1) The main cause of the delay was the trouble experienced with Exci­
tation and Inhibition. These go to the root of the Linked Constella­
tion concept, so trouble with those variables is admittedly trouble 
with the theoretical concept itself. There are however two possible 
contributions to the troubles experienced. One explanation which 
saves the Linked Constellation hypothesis is that Inhibition and Exci­
tation may have been inadequately represented in the model. Two rather 
different implementations of these variables were adopted respectively 
in the main simulations and in the separate simulation investigating 
mediation of the theory by orthodox synapses. Similar troubles were 
encountered in both. Moreover, it was felt that neither representa­
tion of Inhibition and Excitation adequately represented the physio­
logical facts. It may be that the concepts of inhibition and excitation 
as they must appear in the model, may require further clarification.
An alternative to this explanation is that the troubles experienced 
with Inhibition and Excitation in the model represent real problems 
which have had to be solved by the nervous system. This would mean 
that the Linked Constellation concept on its own is inadequate to 
explain neural function, but that it is effective when combined with 
some means of control of excitation and inhibition. The means found 
to be effective in the model was the introduction of Inhibitory Gates: 
an alternative, or perhaps complementary mechanism, was a similar 
rhythmic gating of externally imposed inhibitory influences.
Accordingly one may argue that the delays due to trouble with Inhibi­
tion and Excitation were due to an inadequate conceptualisation of the 
original theory. This inadequacy was disclosed by the subsequent 
attempts at simulation, and once the problems had been exposed and 
solved, the development of the model might proceed more rapidly. The 
questions raised by this argument are empirical. Do troubles such 
as those experienced with the model actually occur in nervous systems?
Is it one of the functions of rhythmic mechanisms to control accumula­
tions of excitatory and inhibitory effects? If research suggests that
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such is the case then tlie Linked Constellation concept would be rein­
forced by tliose discoveries.
(2) There is additionally a second kind of argument against the con­
tention that slow progress with tlie development of the models implies 
a weakness of the Linked Constellation hypothesis. This argument has 
been raised elsewhere in the thesis. It is that accomplishing too 
much too easily would be against a theory as an explanation of brain 
function. Brains have been in existence for hundreds of millions of 
years. As far as is known, those aspects of behaviour which typify 
the higher mammaIs and Man developed exceedingly slowly. The etho- 
logical concepts of Innate Releasing Mechanisms and fixed action 
patterns, as mediated by Preset Constellations, would account for 
much of the behaviour which one might attribute to primitive creatures 
(Maser, 1973). Although primitive creatures would be expected to 
show some signs of the further capacities which were to arise, those 
signs, like those to be seen in the models, would be in considerable 
contrast with the sophisticated behaviours observed in the more advanced 
animals.
Certain weaknesses in tlie performance of the models seemed to arise 
paradoxically directly from efforts to provide them with apparatus 
similar to that presumably possessed by animal systems. The often '
erratic and stupid performance which resulted in place of the expec­
ted "improvement" may be thought to argue against the overall design 
of the models, and of their rationale. That this may not be the 
case may be seen in the example of motivational representation.
It will be recalled that when motivational features were in operation 
in the model, the models tended to lose their power to discriminate 
Input Patterns and instead would repeat Responses which had previously 
yielded reinforcement. However some success was achieved. There is 
accordingly reason to suppose that the performance could be improved.
The empirical question which is raised is whether there is evidence 
of trouble in animal systems similar to that encountered in the models. 
Most readers will agree that it is not implausible to suggest that 
animals "lose their reason" when acting under intense stimulation. Of 
course, the failure of the model cannot be cited in its support. But 
the fact that some success was obtained, and that the failure of per­
formance bears resemblances to weaknesses seen in animals, must qualify 
one's judgement.
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Three important steps in the implementation of behaviour, as pro­
posed in the opening chapters, were not reached in the development 
of the simulations.
One was the representation of sequences in which more than one 
Instrumental Response was required to reach a behavioural goal.
A second was the demonstration that events widely spaced in time 
and separated by events which have other meanings, can be integrated 
into a single pattt.'rn of action, as when a dog eats poisoned food 
and does not become ill for hours, yet will avoid the source of food 
(Oatley, 197Ü). A third is perhaps more speculative, but accords 
with the general approach taken here. It is the capacity to recog­
nise that events are as expected, independently of the consequences 
of those events, i.e. what has been termed here, cognitive confirma­
tion.
These absences from the demonstrations cannot be considered as weak­
nesses of the theory of neural integration in themsleves. In defence 
of the models, it is argued that they are merely transitional examples 
of realisations intended to develop the explanatory potential of the 
theory of neural integration progressively. That there is a long way 
to go before demonstrating such capacities is clear, but this does 
not in itself point to a weakness in the explanatory potential of the 
underlying theory. What raises a question mark against that explana­
tory potential are the particular difficulties encountered in the 
simulations which have been undertaken.
An example may serve to give some indication of questions raised. 
Initially the view of the motivation and direction of behaviour was 
related to the distribution of built up excitation in the system. It 
was visualised that excitation would spread backwards from the repre­
sentations of previously achieved goals and would reinforce the for­
ward spreading (in a temporal sequential sense) excitation from 
current sensory input. The possibility of this was seen in the initial 
simulations which showed a powerful temporal sequential and arousal 
effect centred around the Constellations representing former reinforc­
ing events (see Figure 8.1). Eventually, however, these very aspects 
of the system threatened to overwhelm it. Solutions were found in 
the form of rhythmic inhibitory gates. A revised solution is possible 
in the sense that the flows of excitation from former achieved goals 
to meet current sensory excitation can only be permitted to occur
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during short episodes, during which gating is suspended. Other 
solutions centre around the possibility of labelling the represen­
tation of one event with a marker which indicates its relationship 
to another temporally distant event.
Another difficulty surrounding the idea of a feed-forward and feed- 
backward of excitation concerns the difficulty of mediating a sequence 
of behaviour leading to a distant goal. What was encountered in the 
demonstrations was an inappropriate driving of the intermediate 
responses. A solution was devised, although not demonstrated, using 
the idea of a balanced application of motivational excitation to both 
the suppressive and activating representation of the motor activity. 
Whether these solutions would work, and what the implications of their 
working would be, it is not possible to say at this time. The 
questions raised are empirical, but their usefulness may be limited 
by what it is possible to discover in the laboratory at the present 
time. Meanwhile, it is difficult to say whether the difficulties 
encountered are weaknesses of the original formulation or strengths 
pointing to necessary mechanisms in the nervous system enabling its 
full potential to be exploited.
A more general weakness of the theory, not directly concerned with 
the work presented in this tliesis, relates to the numerical implica­
tions. Its full consideration lies outside the scope of this thesis, 
but a few words may be necessary in acknowledgement of its existence. 
Arguments have been brought against many theories, in particular 
against those following the ideas of Uttley (see e.g. Sutherland,
1959) to the effect that too many elements would be required. A simi­
lar attack may be made upon the theory presented here.
It is difficult to estimate the information storage capacity of my 
model. In a single Linked Constellation, it appears that each linked 
Integrating Neuron holds one bit of information. However, the temporal 
sequential conditional probabilities of the system, the appreciation 
of the significance of which we owe to Uttley, would tremendously 
increase the information capacity of the system. The amount of this 
increase is impossible to assess unless we were prepared to say to what 
extent the system operates in temporal sequential mode, a question 
which has been consistently raised, but not answered, in the simulations.
Moreover, estimates of the information held in the nervous system are
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themselves dependent upon equivalent arbitrary decisions. Wlien, as 
phrased by Mark (1974) we say that "one fleeting experience is 
instantly recorded and remains as a potent influence on subsequent 
behaviour for a lifetime of up to one hundred years" we have no way 
of knowing to what extent it is in the information laid down in that 
particular experience which is recorded unaltered. The Gibsons’ 
contribution was to sliow tliat such information could be represented 
as changes effected in the discrimination system itself. In the 
present model those changes take the form of the influence of earlier 
experiences on tlie Linked Constellations laid down to record later 
experiences. Even tlie ability to recreate earlier memories suggested 
by the experiences related by persons undergoing cortical stimulation 
(Penfield and Rasmussen, 1952; Penfield and Roberts, 1961) do not 
determine the extent to which recall of memory is subject to recon­
struction and filling of gaps by more recent memories-
Nevertheless, when all is said and done, we remain with the impression 
that the actual storage capacity of the brain is unlimited.
If this is true, the principle of the Linked Constellation concept can 
be saved if the elements from which a linked structure is composed is 
taken to be a sub-unit of the neuron, say, a macromolecule. It is not 
immediately apparent how such a model could be implemented in a prac­
tical sense concordant with what is known of the structure and function 
of neurons. The idea may not be impossible, but lies beyond the pres­
ent prospect of discussion. Accordingly at the present time it must 
be concluded that the numerical aspects of the theory, although not 
conclusively against it even assuming its mediation with individual 
neurons as its elements, is a weakness.
This short discussion of the weaknesses of the model is by no means com­
prehensive. However, to go further into the more abstruse implications 
would take us too far away from what was actually simulated.
V Some further aspects of the models
An aim of the project was to try to approach more closely to a real­
istic simulation of brain function. As will be apparent from the 
preceding sections, this aim is not clearly distinguishable from the 
attempt to demonstrate the explanatory potential of a particular
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Üieory. Both eventually involve finding solutions to problems of 
generating plausible behaviour in a model.
Accordingly, it is only necessary to emphasise what has already been 
said. The main aim was to explore the possibility of producing life­
like systems in the computer. The mechanisms developed are not put 
forward as definite hypotheses of neural mechanisms. Their aim is 
suggestive. In some cases the solutions adopted may be at variance 
with the evidence. In many cases the author would suggest that the 
existing evidence, although often extensive, is still inadequate to 
say definitely whether the mechanisms are plausible or not. What 
is hoped is that the models succeed in raising empirical questions. 
Where the mechanisms do not succeed in generating the required 
behaviour, or where the resulting neurology is at variance with what 
is known, or where the models seem particularly implausible, these 
very inadequacies may lead to the formulation of better solutions.
By way of completing the recapitulation of the features of the model, 
two or three further points will be mentioned.
The models relied fairly heavily upon a representation of the suppres­
sion of activity, in an active, that is to say, excitatory sense. In 
this respect, the model closely resembles that of Konorski (1957).
There are differences. Konorski's formulation is an extension although 
an original one, of Pavlovian concepts. His views of organisation of 
behaviour tend to be expressed as interactions of specific "reflexes". 
The function of active suppression in my model is very similar to that 
proposed by Konorski, although my model was developed without reference 
to his formulation. In effect, response suppression is an instrument 
of reinforcement. The mechanisms simulated in my models are similar 
in function, although not neural implementation, to Konorski's descrip­
tion of the transformation of "positive" into "negative" Conditioned 
Reflexes. There is however a difference in respect to the organisation 
of Drive and Anti-Drive. He envisages these as operating as the result 
of the interaction of different reflexes, e.g. the Food Reflex operates 
the Anti-Drive to the Hun.ger Reflex. In my model, behaviour is con­
ceived as organised into sequences by sets of Preset Constellations. 
These Preset Constellations bear an hierarchical relationship to each 
other, much as described by Tinbergen, and it is this hierarchical 
relationship which controls the balance of Drive and Anti-Drive.
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These differences are probably not significant, and in any case, my 
formulation was developed not from a close consideration of the 
behavioural evidence, but from the requirements of the model.
An aspect of neural organisation raised in the models concerned the 
problem of deciding when an inbuilt mechanism for the initiation of 
action should take precedence over a learned indication of which 
action should be taken next. This problem in the form in which it 
occurs may be an artefact of the present model. However, Maser (19 73) 
considers that it is one of the main questions to be answered. It 
certainly presented a considerable and unforeseen problem in generat­
ing behaviour in the models.
The fact that the solutions generated in the model seem to have a 
certain biological flavour in terms of current knowledge may lend 
support to the supposition that the problems as seen in the model reflect 
real problems of neural organisation. It may be remembered that a num­
ber of different possibilities were explored. These included a sup­
posed maturation of inbuilt response to the environment, a maturation 
of motor response which incorporated the current sensory input at the 
time of maturation, processes which were in some ways akin to imprinting 
and other developmental characteristics of behaviour. Another avenue 
explored was a form of Preset Constellation which would respond to a 
class of inputs rather than to a specific input. The most effective 
method in the simulations was that of notional hormonal or metabolic 
clocks which acted as pressor drives to the exercise of motor actions.
As time passed since the clocks were last reset, excitation rose and 
so increasingly urged the expression of that particular action driven 
by the clock concerned.
Whether these mechanisms have any reality in the brain, it is unneces­
sary to urge in the present context. In their defence it may be said 
that they are not complete phantasy. They were guided by a fairly 
extensive acquaintance with the literature (see e.g. Glickman and 
Schiff, 1967; Glickman, 1973; Milner, 1970; Valenstein, 1970; Margules 
and Margules, 1973; Isaacson, 1974; Mogenson and Phillips, 1976; and 
many others). Contemporary views of the biochemical aspects of neural 
processes, sub-cortical organisation of efferent functions, and the 
general behavioural characteristics of response may make them plausible 
to the reader. It is true that there is no sufficient evidence that 
the mechanisms occur, but then there is no sufficient evidence that they 
do not.
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One may take a similar line with regard to the treatment of attention 
and activation (arousal) in the model. Here there is the advantage 
that the principle of attention arises directly out of the basic 
theory of neural integration. True it encountered considerable dif­
ficulties and complications. In fact, it may be said that the implica­
tions of the attentional aspects of the model were the aspects which 
most threatened its development. These difficulties were remedied 
by mechanisms which are admittedly extraneous to the original theory, 
that is, rhytlirnic inhibitory gates. Nevertheless, the atten tional 
aspects of the model remain clearly tied to the extended template 
concept as mediated by the particular neural theory proposed. They 
are peculiar to a system in which quantity of excitation is a valid 
variable of the system. The quantitative values of the excitations 
of afferent fibres, as well as the pattern of excitation, determines 
the weight given to the information carried. This may be seen as 
a direct implication of the theory of neural integration. In this 
respect, the attentional model may be compared and contrasted with 
Walley and Weiden's (1973) attentional model based upon Konorski's 
Gnostic Unit concept.
As to whether the rhythmic mechanisms themselves reflect the func­
tions of the electrical rhythms observed in the brain is, it is 
suggested, an open question for further investigation. In the models 
they solved many problems. It may be permissable to point out that 
in addition to the direct problems which they solved, they offer con­
siderable help in visualising how the model might be developed to 
represent a broad view of behaviour. For example, in the absence of 
rhythmic mechanisms, the model cannot really be distinguished from 
a Stimulus-Response system, as categorised by Oatley (1978) in his 
review of conceptualisations of brain processes. Notwithstanding the 
distributed memory and analogue character of the model, in its oper­
ation before the introduction of rhythm, the net effect was the emis­
sion of a response. With tlie introduction of rhythms the possibility 
of obtaining definite Anticipatory Responses, exemplified in the 
simulations by the Motor Response Indication, became practicable.
Thereby the eventual development of such Indications into cognitive 
attributes become possible.
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VI Some concluding remarks concerning tlie theory of neural integration
Many of tlie weaknesses seen in tlie simulations have been argued away 
as failing to esLabJisli tlie necessary weakness of the fundamental 
concepts. Nevertheless the encounter with considerable difficulties 
discloses tliat the theory is not to be applied in a facile manner to 
explain psychological attributes. The fact that difficulties which 
did seem almost insuperable at the time were eventually able to be 
overcome to take the model to the next state, may in itself suggest 
that a basic tlieory of neural integration is insufficient in itself 
to explain brain function. Perhaps the full understanding of brain 
function will arise only when one can see, not only the underlying 
mode of conmiunication between elements of the system, but also the 
manner in which tlie déficiences of the system have been overcome.
The theory presented here is by no means the only contender for the 
role of explaining the basic mode of communication between the ele­
ments of the system. In the present case, the general characteristics 
of tlie model, with its troubles with excitation levels, inhibition 
levels and disconcerting variablility, may make one perhaps be more 
drawn to the more computational approaches to a solution of brain 
function. It is natural to seek for the remedy of the deficiencies 
of one model in the strengths of another. Memory and thinking seem 
in some way too precise to be mediated by the kind of syscem depicted 
in the mode 1.
In comparison the hierarchical and iterative network models may seem 
to offer a more powerful approach. It must, however, be remembered 
that much of the definiteness of the models of such systems is due to 
their representation in formal units from which the physiological 
properties of the living units have been extracted. Moreover, the 
formal network and hierarchical models have other, and perhaps more 
fundamental, weaknesses as explanations of brain function.
When confronted with these difficulties one is perhaps tempted to fall 
back upon the idea that there is some secret the discovery of which 
would make everything clear.
Whilst this idea is attractive, and undoubtedly has some truth, since 
every step forward in research probably brings a solution nearer, the 
experience of the present project supports a rather different approach.
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The impression tliat we must look for some magic answer may be mistaken. 
As Oatley (19 78) has argued, it may be the emergent properties rather 
than tlie immediately obvious properties of a system which display the 
exceptional capacities seen in tlie higher animals and Man. The pre­
sent project may be seen as an attempt to discover some of the compli­
cations and some of the possible solutions, which display the properties 
of a system.
The theory, as developed in tlie simulations, showed aberrations and 
problems which make it difficult to envisage as the mediator of the 
instrument of higher mathematics, and highly skilled manipulation of 
the world. It remains possible that the evolutionary refinement of the 
system may have brought it to a level of efficiency far beyond that 
achieved in the simulations. Simple rhythmic mechanisms were able to 
achieve very great improvements of performance. With improved per­
formance , the problem of applying the system to solve behavioural and 
psychological problems becomes simpler. The brain has had a very 
long period of evolutionary time to develop these solutions.
The approach has been taken that any theory of neural integration which 
is too efficient in computation fails as an explanation of brain 
function for that very reason. The resulting computational mechanism 
would be too clever to account for the slow progress and development 
of animal intelligence. Within the limitations of the simulations, and 
the stage reached, they have confirmed the predictions of the theory. 
However, those predictions have only been able to be confirmed by add­
ing subsidiary hypotheses, e.g. rhythmic gates. The mechanisms simu­
lated may be quite different from those actually occurring in nervous 
systems, but they accord in a general sense with the known data and 
possess a life-like character. In a general sense, therefore, the 
simulations confirm the explanatory power of the theory. It must be 
considered a contender amongst the theories which at the moment repre­
sent our insights into brain function.
VII Simulation as a tool of theory building
The models presented in this thesis may be considered to have raised 
more questions than they have answered. Does excitation build up 
in the nervous system? Is it necessary to hold up sensory inputs
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before the results of neural processing can be discerned? Does the 
system possess the capacity to develop a "secondary tissue response" 
from which it can test its expectancies? Is behaviour organised 
with reference to sets of genetically determined innately recognised 
patterns of neural excitation?
These questions are not, of course, the original product of the model. 
The last question, for example, has been asked by the ethologists for 
a nun±)er of years. What the models do is to put these questions into 
a unique concrete form which is only possible in a simulation.
It is clear that a computer simulations can never confirm that the 
mcinner in which it achieves its performance is similar to, or even 
analogous to, the manner in which its subject matter, in this case, 
the nervous system, accomplishes similar ends. What a computer simu­
lation can do is to prove that a model can operate in the manner 
claimed for it. Perhaps it can do slightly more than this. It can 
show that certain objections which may have been brought against 
the tlieory can be overcome.
It has been customary to use the computer in the neurological field 
for formal demonstration. The simulations in this thesis serve that 
purpose by exhibiting what the basic postulates of the theory can and 
cannot mediate. However, in the present project, the use of the com­
puter was not restricted to formal demonstration. It was used as a 
tool of theory building. Ideas were tried out and adapted to the 
system until their performance was improved.
Of course, it is not suggested that the use of the computer as a tool 
of theory building originates in the present effort. Every simulation 
research necessarily involves some adaptation and struggle with the 
system. In most computer demonstrations this work is not presented, and 
it is the result alone which is regarded as important. That approach 
is partly determined by the formal logical structure of many simulations.
In the simulations reported here, especially in those developed later 
in the work, there is a change of emphasis. The work is no longer of 
a formal nature. The rationale of such work may need some clarification.
If a computer simulation is immediately successful in that the system 
performs entirely according to the verbal predictions made for it, the 
situation is clear. The position is more complex if the simulation is
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only partly successful: if the system acts according to prediction 
in some senses, but shows difficulties. The failure does not prove 
that the tlieory underlying the simulation was not capable of ful­
filling its predictions, only that tliere are complications. But 
complications are part of the nature of the world.
The failure of a simulation may be due to an number of causes. The 
one relevant to the present project is where the original formulation 
has failed to take into account some unforeseen complication. The 
computer simulation serves to expose this weakness. In a logical 
sense, one can then go back and prepare a new theory in which the com­
plication is avoided. To some extent, this is indeed patching up a 
theory to make it fit the facts. On the other hand, that may be 
exactly what is required when one is trying to represent a subject 
matter which has been subject to such patching up by evolution. This 
kind of approach to simulation may therefore be especially apposite 
to an attempt to apply an explanatory principle to the simulation of 
a complex system like the brain, so many aspects of which are not 
well understood.
In such circumstances, when difficulties are encountered, the model 
may suggest a solution. The resulting simulation can no longer be 
pointed to as an elegant demonstration of the logical implications 
of a formal theory. However, it may now perform a rather different, 
and it is suggested, an equally useful function. It serves as a 
generator of a new theory about the complex system. The new theory 
has the advantage of posing rather pointed empirical questions.
In this light, the extension of the simulation to try to model a more 
comprehensive and realistic nervous system is not to be seen as 
attempting to provide anwers but rather to generate questions. The 
resulting models are not to be considered as proposing a unique 
answer, but rather as approximations which may be refined and modi­
fied as more information and better understanding becomes available.
In this sense, the computer becomes a companion to thought processes, 
just as pencil and paper have been to former generations.
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VIII Final remarks
Since the student is required to state his claims clearly, the follow­
ing points are made:
(1) A tlieory of neural integration has been presented and its implica­
tions examined. In view of the vast historical background of the 
subject, it is difficult to claim of any neurological theory that it 
is original. Nevertheless in the form in which it has been presented 
and developed, the theory may be claimed to be original in a sense 
comparable to those in tlie literature.
Compatible with restricting the thesis to a reasonable length, the data 
available from con temporary research in psychology and neurology has 
been examined in relation to the plausibility of the theory, and to a 
limited extent, of rival theories.
(2) A computer simulation demonstrating the immediate implications of 
the theory as an explanation of neural integration has been undertaken. 
This simulation is comparable to other simulations of neurological 
models which have been presented in the literature.
(3) An attempt has been made to apply computer simulation to build 
models of mechanisms which may enable brain models to approach more 
closely to a realistic representation of brain function. In doing so
a nuiiher of problems implicit in the original theory have been exposed. 
Solutions have been found, and questions raised as to what extent those 
problems reflect actual problems and solutions of neural integration.
(4) The theoretical model was applied to the explanation of the Spiral 
illusion. New facts were predicted and confirmed.
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Appendix A
Monitor Printout of a computer run 
from an extended version of 
the model 
ON MIGROPIGHE
I General
This microfiche is presented as an authentication that the 
work described in the thesis has actually been carried out. It 
does not form part of the presentation of the model and need not 
be referred to except for purposes of authentication.
II General layout of Fiche
A. Fortran Listing of program
with FTN R3 Maps Fiche 1
Fiche 2 (part).
B. Update Listing Fiche 2 (part).
G. Monitor printouts during run Fiche 2 (part).
Fiche 3,4 & 5»
III Printout at each cycle of program
Each main cycle of the program representing an Instant 
consisted of two sub-cycles. The printout for each sub-cycle begins 
with a statement of the Instant No., the position of the notional 
organism in the Environmental Maze, the Trial No. and the Input 
Pattern No.
TIME 406.012 
INSTAMT NO 620 
MAZE: 37 9 43 3TP0S: 4 AlOfK,, 4 .TklAl N". 10
MAZE: 0 37 37 37P0S: 4 AlONv. 4 'JP.TklAl r*i. 10
I MOVE 3JM0VE 1
PRESENT POSIT ION:ACROSS: 4 UP: 4
IFACE- 1
m  . 13 _  PATTjtmiiû hl  __________ __  _ ___________
A large number of variables are printed out which need not 
concern the reader. In particular, at each programming sub-unit to 
process a particular Neuronal Array, some key variables relating to 
tht Array are reported. These are headed Unit 1, Part 1, etc.
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These Units are related to the Neuronal Arrays of tlie model as 
follows;
Sub-cortical
Cortical
Sensory Units 1 and 2
Motor Consummatory Unit 3, Part 1
Instrumental Unit 3, Part 2
Preconsummatory Unit 4, Part 1
Protective Unit 4, Part 2
Motivational Units 3 and 4,
♦Groups 1 and 6.
Sensory Projection 1 Units 5 and 6
Projection 2 Units 9 and 10
Motor Consummatoiy Unit 7, Part 1
Instrumental Unit 7. Part 2
Preconsummatory
Protective
Unit 8, Part 1 
Unit 8, Part 2
Motivational Units 7 and 8,
♦Groups 1 and 6
the computer program approximated to a Neuronal Pool
As illustrated below, variables reported upon includerALSVBL- 
the feed-back criterion for Excitation control; AVEN — the mean of 
Excitation Counts; DIFFAV — the Diffuse Volley Value; AVRIB - the 
mean of Inhibition Counts; DINHIB — the diffuse Inhibition increment; 
and a number of adjusting variables associated with these functions.
ALEVEL AVEN D IF F AV ADDI FF SLO.sS A VR I B
U N I T  1 PART 1 8 8 0 . 0 0 lOtt.32 1 3 0 0 . 0 0 2 0 0 . 0 0 1 4 0 0 . 0 0 1 7 7 . 7 3 201
I C A L I N 0 IX 4 12 4
U N I T  1 PART 2 8 8 0 . 0 0 9 8 4 . 0 9 1000.00 2 0 0 . 0 0 1 4 0 0 . 0 0 . 10 l t>3
I C A L I N 0 I X 4 12 3
U N I T  2 PART 1 8 8 0 . 0 0 9 4 b . 88 9 0 0 . 0 0 2 0 0 . 0 0 1 4 0 0 . 0 0 t b .  16 193
I C A L I N 0 I X 4 12 3
• 1 T  1 1 U S A  Art A  A 1 Ji'.A Art . - KWk k } 1
Response Diagnosis: Under Unit 6, Part 2, are reported the states of 
a number of counting variables. These indicate the notional location 
of signal volleys in delayed pathways. They enable the state of the 
motor system to be assessed and the cause of emission of any motor 
response to be diagnosed. The relevant printout begins DIAG.
2 0 0 .00 1000.00 .10 10 
3. 0. 0.
UNIT 6 PART 2 8:0.00 154.03 1000. )0
AfF 6 2 0 2 1832.00 600.00 1000.00
ORSP 2. 33. 33. 33.0D0MR 0. ffM03 IBSET
DIAG BW 872 2 0 1 1 0 533 6 2 13
ICALIN 1 IX 8 IZ 0
16
State of Integrating Neurons. Once during every computer run, sample 
portions of the computer arrays representing Neuronal Arrays were 
printed out (middle of Fiche 2). Each row reports the variables in 
each Integrating Neuron: Constellation Label, Excitation Count, 
Linking Control Constant, Linking Control Variable, Threshold,
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Inhibition Count, Ouput address, if any. Afferent Input. The 
printout of these samples from Neuronal Arrays may be identified 
from Figure A.1.
Constellation report. At each cycle a table was printed out similar 
to that described in Chapter 8 in respect of the initial set of 
simulations. The table was composed by sorting the Excitation 
Counts of all the Integrating Neurons in the system in relation 
to the Constellation Label of the Neuronsto which they belonged.
Each row of the table represents the state, at the time of printout, 
of the Linked Constellation formed at the Instant shown in the first 
column of the table. The remaining columns show: (2) the aggregate of 
Excitation Counts of the Integrating Neurons belonging to that 
Constellation; (3) the number of Integrating Neurons remaining in
that Constellation; (4) the mean Excitation Count. See below:
246 1.03 1.03 247.18 509 59b90. 71
247 854.89 3. 14 272.08 510 84921.58
248 911.92 4. 14 220.16 511 92370.45
249 656.57 2.14 306.52 512 211158.23
250 5900.93 16. 14 365.56 513 153954.89
251 9419.95 25. 14 374.67 514 55799.33
252 1719.99 5. 14 334.50 515 55812.36
253 1009.99 3. 14 321.45 516 61005.68
254 593.67 1.14 582.63 517 44868.88
255 5790.02 9. 14 633. 34 518 49952.82
256 3992.25 7.14 558.98 519 S7389.55
257 867.30 2.14 404.90 520 38315.17
258 1966.20 6. 14 320.12 521 100946.49
259 1.03 1.03 488.03 522 54469.71
260 3428.12 5. 14 666.69 523 37935.28
261 5534.14 8 . 14 679.70 524 39622.32
262 609.10 1.14 538.00 525 30884.68
26 3 414.67 1. 14 450.36 526 8809.30
DISCHARGE MATRIX FOR INSTANT
...... A  • A  A  A O A I l  • *  • -
NO 526
•* "
Discharge Ifetrix. At each cycle a table was printed out showing
the aggregate of Spikes emitted by Neuron within each Neuronal Pool 
of the model. These were equal to the Spike Frequencies of the 
respective Efferent Fibres:
I. i I ' j £
STANT NO 624
.0 0.0 0.0
. 1 6140.3 7088.9
.0 6432.7 1963.2
.2 4928.6 0.0
.0 6. 1 .0
.0 1922.4 . 1
.5 0.0
.0 0.0 .0
.0 0.0 0.0
.4 27106.9 24600.4
.5 24523.5 27088.5
. 3 25253.8 97. 1
.0 0.0 0.0
.0 0.0 0.0
.5 366.5 366.5
.0 3.8 0.0
.0 0.0 0.0
.0 18567.3 15668.4
.0 17285.7 19865.2
.0 
.0 
.0 
0 . 0  
1195.2 
0.0 
0.0 
9. 1 
4.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0  
0.0 
0.0
0 1^ I î«t t . 81 /V . 13 180 ,. SB
0.0 2506.7 1502.4 8279.6 UNIT 1 SEC 1
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 UNIT 1 SEC 2
0.0 1280.5 0.0 0.0 UNIT 2 SEC 1
2020.6 0,0 0.0 2020.5 UNIT 2 SEC 2
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 UNIT 3 SEC 1
. 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 UNIT 3 SEC 2
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 UNIT 4 SEC 1
.0 .0 .0 .0 UNIT 4 SEC 2
0.0 19580.4 19575.4 19291.3 UNIT 5 SEC 1
176.6 0.0 373.9 103.0 UNIT 5 SEC 2
71.4 23694.7 18.0 88 1 UNIT 6 SEC !
23467. 3 5.4 96.0 246 35.4 UNIT 6 SEC 2
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 UNIT 7 SEC 1
19. 3 1884.2 0.0 0.0 UNIT 7 SEC 2
699.2 366.5 ?66.5 366.5 UNIT 8 SEC 1
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 UNIT 8 SEC 2
0.0 17659.2 17908.5 18299.4 UNIT 9 SEC 1
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 UNIT 9 SEC 2
0.0 15542.3 0.0 0.0 UNIT 10 SEC I
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Control Centre (Thalamus). At each cycle the notional Active 
state or Inactive state of each Fibre leaving the Control 
Centre for a Neuronal Pool in one or other of the Neuronal 
Arrays was reported in the following matrix.
nwuin
AM
AM
.'iM
AM
AM
AM
AM
I ru
IWJ.UO IKCT5 7 1 / a -- “ -■
0 0 BM 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 AM 0 0 0 0 1 0 I I 1 0
0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 AM 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
0 I AM 0 1 0 I 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 AM 0 0 0 I 0 0 I 1 0 1
0 0 AM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 AM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 AM 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 I AM 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 I 0 1
0 0 AM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 AM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IV Summary reports.
At the end of each 15 Instants of the run, a summary report was 
output. (Figure A.2). The chief rows indicate at each successive 
half-cycle the occurrence of key Active Volleys. The key to the 
respective rows is : LL PATTERN - Input Pattern to Subcortical 
Sensory Array; UPP PATT - Input Pattern to delayed projection 
Cortical Sensory Array; POSITION - location in maze; IITSTRUI-IENT - 
Identifying number of Neuronal Pool in Cortical Instrumental Array 
to which an Active Volley was sent. CONSUîïïi.- ditto in respect of 
Consummatory Array. PRECONSUM - ditto in respect of Preconsummatory 
Array; NOT DO - ditto in respect of Instrumental Suppression Array; 
NOTPREC - ditto in respect of Preconsummatory Suppression Array;
NOT CONS - ditto in respect of Consummatory Suppression Array; 
STANDSTILL - transmission of Active Volley to Standstill response 
Àeuronal Pool. IREL - a counting control variable. ICE - the 
state of the Motor Release Mechanism; LEARNED PREC RESP. etc. The 
Anticipatory Response Indication detected in each of the Motor 
Cortical Arrays indicated.
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Appendix B
Monitor Printout of a computer run 
illustrating the separate 
simulations investigating 
mediation of Linleed Constellations by orthodox 
synaptic connections.
I. General
As in the case of the Microfiche presented in Appendix 
A, the Microfiche presented here is intended only to authenticate 
that the work described in the thesis was actually carried out.
The monitor printout for the simulations investigating the 
mediation of Linked Constellations by orthodox synapses was much 
simpler tlian tliat for the main simulations.
II General layout
A. Fortran Listing of program
B. Monitor printouts.
III Main output at each sub-cycle.
In these programs in order to improve the fineness of the
grain of iterative representation of the physiology of the model 
each Instant consisted of up)wards of ten subcycles of the main 
loop of the program. At each sub-cycle the main printout consists 
of a matrix (illustrate in Figures 16.1 and 16.2) reporting the
r:N,-
.P'P Splices emitted by sample neurons in each Neuronal Pool of the
model. The effects of the processing of Excitation and Inhibition 
f ■ ■ variables may be followed by considering these output tables at 
fpi. successive sub-cycles of successive Instants.
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Further Monitor Printouts from vazdous
77,-' programs discussed in the text
P '■ '' I. General
[‘ ' The microfiche included in this Aruxmdix are taken from seven
different experimental runs. The fgeneral l?\you fc and information 
furnished in tiie microfiche is as d' scribed in Api/endix A. In 
addition to Monitor Printouts re hi tin/- to the runs re-aorted in
i
Tables in the text, further nrintout -. irc included wliicn conhain 
,■ programr.dng code relating to mechanisms discus;-ed more infonua.lly
in the thesis.
' - II List of sets of microfiche and contents
'i: ' :
i/i- 01 Monitoring part of the experimental run shown in Table 14.1,
f ■ p.320, This run showed increased frequency of a reinforced
■ c - Response. The Sub-Cortical emission œchanism was a varaety
’ ? ■ :
vlpf of Ma tu rational Linlœd Constellation, the code for which is
r'- ' set out in microfiche 06 below. (See p.SO?),
I'M
;> 02 Monitoring part of tlie experimental run ÏÏACT01H referred to
' K '  .'
? hcvf in Table 14.4, representing discrimination learning and
5 7 : /
utilising a * time since last emission* Sub-Cortical Motor 
Release Mechanism. (See p, 296 and p.32l)
03 Monitoring part of the experimental run UACT0G1 referred to 
in Table 14.4» p.321
:
fq '-K' ,'T
i; ",:s ; G4 Monitoring part of the experimental run UACTOTA shown in 
-
‘I Table 14.7 , p.339. This run included the Motivational
Mechanisms discussed in Section IV of Chapter 12 (jv\ge 284) 
■nd further discussed at page 323 and 337.
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05 Part of the experimental run shown in Table 14.6, 
page 335. The program was similar to tliat of the run 
to which 04 relates, except that in this run the model 
acted under the influence of two different Motivational 
conditions, notional Hunger and Thirst, either acting 
at the same time or at different times (see page 334).
06 A Fortran Source Program and related monitor printout of 
a run, in which the routines for a number of mechanisms 
experimented with earlier are still present in some 
form. The program includes Fortran code for a version
of Response initiation by 1-Iaturational Linked Constellations 
(page 302), and for Protective Responses Bump and Hurt 
(page 259), for lateral and recurrent Inhibition (page 
139).
07 A Fortran Source Program and related monitor printout of 
a version of the model run recently during the proposed 
further developments in the model discussed in Section III, 
Chapter 17 (page 590). The program provided for the
* labelling* of Linlced Constellations with a marker 
indicating their temporal association with a Preconsummatory 
Resj,)0iise and i/d.th a TOTS test of the Anticipatory 
Preconsummatory Response as the criterion of the positive 
(notLoml) Consolidation of the marker. This is the program 
which always produced a * confirmation* regardless of validity 
(see page 395), the remedy of which is discussed in 
imjiiediately following pages.
